Gerhard Schurz | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (original) (raw)
Papers by Gerhard Schurz
Journal for General Philosophy of Science , 2023
In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this... more In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this volume are critically discussed and thereby, new insights are developed. How broad and expandable the program of meta-induction is can be learned from Ortner's contribution. New insights about the transition from the a priori justification of meta-induction to the a posteriori justification of object-induction emerge from the reflection of Shogenji's paper. How meta-induction may be applied also to religious prophecies and that their meta-inductive justification does not fail for a priori reasons but because of missing evidence for predictive success is learned from the discussion of Pitts' contribution. That meta-induction does not rely on a particular prior distribution, while the no free lunch theorem depends implicitly on a uniform prior, is the major conclusion drawn from the discussion of Wolpert's article. How the problem of induction is treated in different versions of the Bayesian account is learned from the discussion of Willliamson's paper. That meta-induction can also be employed for abduction, and that abductive theory-revision can offer meta-inductive aggregation methods is a new insight emerging from the reflection of Aliseda's contribution.
In: R. Hauswald, P. Schmechting (hg), Wissensproduktion und Wissensvermittlung unter erschwerten Bedingungen, Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg 2023,149-185, 2023
European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12:46 (pp. 1-18) and Convergence, 2022
Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first sec... more Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first section, disadvantages of existing Bayesian solution proposals to this problem are pointed out and an alternative solution proposal is presented: that of genuine confirmation (GC). In the second section, the notion of GC is briefly recapitulated and three versions of GC are distinguished: full (qualitative) GC, partial (qualitative) GC and quantitative GC. In the third section, the application of partial GC to pure postfacto speculations is explained. In the fourth section it is demonstrated that full GC is a necessary condition for Bayesian convergence to certainty based on the accumulation of conditionally independent pieces of evidence. It is found that whenever a hypothesis is equivalent to a disjunction of more fine-grained hypotheses conveying different probabilities to the evidence, then conditional independence of the evidence fails. This failure occurs typically for unspecific negations of hypotheses. A refined version of the convergence to certainty theorem that overcomes this difficulty is developed in the final section.
"Theory-generating AbIn: L. Magnani (ed.), Handbook of Abductive Cognition, Cham, Springer Nature, 181-208. , 2023
Theory-generating abductions introduce new (theoretical) concepts into their conclusion. This for... more Theory-generating abductions introduce new (theoretical) concepts into their conclusion. This form of abduction underlies all uncertain inferences from (singular or general) empirical facts to theoretical hypotheses that explain these facts by unobserved or unobservable entities and properties, expressed by theoretical concepts. Theory-generating abductions are discriminated from speculative postfacto abductions by two scientific rationality criteria: unification and independent testability. A particularly important form of theory-generating abductions in science is common cause abductions that explain correlated empirical dispositions in terms of common theoretical causes. These abductions play also an important
Synthese 199, 13067–13094, 2021
In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics... more In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics-multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages.
Journal of Philosophical Logic
In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. ... more In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value (sec. 1). Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language (sec. 2–5). Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Never...
In this paper Reichenbach's best alternative account (BAA) to induction is examined. In the first... more In this paper Reichenbach's best alternative account (BAA) to induction is examined. In the first section, three versions of the BAA are distinguished that have been discussed in the literature. The major objections against all three versions are presented. In the second section it is shown by a text analysis that Reichenbach (The theory of probability, University of California Press, California, 1949) argues for all three versions of the BAA and does not sufficiently distinguish between them. In the third section it is explained how Reichenbach's third version of the BAA can be transformed into a provable optimality theorem within the account of meta-induction.
The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation-theoretic episte... more The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation-theoretic epistemology characterized by two features: (i) All beliefs are to be jus-This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. ... more In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular 'justifications' are demonstrably without epistemic value (sec. 1). Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus nonclassical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaningpreserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language (sec. 2-5). Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Nevertheless the situation is not symmetric, because classical logic has important ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic.
The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-po... more The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness (Sects. 1, 2). In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures (t-measures) are introduced: (i) comparative versus numeric t-measures, (ii) t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and (iii) t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements (Sects. 4, 5). The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single case probabilities (Sect. 4). The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to true probabilistic laws) can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories (Sects. 4-6). In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to given empirical evidence) creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies (as statistical probabilities), but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements (Sect. 6). By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness (Sect. 7).
