Sergio F Martínez Muñoz | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (original) (raw)
Papers by Sergio F Martínez Muñoz
Andamios: Revista de investigación social, 2024
Aunque algunas teorías del razonamiento reconocen su dimensión social, mantienen un individualism... more Aunque algunas teorías del razonamiento reconocen
su dimensión social, mantienen un individualismo cognitivo que
limita la integración de preguntas sobre qué es el razonamiento y
su origen evolutivo. La teoría interaccionista de Mercier y Sperber
destaca la necesidad de una explicación evolutiva para comprender
el razonamiento, pero su subyacente individualismo cognitivo no
explica la importancia de la estructura narrativa. Sostenemos que
las limitaciones de teorías que asumen un individualismo cognitivo
provienen del modelo adaptacionista de la evolución que trata la
cognición como una capacidad individual. A través de un modelo
evolutivo que considera los nichos de desarrollo como la unidad
de evolución (bio-social), caracterizamos el razonamiento principalmente
como un logro social, desarrollándose mediante (proto)
narrativas que siguen normas implícitas en prácticas.
Even though some theories of reasoning recognize the importance of accounting for its social dime... more Even though some theories of reasoning recognize the importance of accounting for its social dimensions, they have problems integrating its evolutionary past. Mercier and Sperber, for instance, have argued for the need to incorporate an evolutionary account of cognition into a theory of reasoning. Still, the underlying cognitive individualism in their theory seriously impairs incorporating the narrative structure of reasoning. We claim that the source of the problem is an underlying adaptationist model of evolution. We suggest that an evolutionary model that takes developmental niches as its main evolutionary unit provides a better way of understanding reasoning. Such an account views reasoning as a bio-social achievement, mainly structured in (proto)narratives answering to norms implicit in practices.
Cognición Social y Artefactualidad en el Razonamiento, 2023
In usual models of social cognition the constitutive character of social interactions tend to be... more In usual models of social cognition the constitutive character of social interactions tend to be seen as the product of aggregation of individual minds. Here we claim that (an important kind of ) social cognition has to be understood as embodied in norms and patterns of behavior (habits) arising from the coordination of behavior afforded by entrainment processes which start with haptic perception early in life (from an phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspective).
Reflections on Naturalism, 2013
Broadly speaking, naturalism refers to views that consider philosophical method to be continuous ... more Broadly speaking, naturalism refers to views that consider philosophical method to be continuous with the methods of science, implying that at least some scientific methods have an impact on whatever philosophy can say about the norms of inquiry. When naturalism is used as a model for epistemology one talks of naturalized epistemology. Similarly, naturalized philosophy of science indicates a philosophy of science that is continuous with science. How to understand such continuity is a major source of controversy in epistemology and the philosophy of science.
Philosophy of Science, 1991
Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule require... more Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Lüders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual state which is not standard.
Philosophical Psychology, 2013
Synthese, 1990
An interpretation of quantum mechanics that rejects hidden variables has to say something about t... more An interpretation of quantum mechanics that rejects hidden variables has to say something about the way measurement can be understood as a transformation on states of individual systems, and that leads to the core of the interpretive problems posed by Luders' projection rule: What, if any, is its physical content? In this paper I explore one suggestion which is implicit in usual interpretations of the rule and show that this view does not stand on solid ground. In the process, important aspects of the role played by the projection postulate in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics will be clarified. It will be shown in particular that serious objections can be raised against the (often implicit) view that identifies the physical relation of compatibility preserved by Luders' rule with the relation of simultaneous measurability.
SIGNO, 2023
What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n... more What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n a n d o M a r t í n e z M u ñ o z
SIGNO
What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n... more What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n a n d o M a r t í n e z M u ñ o z
Place, Space and Hermeneutics, 2017
We argue that the understanding of space, as an extended, simultaneous totality, although useful ... more We argue that the understanding of space, as an extended, simultaneous totality, although useful in some scientific contexts, is not true to our embodied experiences of space. It is an abstraction, involving a de-temporalization of space that falsifies our experience. From the phenomenological-enactivist perspective, space is not already there, neutrally constituted in its objective extension; rather, it is enacted, put in place relative to action affordances that are both corporeal and intercorporeal. Moreover, these action affordances are permeated by an intrinsic temporality, so that the experience of space is fully temporal because it is fully embodied. Space, as the experienced phenomenon of a delimited embodied enactment, is also hermeneutically situated so that meaning emerges for the embodied agent just because of its dynamical relations to a set of physical and social affordances.
