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ProtoSociology Vol. 39 2022 Physicalism, or something near enough In Memory of Jaegwon Kim Edited by Terry Horgan and Brian McLaughlin
Jaegwon Kim (1934-2019) is one of the most influential metaphysicians and philosophers of mind in... more Jaegwon Kim (1934-2019) is one of the most influential metaphysicians and philosophers of mind in the last third of the Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century. In metaphysics, he did pioneering work on events, supervenience, emergence, higher-level causation, properties, and the metaphysics of the special sciences. His highly influential work in the philosophy of mind centered around the mind-body problem. This special issue of Protosciology is in his honor.
Born in Korea, Kim’s first two years of university were at the Seoul National University in South Korea. He moved to the United States after he won a competition for a scholarship to Dartmouth College. After graduating from Dartmouth in 1955, he went to graduate school in Philosophy at Princeton University, where he wrote a dissertation under the supervision of Carl Hempel. Kim’s first teaching position was at Swarthmore College, where he taught for a brief period. Then, over the course of his career, he taught at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University (visiting Professor), the University of Pennsylvania (visiting Professor), Notre Dame University (visiting Professor), the University of Michigan (for many years), and Brown University, where he was the William Herbert Faunce Professor of Philosophy from 1987 until his retirement in 2014. He was President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1989 and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1991. In 2014, he received the prestigious Kyung-Ahm Prize from the Kyung-Ahm Education & Cultural Foundation.
Frank.Manfred.Präreflektives.Selbstbewusstsein
Most of the processes of our soul life may run unconsciously. But only when they become conscious... more Most of the processes of our soul life may run unconsciously. But only when they become conscious do they seem to really concern us. But what makes psychic events conscious? Since Aristotle, philosophers have blamed a peculiar "self-registration mechanism". About its explanation, however, their views diverge widely. Until today the opinion prevails that consciousness comes about by the fact that a mental act of a higher level bends back to a preceding act of a lower level. But how can this be, if the lower level act was not already -- "pre-reflexive", i.e. : 'before all reflection' -- familiar with itself? Should all consciousness presuppose prereflexive self-consciousness? This is what Manfred Frank argues for, supported by the few texts that encourage such a view in modern and contemporary times. Among them is the recently developed "self-representationalism", to which nevertheless critical questions are raised.
Die meisten Vorgänge unseres Seelenlebens mögen unbewusst ablaufen. Aber nur wenn sie bewusst werden, scheinen sie uns wirklich anzugehen. Was aber macht psychische Ereignisse bewusst? Seit Aristoteles machen Philosophen einen eigentümlichen "Selbstregistrierungs-Mechanismus" dafür verasntwortlich. Über dessen Erklärung gehen ihre Ansichten allerdings weit auseinander. Es überwiegt bis heute die Meinung, Bewusstsein komme dadurch zustgande, dass ein psychischer Akt höherer Stufe sich auf einen vorangehenden Akjt niederer Stufe quasi zurückbeugt. Wie aber kann das sein, wenn der niederstufige nicht schon -- "präreflexive", d.h. : 'aller Reflexion zuvor' -- mit sich selbst vertraut war? Sollte alles Bewusstsein präreflexives Selbstbewusstsein voraussetzen? Dafür argumentiert Manfred Frank, gestützt auf die wenigen Texte, die in Neuzeit und Gegenwart eine solche Ansicht ermutigen. Dazu gehört der unlängst entwickelte "Selbstrepräsentationalismus", an den gleichwohl kritische Fragen ergehen.
Stuttgard: Reclam 2015
New edition
Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Goethe-University, ProtoSociology Journal and Project 2022
Ingvar Johanssen Free Will and Evolution , 2023
With this little book, I wish to demonstrate that not all philosophers have given up on the belie... more With this little book, I wish to demonstrate that not all philosophers have
given up on the belief that humans sometimes have a little bit of free will. All states, events, and processes in the world can, in my opinion, not be explained solely through causal factors, regardless of whether these are seen as completely determining or only determining with a certain degree of probability. It is not the case that everything happens due to necessity or chance. Sometimes, humans have a little bit of freedom of action and—more often yet—a will that is, within certain limits, free. For a long time, this opinion has not been held in high regard among philosophers and scientists, especially not among natural scientists and social scientists of the structuralist proclivity. After tentatively starting to write this book in the early autumn of 2020, my motivation to finish the work was reinvigorated in an unexpected way later in October, when the three recipients of the Nobel Prize in physics were announced. One of them, Roger Penrose (b. 1931), has long held the door open to a belief in free will. Though he was not given the award for these opinions, of course. He received it for his theories on how black holes are formed in the
universe.
Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, and raised, from 1924, in S... more Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, and raised, from 1924, in Staten Island, New York. He was educated both as an undergraduate and graduate at Harvard University. After a stint in the navy during the Second World War, which interrupted his graduate education, he returned to Harvard to complete a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus in 1949. He became one the most important philosophers of second half of the 20th century.
He made seminal contributions to many topics but is best known for his
work in three areas. The first is the theory of meaning, especially his work on radical interpretation and the use of truth theories to illuminate the
compositional structure of natural languages. The second is the philosophy of action, in particular, his view that our reasons for what we do both cause and justify them. The third is the philosophy of mind, especially his theory of anomalous monism, which affirms the token identity of mental with physical events, but denies their type-type identity.
Um viele Jahre ging ein Vorspiel unserer späten Freundschaft voraus. In ihm kamen schon dieselben... more Um viele Jahre ging ein Vorspiel unserer späten Freundschaft voraus. In ihm kamen schon dieselben Motive auf, die unsere späteren Begegnungen mehr und mehr durchzogen und getragen haben. Bisher ehrte ich an der Co-lumbia-University in New York, meist über die Philosophie von Leibniz bis Hegel und über die Philosophie des Geistes. Dabei ging es mir nicht darum, eine Botschaft zu exportieren. Ich suchte nur nach der besten Gelegenheit, mich mit der angelsächsischen Analyse vertraut zu machen – vor Ort und möglichst im persönlichen Umgang mit ihren Protagonisten. Als ich damals hörte, dass Donald Davidson zur Rockefeller-University gekommen war, bat ich also sogleich darum, an seinem Unterricht teilnehmen zu können. Ich fuhr dann, wie in den Jahren zuvor zu einem Seminar von Wilfried Sellars, mit meinem blauen Beetle von Stop-Licht zu Stop-Licht quer durch Man-hattan, um ein Seminar von Donald und John Wallace über ‚satisfaction‘ zu besuchen. Es erwies sich als eine Art von Colloquium der beiden, wobei Wallace eine Art von permanentem Referenten gewesen ist. Ich konnte, wie die meisten im kleinen Kreis, nichts zu dem Tema beitragen. Aber Donald hatte doch bemerkt, dass da einer ‚von der andren Seite‘ (Manhattans und des Ozeans) gegenwärtig war.