The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice... more The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice among finitely many prediction methods. Eckhart Arnold and Tom Sterkenburg objected that it breaks down for infinite or unboundedly growing sets of methods. In this article the metainductive approach is defended against this challenge by extending the optimality theorem (i) to unboundedly growing sets of methods whose number grows less than exponentially in time, (ii) to sequences of methods with an application to Goodman's problem, and (iii) to infinite sets of methods whose number of predictive equivalence classes grows less than linearly in time.
The goal of this paper is to defend the theory of generalized evolution (GE) against criticisms b... more The goal of this paper is to defend the theory of generalized evolution (GE) against criticisms by laying down its theoretical principles and their applications in a unified way. Section 2 develops GE theory and its realization in biological evolution (BE) and cultural evolution (CE). The core of GE theory consists of the three Darwinian principles together with the models of population dynamics (PD). Section 3 reconstructs the most important differences between BE and CE. While BE is predominantly based on the replication of genes, CE is based on the reproduction of memes. Memes are understood as the informational "software" of human brains transmitted through social learning processes. The ontology of memes and the concept of cultural fitness is carved out and refined. Finally, section 4 articulates the minimal ontological assumptions of GE theory and the quantitative principles of generalized PD that unify biological PD and evolutionary game theory.
White (2015) proposes an a priori justication of the reliability of inductive prediction methods... more White (2015) proposes an a priori justication of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justication of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justication externalism and (ii) optimality justications.
Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of c... more Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1-2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).
I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy o... more I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy of science perspective. HoHs can be theory driven or evidence driven. Theory-driven HoHs fit well with standard representations of hierarchical theory nets (HTNs) in the philosophy of science. A disadvantage of the development of theory-driven HoHs is that they neglect hypotheses describing the effects of combinations of causes; this disadvantage can be removed by adding an additional layer of system conditions. Evidence-driven HoHs additionally include kinds of empirical tests by means of which certain hypotheses in the HoH are tested. This aspect of HoHs goes beyond standard HTNs in the philosophy of science and is highly fruitful; however, it leads to certain problems concerning the relation between causal hypotheses and empirically testable correlation claims.
I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy o... more I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy of science perspective. HoHs can be theory driven or evidence driven. Theory-driven HoHs fit well with standard representations of hierarchical theory nets (HTNs) in the philosophy of science. A disadvantage of the development of theory-driven HoHs is that they neglect hypotheses describing the effects of combinations of causes; this disadvantage can be removed by adding an additional layer of system conditions. Evidence-driven HoHs additionally include kinds of empirical tests by means of which certain hypotheses in the HoH are tested. This aspect of HoHs goes beyond standard HTNs in the philosophy of science and is highly fruitful; however, it leads to certain problems concerning the relation between causal hypotheses and empirically testable correlation claims.
The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science... more The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will develop the notion of a theory frame and distinguish between theory frames for qualitative theories in which scientific measurement is based on nominal scales and theory frames for quantitative theories in which measurement is based on ratio scales. In three case studies, we will apply frames to a psychological, a linguistic, and a physical theory, thereby showing that the frame model is a powerful and intuitively accessible instrument to analyze the laws of scientific theories, the determination of theoretical concepts, the explanatory role of theoretical concepts, the abductive introduction of a new theoretical concept, the distinction between the core and the periphery of a theory, the diachronic development of a theory, and the distinction between qualitative and quantitative scientific concepts. Finally, we will provide a comparison to the structuralist view of theories, one of the most elaborated and applied models of theory representation.
According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and c... more According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and context-dependent. Here "induction" is understood in the sense of object-induction, i.e., induction applied at the object-level of events. In contrast, Schurz' account proceeds from the demonstration that there are universally optimal rules of meta-induction, i.e., rules of induction applied at the level of competing methods of prediction, including methods of object-induction. The two accounts are not in opposition; on the contrary, they agree on most questions related to the problem of induction. Beyond this agreement the two accounts are complementary: the material account suffers from a justificational circularity or regress problem that the meta-induction account can solve. On the other hand, the meta-inductive account abstracts from domain-specific aspects of objectinduction that are supplied by the material account.
