Toma Strle | University of Ljubljana (original) (raw)

Books by Toma Strle

Aristej (publisher), 2021

Papers by Toma Strle

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2021

Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems increasingly take on crucial roles in our technology-dr... more Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems increasingly take on crucial roles in our technology-driven society, making decisions, for instance, concerning employment, education, finances, and public services. This article aims to identify peoples’ attitudes towards ADM systems and ensuing behaviours when dealing with ADM systems as identified in the literature and in relation to credit scoring. After briefly discussing main characteristics and types of ADM systems, we first consider trust, automation bias, automation complacency and algorithmic aversion as attitudes towards ADM systems. These factors result in various behaviours by users, operators, and managers. Second, we consider how these factors could affect attitudes towards and use of ADM systems within the context of credit scoring. Third, we describe some possible strategies to reduce aversion, bias, and complacency, and consider several ways in which trust could be increased in the context of credit scoring. Importantly, although many advantages in applying ADM systems to complex choice problems can be identified, using ADM systems should be approached with care – e.g., the models ADM systems are based on are sometimes flawed, the data they gather to support or make decisions are easily biased, and the motives for their use unreflected upon or unethical.

Constrictivist Foundations, 2021

Constructivist Foundations, 2020

I show that first-person inquiry into the lived experience of decision-making in naturalistic set... more I show that first-person inquiry into the lived experience of decision-making in naturalistic settings in part affords a different understanding and conceptualization of the phenomenon from those arising in third-person laboratory research. Two aspects are discussed: the role of the task and how the participants understand the investigative situation. Furthermore, I briefly address a related matter: What shapes the choice of tasks in the first place? I argue both that the assemblage of the tasks we use to investigate the mind shapes the way we understand it and that how we conceptualize the mind in part determines our choice of tasks.

Constructivist Foundations, 2019

I argue that the connection between the theoretical claims of the introductory part of the target... more I argue that the connection between the theoretical claims of the introductory part of the target article and the presented empirical findings on different modes of intersubjectivity is rather tenuous. Further, I touch upon the quandary of whether second-person research on intersubjective experience targets the same level of description of intersubjectivity compared with the theoretical accounts of intersubjectivity. I end with a discussion on why understanding the dynamics of intersubjectivity is essential to cognitive science.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2018

Drawing on the distinction between natural and human kinds, I will discuss the looping effects of... more Drawing on the distinction between natural and human kinds, I will discuss the looping effects of human kinds through the lens of contemporary cognitive (neuro)science. I will try to show that cognitive science is mainly in the business of investigating, understanding and explaining human kinds. As new conceptualisations of the human mind, agency and our nature are being created (by, for instance, neuroscience), they open up the possibility for new, different understandings of what it means to be a human being. This, I will argue, can change how people think and behave and thus change the very phenomena cognitive science investigates. Consequently, cognitive science can affect its very (future) findings. This holds especially true when society embraces new conceptualisations of the human mind and new ways of self-understanding become part and parcel of social discourse, activities, and/or structures.
The quest for understanding the human mind, I will claim, is a looping journey, where what we “discover” about the human mind is inherently dependent on how we, as human beings, understand ourselves; and how we understand ourselves is, to a certain degree, dependent on how science understands us and on how we interpret what it has to say about our nature. At the end of the article, this will lead me to consider cognitive science as an intrinsically ethical endeavour.

Constructivist Foundations, 2018

I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person in... more I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics of the reflective act. Furthermore, I propose that the self- referential and enactive nature of inquiring into the mind are sine qua non of any understanding of the mind – be it first- or third-person. I conclude by asking whether the authors’ view of the nature of inquiring into experience entails that we have to renounce the wish for any kind of universal or fundamental “truths” about the mind.

Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2018

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into th... more In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience's mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples' beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public's and legal decision-makers' endorsement of and trust in neuroscience's view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.

