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Chapter one uses vignettes to illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work. I claim that... more Chapter one uses vignettes to illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work. I claim that the full exercise of the virtue of courage, what I call paradigmatic courageous activity, is exhibited only when a courageous action is performed with a courageous manner for an appropriate reason. Chapter two engages and criticizes rival accounts of courage that reduce the virtue of courage to good dispositions regarding some but not all of the excellences of courage identified above. For example, I discuss views on which paradigmatic courageous activity involves, on the one hand, overcoming one’s emotions by means of will-power and, on the other, emotionlessness. Chapter three employs an account of emotion to argue that a courageous manner of acting requires the contributions of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring. Fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. Each emotion principally assists at a stage of courageous activity. An advantage of my view is that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value to some, and fearless daring, a common view of courage, and how the transition from fear to fearless daring is both good and accomplished without suppressing fear by means of will-power. Chapter four lays the groundwork for defending the counterintuitive claim that courageous activity requires pleasure. This groundwork consists in a general account of pleasure, an account of courageous action, and a defense of my way of distinguishing naturally virtuous agents from continent agents on the basis of the distinction I made above between a reason for action and a manner of action. I further defend the difference between naturally virtuous and continent agents on the basis of their experiencing different kinds of pleasure in the choice of their actions. I apply these accounts to defend the surprising claim that courageous activity requires at least two kinds of pleasure: the pleasure of the naturally virtuous and the pleasure of the continent. Chapter five develops the claim of chapter four that courage requires two kinds of pleasure and evaluates other candidate pleasures that may be required for courageous activity. While I identify an additional pleasure that is characteristically present, I argue that no other pleasure is required.Ph.D
Religions, 2021
St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE... more St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE).” This essay employs the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and the recent philosophical work of Daniel Johnson (2020) on this command to investigate a series of questions that the command raises. What is glory? How does one properly act for glory and for the glory of another? How is it possible to do everything for the glory of God? I begin with Aquinas’ account of glory and the pursuit of glory for God’s glory and Aquinas’s answers to some of the above questions that can be drawn from his discussion in De Malo. I defend Aquinas against criticisms from Daniel Johnson and present his own interpretation of the command. I advance the discussion through adding two additional interpretations that do not rely on a controversial assumption Johnson makes. Next, I address the puzzle of how we can intend everything for the glory of God using Aquinas’s three-fold account of intention. Finally, I discuss...
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2017
Religious Studies, 2014
Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy to account for a significant source o... more Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining ofdesires of the heart. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering is benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfilment of her heart's desires. We summarize Stump's arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump's account of how such suffering is defeated and offer solutions to each. We defend and strengthen Stump's response to the hardest cases for her view, and explain what her view demands of God.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2012
Res Philosophica (Virtue and the Emotions Special Issue), Volume 92, No. 4, October 2015. An app... more Res Philosophica (Virtue and the Emotions Special Issue), Volume 92, No. 4, October 2015.
An apparent paradox concerning courageous activity is that it seems to require both fear and fearlessness – on the one hand, mastering one’s fear, and, on the other, eliminating fear. I resolve the paradox by isolating three phases of courageous activity: the initial response to the situation, the choice of courageous action, and the execution of courageous action. I argue that there is an emotion that is proper to each of these phases and that each emotion positively contributes to the performance of courageous activity in each of its phases. More specifically, I argue that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for complete courageous activity. My model of courageous activity explains why courage is a virtue that requires excellent emotion dispositions and resolves the paradox concerning the apparent need for both fear and fearlessness. Fear is required in the first phase and fearless daring in the third phase of courageous activity.
Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas’s theodicy to account for a significant source of hu... more Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas’s theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining of desires of the heart. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering are benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfillment of her heart’s desires. We summarize Stump’s arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump’s account of how such suffering is defeated and offer solutions to each. We defend and strengthen Stump’s response to the hardest cases for her view, and explain what her view demands of God.
This is a reference article for Oxford Bibliographies Online co-authored with Trent Dougherty.
Robert Roberts and Jay Wood criticize St Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between intellectual and mor... more Robert Roberts and Jay Wood criticize St Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. They offer three objections to this distinction. They object that intellectual virtues depend on the will in ways that undermine the distinction, that the subject of intellectual virtues is not an intellectual faculty but a whole person, and that some intellectual virtues require that the will act intellectually. They hold that each of these is sufficient to undermine the distinction. I defend Aquinas’ distinction and respond to each of their objections. I then briefly motivate why this is a distinction worth keeping.
