Jeff Spinner-Halev | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (original) (raw)
Books by Jeff Spinner-Halev
Respect and Loathing in American Democracy: Polarization, Moralization, and the Undermining of Equality, 2024
Respect is in trouble. Many Americans think that respecting other citizens is a virtue of a democ... more Respect is in trouble. Many Americans think that respecting other citizens is a virtue of a democratic society, yet many struggle to respect opposing partisans. It is especially liberal citizens, who hold respect as central to their robust view of democratic equality, who struggle the most to grant respect to others. Egalitarian theorists sing paeans about the importance of respect but say little about the conditions that make respect possible or the trade-offs between respect and other values. Political scientists study tolerance, not respect, and they rarely study how democratic citizens view each other as fellow citizens, which is at the center of democratic respect. In this presentation, This book brings together a political theorist and a political psychologist to examine democratic respect through national surveys, focus groups, survey experiments, and the views of political theorists. Democrats and Republicans are less divided than many believe, but they alienate one another because they moralize different issues. Liberals moralize social justice, conservatives champion national solidarity, and this worldview divide makes it difficult to respect anyone who disagrees. While respect is both far-reaching and vital to a democratic system, it is much harder to grant than many theorists recognize. If people believe that achieving social justice or national solidarity demands action from all Americans, then they readily disrespect anyone who shirks their collective responsibility. This book examines the importance of respect, the tensions between justice and respect, and a theoretical path forward that is challenging but far from impossible for political theorists and citizens to traverse.
Papers by Jeff Spinner-Halev
American Political Science Review, 2024
Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about high stakes problems. This article show... more Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about high stakes problems. This article shows that those theories would be more credible if political philosophers ensured their work was robust: capable of withstanding reasonable changes to their assumptions and to the cases to which their arguments apply. The world is varied and inconstant. As a result, scientists and social scientists recognize the virtue of robustness. This article shows why political philosophers should also do so. It defines robustness, demonstrates its value and shows how it can be evaluated. Illustrating the stakes of robustness, the article assesses prominent arguments concerning multiculturalism and open borders. Avoiding misunderstanding and confusion should be a central aim of political philosophy. To sidestep these outcomes and to reassure scholars that one’s theory is not subject to concerns about its credibility, it will often be reasonable for philosophers to explicitly test their theories for robustness.
Journal of Politics, 2017
Abstract The specter of individual responsibility is ever present in many liberal theories of di... more Abstract
The specter of individual responsibility is ever present in many liberal theories of distributive justice, yet these “responsibilitarian” arguments ignore the unpredictability of markets, misunderstand the role of luck that nearly everyone faces in a market economy, while overvaluing (while not defining) prudent or responsible behavior. Nearly all economic behavior in market societies is risky—there is no baseline of prudent or responsible behavior. Further, the idea of individual responsibility is normative in ways that responsibility theorists fail to recognize; they rarely take into account our responsibility to other people, like our obligations to one’s spouse, parents, and children. I argue here that instead of focusing on when an individual is acting responsibly or not, contemporary theories of justice should focus on the ways in which political and social institutions can help people be responsible, in both economic and non-economic ways.
This article examines John Rawls's turn toward a purely political liberalism by comparing and con... more This article examines John Rawls's turn toward a purely political liberalism by comparing and contrasting it with the comprehensive liberalism he imputes to John Stuart Mill. We argue that Mill and Rawls have similar views about individual autonomy, despite Rawls's insistence to the contrary. We contend that Rawls accords a much larger role to the state in enforcing justice than does Mill. Whereas Rawls's view of justice rests ultimately on state enforcement, Mill sees justice reaching into many institutions, but accords the state a lesser role in this. Mill's view of justice rests on a view of progress and moral psychology not shared by Rawls. In the service of stability, Rawls demands more agreement from citizens about justice than does Mill, but these demands undermine the stability that Rawls so desires. The differences between Rawls and Mill discussed here are not elucidated by the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalisms.