Li, Feng Analyses on Arbitrariness of Chinese Characters from the Perspective of Morphology
The arbitrariness of a sign is considered a universal feature and a well-established property of ... more The arbitrariness of a sign is considered a universal feature and a well-established property of the world's languages by many linguists, which makes languages flexible and facilitates distinguishing the particular referents to words. However, there are some exceptions in the case of Chinese, a language quite different from western languages. This article analyzes Chinese's arbitrariness mainly from the perspective of word formation and will show that Chinese characters, which were iconic originally, depart from this universal feature to a great extent. Through many transformations and changes, Chinese characters continue to display three features: iconicity, systematicity and arbitrariness.
Penco Carlo, Idiolect and context
In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson's claims on the problem of communicatio... more In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson's claims on the problem of communication and idiolects: how can we understand each other if we use different idiolects? First I define the problem, giving the alternative theses of (I) the priority of language over idiolects and (II) the priority of idiolects over language. I then present Dummett's claims supporting (I) and Davidson's claims supporting (II). In the first three paragraphs, I will provide a reconstruction of the debate between Dummett and Davidson, showing some weaknesses in both programs. In the remaining two paragraphs, I will work on the concept of "convergence". I will try to show that the process of convergence, which is basic in Davidson's theory, needs a level of (formal) analysis of what I call "contextual competence". The main point of the paper is to show a blindspot in Davidson and Dummett, and to fill the gap. In short, to explain communication, Dummett asks for too much sharing among speakers, and Davidson asks for too little. Even if proposed, for the sake of argument, as a possible supplementation of Davidson's idea of convergence, the suggestion of contextual competence may be used as an extension of Dummett's molecularism. 1
Green, Mitchell Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression
I provide an overview of the main themes, claims, and arguments in support of those claims that f... more I provide an overview of the main themes, claims, and arguments in support of those claims that form the substance of my book, Self-Expression (OUP, 2007; paperback issue, 2011). I then summarize some recently published comments upon and challenges to certain of those claims and arguments offered by BarOn (2010), Eriksson (2010), Martin (2010), and Moore (2010). Next, I reply to those comments and challenges, in some cases by clarification of what is in the book, and in other cases by refinement and elaboration thereof. I close with some glimpses ahead to lines of research that I intend to pursue in further development of the book's main theses.
Rational Procedures A neo Fregean Perspective ond Thougth and Jugement
In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought" in the debate on the defini... more In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought" in the debate on the definition of the content of an assertion. I shall present a well known tension in Frege's writings, between a cognitive and semantic notion of sense. This tension is at the source of some of the major contemporary discussions, mainly because of the negative influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which did not give in-depth consideration to the tension found in Frege. However many contemporary authors, after the first attempt by Carnap himself, have tried to make room both for a cognitive and semantic aspect of meaning. I claim that at least some of these attempts (Dummett, Perry and Chalmers) are seriously flawed, mainly due to the difficulty in making a proper connection between the two different conceptions of sense. I shall outline an alternative project, which takes into consideration Frege's requirements on antipsychologism and of the objectivity of thought, while maintaining a close connection between the two aspects of sense. The hints which may come from Frege's tension suggest some constructivist solutions, solving the tension within a framework of contemporary logic of uncertain reasoning.
Willburn.Ron.Assertability
In a number of papers, Keith DeRose articulates his reasons for thinking that we cannot plausibly... more In a number of papers, Keith DeRose articulates his reasons for thinking that we cannot plausibly explain the mechanics of knowledge attribution in terms of varying conditions of warranted assertability (1998, 2002). His reasoning is largely comparative: “know,” he argues, proves a poor candidate for such a diagnosis when compared to other terms to
which such warranted assertabilility maneuvers (i.e., WAMs) clearly apply. More specifically, DeRose aims, through to use of such comparative case studies, to identify several general
principles through which we might determine when WAMs are called for. In what follows, I take issue with one of these principles and argue that DeRose’s efforts to deploy the others to pro-contextualist (i.e., anti-invariantist) ends are misguided. I conclude by examining
DeRose’s specific objection to Unger’s skeptical invariantism, and identify a problematic feature of his recurrent appeals to linguistic intuition. The payoff of this is an enhanced appreciation of the factors on which the contextualist/invariantist dispute should be seen to turn.
It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their ... more It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their words. Yet "ignorance and error" arguments proposed by the revolution in the theory of reference seem to show that people can share a meaning and yet differ greatly in usage. Horwich responds to this problem for UTM by appealing to deference. I give five reasons for doubting that his brief remarks about deference can be developed into a satisfactory theory.
oder Dorothée Legrand). Doch hat er bei diesen Autoren nicht genau die Bedeutung, die Sartre mein... more oder Dorothée Legrand). Doch hat er bei diesen Autoren nicht genau die Bedeutung, die Sartre meinte eingeführt zu haben und an der ich mich im Folgenden orientiere. Der Ausdruck ist zunächst in negativer Absicht geprägt worden. Er besagt, dass Selbstbewusstsein nicht das Ergebnis einer Reflexion sei, wie das die Verteter(innen) der Mainstream Philosophy of Mind, besonders die Higher-Order-Theoretiker(innen) annehmen. Manche Kritiker werfen den Verfechter(inne)n der Präreflexivität vor, im Negativen stecken geblieben zu sein und nicht ins Offene einer positiven Theorie des Selbstbewusstseinsgelangt zu sein. Diesen Einwand werde ich am Schluss diskutieren. Ich will im Folgenden zuerst (I) daran erinnern, welche Philosophen mit welcher Motivation auf der Präreflexivität des Selbstbewusstseins bestanden haben. In einem II. Teil werde ich höherstufige von einstufigen Modellen der Selbstrepräsentation unterscheiden und die Vorzüge der zweiten verteidigen. Die so genannten self-representatio nalists, die hier angesprochen werden, lehnen aber mehrheitlich prä-reflexives Bewusstsein ab. Sie tun es, weil sie fälschlich meinen, ‚Repräsentation' sei der basale Terminus-"the core condition" (Kriegel 2009, 107, 154 ff.)-jeder angemessenen Bewusstseins-Theorie. Diesen Standpunkt greife ich im III. Abschnitt an, indem ich u. a. zeige, dass Selbst-Repräsentation am De-se constraint scheitert, der zu radikalen, prä-reflexivistischen Konsequenzen einlädt. Im IV. Teil will ich abschließend vorführen, dass eine übliche Kritik am Präreflexivismus unbegründet ist, wonach er sich nämlich nur negativ zu Alternativmodellen verhalte und insbesondere der inneren Differenziertheit der Gesamtstruktur von subjektivem Bewusstsein nicht gerecht werde.