Journal for General Philosophy of Science , 2023
In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this... more In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this volume are critically discussed and thereby, new insights are developed. How broad and expandable the program of meta-induction is can be learned from Ortner's contribution. New insights about the transition from the a priori justification of meta-induction to the a posteriori justification of object-induction emerge from the reflection of Shogenji's paper. How meta-induction may be applied also to religious prophecies and that their meta-inductive justification does not fail for a priori reasons but because of missing evidence for predictive success is learned from the discussion of Pitts' contribution. That meta-induction does not rely on a particular prior distribution, while the no free lunch theorem depends implicitly on a uniform prior, is the major conclusion drawn from the discussion of Wolpert's article. How the problem of induction is treated in different versions of the Bayesian account is learned from the discussion of Willliamson's paper. That meta-induction can also be employed for abduction, and that abductive theory-revision can offer meta-inductive aggregation methods is a new insight emerging from the reflection of Aliseda's contribution.
In: R. Hauswald, P. Schmechting (hg), Wissensproduktion und Wissensvermittlung unter erschwerten Bedingungen, Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg 2023,149-185, 2023
European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12:46 (pp. 1-18) and Convergence, 2022
Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first sec... more Tacking by conjunction is a well-known problem for Bayesian confirmation theory. In the first section, disadvantages of existing Bayesian solution proposals to this problem are pointed out and an alternative solution proposal is presented: that of genuine confirmation (GC). In the second section, the notion of GC is briefly recapitulated and three versions of GC are distinguished: full (qualitative) GC, partial (qualitative) GC and quantitative GC. In the third section, the application of partial GC to pure postfacto speculations is explained. In the fourth section it is demonstrated that full GC is a necessary condition for Bayesian convergence to certainty based on the accumulation of conditionally independent pieces of evidence. It is found that whenever a hypothesis is equivalent to a disjunction of more fine-grained hypotheses conveying different probabilities to the evidence, then conditional independence of the evidence fails. This failure occurs typically for unspecific negations of hypotheses. A refined version of the convergence to certainty theorem that overcomes this difficulty is developed in the final section.
"Theory-generating AbIn: L. Magnani (ed.), Handbook of Abductive Cognition, Cham, Springer Nature, 181-208. , 2023
Theory-generating abductions introduce new (theoretical) concepts into their conclusion. This for... more Theory-generating abductions introduce new (theoretical) concepts into their conclusion. This form of abduction underlies all uncertain inferences from (singular or general) empirical facts to theoretical hypotheses that explain these facts by unobserved or unobservable entities and properties, expressed by theoretical concepts. Theory-generating abductions are discriminated from speculative postfacto abductions by two scientific rationality criteria: unification and independent testability. A particularly important form of theory-generating abductions in science is common cause abductions that explain correlated empirical dispositions in terms of common theoretical causes. These abductions play also an important
Synthese 199, 13067–13094, 2021
In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics... more In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics-multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages.
Journal of Philosophical Logic
In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. ... more In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value (sec. 1). Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language (sec. 2–5). Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Never...
In this paper Reichenbach's best alternative account (BAA) to induction is examined. In the first... more In this paper Reichenbach's best alternative account (BAA) to induction is examined. In the first section, three versions of the BAA are distinguished that have been discussed in the literature. The major objections against all three versions are presented. In the second section it is shown by a text analysis that Reichenbach (The theory of probability, University of California Press, California, 1949) argues for all three versions of the BAA and does not sufficiently distinguish between them. In the third section it is explained how Reichenbach's third version of the BAA can be transformed into a provable optimality theorem within the account of meta-induction.
The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation-theoretic episte... more The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation-theoretic epistemology characterized by two features: (i) All beliefs are to be jus-This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.
In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. ... more In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular 'justifications' are demonstrably without epistemic value (sec. 1). Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus nonclassical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaningpreserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language (sec. 2-5). Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Nevertheless the situation is not symmetric, because classical logic has important ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic.
The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-po... more The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness (Sects. 1, 2). In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures (t-measures) are introduced: (i) comparative versus numeric t-measures, (ii) t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and (iii) t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements (Sects. 4, 5). The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single case probabilities (Sect. 4). The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to true probabilistic laws) can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories (Sects. 4-6). In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness (evaluated relative to given empirical evidence) creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies (as statistical probabilities), but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements (Sect. 6). By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness (Sect. 7).
The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice... more The universal optimality theorem for metainduction works for epistemic agents faced with a choice among finitely many prediction methods. Eckhart Arnold and Tom Sterkenburg objected that it breaks down for infinite or unboundedly growing sets of methods. In this article the metainductive approach is defended against this challenge by extending the optimality theorem (i) to unboundedly growing sets of methods whose number grows less than exponentially in time, (ii) to sequences of methods with an application to Goodman's problem, and (iii) to infinite sets of methods whose number of predictive equivalence classes grows less than linearly in time.
