Jens Rometsch | Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (original) (raw)
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Books by Jens Rometsch
How do our perceptions come about? If our ways of forming them is deterministically given, skepti... more How do our perceptions come about? If our ways of forming them is deterministically given, skeptical objections can no longer be warded off. We might as well be calibrated for errors. If, instead, our cognition works unbounded and free, there is no compulsion to fall prey to error. It is therefore advisable to understand cognitive formation as a plurimodal interaction of activities of perception, imagination and verbalization, the course of which is never determined by the conditions under which it currently stands. Further, we should not describe ourselves as mere "res cogitans," no matter what the philosophical intentions: there is no sense in assuming that we are determined to perform activities of cognition only. In dealing with two major historical examples, these assumptions are developed and tested. It is shown why René Descartes unexpectedly champions them, and which consequences ensue from John Locke´s disregarding them.
Papers by Jens Rometsch
Die „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in Kants praktischer Philosophie, 2016
One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns t... more One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns the overall character of freedom in Kant’s second Critique. Kant operates with a juxtaposition of „transcendental freedom“ and the „comparative freedom“ instantiated by a turnspit. Obviously, „comparative free- dom“ is no freedom at all, since Kant considers the movements of a turnspit to be absolutely determined by natural causes. Absolute determination implies that at any given point in time, preceding conditions limit the future course of the turnspit’s movements to just one possible option. The article examines if actions or processes characterised by „transcendental freedom“ aren’t determined in es- sentially the same manner, albeit not by natural causes, but nonetheless abso- lutely. By means of being absolutely determined by the moral law, processes (actions, maxim-forming thoughts, decisions etc.) that count as cases of „tran- scendental freedom“ seem to be simply bound to another form of absolute de- termination. Inasmuch as moral obligation leaves us without options, „tran- scendental freedom“ turns out to be a higher-order variation of empirical turnspit freedom.
El concepto de “realidad” (Wirklichkeit) desempena un rol importante en los realismos filosoficos... more El concepto de “realidad” (Wirklichkeit) desempena un rol importante en los realismos filosoficos actuales, aunque a menudo se interpreta de manera diferente. El presente articulo aboga por una primera descripcion formal de la realidad como “factualidad formal”: se considera que la realidad es el hecho de que nuestras descripciones deben aplicarse a algo. Este hecho no solo afecta a nuestra cognicion de la realidad, sino a si mismo.
SATS, 2012
Philosophical interests in knowledge tend to focus exclusively on knowledge of things or facts in... more Philosophical interests in knowledge tend to focus exclusively on knowledge of things or facts in the world and our knowledge of that knowledge. I will argue that knowledge of what we are doing should be an integral part of those interests. It is too rarely discussed to which extent an account of knowledge of our own non-epistemic activities might be necessary in order to get the full picture of how we relate to facts in trying to know them. (2.) Hegel's epistemology in the philosophy of subjective spirit is an interesting exception to this rule: A certain type of knowledge of what we are doing serves as a partial justification for his entire philosophical project, although in Hegel it rests obscure in what sense we can actually have that type of knowledge.
German Idealism Today, 2017
Die "Kategorien der Freiheit" in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Historisch-systematische Beiträge, 2016
One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns t... more One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns the overall character of freedom in Kant’s second Critique. Kant operates with a juxtaposition of „transcendental freedom“ and the „comparative freedom“ instantiated by a turnspit. Obviously, „comparative free- dom“ is no freedom at all, since Kant considers the movements of a turnspit to be absolutely determined by natural causes. Absolute determination implies that at any given point in time, preceding conditions limit the future course of the turnspit’s movements to just one possible option. The article examines if actions or processes characterised by „transcendental freedom“ aren’t determined in es- sentially the same manner, albeit not by natural causes, but nonetheless abso- lutely. By means of being absolutely determined by the moral law, processes (actions, maxim-forming thoughts, decisions etc.) that count as cases of „tran- scendental freedom“ seem to be simply bound to another form of absolute de- termination. Inasmuch as moral obligation leaves us without options, „tran- scendental freedom“ turns out to be a higher-order variation of empirical turnspit freedom.
Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik/The New Desire for Metaphysics, 2015
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, Tome 111, No. 2, pp. 335-359
sats Northern European Journal of Philosophy, Dec 2012
Skeptizismus und Metaphysik, 2012
Für die Philosophie der Neuzeit im Gefolge Descartes' ist die skeptische Korrektur unbegründe... more Für die Philosophie der Neuzeit im Gefolge Descartes' ist die skeptische Korrektur unbegründeter Wissensansprüche fester Bestandteil des methodischen Repertoires. Die folgende motivgeschichtliche Überlegung möchte zeigen, dass auch in Heideggers ...
Im Mainstream traditioneller Erkenntnistheorien der Neuzeit kommt das erkennende Subjekt tendenzi... more Im Mainstream traditioneller Erkenntnistheorien der Neuzeit kommt das erkennende Subjekt tendenziell nur über seine epistemischen Tätigkeiten in den Blick. Diese Abstraktion wird der erkenntnistheoretischen Aufgabe, das Erkennen zu erkennen, nicht gerecht. Erfordert wäre eine Erkenntnistheorie, die auch die nicht-epistemischen Tätigkeiten des Subjekts als integrale Komponente jeder Erkenntnisrelation begreift.