The World in the Head (Cummins, 2010) is a collection of sixteen papers spanning over two decades... more The World in the Head (Cummins, 2010) is a collection of sixteen papers spanning over two decades. Six of them are co-authored with various colleagues. 1 Three have not been previously published. All of them are papers in the philosophy of mind. More particularly, they are about representation and psychological explanation. All of these papers are colored by two convictions that, for me, amount to methodological constraints. The first is that the philosophy of mind should be a branch of the philosophy of science, where the sciences in question are psychology, neuroscience and biology, especially evolutionary biology. More particularly, the philosophy of mental representation should, first and last, account for the explanatory role representation plays in the sciences of the mind. The second constraint is really a consequence of the first. It is that neither the semantics of propositional attitude sentences, nor our "intuitions" concerning the application of mental terminology to various real or hypothetical situations, should constrain the science or our attempts to make sense of it. "Philosophers of mind," I wrote in the Preface to The World in the Head, "come in many flavors, but a useful broad sort when thinking about the philosophy of mental representation is the distinction between philosophers of science, whose science was one of the mind sciences, and philosophers of language, whose interest in the verbs of propositional attitude led to an interest in the contents of beliefs" (p. v). I am deeply suspicious of the latter approach because it inevitably leads to what I call semantic poaching. There is a tempting line of argument running from the semantic analysis of sentences involving "mental" terminology to conclusions about the functional structure of the
I argue that the scope of Searle's theory is wider than previously acknowledged. Critics object t... more I argue that the scope of Searle's theory is wider than previously acknowledged. Critics object that the scope of the theory is too narrow since it cannot account for opaque kinds of social facts due to the self-referentiality of social concepts. Using the distinction between a macrolevel and a micro-level, I show that it can in fact account for opaque social phenomena like power structures and inflation: opaque kinds of social facts (macro phenomena) can be reduced to self-referential and transparent institutional facts (micro phenomena). Hence, opaque social phenomena can be taken into account, while still keeping the self-referentiality.
I explore the question of whether scientific changes can induce mutations in our ordinary notion ... more I explore the question of whether scientific changes can induce mutations in our ordinary notion of existence. I conclude that they can't, partially on the grounds that some of the proposed alternative-notions of existence are only terminologically-distinct from our ordinary notion, and so don't provide genuine metaphysical alternatives, and partially on the grounds that the ordinary notion of existence is criterion-transcendent.
Dieter Henrich’s treatise “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht” (Fichte’s Original Insight) was first... more Dieter Henrich’s treatise “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht” (Fichte’s Original
Insight) was first published in 1966.1 Half a century on, Henrich has now
presented this text once again unchanged and followed it with an extensive commentary. Those familiar with Dieter Henrich’s philosophical life’s work will be excited to read the retrospective reflections on his early interpretation of Fichte. To anticipate: Henrich’s afterthoughts impressively reveal the unbroken fascination of Fichte’s ‘original insight’. At the same time, they offer a decisive plea for the topicality of Fichte’s epochal discovery in the context of founding a theory of subjectivity. Compared with the early treatise, however, the critical distance of the author’s own theory on the connection between selfconsciousness
and life is profiled more sharply in relation to the systematics of
Fichte’s philosophy. Before this can be explored in more detail, it is useful to recall the motives and central theses of the 1966 treatise.
Fichte’s original insight was an ‘untimely meditation’.
Stolzebnberg Jürgen “But how is self-consciousness possible?” Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in “Judgment and Being”
“But how is self-consciousness possible?” Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in “Judgment and Bein... more “But how is self-consciousness possible?”
Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in
“Judgment and Being”
At first glance it may be odd to turn to Friedrich Hölderlin in order to discuss problems of self-consciousness. Hölderlin, you may say, was a poet and not a philosopher. Of course, Hölderlin was a poet, but nevertheless he was very well acquainted with the philosophical problems of his days.1 What is more he played an important role within the post-kantian philosophy, especially within the advanced discussions about self-consciousness – more precisely concerning the problem of defining the logical structure of the concept of self-consciousness and its role as a grounding principle of philosophy.
Our source is a text by Hölderlin which was edited by Friedrich Beißner in 1961. Beißner baptized it “Über Urteil und Seyn” – ‘On Judgment and Being’, following the keywords at the beginning of the two sections of the text.2 In the following, I will not deal with the special historical circumstances of this text.3 I rather want to show its systematic importance with regard to the concept of self-consciousness, especially with regard to recent theories which understand self-consciousness in terms of self-representation.4 Here Hölderlin can be a systematically important interlocutor.
Miguens.Sofia.Phenomenology
ProtoSociology Vol. 39 2022 Physicalism, or something near enough In Memory of Jaegwon Kim Edited by Terry Horgan and Brian McLaughlin
Jaegwon Kim (1934-2019) is one of the most influential metaphysicians and philosophers of mind in... more Jaegwon Kim (1934-2019) is one of the most influential metaphysicians and philosophers of mind in the last third of the Twentieth Century and early Twenty-First Century. In metaphysics, he did pioneering work on events, supervenience, emergence, higher-level causation, properties, and the metaphysics of the special sciences. His highly influential work in the philosophy of mind centered around the mind-body problem. This special issue of Protosciology is in his honor.