The goal of this paper is to defend the theory of generalized evolution (GE) against criticisms b... more The goal of this paper is to defend the theory of generalized evolution (GE) against criticisms by laying down its theoretical principles and their applications in a unified way. Section 2 develops GE theory and its realization in biological evolution (BE) and cultural evolution (CE). The core of GE theory consists of the three Darwinian principles together with the models of population dynamics (PD). Section 3 reconstructs the most important differences between BE and CE. While BE is predominantly based on the replication of genes, CE is based on the reproduction of memes. Memes are understood as the informational "software" of human brains transmitted through social learning processes. The ontology of memes and the concept of cultural fitness is carved out and refined. Finally, section 4 articulates the minimal ontological assumptions of GE theory and the quantitative principles of generalized PD that unify biological PD and evolutionary game theory.
White (2015) proposes an a priori justication of the reliability of inductive prediction methods... more White (2015) proposes an a priori justication of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justication of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justication externalism and (ii) optimality justications.
Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of c... more Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1-2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).
I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy o... more I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy of science perspective. HoHs can be theory driven or evidence driven. Theory-driven HoHs fit well with standard representations of hierarchical theory nets (HTNs) in the philosophy of science. A disadvantage of the development of theory-driven HoHs is that they neglect hypotheses describing the effects of combinations of causes; this disadvantage can be removed by adding an additional layer of system conditions. Evidence-driven HoHs additionally include kinds of empirical tests by means of which certain hypotheses in the HoH are tested. This aspect of HoHs goes beyond standard HTNs in the philosophy of science and is highly fruitful; however, it leads to certain problems concerning the relation between causal hypotheses and empirically testable correlation claims.
I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy o... more I investigate Heger and Jeschke's account of hierarchies of hypotheses (HoHs) from a philosophy of science perspective. HoHs can be theory driven or evidence driven. Theory-driven HoHs fit well with standard representations of hierarchical theory nets (HTNs) in the philosophy of science. A disadvantage of the development of theory-driven HoHs is that they neglect hypotheses describing the effects of combinations of causes; this disadvantage can be removed by adding an additional layer of system conditions. Evidence-driven HoHs additionally include kinds of empirical tests by means of which certain hypotheses in the HoH are tested. This aspect of HoHs goes beyond standard HTNs in the philosophy of science and is highly fruitful; however, it leads to certain problems concerning the relation between causal hypotheses and empirically testable correlation claims.
The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science... more The frame model was developed in cognitive psychology and imported into the philosophy of science in order to provide representations of scientific concepts and conceptual taxonomies. The aim of this article is to show that beside the representation of scientific concepts the frame model is an efficient instrument to represent and analyze scientific theories. That is, we aim to establish the frame model as a representation tool for the structure of theories within the philosophy of science. For this, we will develop the notion of a theory frame and distinguish between theory frames for qualitative theories in which scientific measurement is based on nominal scales and theory frames for quantitative theories in which measurement is based on ratio scales. In three case studies, we will apply frames to a psychological, a linguistic, and a physical theory, thereby showing that the frame model is a powerful and intuitively accessible instrument to analyze the laws of scientific theories, the determination of theoretical concepts, the explanatory role of theoretical concepts, the abductive introduction of a new theoretical concept, the distinction between the core and the periphery of a theory, the diachronic development of a theory, and the distinction between qualitative and quantitative scientific concepts. Finally, we will provide a comparison to the structuralist view of theories, one of the most elaborated and applied models of theory representation.
According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and c... more According to the material account of induction, all reliable rules of 'induction' are local and context-dependent. Here "induction" is understood in the sense of object-induction, i.e., induction applied at the object-level of events. In contrast, Schurz' account proceeds from the demonstration that there are universally optimal rules of meta-induction, i.e., rules of induction applied at the level of competing methods of prediction, including methods of object-induction. The two accounts are not in opposition; on the contrary, they agree on most questions related to the problem of induction. Beyond this agreement the two accounts are complementary: the material account suffers from a justificational circularity or regress problem that the meta-induction account can solve. On the other hand, the meta-inductive account abstracts from domain-specific aspects of objectinduction that are supplied by the material account.