Nearly all democratizing states are also nationalizing, but this connection has not been adequate... more Nearly all democratizing states are also nationalizing, but this connection has not been adequately explained. A few scholars argue that nationality supplies democracy with a pre-political identity, while others maintain that nationality is often developed and manipulated by elites. I argue that national identity is a political identity, sustained by political institutions for political purposes, though this identity may contain some ethnic or abstract principles within it. The solidarity that national identity creates is most needed by democracies when they first emerge. Democratizing states need to build up institutions and create a culture of sacrifice, which they can do by creating a sense of solidarity among citizens. This solidarity is not only in the interests of the elites, but also benefits those in the dominant national group. The solidarity created by national identity is crucial to institution building, but it is also a source of inequality, since those not seen as members will often face discrimination or worse. The unfortunate side of nationalism has led some theorists to argue that liberal democracies need to move toward postnationalism if they are to reach the promise of equality and individual rights for all. Doing so, however, means separating identity from the state. I doubt this is possible; and I argue that post-nationalism means forgetting about national memories. Yet to honor rightly the past victims of nationalism we must engage in acts of remembrance. We cannot both bear the legacy of the past and easily move toward postnationalism. I work through these issues partly by way of Habermas who tries, unsuccessfully in my view, to reconcile post-nationalism with the retention of national memory. This is not an accident, but frequently a result of the need of emerging democracies to build up institutions and create a culture of sacrifice, which they can do
Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility fo... more Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility for their past, but their arguments are ambiguous about whether all past injustices need remedy, or just those regarding groups that suffer from current injustice. This ambiguity leaves unanswered the challenge of critics who argue that contemporary injustices matter, not those in the past. I argue instead for a focus on injustices that have roots in the past, and continue to the present day, what I call enduring injustice. Instead of focusing on finding the party responsible for the injustice, I argue that we use history to help us understand why some injustices endure, which I suggest is partly due to the limitations of liberal justice. I conclude with a conception of responsibility for repairing enduring injustice that deemphasizes searching for the causal agent, and instead focuses on how to repair the injustice, which I explain through an expansive conception of shared space.
Polity, 2010
The relationship between justice and the family is a difficult and often ignored issue in liberal... more The relationship between justice and the family is a difficult and often ignored issue in liberal theory. John Stuart Mill is one liberal theorist who tackled the issue, but his arguments about the matter are often misconstrued. Much of the debate about Mill's feminism turns on the role of the state in effecting moral and political change in society. Mill's critics focus on his minimal legal prescriptions, believing them to be insufficient for achieving justice and equality in any meaningful sense. His supporters point to how much he expected the rigidity of gender roles to weaken for the better, which, in their view, suggests Mill envisioned a large role for the state in bringing about this change. Both views overlook a central tenet in Mill's thought, which is that such shifts in values would come about only when the conditions for progress were in place. Although the state has an important role in creating the requisite conditions, it could not itself impose moral progress on its citizens. Progress is a political notion for Mill, but he did not narrowly conceive of politics as merely the business of the state. Progress also presupposes changes in the family, which explains why Mill thought equality and justice ought to be secured in the family and why he believed the family was instrumental in generating democratic values. Rawls, too, misconstrues Mill's feminism and liberalism by ignoring his conception of politics and his limited role for the state in ensuring justice. Mill has a more nuanced view of the boundaries of politics than most liberals, but allows a relatively narrow role for the state. The gap between these two is filled by his theory of progress.
Political Theory, 2005
tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article... more tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article about how to combine these two models of toleration.
Journal of Political Philosophy, 1995
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2008
Social Theory and Practice, 2009
Respect and Loathing in American Democracy: Polarization, Moralization, and the Undermining of Equality, 2024
Respect is in trouble. Many Americans think that respecting other citizens is a virtue of a democ... more Respect is in trouble. Many Americans think that respecting other citizens is a virtue of a democratic society, yet many struggle to respect opposing partisans. It is especially liberal citizens, who hold respect as central to their robust view of democratic equality, who struggle the most to grant respect to others. Egalitarian theorists sing paeans about the importance of respect but say little about the conditions that make respect possible or the trade-offs between respect and other values. Political scientists study tolerance, not respect, and they rarely study how democratic citizens view each other as fellow citizens, which is at the center of democratic respect. In this presentation, This book brings together a political theorist and a political psychologist to examine democratic respect through national surveys, focus groups, survey experiments, and the views of political theorists. Democrats and Republicans are less divided than many believe, but they alienate one another because they moralize different issues. Liberals moralize social justice, conservatives champion national solidarity, and this worldview divide makes it difficult to respect anyone who disagrees. While respect is both far-reaching and vital to a democratic system, it is much harder to grant than many theorists recognize. If people believe that achieving social justice or national solidarity demands action from all Americans, then they readily disrespect anyone who shirks their collective responsibility. This book examines the importance of respect, the tensions between justice and respect, and a theoretical path forward that is challenging but far from impossible for political theorists and citizens to traverse.