Perspectives on Science
In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being desc... more In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being described as the omission of a target’s features when it is represented. This approach to abstraction sidesteps cognitive aspects of abstraction processes. However, cognitive aspects of abstraction are important in understanding the role of historically grounded epistemic criteria supporting modeling in science. Drawing on recent work on the relation between metaphor and abstraction, we introduce the concept of paths of abstraction, and use historical and contemporary examples to point to their role in guiding the development of relevance criteria which support modeling strategies in science.
Scientific Inquiry, From Metaphors to Abstraction, 2023
In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being desc... more In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being described as the omission of a target’s features when it is represented. This approach to abstraction sidesteps cognitive aspects of abstraction processes. However, cognitive aspects of abstraction are important in understanding the role of historically grounded epistemic criteria supporting modeling in science. Drawing on recent work on the relation between metaphor and abstraction, we introduce the concept of paths of abstraction, and use historical and contemporary examples to point to their role in guiding the development of relevance criteria which support modeling strategies in science.
Revista M, 2012
632 "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" y tiene por objetivo compartir y debatir sobre investigaci... more 632 "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" y tiene por objetivo compartir y debatir sobre investigación en arquitectura. Es una publicación científica con periodicidad semestral, en formato papel y digital, que publica trabajos originales que no hayan sido publicados anteriormente en otras revistas. Queda establecido el sistema de arbitraje para la selección de artículos a publicar mediante dos revisores externos-sistema doble ciego-siguiendo los protocolos habituales para publicaciones científicas seriadas. Los títulos, resúmenes y palabras clave de los artículos se publican también en lengua inglesa. "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" presenta una estructura clara, sencilla y flexible. Trata todos los temas relacionados con la teoría y la práctica del proyecto arquitectónico. Las distintas "temáticas abiertas" que componen nuestra línea editorial, son las fuentes para la conjunción de investigaciones diversas. La revista va dirigida a arquitectos, estudiantes, investigadores y profesionales relacionados con el proyecto y la realización de la obra de arquitectura.
RESUMEN: Una rendencia imporranre en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociol... more RESUMEN: Una rendencia imporranre en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociología del conocimiento la manera de entender la naruraleza del cono-cimiento cienrífico. Esra rendencia parre de una crírica al "cognirivismo" individua-lisra, asociado con una concepción rradicional del conocimienro y defiende una posi-ción consensualisra según la cual el conocimiento es la búsqueda de consenso. El obje-rivo del rrabajo es mosrrar que los consensualisras asumen una falsa dicotomía. Con-rrario a lo que los consensualisras asumen la cognición puede enrenderse a la vez como un logro social y como el resulrado del ejercicio de capacidades individuales. Con-cluyo haciendo ver algunas consecuencias del abandono de esa dicotomía para enrender el papel de la autoridad en la educación. Descriprores: autoridad y conocimiento, cognirivismo vrs consensualismo, cognición social y educación. ABSTRACT: An importarzt trend in contemporary phi/osophy of education folfows a view...
Crítica (México D. F. En línea), 1990
A central metaphysical thesis of modern science has been the idea that the structure of a physica... more A central metaphysical thesis of modern science has been the idea that the structure of a physical system can be explained in terms of the properties of its constitutive subsystems. I call this presupposition the Newtonian merological presupposition. After some brief introductory remarks on the role of this presupposition in the methodology of modern physics, and after mentioning some recent challenges to it, I focus my attention on quantum systems. Quantum mechanics is the only highly confirmed theory in which the Newtonian merological presupposition is denied. I argue that the presence of a non-Newtonian (holistic) merological structure is the result of the existence of two different types of properties, and in particular of the existence of genuinely dispositional properties. Genuinely dispositional properties are properties of a system which are not reducible to occurrent properties of the subsystems. This distinction between two different types of properties can be made precise...
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
During the 19thcentury, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity,... more During the 19thcentury, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.
Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA, 1991
En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.
Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA, 1989
En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.