Constructivist Foundations, 2017

To provide an illustration some of the author’s theses, I firstly discuss contemporary accounts ... more To provide an illustration some of the author’s theses, I firstly discuss contemporary accounts of embodied decision-making. I argue that they do not endorse the embodied cognition thesis in its essential (or radical) scope and thus cannot provide a meaningful account of decision-making. Secondly, I briefly discuss researchers’ intrinsic embeddedness in their scientific culture and life-world and the associated inseparability of the subject and the world. I end the essay with a question pertaining to the seemingly endless circularity of knowledge emergence in cognitive science which, arguably, entails that we cannot reveal the “invariants of the mind.”

Constructivist Foundations, 2017

In the first part of the commentary, I argue that the some of the main objectives of Depraz et al... more In the first part of the commentary, I argue that the some of the main objectives of Depraz et al.’s target article (i.e., introducing a novel method of analysing first-person data using third- person physiological data and showing how first- and third-person data enrich and delimitate each other) remain somewhat unfulfilled. In the second part, I touch upon and briefly discuss the issue of what constitutes a valid method of researching experience.

Constructivist Foundations, 2016

I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First... more I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First, I discuss a potentially dangerous consequence of claiming that empirical phenomenology necessarily calls for a constructivist foundation. Second, I consider the threat to intersubjective validation and the related problem that the author does not specify what technique(s) one should use for training and collecting data in research on experience. Third, I briefly touch upon the question of the integration of empirical phenomenology and cognitive science.

Phainomena , 2016

In this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary approaches to understanding and... more In this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary approaches to understanding and researching decision-making – endorsing the goals and core presuppositions of traditional cognitive science – provide a limited account of decision-making at best. Firstly, they falsely presuppose that decision-makers are mostly making some sort of calculation regarding objective states of a pregiven world, independent from decision-makers. Secondly, even though the majority of approaches admit subjectivity into the picture of decision-making, they mostly try to avoid it or objectify it. irdly, the interactive history of decision-makers with their environment and the role of the body are in large part le out of research designs and explanations of decision-making.
Even though there has been a surge of proposals of embodying decision- making in recent years, they do not take the theses of embodied cognition far (or seriously) enough (at least from the perspective of the enactivist view of embodied cognition) – they, for instance, do not take the lived (experienced) body, experience of decision-makers, or sense-making as central to decision- making. Borrowing and extending the ideas from (neuro)phenomenology and enactivism, I will argue that decision-making is best understood from the perspective of what sense and meaning situations, decisions, and the process of decision-making have from and in the (experiential) perspective of decision-makers. As a consequence, I will further claim that decision-making science must begin researching the experience of decision-makers rigorously and systematically if it is to understand the phenomenon in a less limited and a more meaningful way.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2016

In the article, I will argue that metacognition plays an important role in decision-making not on... more In the article, I will argue that metacognition plays an important role in decision-making not only as direct online monitoring and control of decision-making processes but also by enabling us to influence our decisions and actions – and mental states and processes, related to them – in an offline manner. That is, offline metacognition allows us to observe, refer to and, to a certain degree, exert influence on mental states and processes related to our decisions and actions in the way of being removed, decoupled from the task/decision at hand and present time demands. As such, it enables us to observe, form thoughts and have feelings about mental states and processes directly related to our future decisions, to plan our future decisions, to reflect on our past choices, and to think and have feelings about our broader goals, desires, and personal values that are indirectly related to our decisions. To illustrate the importance of offline metacognition in decision-making, I will firstly review and discuss some experimental findings on implementation intentions (" decisions about the future ") and anticipated emotions (beliefs about future emotional states related to outcomes of our decisions). Secondly, I will argue that our ability to reflect (think and feel) on our broader goals, desires and personal values – that represent a kind of structure into which our specific decisions are embedded – reveals how offline metacognition can exert influence on our decisions also in an indirect way. All in all, I will try to show that our ability to refer to our own minds in an offline way – be it to mental states and processes directly or indirectly related to specific decisions – is essential for us to decide, as we decide, and act, as we act.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2013

