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Conference Presentations by Andreas Sandner

It is widely held in analytic philosophy of mind and cognition that olfactory perception – first ... more It is widely held in analytic philosophy of mind and cognition that olfactory perception – first and foremost – represents odours if it represents anything at all. Despite some controversies on the very nature of those odours we encounter in olfactory perceptual experience, the vast majority of today’s philosophers hold that the intentional objects of olfactory perception are the odorous emanations of so-called source objects – ordinary concrete things. So, broadly speaking, most discussants account for some version of the principle of ‘olfactory austerity’: When we smell we perceive nothing but odours, and never do we (directly) smell particular objects.

After depicting the main reasons for adopting such a view especially within a chiefly representationalist framework, I will examine one of the alleged benefits a bit more carefully. Namely I will address the anti-visuocentrism in austere theories of olfactory objects. It has been argued frequently that the view of olfactory austerity reveals our visuocentric biases and guides us to overcome them in theorising perception. In short, the idea goes pretty much as follows: Those who think that we could smell ordinary objects in olfactory experience just like we can see these objects in visual experience simply disregard the missing aspects of objecthood in what is really smelled there, particularly the missing spatial structure. To attribute such aspects to pure olfactory experience then would mean to fall for the supremacy of vision and to only infer the particular source object by the smelled odour from memory or recollection.

The main goal of my talk will come down to contrasting the so reproached visuocentrism of a source-object-theory of olfactory objects with the visuocentricism within the view of olfactory austerity itself, as it is still at work at the very core of this approach in that the criteria of ‘objecthood’ are obviously stipulated by means of the ordinary objects in visual perception. What is at stake in this comparison is to extrapolate visuocentrism as a crucial structure of perceptual consciousness – at least for the sighted – and hence accounting for the supremacy of vision as a fact instead of a fallacious bias.

Was genau riechen wir, wenn wir etwas riechen? In der Diskussion über sogenannte »olfaktorische O... more Was genau riechen wir, wenn wir etwas riechen? In der Diskussion über sogenannte »olfaktorische Objekte« lassen sich, ganz grundlegend betrachtet, zwei mögliche Antworten auf diese Frage finden: Vertreter einer »Dufttheorie« (odour theory) argumentieren dafür, dass die infrage stehenden Objekte des Riechens (smelling) eben die Düfte (odours) sind, die von Gegenständen ausströmen oder von diesen hinterlassen werden. Die Gegenposition, die als »Quellobjekttheorie« (source-object theory) bezeichnet wird, sollte dagegen annehmen, dass die eigentlichen Objekte des Riechens die Gegenstände selbst sind, also die Dinge, die einen Duft emittieren. Bezeichnenderweise wird letztere Position bislang aber wohl gar nicht in Anspruch genommen. Die Diskutanten erörtern daher immer »nur« verschiedene Varianten eines prinzipiell duft-theoretischen Ansatzes, denn alle sich einige darüber zu sein, dass wir riechend eigentlich keine Dinge wie Bücher, Blumen oder Katzen wahrnehmen, sondern eben stets bloß die Düfte derselbigen. Wie aber kommt es zu einer solch beispiellosen Einhelligkeit der Debattenteilnehmer? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage sollen zunächst die wichtigsten Einwände gegen die Quellobjekttheorie vorgestellt werden, welche zugleich auch die zentralen Grundzüge der Dufttheorie beinhalten. Anschließend soll gezeigt werden, dass bei dieser Konzeption eine latent videozentrische Grundannahme zum Tragen kommt, die eine Quellobjekttheorie nicht-visueller Wahrnehmungssinne schon von vorn herein auszuschließen scheint und gleichzeitig den Blick auf die gravierenden immanenten Probleme der Dufttheorie selbst verstellt. Tatsächlich entpuppt sich diese nämlich entweder als zirkulär oder sie führt zu einem infiniten Regress. Da die gegen eine Quellobjekttheorie vorgebrachten Kritikpunkte weit weniger schwerwiegend sind, möchte ich schließlich einen wahrnehmungsphilosophischen Ansatz skizzieren, der eine solche Theorie grundsätzlich ermöglichen würde.

In this presentation I'm concerned with some struggles regarding the relation, the similarities a... more In this presentation I'm concerned with some struggles regarding the relation, the similarities and differences of continental phenomenology and analytic representational theory of mind in the area of philosophy of perception...

Since smelling seems to be a very rare topic in the philosophy of perception, I tried to figure o... more Since smelling seems to be a very rare topic in the philosophy of perception, I tried to figure out that it in fact is a topic which was discussed during the whole history of western philosophy and also that it really is a philosophical topic worth discussing. Pointing out the remarks on smell, odor and olfaction of different authors, from Plato over Condillac to Jean Paul, I emphasized three main subjects every scent philosophy has to deal with:

(1) hierarchy of senses
(2) intellectual and/or epistemic powers of smelling
(3) our poor olfactory vocabulary & the difficulty of speaking of scents

In a last step I showed how these issues are presented and dealt with in contemporary systematic arguments by referring to William G. Lycans paper "The intentionality of smell" as an example for the recent debate on what is called "olfactory consciousness".

Papers by Andreas Sandner

When Kant read the first review of his Critique Of Pure Reason’s A edition by Garve & Feder he ob... more When Kant read the first review of his Critique Of Pure Reason’s A edition by Garve & Feder he obviously found it outrageous. Not only did it overlook the fundamental revolution in philosophical thinking, it even classed his system with the idealistic approach of George Berkeley which Kant thought of as one of those that he just would have been refuted with his Critique. That’s how the review became an important starting point for Kant’s Prolegomena as well as for the changes that make up the B edition of the Critique. However, since parallels to Berkeley in fact don’t seem to be so erroneous and since the Prolegomena’s and B edition’s remarks regarding the bishop are far from simply clarifying the differences between Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s immaterialism the question about their theoretical relation remains unanswered.
In my master thesis I’m reconstructing Kant’s arguments throughout the passages in A and B edition of the Critique Of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena where he outlines and defends transcendental idealism against other forms of idealism. In every step I try to stay highly sensible for Kant’s intentions and beliefs regarding the problems he just addresses and wants to solve. Nevertheless I will conclude by claiming that, despite some indisputable formal differences, the philosophical systems of Kant and Berkeley indeed notably share important contentual fundamentals.

Plato's Phaedo is very famous for its proof of the immortality of the soul. Unfortunately this ex... more Plato's Phaedo is very famous for its proof of the immortality of the soul. Unfortunately this existential question somehow overshines all the other problems raised in the dialogue. One of these more unknow parts is the so called "Second Voyage", which describes the method of hypothesis and Plato's theory of forms as causes. My aim is to examine the passage 95a4-102a9 to figure out clearly what's the connection between forms and causes and the method of hypothesis, and how the theoretical assumptions made there could benefit philosophy in general.

(1) hierarchy of senses
(2) intellectual and/or epistemic powers of smelling
(3) our poor olfactory vocabulary & the difficulty of speaking of scents