Markus Schrenk | Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (original) (raw)

Videos by Markus Schrenk

Many works of art are predominantly visual or auditory in nature (visual arts such as drawing, pa... more Many works of art are predominantly visual or auditory in nature (visual arts such as drawing, painting, photography or performing arts like music). Only some art works (happenings, fluxus, performance) might also crucially involve the audience’s own physicality and thereby intentionally provoke the recipients’ perception of their own body, i.e. their proprioceptions.
This talk poses a radical question: Could there be works of art that are primarily or dominantly proprioceptive in nature, i.e. that have the perception of one’s own body movement and position in space, balance, muscle tension, stretching, pain, temperature, energy and stress levels, etc., at their core:
Is proprioceptive art possible?

267 views

Books by Markus Schrenk

The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all... more The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics.

There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against the claim that our perceptions are ‘locally conjoined’ with any entity (namely, a soul).

Special Issue of Yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy (mentis 2010)

http://www.mentis.de/index.php?id=00000065&article_id=00000028&serie_id=00000013

http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/pla/index.html

Kurzbeschreibung des Verlags: Die Grundlagen der Sprachphilosophie werden in diesem Band anschaul... more Kurzbeschreibung des Verlags: Die Grundlagen der Sprachphilosophie werden in diesem Band anschaulich und didaktisch erläutert. Was sind Sätze? Welche anderen Bausteine der Sprache gibt es? Wie verhält sich die Sprachphilosophie zu den übrigen philosophischen Disziplinen? Auch die aktuellen Strömungen sprachphilosophischer Forschung werden beleuchtet.

Universality is not sufficient to distinguish laws of nature from accidental regularities. A mult... more Universality is not sufficient to distinguish laws of nature from accidental regularities. A multitude of additional defining features have been suggested. Yet, once it is acknowledged that exceptionless universality is not the only criterion for lawhood it is possible to start questioning whether it is necessary.

In this book I take this step and I conclude that existing theories—especially David Lewis’s and David Armstrong’s—are, in fact, strong enough to guarantee lawhood even if there are instances that do not conform to the laws. I also advance two novel theories for special science ceteris paribus laws.

My arguments also cover themes from philosophy of religion (miracles) and cosmology (black holes and other singularities).

Papers by Markus Schrenk

In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher ... more In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a phenomenalist viewpoint, i.e., if we believe that the manifold of sensations we are confronted with is ontologically fundamental —as Mach clearly does: “For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,… are the ultimate ele-ments” (Mach 1885: 23)—then we are in danger to end up in solipsism. Unless, that is, we assume that some underlying thing-in-itself substratum from which matter, we ourselves, and all the others emanate. The only other alter-native seems to be—and Mach advertises it vehemently for he denies any “mons-trous notion of a thing-in-its...

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 2023

Vermögen und Handlung

Hume glaubte, die Kausalverknüpfung sei eine "secret connection", also eine Verknüpfung die minde... more Hume glaubte, die Kausalverknüpfung sei eine "secret connection", also eine Verknüpfung die mindestens unerkennbar, wenn nicht sogar inexistent ist. Einige moderne Gegner Humes halten dem entgegen, dass aposteriorisch entdeckte, metaphysische Notwendigkeit, wie wir sie beispielsweise von Kripke und Putnam kennen, diejenige objektiv-reale Verknüpfung in der Welt ist, die auch die Rolle einer kausalen Verknüpfung in der Welt spielen kann. Ich hinterfrage diese anti-Hume'sche Identifizierung kausaler mit metaphysischer Notwendigkeit, zeige aber auch einen anderen Weg auf, kausale Kräfte zu postulieren: Wenn unsere willentlichen Handlungen auf Widerstände in der Welt stossen, haben wir (direkten) Beobachtungszugang zu einer Verknüpfung in der Welt, die mindestens einen essentiellen Teil kausaler Kraft ausmacht. Die wesentlichen Argumentationsschritte des Papers sind die folgenden: (1.1-1.5) Die Nähe der metaphysischen Notwendigkeit zur logischen Notwendigkeit wird aufgezeigt. Es wird vermutet, dass metaphysische Notwendigkeit eine Projektion logischer Notwendigkeit auf die Welt ist. (1.6) Dies mag in synchron-statischen Fällen (Wasser ist H2O, etc.) zulässig sein, nicht aber in diachron-dynamisch Fällen (Kausalität, das Manifestieren von Dispositionen, etc.). Wegen der prinzipiellen Möglichkeit von Intervention und Prävention kann kausale "Notwendigkeit" keine strikte Notwendigkeit sein. (2 & 3.1-3.2) Nach einer Zwischenbilanz wird eine Alternative für einen aposteriorischen Zugang zu einer anti-Humeschen Verknüpfung in der Welt vorgestellt. Die Kernthese ist, dass wir kausale Kräfte in der Widerständigkeit der Welt gegen unsere willentlichen Akte wahrnehmen. (3.3) Hume selbst diskutierte und verwarf diese These. Seine Gegenargumente werden entkräftet und es wird gezeigt, wie eng seine These von der fehlenden Kausalverknüpfung mit einem (ungewollten) Idealismus verknüpft ist. (3.4) Die These der Widerstandserfahrung als Zugang zu einer anti-Humeschen Verknüpfung fügt sich in zwei Theorien der Kausalität nahtlos ein: Manipulations-und Transfertheorien. | ! 1 30 ! Ich danke Tony Dardis, Andreas Hüttemann, Jennifer McKitrick und Daniel Wehinger für ihre wertvollen Kommentare 1 zu einer früheren Fassung dieses Beitrags. Mein Dank gilt auch allen Teilnehmern der Konferenz "Handeln und Verursachen" in Innsbruck im September 2012 für die kritischen Fragen und hilfreichen Anmerkungen. Bastian Walter hat mir beim Erstellen der Bibliographie geholfen. Anne Sophie Spann bin ich für ihre unendliche Geduld und das Ausrichten der Konferenz dankbar. " | ! 3 30 ! Ohne dass die beiden jedoch selbst diese Intuitionen teilten. 3 ! Ich weiß nicht, ob alle anti-Humeaner diese beiden Intuitionen teilen. Die, die es nicht tun (oder nur eine davon), 4 werden ihre Interessen in diesem Paper nur bedingt verfolgt sehen.