Philosophische Rundschau, Jan 1, 2009
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Translations by Jens Rometsch
Angst vor der Wahrheit - Ein Plädoyer gegen Relativismus und Konstruktivismus, Aug 19, 2013
How do our perceptions come about? If our ways of forming them is deterministically given, skepti... more How do our perceptions come about? If our ways of forming them is deterministically given, skeptical objections can no longer be warded off. We might as well be calibrated for errors. If, instead, our cognition works unbounded and free, there is no compulsion to fall prey to error. It is therefore advisable to understand cognitive formation as a plurimodal interaction of activities of perception, imagination and verbalization, the course of which is never determined by the conditions under which it currently stands. Further, we should not describe ourselves as mere "res cogitans," no matter what the philosophical intentions: there is no sense in assuming that we are determined to perform activities of cognition only. In dealing with two major historical examples, these assumptions are developed and tested. It is shown why René Descartes unexpectedly champions them, and which consequences ensue from John Locke´s disregarding them.
Die „Kategorien der Freiheit“ in Kants praktischer Philosophie, 2016
One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns t... more One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns the overall character of freedom in Kant’s second Critique. Kant operates with a juxtaposition of „transcendental freedom“ and the „comparative freedom“ instantiated by a turnspit. Obviously, „comparative free- dom“ is no freedom at all, since Kant considers the movements of a turnspit to be absolutely determined by natural causes. Absolute determination implies that at any given point in time, preceding conditions limit the future course of the turnspit’s movements to just one possible option. The article examines if actions or processes characterised by „transcendental freedom“ aren’t determined in es- sentially the same manner, albeit not by natural causes, but nonetheless abso- lutely. By means of being absolutely determined by the moral law, processes (actions, maxim-forming thoughts, decisions etc.) that count as cases of „tran- scendental freedom“ seem to be simply bound to another form of absolute de- termination. Inasmuch as moral obligation leaves us without options, „tran- scendental freedom“ turns out to be a higher-order variation of empirical turnspit freedom.
El concepto de “realidad” (Wirklichkeit) desempena un rol importante en los realismos filosoficos... more El concepto de “realidad” (Wirklichkeit) desempena un rol importante en los realismos filosoficos actuales, aunque a menudo se interpreta de manera diferente. El presente articulo aboga por una primera descripcion formal de la realidad como “factualidad formal”: se considera que la realidad es el hecho de que nuestras descripciones deben aplicarse a algo. Este hecho no solo afecta a nuestra cognicion de la realidad, sino a si mismo.
SATS, 2012
Philosophical interests in knowledge tend to focus exclusively on knowledge of things or facts in... more Philosophical interests in knowledge tend to focus exclusively on knowledge of things or facts in the world and our knowledge of that knowledge. I will argue that knowledge of what we are doing should be an integral part of those interests. It is too rarely discussed to which extent an account of knowledge of our own non-epistemic activities might be necessary in order to get the full picture of how we relate to facts in trying to know them. (2.) Hegel's epistemology in the philosophy of subjective spirit is an interesting exception to this rule: A certain type of knowledge of what we are doing serves as a partial justification for his entire philosophical project, although in Hegel it rests obscure in what sense we can actually have that type of knowledge.
German Idealism Today, 2017
Die "Kategorien der Freiheit" in Kants praktischer Philosophie. Historisch-systematische Beiträge, 2016
One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns t... more One of the most fundamental questions with respect to Kant’s „cate- gories of freedom“ concerns the overall character of freedom in Kant’s second Critique. Kant operates with a juxtaposition of „transcendental freedom“ and the „comparative freedom“ instantiated by a turnspit. Obviously, „comparative free- dom“ is no freedom at all, since Kant considers the movements of a turnspit to be absolutely determined by natural causes. Absolute determination implies that at any given point in time, preceding conditions limit the future course of the turnspit’s movements to just one possible option. The article examines if actions or processes characterised by „transcendental freedom“ aren’t determined in es- sentially the same manner, albeit not by natural causes, but nonetheless abso- lutely. By means of being absolutely determined by the moral law, processes (actions, maxim-forming thoughts, decisions etc.) that count as cases of „tran- scendental freedom“ seem to be simply bound to another form of absolute de- termination. Inasmuch as moral obligation leaves us without options, „tran- scendental freedom“ turns out to be a higher-order variation of empirical turnspit freedom.
Das neue Bedürfnis nach Metaphysik/The New Desire for Metaphysics, 2015
Revue Philosophique de Louvain, Tome 111, No. 2, pp. 335-359
sats Northern European Journal of Philosophy, Dec 2012
Skeptizismus und Metaphysik, 2012
Für die Philosophie der Neuzeit im Gefolge Descartes' ist die skeptische Korrektur unbegründe... more Für die Philosophie der Neuzeit im Gefolge Descartes' ist die skeptische Korrektur unbegründeter Wissensansprüche fester Bestandteil des methodischen Repertoires. Die folgende motivgeschichtliche Überlegung möchte zeigen, dass auch in Heideggers ...
Im Mainstream traditioneller Erkenntnistheorien der Neuzeit kommt das erkennende Subjekt tendenzi... more Im Mainstream traditioneller Erkenntnistheorien der Neuzeit kommt das erkennende Subjekt tendenziell nur über seine epistemischen Tätigkeiten in den Blick. Diese Abstraktion wird der erkenntnistheoretischen Aufgabe, das Erkennen zu erkennen, nicht gerecht. Erfordert wäre eine Erkenntnistheorie, die auch die nicht-epistemischen Tätigkeiten des Subjekts als integrale Komponente jeder Erkenntnisrelation begreift.
Philosophische Rundschau, Jan 1, 2009
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Angst vor der Wahrheit - Ein Plädoyer gegen Relativismus und Konstruktivismus, Aug 19, 2013