Andamios: Revista de investigación social, 2024
Aunque algunas teorías del razonamiento reconocen su dimensión social, mantienen un individualism... more Aunque algunas teorías del razonamiento reconocen
su dimensión social, mantienen un individualismo cognitivo que
limita la integración de preguntas sobre qué es el razonamiento y
su origen evolutivo. La teoría interaccionista de Mercier y Sperber
destaca la necesidad de una explicación evolutiva para comprender
el razonamiento, pero su subyacente individualismo cognitivo no
explica la importancia de la estructura narrativa. Sostenemos que
las limitaciones de teorías que asumen un individualismo cognitivo
provienen del modelo adaptacionista de la evolución que trata la
cognición como una capacidad individual. A través de un modelo
evolutivo que considera los nichos de desarrollo como la unidad
de evolución (bio-social), caracterizamos el razonamiento principalmente
como un logro social, desarrollándose mediante (proto)
narrativas que siguen normas implícitas en prácticas.
Even though some theories of reasoning recognize the importance of accounting for its social dime... more Even though some theories of reasoning recognize the importance of accounting for its social dimensions, they have problems integrating its evolutionary past. Mercier and Sperber, for instance, have argued for the need to incorporate an evolutionary account of cognition into a theory of reasoning. Still, the underlying cognitive individualism in their theory seriously impairs incorporating the narrative structure of reasoning. We claim that the source of the problem is an underlying adaptationist model of evolution. We suggest that an evolutionary model that takes developmental niches as its main evolutionary unit provides a better way of understanding reasoning. Such an account views reasoning as a bio-social achievement, mainly structured in (proto)narratives answering to norms implicit in practices.
Cognición Social y Artefactualidad en el Razonamiento, 2023
In usual models of social cognition the constitutive character of social interactions tend to be... more In usual models of social cognition the constitutive character of social interactions tend to be seen as the product of aggregation of individual minds. Here we claim that (an important kind of ) social cognition has to be understood as embodied in norms and patterns of behavior (habits) arising from the coordination of behavior afforded by entrainment processes which start with haptic perception early in life (from an phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspective).
Reflections on Naturalism, 2013
Broadly speaking, naturalism refers to views that consider philosophical method to be continuous ... more Broadly speaking, naturalism refers to views that consider philosophical method to be continuous with the methods of science, implying that at least some scientific methods have an impact on whatever philosophy can say about the norms of inquiry. When naturalism is used as a model for epistemology one talks of naturalized epistemology. Similarly, naturalized philosophy of science indicates a philosophy of science that is continuous with science. How to understand such continuity is a major source of controversy in epistemology and the philosophy of science.
Philosophy of Science, 1991
Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule require... more Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Lüders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual state which is not standard.
Philosophical Psychology, 2013
Synthese, 1990
An interpretation of quantum mechanics that rejects hidden variables has to say something about t... more An interpretation of quantum mechanics that rejects hidden variables has to say something about the way measurement can be understood as a transformation on states of individual systems, and that leads to the core of the interpretive problems posed by Luders' projection rule: What, if any, is its physical content? In this paper I explore one suggestion which is implicit in usual interpretations of the rule and show that this view does not stand on solid ground. In the process, important aspects of the role played by the projection postulate in the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics will be clarified. It will be shown in particular that serious objections can be raised against the (often implicit) view that identifies the physical relation of compatibility preserved by Luders' rule with the relation of simultaneous measurability.
SIGNO, 2023
What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n... more What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n a n d o M a r t í n e z M u ñ o z
SIGNO
What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n... more What makes a good metaphor in science? O que faz uma boa metáfora na ciência? S e r g i o F e r n a n d o M a r t í n e z M u ñ o z
Place, Space and Hermeneutics, 2017
We argue that the understanding of space, as an extended, simultaneous totality, although useful ... more We argue that the understanding of space, as an extended, simultaneous totality, although useful in some scientific contexts, is not true to our embodied experiences of space. It is an abstraction, involving a de-temporalization of space that falsifies our experience. From the phenomenological-enactivist perspective, space is not already there, neutrally constituted in its objective extension; rather, it is enacted, put in place relative to action affordances that are both corporeal and intercorporeal. Moreover, these action affordances are permeated by an intrinsic temporality, so that the experience of space is fully temporal because it is fully embodied. Space, as the experienced phenomenon of a delimited embodied enactment, is also hermeneutically situated so that meaning emerges for the embodied agent just because of its dynamical relations to a set of physical and social affordances.
Perspectives on Science
In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being desc... more In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being described as the omission of a target’s features when it is represented. This approach to abstraction sidesteps cognitive aspects of abstraction processes. However, cognitive aspects of abstraction are important in understanding the role of historically grounded epistemic criteria supporting modeling in science. Drawing on recent work on the relation between metaphor and abstraction, we introduce the concept of paths of abstraction, and use historical and contemporary examples to point to their role in guiding the development of relevance criteria which support modeling strategies in science.