In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first-and second-person... more In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first-and second-person methods more systematically, as part of everyday research practice, if it wants to understand the human mind in its full scope. Neurophenomenological programme proposed by Varela as a remedy for the hard problem of consciousness (i.e. the problem of experience) does not solve it on the ontological level. Nevertheless, it represents a good starting point of how to tackle the phenomenon of experience in a more systematic, methodologically sound way. On the other hand, Varela's criterion of phenomenological reduction as a necessary condition for systematic investigation of experience is too strong. Regardless of that and some other problems that research of experience faces (e.g. the problem of training, the question of what kind of participants we want to study), it is becoming clear that investigating experience seriously – from first-and second-person perspective – is a necessary step cognitive science must take. This holds especially when researching phenomena that involve consciousness and/or where differentiation between conscious and unconscious processing is crucial. Furthermore, gathering experiential data is essential for interpreting experimental results gained purely by quantitative methods – especially when we are implicitly or explicitly referring to experience in our conclusions and interpretations. To support these claims some examples from the broader area of decision making will be given (the effect of deliberation-without-attention, cognitive reflection test).

Analiza , 2016

In the paper, I focus on criticising mainstream contemporary approaches to decision-making resear... more In the paper, I focus on criticising mainstream contemporary approaches to decision-making research. I argue that such approaches are severely limited and in some aspects provide a false account of decision-making since: (a) their conception of decision-making is partly wrong since they do not emphasise enough the subjective aspects of decision-making, and do not truly conceive decision-making as a goal-oriented activity; (b) they focus on researching specific, inconsequential and unimportant decision situations and problems that do not have much in common with decisions of everyday life; and (c) they research decision-making almost entirely from the third-person perspective, leaving out the first-person perspective. As a consequence, the subjective character, being essential, even intrinsic to decision-making, and how decision situations are understood/interpreted by the decision-makers, are poorly understood at best. Contemporary approaches to decision-making research thus lead to a severely limited and to some degree perverted image of decision-making, potentially reducing the researched phenomenon to something that it is in fact not.

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems , Nov 1, 2012

The aim of the article is firstly, to show how metacognitive monitoring, control (regulation) and... more The aim of the article is firstly, to show how metacognitive monitoring, control (regulation) and meta- knowledge are important in guiding decision making and secondly, to argue that researching experience is necessary for a more complete understanding of the role of metacognition in decision making. In the context of dual process theories of cognition it is sometimes proposed that people usually do not deliberate or reflect on their judgments and decisions, but rather follow their intuitions. Some metacognition researchers propose that metacognitive experiences (such as feeling of rightness or difficulty) play an important role in determining whether we change our intuitive responses for more deliberate, reflective reasoning and decision making. Although metacognition researchers’ contribution to understanding the role of metacognitive experiences in decision making is valuable, their studies face some serious problems. Furthermore, it is not only our experiences, but also our evaluations of those experiences (metacognitive judgments) and our metacognitive knowledge that influence our judgments and choices. I argue that if we want to understand how and why people decide, we should be studying the entanglement of all these influencing factors from first and third person perspective. We should also conduct more thorough first person research. I conclude the article by arguing that first and third person perspective on metacognition and decision making should mutually constrain and inform each other about insights and contradictions that arise between them.

Book chapters by Toma Strle

Filozofska pot Andreja Uleta (Eds.: O. Markič & M. Malec), 2019

In the paper, I will claim that experience is irreducible to behaviour and events or processes in... more In the paper, I will claim that experience is irreducible to behaviour and events or processes in the brain. Cognitive science that mainly focuses on researching such third-person aspects of the mind, is, from this point of view, incomplete and potentially leads to an erroneous understanding of the mind. One of the proposals of how to enrich cognitive science with systematic research of experience is to combine phenomenology (especially Husserl’s “method” of phenomenological reduction) and empirical cognitive science (i.e., the project of naturalisation of phenomenology). But such an alliance is, of course, full of troubles. For, we are discussing how to combine objectivistic, naturalistic science and transcendental phenomenology, which upholds the view that experience (consciousness) is primary, considers itself to be the sine qua non of scientific knowledge, denies metaphysical realism etc. In light of the radically different attitude of (cognitive) science and phenomenology towards the world, experience and knowledge itself, I will ask whether such an alliance is even possible. I will present Varela’s proposal of such a marriage (neurophenomenology, with emphasis on its phenomenological aspect) and argue that such a project is, indeed, possible, but only insofar we are willing to transform our everyday and scientific view and understanding of nature and consciousness.