Born in Korea, Kim’s first two years of university were at the Seoul National University in South Korea. He moved to the United States after he won a competition for a scholarship to Dartmouth College. After graduating from Dartmouth in 1955, he went to graduate school in Philosophy at Princeton University, where he wrote a dissertation under the supervision of Carl Hempel. Kim’s first teaching position was at Swarthmore College, where he taught for a brief period. Then, over the course of his career, he taught at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University (visiting Professor), the University of Pennsylvania (visiting Professor), Notre Dame University (visiting Professor), the University of Michigan (for many years), and Brown University, where he was the William Herbert Faunce Professor of Philosophy from 1987 until his retirement in 2014. He was President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1989 and was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1991. In 2014, he received the prestigious Kyung-Ahm Prize from the Kyung-Ahm Education & Cultural Foundation.
Frank.Manfred.Präreflektives.Selbstbewusstsein
Most of the processes of our soul life may run unconsciously. But only when they become conscious... more Most of the processes of our soul life may run unconsciously. But only when they become conscious do they seem to really concern us. But what makes psychic events conscious? Since Aristotle, philosophers have blamed a peculiar "self-registration mechanism". About its explanation, however, their views diverge widely. Until today the opinion prevails that consciousness comes about by the fact that a mental act of a higher level bends back to a preceding act of a lower level. But how can this be, if the lower level act was not already -- "pre-reflexive", i.e. : 'before all reflection' -- familiar with itself? Should all consciousness presuppose prereflexive self-consciousness? This is what Manfred Frank argues for, supported by the few texts that encourage such a view in modern and contemporary times. Among them is the recently developed "self-representationalism", to which nevertheless critical questions are raised.
Die meisten Vorgänge unseres Seelenlebens mögen unbewusst ablaufen. Aber nur wenn sie bewusst werden, scheinen sie uns wirklich anzugehen. Was aber macht psychische Ereignisse bewusst? Seit Aristoteles machen Philosophen einen eigentümlichen "Selbstregistrierungs-Mechanismus" dafür verasntwortlich. Über dessen Erklärung gehen ihre Ansichten allerdings weit auseinander. Es überwiegt bis heute die Meinung, Bewusstsein komme dadurch zustgande, dass ein psychischer Akt höherer Stufe sich auf einen vorangehenden Akjt niederer Stufe quasi zurückbeugt. Wie aber kann das sein, wenn der niederstufige nicht schon -- "präreflexive", d.h. : 'aller Reflexion zuvor' -- mit sich selbst vertraut war? Sollte alles Bewusstsein präreflexives Selbstbewusstsein voraussetzen? Dafür argumentiert Manfred Frank, gestützt auf die wenigen Texte, die in Neuzeit und Gegenwart eine solche Ansicht ermutigen. Dazu gehört der unlängst entwickelte "Selbstrepräsentationalismus", an den gleichwohl kritische Fragen ergehen.
Stuttgard: Reclam 2015
New edition
Frankfurt a. M., Germany: Goethe-University, ProtoSociology Journal and Project 2022
Ingvar Johanssen Free Will and Evolution , 2023
With this little book, I wish to demonstrate that not all philosophers have given up on the belie... more With this little book, I wish to demonstrate that not all philosophers have
given up on the belief that humans sometimes have a little bit of free will. All states, events, and processes in the world can, in my opinion, not be explained solely through causal factors, regardless of whether these are seen as completely determining or only determining with a certain degree of probability. It is not the case that everything happens due to necessity or chance. Sometimes, humans have a little bit of freedom of action and—more often yet—a will that is, within certain limits, free. For a long time, this opinion has not been held in high regard among philosophers and scientists, especially not among natural scientists and social scientists of the structuralist proclivity. After tentatively starting to write this book in the early autumn of 2020, my motivation to finish the work was reinvigorated in an unexpected way later in October, when the three recipients of the Nobel Prize in physics were announced. One of them, Roger Penrose (b. 1931), has long held the door open to a belief in free will. Though he was not given the award for these opinions, of course. He received it for his theories on how black holes are formed in the
universe.
Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, and raised, from 1924, in S... more Donald Davidson (1917 – 2003) was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, and raised, from 1924, in Staten Island, New York. He was educated both as an undergraduate and graduate at Harvard University. After a stint in the navy during the Second World War, which interrupted his graduate education, he returned to Harvard to complete a dissertation on Plato’s Philebus in 1949. He became one the most important philosophers of second half of the 20th century.
He made seminal contributions to many topics but is best known for his
work in three areas. The first is the theory of meaning, especially his work on radical interpretation and the use of truth theories to illuminate the
compositional structure of natural languages. The second is the philosophy of action, in particular, his view that our reasons for what we do both cause and justify them. The third is the philosophy of mind, especially his theory of anomalous monism, which affirms the token identity of mental with physical events, but denies their type-type identity.
Um viele Jahre ging ein Vorspiel unserer späten Freundschaft voraus. In ihm kamen schon dieselben... more Um viele Jahre ging ein Vorspiel unserer späten Freundschaft voraus. In ihm kamen schon dieselben Motive auf, die unsere späteren Begegnungen mehr und mehr durchzogen und getragen haben. Bisher ehrte ich an der Co-lumbia-University in New York, meist über die Philosophie von Leibniz bis Hegel und über die Philosophie des Geistes. Dabei ging es mir nicht darum, eine Botschaft zu exportieren. Ich suchte nur nach der besten Gelegenheit, mich mit der angelsächsischen Analyse vertraut zu machen – vor Ort und möglichst im persönlichen Umgang mit ihren Protagonisten. Als ich damals hörte, dass Donald Davidson zur Rockefeller-University gekommen war, bat ich also sogleich darum, an seinem Unterricht teilnehmen zu können. Ich fuhr dann, wie in den Jahren zuvor zu einem Seminar von Wilfried Sellars, mit meinem blauen Beetle von Stop-Licht zu Stop-Licht quer durch Man-hattan, um ein Seminar von Donald und John Wallace über ‚satisfaction‘ zu besuchen. Es erwies sich als eine Art von Colloquium der beiden, wobei Wallace eine Art von permanentem Referenten gewesen ist. Ich konnte, wie die meisten im kleinen Kreis, nichts zu dem Tema beitragen. Aber Donald hatte doch bemerkt, dass da einer ‚von der andren Seite‘ (Manhattans und des Ozeans) gegenwärtig war.
