Carsten Held | Universität Erfurt (original) (raw)

Papers by Carsten Held

Kant's Legacy, Apr 16, 2001

Any theory of conditions must solve the symmetry problem, i.e. must (i) explain why being a neces... more Any theory of conditions must solve the symmetry problem, i.e. must (i) explain why being a necessary condition and being sufficient condition in many cases are not mutual converses, yet in some cases having to do with the notion of truth they are; and must (ii) explain why being a necessary and sufficient condition is generally non-symmetric, yet in some cases having to do with the notion of truth is symmetric. I explain the problem and propose a solution

Symbol and Physical Knowledge, 2002

... it seems to say that the square of the time dependent coe cient hakj (t1) i (the length of th... more ... it seems to say that the square of the time dependent coe cient hakj (t1) i (the length of the projec-tion of j (t1) ionto jaki) yields the ... come as opposed to another possible one is the actual outcome; all of them are actual, relative to, eg, a world or a mind.(See Everett 1957, Albert ...

International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 2012

Theoria, 2006

Los editores agradecen la inestimable contribucion aportada par las personas que se detallan a co... more Los editores agradecen la inestimable contribucion aportada par las personas que se detallan a continuacion, cada una de las cuales informo sobre uno 0 mas manuscritos durante el periodo 2003-2005. Ellos han aiiadido competencia a los juicios emitidos por los miembros de los Consejos Asesor y Editor que habitualmente han venido informando sobre los manuscritos.

For an indicative conditional to be true it is not generally sufficient that its antecedent be fa... more For an indicative conditional to be true it is not generally sufficient that its antecedent be false or its consequent true. I propose to analyse such a conditional as strong, i.e. as containing a tacit quantification over a domain of possible situations, with the if-clause specifying that domain such that the conditional gets assigned the appropriate truth conditions. Now, one definition of logical consequence proceeds in terms of a natural-language conditional. Interpreting it as strong leads to a paraconsistent consequence relation, though the motivation behind it is not to reason coherently about contradictions but to reason entirely without them.

The paper presents an argument for the incompleteness in principle of quantum mechanics. I introd... more The paper presents an argument for the incompleteness in principle of quantum mechanics. I introduce four principles (P0–P3) concerning the interpretation of probability, in general and in quantum mechanics, and argue that the defender of completeness must reject either P0 or all of P1–P3, which options both seem unacceptable. The problem is shown to be more fundamental than the measurement problem and to have implications for our understanding of quantum-mechanical contextuality.

Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2017

Antecedent-strengthening, a trivially valid inference of classical logic of the form: P → Q ⊨ (P ... more Antecedent-strengthening, a trivially valid inference of classical logic of the form: P → Q ⊨ (P & R) → Q, has a counterpart in everyday reasoning that often fails. A plausible solution to the problem involves assuming an implicit ceteris paribus (CP) qualifier that can be explicated as an additional conjunct in the antecedent of the premise. The qualifier can be explicated as ‘everything else relevant remains unchanged’ or alternatively as ‘nothing interferes’. The qualifier appears most prominently in the context of the discussion of laws in the sciences, where these laws are often expressed with a CP qualifier. From an analysis of the qualifier’s role in the problem of antecedent-strengthening, we can learn more about CP qualifiers in general and in their application to the laws used in the sciences.

Mind & Society, 2012

Rationality in decision making is commonly assessed by comparing choice performance against norma... more Rationality in decision making is commonly assessed by comparing choice performance against normative standards. We argue that such a performance-centered approach blurs the distinction between rational choice and adaptive behavior. Instead, rational choice should be assessed with regard to the way individuals make analytic decisions. We suggest that analytic decisions can be made in two different modes in which control processes are directed at different levels. In a RUN mode, thought is directed at controlling the operation of a decision strategy. In the JUMP mode, the individual analyses the interpretation of the decision situation as well as the appropriateness of alternative strategies. We suggest that a decision should be considered ''rational'' when an individual is able to switch between these modes and balance their interaction.

Quantum Studies: Mathematics and Foundations

$Research paper thumbnail of Renate Huber: Einstein und Poincaré. Die philosophische Beurteilung physikalischer Theorien\Carsten Klein: Konventionalismus und Realismus. Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Relevanz der empirischen Unterbestimmtheit von Theorien$

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis

Journal for General Philosophy of Science

Page 1. ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 138 Mental Models and the Mind Carsten Held Markus Knauff Gottfrie... more Page 1. ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 138 Mental Models and the Mind Carsten Held Markus Knauff Gottfried Vosgerau Page 2. MENTAL MODELS AND THE MIND Current Developments in Cognitive Psychology, Neuroscience, and Philosophy of Mind Page 3. ...

Foundations of Physics, Nov 5, 2014