Conference papers by Toma Strle

Cognitive Science : Proceedings of the 22nd International Multiconference Information Society - IS 2019, 2019

First, I present the idea of bounded rationality, the heuristics and biases research programme, a... more First, I present the idea of bounded rationality, the heuristics and biases research programme, and some further findings of behavioural decision sciences which show that people’s decisions are not optimal and are many times biased. Next, I briefly present the decision nudge programme that aims at improving human decision-making by modifying choice environments. I also briefly stop at choice manipulation by “smart” algorithms and big data. In the last part of the paper, I consider possible circular effects of modifying choice environments. I argue that decision sciences and various attempts at modifying choice environments do not take into account the possibility that changes in choice environments not only affect a certain range of choice but also attitudes of decision-makers towards decision-making. However, by that, they also alter how decision-makers react to the implemented interventions and changes. Changes in choice environments thus potentially exert influence on themselves; i.e., they exert influence on their desired effects on decision-makers.

Cognitive science : proceedings of the 19th International Multiconference Information Society - IS 2016, 13 October 2016, Ljubljana, Slovenia. Ljubljana: Institut Jožef Stefan, 2016, 2016

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2021

Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems increasingly take on crucial roles in our technology-dr... more Algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems increasingly take on crucial roles in our technology-driven society, making decisions, for instance, concerning employment, education, finances, and public services. This article aims to identify peoples’ attitudes towards ADM systems and ensuing behaviours when dealing with ADM systems as identified in the literature and in relation to credit scoring. After briefly discussing main characteristics and types of ADM systems, we first consider trust, automation bias, automation complacency and algorithmic aversion as attitudes towards ADM systems. These factors result in various behaviours by users, operators, and managers. Second, we consider how these factors could affect attitudes towards and use of ADM systems within the context of credit scoring. Third, we describe some possible strategies to reduce aversion, bias, and complacency, and consider several ways in which trust could be increased in the context of credit scoring. Importantly, although many advantages in applying ADM systems to complex choice problems can be identified, using ADM systems should be approached with care – e.g., the models ADM systems are based on are sometimes flawed, the data they gather to support or make decisions are easily biased, and the motives for their use unreflected upon or unethical.

Constrictivist Foundations, 2021

Constructivist Foundations, 2020

I show that first-person inquiry into the lived experience of decision-making in naturalistic set... more I show that first-person inquiry into the lived experience of decision-making in naturalistic settings in part affords a different understanding and conceptualization of the phenomenon from those arising in third-person laboratory research. Two aspects are discussed: the role of the task and how the participants understand the investigative situation. Furthermore, I briefly address a related matter: What shapes the choice of tasks in the first place? I argue both that the assemblage of the tasks we use to investigate the mind shapes the way we understand it and that how we conceptualize the mind in part determines our choice of tasks.

Constructivist Foundations, 2019

I argue that the connection between the theoretical claims of the introductory part of the target... more I argue that the connection between the theoretical claims of the introductory part of the target article and the presented empirical findings on different modes of intersubjectivity is rather tenuous. Further, I touch upon the quandary of whether second-person research on intersubjective experience targets the same level of description of intersubjectivity compared with the theoretical accounts of intersubjectivity. I end with a discussion on why understanding the dynamics of intersubjectivity is essential to cognitive science.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2018