Li, Feng Analyses on Arbitrariness of Chinese Characters from the Perspective of Morphology
The arbitrariness of a sign is considered a universal feature and a well-established property of ... more The arbitrariness of a sign is considered a universal feature and a well-established property of the world's languages by many linguists, which makes languages flexible and facilitates distinguishing the particular referents to words. However, there are some exceptions in the case of Chinese, a language quite different from western languages. This article analyzes Chinese's arbitrariness mainly from the perspective of word formation and will show that Chinese characters, which were iconic originally, depart from this universal feature to a great extent. Through many transformations and changes, Chinese characters continue to display three features: iconicity, systematicity and arbitrariness.
Penco Carlo, Idiolect and context
In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson's claims on the problem of communicatio... more In this paper I will compare some of Dummett and Davidson's claims on the problem of communication and idiolects: how can we understand each other if we use different idiolects? First I define the problem, giving the alternative theses of (I) the priority of language over idiolects and (II) the priority of idiolects over language. I then present Dummett's claims supporting (I) and Davidson's claims supporting (II). In the first three paragraphs, I will provide a reconstruction of the debate between Dummett and Davidson, showing some weaknesses in both programs. In the remaining two paragraphs, I will work on the concept of "convergence". I will try to show that the process of convergence, which is basic in Davidson's theory, needs a level of (formal) analysis of what I call "contextual competence". The main point of the paper is to show a blindspot in Davidson and Dummett, and to fill the gap. In short, to explain communication, Dummett asks for too much sharing among speakers, and Davidson asks for too little. Even if proposed, for the sake of argument, as a possible supplementation of Davidson's idea of convergence, the suggestion of contextual competence may be used as an extension of Dummett's molecularism. 1
Green, Mitchell Refinements and Elaborations on the Central Ideas of Self-Expression
I provide an overview of the main themes, claims, and arguments in support of those claims that f... more I provide an overview of the main themes, claims, and arguments in support of those claims that form the substance of my book, Self-Expression (OUP, 2007; paperback issue, 2011). I then summarize some recently published comments upon and challenges to certain of those claims and arguments offered by BarOn (2010), Eriksson (2010), Martin (2010), and Moore (2010). Next, I reply to those comments and challenges, in some cases by clarification of what is in the book, and in other cases by refinement and elaboration thereof. I close with some glimpses ahead to lines of research that I intend to pursue in further development of the book's main theses.
Rational Procedures A neo Fregean Perspective ond Thougth and Jugement
In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought" in the debate on the defini... more In this paper I shall deal with the role of "understanding a thought" in the debate on the definition of the content of an assertion. I shall present a well known tension in Frege's writings, between a cognitive and semantic notion of sense. This tension is at the source of some of the major contemporary discussions, mainly because of the negative influence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which did not give in-depth consideration to the tension found in Frege. However many contemporary authors, after the first attempt by Carnap himself, have tried to make room both for a cognitive and semantic aspect of meaning. I claim that at least some of these attempts (Dummett, Perry and Chalmers) are seriously flawed, mainly due to the difficulty in making a proper connection between the two different conceptions of sense. I shall outline an alternative project, which takes into consideration Frege's requirements on antipsychologism and of the objectivity of thought, while maintaining a close connection between the two aspects of sense. The hints which may come from Frege's tension suggest some constructivist solutions, solving the tension within a framework of contemporary logic of uncertain reasoning.
Willburn.Ron.Assertability
In a number of papers, Keith DeRose articulates his reasons for thinking that we cannot plausibly... more In a number of papers, Keith DeRose articulates his reasons for thinking that we cannot plausibly explain the mechanics of knowledge attribution in terms of varying conditions of warranted assertability (1998, 2002). His reasoning is largely comparative: “know,” he argues, proves a poor candidate for such a diagnosis when compared to other terms to
which such warranted assertabilility maneuvers (i.e., WAMs) clearly apply. More specifically, DeRose aims, through to use of such comparative case studies, to identify several general
principles through which we might determine when WAMs are called for. In what follows, I take issue with one of these principles and argue that DeRose’s efforts to deploy the others to pro-contextualist (i.e., anti-invariantist) ends are misguided. I conclude by examining
DeRose’s specific objection to Unger’s skeptical invariantism, and identify a problematic feature of his recurrent appeals to linguistic intuition. The payoff of this is an enhanced appreciation of the factors on which the contextualist/invariantist dispute should be seen to turn.
It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their ... more It is plausible to think that members of a linguistic community typically mean the same by their words. Yet "ignorance and error" arguments proposed by the revolution in the theory of reference seem to show that people can share a meaning and yet differ greatly in usage. Horwich responds to this problem for UTM by appealing to deference. I give five reasons for doubting that his brief remarks about deference can be developed into a satisfactory theory.
oder Dorothée Legrand). Doch hat er bei diesen Autoren nicht genau die Bedeutung, die Sartre mein... more oder Dorothée Legrand). Doch hat er bei diesen Autoren nicht genau die Bedeutung, die Sartre meinte eingeführt zu haben und an der ich mich im Folgenden orientiere. Der Ausdruck ist zunächst in negativer Absicht geprägt worden. Er besagt, dass Selbstbewusstsein nicht das Ergebnis einer Reflexion sei, wie das die Verteter(innen) der Mainstream Philosophy of Mind, besonders die Higher-Order-Theoretiker(innen) annehmen. Manche Kritiker werfen den Verfechter(inne)n der Präreflexivität vor, im Negativen stecken geblieben zu sein und nicht ins Offene einer positiven Theorie des Selbstbewusstseinsgelangt zu sein. Diesen Einwand werde ich am Schluss diskutieren. Ich will im Folgenden zuerst (I) daran erinnern, welche Philosophen mit welcher Motivation auf der Präreflexivität des Selbstbewusstseins bestanden haben. In einem II. Teil werde ich höherstufige von einstufigen Modellen der Selbstrepräsentation unterscheiden und die Vorzüge der zweiten verteidigen. Die so genannten self-representatio nalists, die hier angesprochen werden, lehnen aber mehrheitlich prä-reflexives Bewusstsein ab. Sie tun es, weil sie fälschlich meinen, ‚Repräsentation' sei der basale Terminus-"the core condition" (Kriegel 2009, 107, 154 ff.)-jeder angemessenen Bewusstseins-Theorie. Diesen Standpunkt greife ich im III. Abschnitt an, indem ich u. a. zeige, dass Selbst-Repräsentation am De-se constraint scheitert, der zu radikalen, prä-reflexivistischen Konsequenzen einlädt. Im IV. Teil will ich abschließend vorführen, dass eine übliche Kritik am Präreflexivismus unbegründet ist, wonach er sich nämlich nur negativ zu Alternativmodellen verhalte und insbesondere der inneren Differenziertheit der Gesamtstruktur von subjektivem Bewusstsein nicht gerecht werde.