American Political Science Review, 2024
Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about high stakes problems. This article show... more Political philosophers and theorists make arguments about high stakes problems. This article shows that those theories would be more credible if political philosophers ensured their work was robust: capable of withstanding reasonable changes to their assumptions and to the cases to which their arguments apply. The world is varied and inconstant. As a result, scientists and social scientists recognize the virtue of robustness. This article shows why political philosophers should also do so. It defines robustness, demonstrates its value and shows how it can be evaluated. Illustrating the stakes of robustness, the article assesses prominent arguments concerning multiculturalism and open borders. Avoiding misunderstanding and confusion should be a central aim of political philosophy. To sidestep these outcomes and to reassure scholars that one’s theory is not subject to concerns about its credibility, it will often be reasonable for philosophers to explicitly test their theories for robustness.
Journal of Politics, 2017
Abstract The specter of individual responsibility is ever present in many liberal theories of di... more Abstract
The specter of individual responsibility is ever present in many liberal theories of distributive justice, yet these “responsibilitarian” arguments ignore the unpredictability of markets, misunderstand the role of luck that nearly everyone faces in a market economy, while overvaluing (while not defining) prudent or responsible behavior. Nearly all economic behavior in market societies is risky—there is no baseline of prudent or responsible behavior. Further, the idea of individual responsibility is normative in ways that responsibility theorists fail to recognize; they rarely take into account our responsibility to other people, like our obligations to one’s spouse, parents, and children. I argue here that instead of focusing on when an individual is acting responsibly or not, contemporary theories of justice should focus on the ways in which political and social institutions can help people be responsible, in both economic and non-economic ways.
This article examines John Rawls's turn toward a purely political liberalism by comparing and con... more This article examines John Rawls's turn toward a purely political liberalism by comparing and contrasting it with the comprehensive liberalism he imputes to John Stuart Mill. We argue that Mill and Rawls have similar views about individual autonomy, despite Rawls's insistence to the contrary. We contend that Rawls accords a much larger role to the state in enforcing justice than does Mill. Whereas Rawls's view of justice rests ultimately on state enforcement, Mill sees justice reaching into many institutions, but accords the state a lesser role in this. Mill's view of justice rests on a view of progress and moral psychology not shared by Rawls. In the service of stability, Rawls demands more agreement from citizens about justice than does Mill, but these demands undermine the stability that Rawls so desires. The differences between Rawls and Mill discussed here are not elucidated by the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalisms.