-- Citation information: Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2012). Explanation, causality, and unific... more --
Citation information: Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2012). Explanation, causality, and unification, 11–12 November [Conference report]. The Reasoner, 6(1), 9–10.
-- Citation information: Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). Introduction to the special issue "... more --
Citation information: Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2016). Introduction to the special issue "Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour" [Introduction]. Synthese, 193(4), 1007–1010. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-1007-7
Editors' introduction to the monographic section Explanation, causality, and unification. Citat... more Editors' introduction to the monographic section Explanation, causality, and unification.
Citation information: Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (2014). Editors’ introduction [Introduction]. Theoria – An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 5–7. doi:10.1387/theoria.10708
-- Citation information: Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Erratum to: Causality as a theoreti... more --
Citation information: Schurz, G., & Gebharter, A. (2016). Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets [Erratum]. Synthese, 193(4), 1105–1106. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1019-y
Contributions to this monographic section: Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Editors' introd... more Contributions to this monographic section:
Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Editors' introduction;
Stathis Psillos: Regularities, natural patterns and laws of nature;
Andreas Hüttemann: Scientific practice and necessary connections;
Erik Weber & Merel Lefevere: The role of explanations in micro-explanations of physical laws;
Gerhard Schurz: Unification and explanation: Explanation as a prototype concept. A reply to Weber and van Dyck, Gijsbers, and de Regt;
Victor Gijsbers: Unification as a measure of natural classification.
Citation information: Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2014). Explanation, causality, and unification [Monographic section]. Theoria – An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 3–82.
Contributions to this special issue: Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Introduction to the s... more Contributions to this special issue:
Alexander Gebharter & Gerhard Schurz: Introduction to the special issue "Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour";
Jiji Zhang & Peter Spirtes: The three faces of faithfulness;
Frederick Eberhardt: Green and grue causal variables;
James Woodward: The problem of variable choice;
Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets;
Gerhard Schurz & Alexander Gebharter: Erratum to: Causality as a theoretical concept: Explanatory warrant and empirical content of the theory of causal nets;
York Hagmayer: Causal Bayes nets as psychological theories of causal reasoning – evidence from psychological research;
Paul Näger: The causal problem of entanglement;
Christopher Hitchcock: Conditioning, intervening, and decision;
Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Of brains and planets: On a causal criterion for mind-brain identities;
Kevin Kelly, Konstantin Genin, & Hanti Lin: Realism, rhetoric and reliability;
Sylvia Wenmackers & Jan-Willem Romeijn: New theory about old evidence: A framework for open-minded Bayesianism;
Clark Glymour: Clark Glymour's responses to the contributions to the Synthese special issue "Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour";
Citation information: Gebharter, A., & Schurz, G. (Eds.). (2016). Causation, probability, and truth – the philosophy of Clark Glymour [Special issue]. Synthese, 193(4).
Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanat... more Mechanisms play an important role in many sciences when it comes to questions concerning explanation, prediction, and control. Answering such questions in a quantitative way requires a formal represention of mechanisms. Gebharter (2014) suggests to represent mechanisms by an acyclic causal net's arrows. In this paper we show how this approach can be extended in such a way that it can also be fruitfully applied to mechanisms featuring causal feedback.
In this paper we demonstrate that causality, if characterized by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines’ ... more In this paper we demonstrate that causality, if characterized by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines’ (2000) causal Markov and minimality conditions, satisfies recent standards for theoretical concepts. Firstly, it explains two otherwise unexplainable statistical phenomena and, thus, can be justified as something ontologically real by an inference to the best (available) explanation (IBE). Secondly, while the set of axioms containing only the causal Markov and the minimality conditions is empirically empty, adding principles of faithfulness, time directedness, or intervention assumptions excludes certain logically possible probability distributions. Thus, enriched versions of the theory possesses empirical content, on the basis of which not only particular causal models, but the respective version of the theory as a whole becomes independently testable.
In this paper we show that the application of Occam’s razor to the theory of causal Bayes nets gi... more In this paper we show that the application of Occam’s razor to the theory of causal Bayes nets gives us a neat definition of direct causation. In particular we show that Occam’s razor implies Woodward’s (2003) definition of direct causation, provided suitable intervention variables exist and the causal Markov condition (CMC) is satisfied. We also show how Occam’s razor can account for direct causal relationships Woodward style when only stochastic intervention variables are available.
The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompa... more The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1).