The World in the Head (Cummins, 2010) is a collection of sixteen papers spanning over two decades... more The World in the Head (Cummins, 2010) is a collection of sixteen papers spanning over two decades. Six of them are co-authored with various colleagues. 1 Three have not been previously published. All of them are papers in the philosophy of mind. More particularly, they are about representation and psychological explanation. All of these papers are colored by two convictions that, for me, amount to methodological constraints. The first is that the philosophy of mind should be a branch of the philosophy of science, where the sciences in question are psychology, neuroscience and biology, especially evolutionary biology. More particularly, the philosophy of mental representation should, first and last, account for the explanatory role representation plays in the sciences of the mind. The second constraint is really a consequence of the first. It is that neither the semantics of propositional attitude sentences, nor our "intuitions" concerning the application of mental terminology to various real or hypothetical situations, should constrain the science or our attempts to make sense of it. "Philosophers of mind," I wrote in the Preface to The World in the Head, "come in many flavors, but a useful broad sort when thinking about the philosophy of mental representation is the distinction between philosophers of science, whose science was one of the mind sciences, and philosophers of language, whose interest in the verbs of propositional attitude led to an interest in the contents of beliefs" (p. v). I am deeply suspicious of the latter approach because it inevitably leads to what I call semantic poaching. There is a tempting line of argument running from the semantic analysis of sentences involving "mental" terminology to conclusions about the functional structure of the
I argue that the scope of Searle's theory is wider than previously acknowledged. Critics object t... more I argue that the scope of Searle's theory is wider than previously acknowledged. Critics object that the scope of the theory is too narrow since it cannot account for opaque kinds of social facts due to the self-referentiality of social concepts. Using the distinction between a macrolevel and a micro-level, I show that it can in fact account for opaque social phenomena like power structures and inflation: opaque kinds of social facts (macro phenomena) can be reduced to self-referential and transparent institutional facts (micro phenomena). Hence, opaque social phenomena can be taken into account, while still keeping the self-referentiality.
I explore the question of whether scientific changes can induce mutations in our ordinary notion ... more I explore the question of whether scientific changes can induce mutations in our ordinary notion of existence. I conclude that they can't, partially on the grounds that some of the proposed alternative-notions of existence are only terminologically-distinct from our ordinary notion, and so don't provide genuine metaphysical alternatives, and partially on the grounds that the ordinary notion of existence is criterion-transcendent.
Dieter Henrich’s treatise “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht” (Fichte’s Original Insight) was first... more Dieter Henrich’s treatise “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht” (Fichte’s Original
Insight) was first published in 1966.1 Half a century on, Henrich has now
presented this text once again unchanged and followed it with an extensive commentary. Those familiar with Dieter Henrich’s philosophical life’s work will be excited to read the retrospective reflections on his early interpretation of Fichte. To anticipate: Henrich’s afterthoughts impressively reveal the unbroken fascination of Fichte’s ‘original insight’. At the same time, they offer a decisive plea for the topicality of Fichte’s epochal discovery in the context of founding a theory of subjectivity. Compared with the early treatise, however, the critical distance of the author’s own theory on the connection between selfconsciousness
and life is profiled more sharply in relation to the systematics of
Fichte’s philosophy. Before this can be explored in more detail, it is useful to recall the motives and central theses of the 1966 treatise.
Fichte’s original insight was an ‘untimely meditation’.
Stolzebnberg Jürgen “But how is self-consciousness possible?” Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in “Judgment and Being”
“But how is self-consciousness possible?” Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in “Judgment and Bein... more “But how is self-consciousness possible?”
Hölderlin’s criticism of Fichte in
“Judgment and Being”
At first glance it may be odd to turn to Friedrich Hölderlin in order to discuss problems of self-consciousness. Hölderlin, you may say, was a poet and not a philosopher. Of course, Hölderlin was a poet, but nevertheless he was very well acquainted with the philosophical problems of his days.1 What is more he played an important role within the post-kantian philosophy, especially within the advanced discussions about self-consciousness – more precisely concerning the problem of defining the logical structure of the concept of self-consciousness and its role as a grounding principle of philosophy.
Our source is a text by Hölderlin which was edited by Friedrich Beißner in 1961. Beißner baptized it “Über Urteil und Seyn” – ‘On Judgment and Being’, following the keywords at the beginning of the two sections of the text.2 In the following, I will not deal with the special historical circumstances of this text.3 I rather want to show its systematic importance with regard to the concept of self-consciousness, especially with regard to recent theories which understand self-consciousness in terms of self-representation.4 Here Hölderlin can be a systematically important interlocutor.
Miguens.Sofia.Phenomenology
Gerhard Preyer Soziologie ohne Menschen Studien zu gesellschaftlichen Mitgliedschawftsordnungen
Eliezer Ben-Rafael From Multiple Modernities to Multiple Globalizations
We draw from Eisenstadt's (2002) conceptualization of multiple modernities which he proposed to a... more We draw from Eisenstadt's (2002) conceptualization of multiple modernities which he proposed to analyze processes marking modernity and their different versions in contemporary societies. These processes do not delete all pre-existing orientations, value affinities and social arrangements, and while modernity is recognizable everywhere, modern societies also differ at other respects. We formulate a similar contention for globalization. We point to three interacting and intermingling movers of social reality-globalization, multiculturalism and the national principle-which concretize everywhere, and according to contexts and a priori features, specific models qualifying for the notion of multiple globalizations. Beyond the variety of multiple globalizations, this notion underlines the newness of our time and hints the "next society".