Chapter one uses vignettes to illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work. I claim that... more Chapter one uses vignettes to illustrate a set of distinctions central to this work. I claim that the full exercise of the virtue of courage, what I call paradigmatic courageous activity, is exhibited only when a courageous action is performed with a courageous manner for an appropriate reason. Chapter two engages and criticizes rival accounts of courage that reduce the virtue of courage to good dispositions regarding some but not all of the excellences of courage identified above. For example, I discuss views on which paradigmatic courageous activity involves, on the one hand, overcoming one’s emotions by means of will-power and, on the other, emotionlessness. Chapter three employs an account of emotion to argue that a courageous manner of acting requires the contributions of the emotions of fear, hope, and daring. Fear is necessary for properly responding to a significant threat, hope is necessary for properly pursuing a significant but obstacle-laden goal, and daring is necessary for properly confronting the significant threat as a means to attaining the significant goal. Each emotion principally assists at a stage of courageous activity. An advantage of my view is that it can account for how courageous activity requires both fear, an emotion of suspect value to some, and fearless daring, a common view of courage, and how the transition from fear to fearless daring is both good and accomplished without suppressing fear by means of will-power. Chapter four lays the groundwork for defending the counterintuitive claim that courageous activity requires pleasure. This groundwork consists in a general account of pleasure, an account of courageous action, and a defense of my way of distinguishing naturally virtuous agents from continent agents on the basis of the distinction I made above between a reason for action and a manner of action. I further defend the difference between naturally virtuous and continent agents on the basis of their experiencing different kinds of pleasure in the choice of their actions. I apply these accounts to defend the surprising claim that courageous activity requires at least two kinds of pleasure: the pleasure of the naturally virtuous and the pleasure of the continent. Chapter five develops the claim of chapter four that courage requires two kinds of pleasure and evaluates other candidate pleasures that may be required for courageous activity. While I identify an additional pleasure that is characteristically present, I argue that no other pleasure is required.Ph.D
Religions, 2021
St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE... more St. Paul writes, “whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God (1 Corinthians 10: 31 NABRE).” This essay employs the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and the recent philosophical work of Daniel Johnson (2020) on this command to investigate a series of questions that the command raises. What is glory? How does one properly act for glory and for the glory of another? How is it possible to do everything for the glory of God? I begin with Aquinas’ account of glory and the pursuit of glory for God’s glory and Aquinas’s answers to some of the above questions that can be drawn from his discussion in De Malo. I defend Aquinas against criticisms from Daniel Johnson and present his own interpretation of the command. I advance the discussion through adding two additional interpretations that do not rely on a controversial assumption Johnson makes. Next, I address the puzzle of how we can intend everything for the glory of God using Aquinas’s three-fold account of intention. Finally, I discuss...
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 2018
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2017
Religious Studies, 2014
Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy to account for a significant source o... more Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas's theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining ofdesires of the heart. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering is benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfilment of her heart's desires. We summarize Stump's arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump's account of how such suffering is defeated and offer solutions to each. We defend and strengthen Stump's response to the hardest cases for her view, and explain what her view demands of God.
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 2012
Res Philosophica (Virtue and the Emotions Special Issue), Volume 92, No. 4, October 2015. An app... more Res Philosophica (Virtue and the Emotions Special Issue), Volume 92, No. 4, October 2015.
An apparent paradox concerning courageous activity is that it seems to require both fear and fearlessness – on the one hand, mastering one’s fear, and, on the other, eliminating fear. I resolve the paradox by isolating three phases of courageous activity: the initial response to the situation, the choice of courageous action, and the execution of courageous action. I argue that there is an emotion that is proper to each of these phases and that each emotion positively contributes to the performance of courageous activity in each of its phases. More specifically, I argue that fear, hope, and daring are necessary for complete courageous activity. My model of courageous activity explains why courage is a virtue that requires excellent emotion dispositions and resolves the paradox concerning the apparent need for both fear and fearlessness. Fear is required in the first phase and fearless daring in the third phase of courageous activity.
Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas’s theodicy to account for a significant source of hu... more Eleonore Stump insightfully develops Aquinas’s theodicy to account for a significant source of human suffering, namely the undermining of desires of the heart. Stump argues that what justifies God in allowing such suffering are benefits made available to the sufferer through her suffering that can defeat the suffering by contributing to the fulfillment of her heart’s desires. We summarize Stump’s arguments for why such suffering requires defeat and how it is defeated. We identify three problems with Stump’s account of how such suffering is defeated and offer solutions to each. We defend and strengthen Stump’s response to the hardest cases for her view, and explain what her view demands of God.
This is a reference article for Oxford Bibliographies Online co-authored with Trent Dougherty.
Robert Roberts and Jay Wood criticize St Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between intellectual and mor... more Robert Roberts and Jay Wood criticize St Thomas Aquinas’ distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. They offer three objections to this distinction. They object that intellectual virtues depend on the will in ways that undermine the distinction, that the subject of intellectual virtues is not an intellectual faculty but a whole person, and that some intellectual virtues require that the will act intellectually. They hold that each of these is sufficient to undermine the distinction. I defend Aquinas’ distinction and respond to each of their objections. I then briefly motivate why this is a distinction worth keeping.