Nearly all democratizing states are also nationalizing, but this connection has not been adequate... more Nearly all democratizing states are also nationalizing, but this connection has not been adequately explained. A few scholars argue that nationality supplies democracy with a pre-political identity, while others maintain that nationality is often developed and manipulated by elites. I argue that national identity is a political identity, sustained by political institutions for political purposes, though this identity may contain some ethnic or abstract principles within it. The solidarity that national identity creates is most needed by democracies when they first emerge. Democratizing states need to build up institutions and create a culture of sacrifice, which they can do by creating a sense of solidarity among citizens. This solidarity is not only in the interests of the elites, but also benefits those in the dominant national group. The solidarity created by national identity is crucial to institution building, but it is also a source of inequality, since those not seen as members will often face discrimination or worse. The unfortunate side of nationalism has led some theorists to argue that liberal democracies need to move toward postnationalism if they are to reach the promise of equality and individual rights for all. Doing so, however, means separating identity from the state. I doubt this is possible; and I argue that post-nationalism means forgetting about national memories. Yet to honor rightly the past victims of nationalism we must engage in acts of remembrance. We cannot both bear the legacy of the past and easily move toward postnationalism. I work through these issues partly by way of Habermas who tries, unsuccessfully in my view, to reconcile post-nationalism with the retention of national memory. This is not an accident, but frequently a result of the need of emerging democracies to build up institutions and create a culture of sacrifice, which they can do
Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility fo... more Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility for their past, but their arguments are ambiguous about whether all past injustices need remedy, or just those regarding groups that suffer from current injustice. This ambiguity leaves unanswered the challenge of critics who argue that contemporary injustices matter, not those in the past. I argue instead for a focus on injustices that have roots in the past, and continue to the present day, what I call enduring injustice. Instead of focusing on finding the party responsible for the injustice, I argue that we use history to help us understand why some injustices endure, which I suggest is partly due to the limitations of liberal justice. I conclude with a conception of responsibility for repairing enduring injustice that deemphasizes searching for the causal agent, and instead focuses on how to repair the injustice, which I explain through an expansive conception of shared space.
Polity, 2010
The relationship between justice and the family is a difficult and often ignored issue in liberal... more The relationship between justice and the family is a difficult and often ignored issue in liberal theory. John Stuart Mill is one liberal theorist who tackled the issue, but his arguments about the matter are often misconstrued. Much of the debate about Mill's feminism turns on the role of the state in effecting moral and political change in society. Mill's critics focus on his minimal legal prescriptions, believing them to be insufficient for achieving justice and equality in any meaningful sense. His supporters point to how much he expected the rigidity of gender roles to weaken for the better, which, in their view, suggests Mill envisioned a large role for the state in bringing about this change. Both views overlook a central tenet in Mill's thought, which is that such shifts in values would come about only when the conditions for progress were in place. Although the state has an important role in creating the requisite conditions, it could not itself impose moral progress on its citizens. Progress is a political notion for Mill, but he did not narrowly conceive of politics as merely the business of the state. Progress also presupposes changes in the family, which explains why Mill thought equality and justice ought to be secured in the family and why he believed the family was instrumental in generating democratic values. Rawls, too, misconstrues Mill's feminism and liberalism by ignoring his conception of politics and his limited role for the state in ensuring justice. Mill has a more nuanced view of the boundaries of politics than most liberals, but allows a relatively narrow role for the state. The gap between these two is filled by his theory of progress.
Political Theory, 2005
tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article... more tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article about how to combine these two models of toleration.
Journal of Political Philosophy, 1995
Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2008
Social Theory and Practice, 2009
Jewish Quarterly Review, 2005
Lubavitch Hasidim appeared in Lithuania at the end of the eighteenth century as one of many Hasid... more Lubavitch Hasidim appeared in Lithuania at the end of the eighteenth century as one of many Hasidic sects to form in the wake of the death in 1772 of the movement's second leader, Dov Ber of Mezeritch. The founder of the Lubavitch sect, Rabbi Schneur Zalman of Liadi (1745-...
Theory and Research in Education, 2003
American Journal of Sociology, 2002
© 2000 by Bhikhu Parekh All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain First United Kingdom publica... more © 2000 by Bhikhu Parekh All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain First United Kingdom publication in 2000 by Macmillan Press Ltd. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Parekh, Bhikhu C. Rethinking multicuhuralism: cultural diversity and political theory / Bhikhu ...
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2005
Now, this reader does not have a problem with any of Herzog's conclusions: In early modern Englan... more Now, this reader does not have a problem with any of Herzog's conclusions: In early modern England, there were diverse views over and debate about women and the family; male authority over wives, children, and servants was not simply and meekly accepted by all. The biggest problem with this book is that we kind of knew that already. This need not have mattered very much if the book had been set up differently. Historians and other scholars of the period might be unfamiliar with these songs and plays. If Herzog had started out saying something like "We know that early modern England was a complex and violent place, marked by upheavals in almost all respects: political, philosophical, scientific, theological, and so on, so let us see what picture we get when we look at popular culture," then this could have been a good read. The discussion about the concept of politics has the material of an interesting article.