The Philosophy ofLanguage belongs to the foundations of philosophical reflexion. In this volume, ... more The Philosophy ofLanguage belongs to the foundations of philosophical reflexion. In this volume, its central problems and strategies are explained, and the nature of sentences and other elements of language are analysed. The didactical exposition of the most important schools and thinkers makes the volume particularly interesting for readers new to the subject

WBG (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) eBooks, Feb 7, 2014

Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) a... more Many philosophers of science think that most laws of nature (even those of fundamental physics) are so called ceteris paribus laws, i.e., roughly speaking, laws with exceptions. Yet, the ceteris paribus clause of these laws is problematic. Amongst the more infamous difficulties is the danger that 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, ceteris paribus' may state no more than a tautology: 'For all x: Fx ⊃ Gx, unless not'. One of the major attempts to avoid this problem (and others concerning ceteris paribus laws) is to claim that the subject matter of laws are ascriptions of dispositions, powers, capacities etc., and not the regular behaviour we find in nature. That we do not know whether the cetera are paria in a specific situation does not matter to the dispositionalist because the objects have the disposition regardless of the circumstances. The defence of the latter claim is that dispositions can be instantiated without being manifested. Hence, the laws that ascribe dispositions are strict and it looks as if they do not face the above mentioned problems of ceteris paribus laws. In this essay I attempt to show that these assumptions are wrong. I hope to illustrate that not only does the ceteris paribus clause reoccur inside the dispositions, moreover, there are laws-laws about non-fundamental entities with instable dispositions-which bear a ceteris paribus clause that cannot be hidden in a disposition. 1 ALL PREVAILING CETERIS PARIBUS LAWS Many philosophers of science think that all, most, or many laws of nature are so called ceteris paribus laws. Take the following statements for examples: "All laws are ceteris paribus laws. (in Fn.) I even intend to include most so-called fundamental laws of physics." (Cartwright 1995: 155) "Whatever the law says must happen, hold or obtain, everything else being equal." (Harré 1993: 79) "The validity of most laws-even of a fundamental physical kind-is compatible with the existence of exceptional situations." (Kistler 2003: 192) 1 Better, the core of the proviso law does not hold good; where I define: the core of '∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx), ceteris paribus' is ∀x (Fx ⊃ Gx).

Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, ... more Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates.

w/k - Zwischen Wissenschaft & Kunst, 2020

Zeitschrift Fur Philosophische Forschung, Sep 28, 2015

Philosophie ist oft dann am faszinierendsten, wenn sie die gewohnte Sicht der Dinge aufbricht und... more Philosophie ist oft dann am faszinierendsten, wenn sie die gewohnte Sicht der Dinge aufbricht und uns anders sehen lehrt, wenn sie unser Begriffsschema ändert. Barbara Vetters Buch tut genau dies: Es liefert uns eine neue Orthodoxie, wie Potentialität und Modalität gedacht werden können. Und die Autorin argumentiert vorbildlich, mit einer Klarheit und Präzision, die man manchmal in der Literatur über dispositionale Kräfte vermisst. Vetter schreibt auf Seite 300: "This book is meant to be the beginning of a debate, not its end" und es ist ein Vergnügen, Anteil an dieser beginnenden Debatte zu haben. Fangen wir also an: Ein weiter Teil des Buchs handelt davon, warum die orthodoxe Auffassung, wie Dispositionen bzw. Dispositionsprädikate metaphysisch/semantisch zu analysieren sind, zugunsten von Vetters Potentiale-Metaphysik aufgegeben werden soll. Aspekte dieses Teils werden im ersten Kommentar behandelt. Ein zweiter großer Teil des Projekts betrifft die Art und Weise, wie wir von Potentialen zu Möglichkeiten gelangen. Das wird ein maßgeblicher Part des zweiten Kommentars sein. 1.0 Argumente für die Triggerlosigkeit Die orthodoxen Kernthesen zu Dispositionen, wie Löslichkeit zum Beispiel, lauten, so Vetter:

We present a cognitively grounded analysis of the pattern of variation that underlies the use of ... more We present a cognitively grounded analysis of the pattern of variation that underlies the use of two aspectual markers in Spanish (the Simple-Present marker, Ana baila ‘Ana dances’ and the Present-Progressive marker, Ana está bailando ‘Ana is dancing’) when they express an eventin-progress reading. This analysis is centered around one fundamental communicative goal, which we term perspective alignment: the bringing of the hearer's perspective closer to that of the speaker. Perspective alignment optimizes the tension between two nonlinguistic constraints: Theory of Mind, which gives rise to linguistic expressivity, and Common Ground, which gives rise to linguistic economy. We propose that, linguistically, perspective alignment capitalizes on lexicalized meanings, such as the progressive meaning, that can bring the hearer to the “here and now”. In Spanish, progressive meaning can be conveyed with the Present-Progressive marker regardless of context. By contrast, if the Simple-Pres...

Erkenntnis, 2014

This paper combines two ideas: (i) That the Lewisian best system analysis of lawhood (BSA) can co... more This paper combines two ideas: (i) That the Lewisian best system analysis of lawhood (BSA) can cope with laws that have exceptions (cf. Braddon-Mitchell 2001, Schrenk 2007). (ii) That a BSA can be executed not only on the mosaic of perfectly natural properties but also on any set of special science properties (cf., inter alia, Schrenk 2007 & 2008, Cohen & Callender 2009 & 2010). Bringing together (i) and (ii) results in an analysis of special science ceteris paribus laws.

267 views

Special Issue of Yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy (mentis 2010)

http://www.mentis.de/index.php?id=00000065&article_id=00000028&serie_id=00000013

http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/pla/index.html

My arguments also cover themes from philosophy of religion (miracles) and cosmology (black holes and other singularities).

Oxford University Press eBooks, Jun 1, 2023

Vermögen und Handlung

WBG (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft) eBooks, Feb 7, 2014

w/k - Zwischen Wissenschaft & Kunst, 2020

Zeitschrift Fur Philosophische Forschung, Sep 28, 2015

Erkenntnis, 2014

... Rudolph Glitz, Holger Hoock, Andreas Krebs, Gordon Lawson, Achim Näckel, Thomas Runkel, and J... more ... Rudolph Glitz, Holger Hoock, Andreas Krebs, Gordon Lawson, Achim Näckel, Thomas Runkel, and Julia Schrenk helped me with all that is non-academic. And so did Migena: I have been very lucky to enjoy her love and companionship. ...

The Philosophical Quarterly, 2010

David Armstrong's law-maker, nomological necessity (N), is a second order relational universal th... more David Armstrong's law-maker, nomological necessity (N), is a second order relational universal that holds between state of affairs types, e.g., N(F, G). With only a small proviso, nomological necessity is supposed to instantiate as the causation of its second relatum, G, whenever its first relatum, F, instantiates. In this paper, I will show that there is some friction within this theory when we consider that causal processes can be prevented and interfered with. The above mentioned proviso is supposed to handle these case but, so I argue, it fails to do so.

Noûs, 2010

This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existen... more This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity.-Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties-kinds and their essential features, for example-but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do that job. My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many decades-namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates-but I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly.

This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existen... more This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity. — Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue. I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds and their essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do that job. My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many decades —...

British Journal for The Philosophy of Science, 2008

Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy,, 2010