Scientific Inquiry, From Metaphors to Abstraction, 2023
In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being desc... more In philosophy of science, abstraction tends to be subsumed under representation, often being described as the omission of a target’s features when it is represented. This approach to abstraction sidesteps cognitive aspects of abstraction processes. However, cognitive aspects of abstraction are important in understanding the role of historically grounded epistemic criteria supporting modeling in science. Drawing on recent work on the relation between metaphor and abstraction, we introduce the concept of paths of abstraction, and use historical and contemporary examples to point to their role in guiding the development of relevance criteria which support modeling strategies in science.
Revista M, 2012
632 "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" y tiene por objetivo compartir y debatir sobre investigaci... more 632 "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" y tiene por objetivo compartir y debatir sobre investigación en arquitectura. Es una publicación científica con periodicidad semestral, en formato papel y digital, que publica trabajos originales que no hayan sido publicados anteriormente en otras revistas. Queda establecido el sistema de arbitraje para la selección de artículos a publicar mediante dos revisores externos-sistema doble ciego-siguiendo los protocolos habituales para publicaciones científicas seriadas. Los títulos, resúmenes y palabras clave de los artículos se publican también en lengua inglesa. "proyecto, progreso, arquitectura" presenta una estructura clara, sencilla y flexible. Trata todos los temas relacionados con la teoría y la práctica del proyecto arquitectónico. Las distintas "temáticas abiertas" que componen nuestra línea editorial, son las fuentes para la conjunción de investigaciones diversas. La revista va dirigida a arquitectos, estudiantes, investigadores y profesionales relacionados con el proyecto y la realización de la obra de arquitectura.
RESUMEN: Una rendencia imporranre en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociol... more RESUMEN: Una rendencia imporranre en la filosofía de la educación contemporánea toma de la sociología del conocimiento la manera de entender la naruraleza del cono-cimiento cienrífico. Esra rendencia parre de una crírica al "cognirivismo" individua-lisra, asociado con una concepción rradicional del conocimienro y defiende una posi-ción consensualisra según la cual el conocimiento es la búsqueda de consenso. El obje-rivo del rrabajo es mosrrar que los consensualisras asumen una falsa dicotomía. Con-rrario a lo que los consensualisras asumen la cognición puede enrenderse a la vez como un logro social y como el resulrado del ejercicio de capacidades individuales. Con-cluyo haciendo ver algunas consecuencias del abandono de esa dicotomía para enrender el papel de la autoridad en la educación. Descriprores: autoridad y conocimiento, cognirivismo vrs consensualismo, cognición social y educación. ABSTRACT: An importarzt trend in contemporary phi/osophy of education folfows a view...
Crítica (México D. F. En línea), 1990
A central metaphysical thesis of modern science has been the idea that the structure of a physica... more A central metaphysical thesis of modern science has been the idea that the structure of a physical system can be explained in terms of the properties of its constitutive subsystems. I call this presupposition the Newtonian merological presupposition. After some brief introductory remarks on the role of this presupposition in the methodology of modern physics, and after mentioning some recent challenges to it, I focus my attention on quantum systems. Quantum mechanics is the only highly confirmed theory in which the Newtonian merological presupposition is denied. I argue that the presence of a non-Newtonian (holistic) merological structure is the result of the existence of two different types of properties, and in particular of the existence of genuinely dispositional properties. Genuinely dispositional properties are properties of a system which are not reducible to occurrent properties of the subsystems. This distinction between two different types of properties can be made precise...
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 2019
During the 19thcentury, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity,... more During the 19thcentury, evolutionary models of innovation followed a famous thesis of continuity, according to which methods and explanatory patterns of biology should have an important say in the social sciences. In the 20th century, this thesis was considered unacceptable as part of the sharp separation of biology from the social sciences. Recent advances in the biological sciences suggest a way in which a version of the thesis of continuity can be reinstated, to suggest new ways of explaining innovation in the social sciences. Key kinds of innovation can be explained in terms of the evolution of robust complex systems, interpreted as processes of path creation.
Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA, 1991
En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.
Revista de filosofía DIÁNOIA, 1989
En esta época de la publicación de Diánoia no se incluían resúmenes.