Vittorio Cotesta The Axial Age and Modernity: From Max Weber to Karl Jaspers and Shmuel Eisenstadt
This essay highlights the theoretical relations between Weber, Jaspers and Eisenstadt on the issu... more This essay highlights the theoretical relations between Weber, Jaspers and Eisenstadt on the issue of the axial age and modernity. For Weber Modernity is an "axial age" but also an event in the history of Western rationalization. So we can't say which is his idea on this topic. For Jaspers the axial revolution took place at the same time in China, India, and Greece. Modernity can't be an "axial age" because it took place in the West and only after in these three civilizations. For Eisenstadt, on the contrary, modernity is a second "axial age". He thinks the XX and the XXI century as an era of multiple modernities.
Deborah Perron Tollefsen Collective Epistemic Agency n
Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualis... more Who Knows? According to contemporary analytic epistemology only individuals do. This individualistic bias is present in standard analyses of knowledge. The "S" of "S knows that p" is always an individual cognizer. The idea that collectives could be genuine knowers has received little, if any, serious consideration. 1 This form of epistemic individualism, call it epistemic agent individualism, seems to be motivated by the view that epistemology is about things that go on inside the head. As one prominent analytic epistemologist puts it, "Knowers are individuals, and knowledge is generated by mental processes and lodged in the mind-brain" (Goldman, 1987). In this paper I challenge epistemic agent individualism by arguing that certain groups can be epistemic agents. In section I, I develop an account of epistemic agency based on the work of Tyler Burge. In section II, I extend this account of epistemic agency to groups. In section III, I consider whether my thesis supports the view, put forth by some feminist epistemologists, that social groups or communities are the primary epistemic agents.
Domenica Bruni Love, sex,and language: Gender differences in sexual fantasizing and evolutionary evidence from story telling
Charles Darwin first argued that natural selection affects not only biological structures, but al... more Charles Darwin first argued that natural selection affects not only biological structures, but also cognitive functions. Evolutionary psychology has now shown how this influence encompasses every facet of the mind, from categorization to language. In particular, the impact of selection pressure is evident in the human ability to form narratives. But, not all narratives are the same; they serve different functions from both an individual and societal perspective. There is also an interesting gender difference in them. It is precisely at the intersection of gender differences, different kinds of narratives, and different ways in which selection pressures affect men's and women's behaviour, that we see a somewhat sexually oriented natural preference for different kinds of stories. While men have a clear preference for erotic fiction, women seem to prefer the romance novel. The reason for this lies in the different parental investment that evolutionarily characterizes males and females of the human species. While male interest is about increasing the chances of offspring, female interest is about building relationships stable enough for parental care to succeed during the difficult period of human neoteny. This is the reason why males and females prefer to fantasize sexually about different things. This thesis is tested by strong contemporary cultural drives that seem to free the sexes, at least in part, from such constraints. The social organization of Western countries, women's emancipation movements, and particularly the contemporary tendency to transform every natural drive into a cultural convention, transform the evolutionary constraints just mentioned into socially contested social constructs. It is impossible to determine the outcome of this struggle. But interestingly, this tension shapes the cultural conjuncture in which we live, making our time a pivotal point in the evolutionary and cultural history of our species.
Nicholas Rescher Presumption an the Judgement of Elites
Elites arise whenever there is a group within whose membership there is some feature of more or l... more Elites arise whenever there is a group within whose membership there is some feature of more or less. They consist of those group members that exhibit this feature none the general run—to a greater extent than most. To symbolize this we shall designate by <F, G> the elite constituted by the subgroup of those G members that exhibit the feature F to a greater than ordinary extent.
However, the special focus on the present discussion will be upon reflexive groups—those amongst whose membership certain intra-group relations obtain, so that some of them can stand in relation R to others. With such a group there will (or can) be
1. The active elite <R→, G> consisting of those G-members that R a more than ordinarily larger number of others.
2. The passive elite <R←, G> consisting of those G-members that are Rd by a more than ordinarily larger number of others.
With reflexive groups there will accordingly be second-order elites as for example the people most trusted (or resented) among those who are themselves most trusted (or resented). This second-order elite may be designated by <R←, <R←, G>>.
Richard Münch Die Dialektik von transnationaler Integration und nationaler Desintegration
In der Debatte über den zunehmenden Wettbewerb zwischen den liberalen, konservativen und egalitär... more In der Debatte über den zunehmenden Wettbewerb zwischen den liberalen, konservativen und egalitären Modellen des Wohlfahrtsstaates in der globalisierten Wirtschaft wird in der Regel die größere Integrationskraft als Argument für die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der konservativen und egalitären Modelle ins Feld geführt. In diesem Aufsatz soll im Anschluss an Emile Durkheim und Robert K. Merton gezeigt werden, dass relative Exklusion eine wesentliche Ursache für Desintegrationserscheinungen wie Delinquenz, politischer Extremismus, politische Entfremdung, Rückzug und auch mangelndes Commitment (Ritualismus) ist. Es wird dargelegt, dass relative Exklusion lange Zeit eher ein Merkmal der US-amerikanischen Gesellschaft als Repräsentant des liberalen Wohlfahrtsstaatsmodells war, aber weniger ein Merkmal der europäischen konservativen und egalitären Wohlfahrtsstaaten. In einem weiteren Schritt wird festgestellt, dass allerdings auch die konservativen und egalitären Wohlfahrtsstaaten in der jüngeren Vergangenheit eine Zunahme von Desintegrationserscheinungen zu verbuchen haben. Dieser Trend wird mit einer auch in diesen Wohlfahrtsstaaten steigenden relativen Exklusion neuer marginalisierter Gruppen erklärt. Es werden sechs Entwicklungstrends dafür verantwortlich gemacht. Diese Entwicklungstrends münden in ein grundsätzliches Spannungsverhältnis von transnationaler und nationaler Integration. Strategien der Reintegration auf nationaler Ebene sind in ihren Erfolgsbedingungen an die Bewältigung dieser Spannung gebunden.
Klaus Lichtblau Die Stellung der Soziologie innerhalb der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Disziplinen
Einer weit verbreiteten Meinung zufolge hat sich die Soziologie in den letzten hundert Jahren zun... more Einer weit verbreiteten Meinung zufolge hat sich die Soziologie in den letzten hundert Jahren zunehmend von den ihr benachbarten Disziplinen ‚emanzipiert‘. Wurde sie einstmals noch den Geistes-, Staats- oder Kulturwissenschaften zugerechnet, sei spätestens Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts ein Zustand erreicht worden, dem zufolge die moderne Soziologie gemäß einem berühmten Diktum von René König nichts anderes mehr „als Soziologie“ sein möchte.