Drawing on the distinction between natural and human kinds, I will discuss the looping effects of... more Drawing on the distinction between natural and human kinds, I will discuss the looping effects of human kinds through the lens of contemporary cognitive (neuro)science. I will try to show that cognitive science is mainly in the business of investigating, understanding and explaining human kinds. As new conceptualisations of the human mind, agency and our nature are being created (by, for instance, neuroscience), they open up the possibility for new, different understandings of what it means to be a human being. This, I will argue, can change how people think and behave and thus change the very phenomena cognitive science investigates. Consequently, cognitive science can affect its very (future) findings. This holds especially true when society embraces new conceptualisations of the human mind and new ways of self-understanding become part and parcel of social discourse, activities, and/or structures.
The quest for understanding the human mind, I will claim, is a looping journey, where what we “discover” about the human mind is inherently dependent on how we, as human beings, understand ourselves; and how we understand ourselves is, to a certain degree, dependent on how science understands us and on how we interpret what it has to say about our nature. At the end of the article, this will lead me to consider cognitive science as an intrinsically ethical endeavour.

Constructivist Foundations, 2018

I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person in... more I argue that the target article does not clearly explicate in what ways empirical first-person inquiry into experience and theoretical insight contributes to the model of the experiential dynamics of the reflective act. Furthermore, I propose that the self- referential and enactive nature of inquiring into the mind are sine qua non of any understanding of the mind – be it first- or third-person. I conclude by asking whether the authors’ view of the nature of inquiring into experience entails that we have to renounce the wish for any kind of universal or fundamental “truths” about the mind.

Balkan Journal of Philosophy, 2018

In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into th... more In the following article we first present the growing trend of incorporating neuroscience into the law, and the growing acceptance of and trust in neuroscience's mechanistic and reductionistic explanations of the human mind. We then present and discuss some studies that show how nudging peoples' beliefs about matters related to human agency (such as free will, decision-making, or self-control) towards a more deterministic, mechanistic and/or reductionistic conception, exerts an influence on their very actions, mentality, and brain processes. We suggest that the neuroscientific view of the human mind exerts an influence on the very cognitive phenomena neuroscience falsely believes to be studying objectively. This holds especially when we consider the systematic integration of neuroscience into the public domain, such as the law. For, such an integration acts as a reinforcement of the public's and legal decision-makers' endorsement of and trust in neuroscience's view of human nature that further changes how people think and act. Such looping effects of neurolaw are probably inevitable. Accordingly, we should be aware of the scope of neuroscientific explanations and be careful not to overstate neuroscientific evidence and findings in legal contexts.

Constructivist Foundations, 2017

To provide an illustration some of the author’s theses, I firstly discuss contemporary accounts ... more To provide an illustration some of the author’s theses, I firstly discuss contemporary accounts of embodied decision-making. I argue that they do not endorse the embodied cognition thesis in its essential (or radical) scope and thus cannot provide a meaningful account of decision-making. Secondly, I briefly discuss researchers’ intrinsic embeddedness in their scientific culture and life-world and the associated inseparability of the subject and the world. I end the essay with a question pertaining to the seemingly endless circularity of knowledge emergence in cognitive science which, arguably, entails that we cannot reveal the “invariants of the mind.”

Constructivist Foundations, 2017

In the first part of the commentary, I argue that the some of the main objectives of Depraz et al... more In the first part of the commentary, I argue that the some of the main objectives of Depraz et al.’s target article (i.e., introducing a novel method of analysing first-person data using third- person physiological data and showing how first- and third-person data enrich and delimitate each other) remain somewhat unfulfilled. In the second part, I touch upon and briefly discuss the issue of what constitutes a valid method of researching experience.

Constructivist Foundations, 2016

I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First... more I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First, I discuss a potentially dangerous consequence of claiming that empirical phenomenology necessarily calls for a constructivist foundation. Second, I consider the threat to intersubjective validation and the related problem that the author does not specify what technique(s) one should use for training and collecting data in research on experience. Third, I briefly touch upon the question of the integration of empirical phenomenology and cognitive science.