Klaus Lichtblau Vergemeinschaftung and Vergesellschaftung in Max Weber: A reconstruction of his linguistic usage
This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the a... more This article appeared in a journal published by Elsevier. The attached copy is furnished to the author for internal non-commercial research and education use, including for instruction at the authors institution and sharing with colleagues. Other uses, including reproduction and distribution, or selling or licensing copies, or posting to personal, institutional or third party websites are prohibited. In most cases authors are permitted to post their version of the article (e.g. in Word or Tex form) to their personal website or institutional repository. Authors requiring further information regarding Elsevier's archiving and manuscript policies are encouraged to visit: http://www.elsevier.com/copyright
Veridiana Domingos Cordeiro ‘Groups’ as a product of individual and collective memory: the hardcore of Maurice Halbwachs’ theory of collective memory
This paper reconstructs the theoretical framework of the Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective ... more This paper reconstructs the theoretical framework of the Maurice Halbwachs' theory of collective memory, demonstrating that the hardcore of his theory relies on the conceptualization of 'groups' because of individual memory and collective memory. We show how this relation is entailed by the epistemic objective status attribute to remembrances, and what is the place for the individual remembrance itself. At the end, we show how every content related to the past could be framed by his theoretical assumptions.
This paper tries to demonstrate three problems that emerge when we try to define knowledge within... more This paper tries to demonstrate three problems that emerge when we try to define knowledge within Max Weber's Sociology: the indetermination of semantic acts, the paradox of magical contents, and the presupposition of meaning for meaning creation. We demonstrate how it is possible to solve two of them with the work of the American philosopher John Searle due to their converging hardcore theoretical assumptions. Nevertheless, because of their similar individualistic position to explain social knowledge there remains one of the problems, which is a dilemma. At the end, we indicate the limitations of the individualistic assumptions.
ProtoSociology Vol. 38 2021 Thirty Years of ProtoSociology Three decades between disciplines, 2021
ProtoSociology Vol. 38 2021 Thirty Years of ProtoSociology Three Decades between Disciplines ... more ProtoSociology
Vol. 38 2021
Thirty Years of ProtoSociology
Three Decades between Disciplines
Edited by Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter, and Reuss-Markus Krausse
https://www.pdcnet.org/protosociology/Special-Issues
New Philosophy
Gerhard Preyer
Materialismus, phänomenales Bewusstsein und eigenpsychische Basis
William G. Lycans Theory der mentalen Repräsentation und des phänomenalen Externalismus
https://tinyurl.com/2p8mc98y
ProtoSociology occupies an important position in the European intellectual scene, bridging philos... more ProtoSociology occupies an important position in the European intellectual scene, bridging philosophy, economics, sociology and related disciplines. Its volumes on rationality bring together concerns in all these topics, and present an important challenge to the cognitive sciences. Donald Davidson ProtoSociology is a truly premier interdisciplinary journal that publishes articles and reviews on timely topics written by and for a wide range of international scholars.
Roger Gibson
} ProtoSociology Vol. 32: Making and Un-Making Modern Japan | Making and Un-Making Making and Un-... more } ProtoSociology Vol. 32: Making and Un-Making Modern Japan | Making and Un-Making Making and Un-Making Making and Un-Making Modern Japan Modern Japan Modern Japan Ritu Vij (ed.) Ritu Vij (ed.) Ritu Vij (ed.) © ProtoSociology Volume 32/2015: Making and Un-Making Modern Japan
Scholars of different schools have extensively analyzed world systems as networks of communicatio... more Scholars of different schools have extensively analyzed world systems as networks of communication under the fashionable heading "globalization". Our collected new research pushes the argument one-step further. Globalization is not a homogenization of all social life on earth. It is a heterogeneous process that connects the global and the local on different levels. Furthermore, globalization is more often used as a catchall argument to pursue political goals than for sound scientific analysis. Eager followers of the concept of globalization largely overestimate its dynamics and its opponents forcefully deconstruct the concept under different perspectives. Yet, we also recognize, it is a social process thats leads to new forms of differentiation and thereby an evolution of functional imperatives for all differentiated social systems, not only for the economical system, the political system or households but also for ethnic and religious communities. Differentiation means distinction. Distinctions emerge on both sides: inside and outside. Analyzing the processes to bridge inside and outside, we find a set mechanisms of selection, which produce new zones of social change but also new borderlines and new frontiers within the social conduct. Networks perform these mechanisms of selection. Globalization is used as metaphor to describe the complex set of interrelated networks within an emerging global social structure. In a time of globalization the development of networks as an increasingly important part of a new social structure means as well other conditions of membership, particular forms of segregation and social conflicts without simple or consensual solutions. In particular sociologists such as in the tradition of Talcot Parsons overestimate the role of consent of values in social systems. It was a result of a continuation of the problem of legitimization as the basic feature of the political system following Max Weber's sociology. Today we recognize that no societal system (Gesellschaftssystem) can be controlled by the "imagined" consent among its members. We can not presuppose consent independent from the factor of time, for example, at which point in time is there an agreement between which members of social systems. In particular the system of modern society is not structured through value consent at all. On the contrary values are modified in an opportunistic way. Sociologists often do not take into account sufficiently, that subsystems of action of modern societies have Introduction: Borderlines in Time of Globalization 5 their own temporal structure and fixe and program their codes of membership in their own ways. Ignoring these processes leads to the illusion of an overall societal consent of values.
Aus A folgt B, aus B folgt C: Also folgt C aus A. Das westliche Denken zerlegt Abläufe in ihre Be... more Aus A folgt B, aus B folgt C: Also folgt C aus A. Das westliche Denken zerlegt Abläufe in ihre Bestandteile, untersucht ihre Abfolge und zieht daraus Folgerungen. Diese uns selbstverständliche Vorgehensweise verkennt die chinesische Kommunikation und die Geschäftsgestaltung in China. In China erfolgreich zu sein heißt, sowohl Vergangenes und Zukünftiges als auch Soziales und Geschäftliches in eine Betrachtung einzubeziehen. Das erfordert das Denken in Kreisläufen.