Phainomena , 2016

In this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary approaches to understanding and... more In this paper I will attempt to show that mainstream contemporary approaches to understanding and researching decision-making – endorsing the goals and core presuppositions of traditional cognitive science – provide a limited account of decision-making at best. Firstly, they falsely presuppose that decision-makers are mostly making some sort of calculation regarding objective states of a pregiven world, independent from decision-makers. Secondly, even though the majority of approaches admit subjectivity into the picture of decision-making, they mostly try to avoid it or objectify it. irdly, the interactive history of decision-makers with their environment and the role of the body are in large part le out of research designs and explanations of decision-making.
Even though there has been a surge of proposals of embodying decision- making in recent years, they do not take the theses of embodied cognition far (or seriously) enough (at least from the perspective of the enactivist view of embodied cognition) – they, for instance, do not take the lived (experienced) body, experience of decision-makers, or sense-making as central to decision- making. Borrowing and extending the ideas from (neuro)phenomenology and enactivism, I will argue that decision-making is best understood from the perspective of what sense and meaning situations, decisions, and the process of decision-making have from and in the (experiential) perspective of decision-makers. As a consequence, I will further claim that decision-making science must begin researching the experience of decision-makers rigorously and systematically if it is to understand the phenomenon in a less limited and a more meaningful way.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2016

In the article, I will argue that metacognition plays an important role in decision-making not on... more In the article, I will argue that metacognition plays an important role in decision-making not only as direct online monitoring and control of decision-making processes but also by enabling us to influence our decisions and actions – and mental states and processes, related to them – in an offline manner. That is, offline metacognition allows us to observe, refer to and, to a certain degree, exert influence on mental states and processes related to our decisions and actions in the way of being removed, decoupled from the task/decision at hand and present time demands. As such, it enables us to observe, form thoughts and have feelings about mental states and processes directly related to our future decisions, to plan our future decisions, to reflect on our past choices, and to think and have feelings about our broader goals, desires, and personal values that are indirectly related to our decisions. To illustrate the importance of offline metacognition in decision-making, I will firstly review and discuss some experimental findings on implementation intentions (" decisions about the future ") and anticipated emotions (beliefs about future emotional states related to outcomes of our decisions). Secondly, I will argue that our ability to reflect (think and feel) on our broader goals, desires and personal values – that represent a kind of structure into which our specific decisions are embedded – reveals how offline metacognition can exert influence on our decisions also in an indirect way. All in all, I will try to show that our ability to refer to our own minds in an offline way – be it to mental states and processes directly or indirectly related to specific decisions – is essential for us to decide, as we decide, and act, as we act.

Interdisciplinary description of complex systems, 2013

In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first-and second-person... more In the article I will defend the view that cognitive science needs to use first-and second-person methods more systematically, as part of everyday research practice, if it wants to understand the human mind in its full scope. Neurophenomenological programme proposed by Varela as a remedy for the hard problem of consciousness (i.e. the problem of experience) does not solve it on the ontological level. Nevertheless, it represents a good starting point of how to tackle the phenomenon of experience in a more systematic, methodologically sound way. On the other hand, Varela's criterion of phenomenological reduction as a necessary condition for systematic investigation of experience is too strong. Regardless of that and some other problems that research of experience faces (e.g. the problem of training, the question of what kind of participants we want to study), it is becoming clear that investigating experience seriously – from first-and second-person perspective – is a necessary step cognitive science must take. This holds especially when researching phenomena that involve consciousness and/or where differentiation between conscious and unconscious processing is crucial. Furthermore, gathering experiential data is essential for interpreting experimental results gained purely by quantitative methods – especially when we are implicitly or explicitly referring to experience in our conclusions and interpretations. To support these claims some examples from the broader area of decision making will be given (the effect of deliberation-without-attention, cognitive reflection test).

Analiza , 2016

In the paper, I focus on criticising mainstream contemporary approaches to decision-making resear... more In the paper, I focus on criticising mainstream contemporary approaches to decision-making research. I argue that such approaches are severely limited and in some aspects provide a false account of decision-making since: (a) their conception of decision-making is partly wrong since they do not emphasise enough the subjective aspects of decision-making, and do not truly conceive decision-making as a goal-oriented activity; (b) they focus on researching specific, inconsequential and unimportant decision situations and problems that do not have much in common with decisions of everyday life; and (c) they research decision-making almost entirely from the third-person perspective, leaving out the first-person perspective. As a consequence, the subjective character, being essential, even intrinsic to decision-making, and how decision situations are understood/interpreted by the decision-makers, are poorly understood at best. Contemporary approaches to decision-making research thus lead to a severely limited and to some degree perverted image of decision-making, potentially reducing the researched phenomenon to something that it is in fact not.

Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems , Nov 1, 2012

The aim of the article is firstly, to show how metacognitive monitoring, control (regulation) and... more The aim of the article is firstly, to show how metacognitive monitoring, control (regulation) and meta- knowledge are important in guiding decision making and secondly, to argue that researching experience is necessary for a more complete understanding of the role of metacognition in decision making. In the context of dual process theories of cognition it is sometimes proposed that people usually do not deliberate or reflect on their judgments and decisions, but rather follow their intuitions. Some metacognition researchers propose that metacognitive experiences (such as feeling of rightness or difficulty) play an important role in determining whether we change our intuitive responses for more deliberate, reflective reasoning and decision making. Although metacognition researchers’ contribution to understanding the role of metacognitive experiences in decision making is valuable, their studies face some serious problems. Furthermore, it is not only our experiences, but also our evaluations of those experiences (metacognitive judgments) and our metacognitive knowledge that influence our judgments and choices. I argue that if we want to understand how and why people decide, we should be studying the entanglement of all these influencing factors from first and third person perspective. We should also conduct more thorough first person research. I conclude the article by arguing that first and third person perspective on metacognition and decision making should mutually constrain and inform each other about insights and contradictions that arise between them.

Filozofska pot Andreja Uleta (Eds.: O. Markič & M. Malec), 2019

In the paper, I will claim that experience is irreducible to behaviour and events or processes in... more In the paper, I will claim that experience is irreducible to behaviour and events or processes in the brain. Cognitive science that mainly focuses on researching such third-person aspects of the mind, is, from this point of view, incomplete and potentially leads to an erroneous understanding of the mind. One of the proposals of how to enrich cognitive science with systematic research of experience is to combine phenomenology (especially Husserl’s “method” of phenomenological reduction) and empirical cognitive science (i.e., the project of naturalisation of phenomenology). But such an alliance is, of course, full of troubles. For, we are discussing how to combine objectivistic, naturalistic science and transcendental phenomenology, which upholds the view that experience (consciousness) is primary, considers itself to be the sine qua non of scientific knowledge, denies metaphysical realism etc. In light of the radically different attitude of (cognitive) science and phenomenology towards the world, experience and knowledge itself, I will ask whether such an alliance is even possible. I will present Varela’s proposal of such a marriage (neurophenomenology, with emphasis on its phenomenological aspect) and argue that such a project is, indeed, possible, but only insofar we are willing to transform our everyday and scientific view and understanding of nature and consciousness.

Cognitive Science : Proceedings of the 22nd International Multiconference Information Society - IS 2019, 2019

First, I present the idea of bounded rationality, the heuristics and biases research programme, a... more First, I present the idea of bounded rationality, the heuristics and biases research programme, and some further findings of behavioural decision sciences which show that people’s decisions are not optimal and are many times biased. Next, I briefly present the decision nudge programme that aims at improving human decision-making by modifying choice environments. I also briefly stop at choice manipulation by “smart” algorithms and big data. In the last part of the paper, I consider possible circular effects of modifying choice environments. I argue that decision sciences and various attempts at modifying choice environments do not take into account the possibility that changes in choice environments not only affect a certain range of choice but also attitudes of decision-makers towards decision-making. However, by that, they also alter how decision-makers react to the implemented interventions and changes. Changes in choice environments thus potentially exert influence on themselves; i.e., they exert influence on their desired effects on decision-makers.

Cognitive science : proceedings of the 19th International Multiconference Information Society - IS 2016, 13 October 2016, Ljubljana, Slovenia. Ljubljana: Institut Jožef Stefan, 2016, 2016