Ragnar Hund | University of Osnabrück (original) (raw)

Papers by Ragnar Hund

Marcomannic Wars and Antonine Plague Selected essays on two disasters that shook the Roman World, 2020

Maximiniana -Zu einem ehrenden Beinamen militärischer Formationen im frühen 3. Jh. n.

Books by Ragnar Hund

The present study aims at examining the Roman foreign policy during the reigns of Antonius Pius a... more The present study aims at examining the Roman foreign policy during the reigns of Antonius Pius and Marcus Aurelius as well as in the first half of the reign of Commodus. The main emphasis put here is on the regions of the Lower- and Mid-Danube. In addition to literary, numismatic and epigraphic sources, archaeological sources and research findings in particular will be evaluated for the ensuing argumentation.
For that matter, the principes’ decisions can be regarded as a result of structurally conditioned forms of individual depiction of power in contrast to or in connection with the emperors’ predecessors. These decisions can also be seen as reactions to certain domestic as well as foreign-policy constellations.
After an extensive preface, the presentation of source material, the analysis of the term ‘foreign policy’ and policymakers in regard of foreign policy in the Principate as well as with an underlying knowledge of Roman frontiers, the main body of this paper will be structured into four larger parts, followed by an appendix. Here, the description of the armies of Raetia, Noricum, and western Dacia provide the basis for the analysis of the decisions regarding the frontier policy pursued by the three named principes.
Chapter 2 deals with the development of frontier policies under Hadrian and thus provides the background of the analysis of Antonius Pius’ decisions on foreign-policy. In doing so, the author of this paper conceives the frontier policy undertaken by Hadrian in order to established the concept of an on-guard defense as point of origin for his successor’s policy.
In chapter 3 the author extensively covers Antonius Pius’ foreign policy. The text elaborates on how deliberately the emperor distinguished himself from his predecessor from the outset of his reign. Whilst Antonius Pius extended the frontiers of the Roman Empire, he remained true to his predecessor’s concept of fortified frontiers, which he enlarged. The emperor also resumed the policy of his predecessor in other areas, such as increasing the discipline within the army.
The author, however, rejects the notion that for the most part, the reign of Antonius Pius proceeded peacefully and without any major conflicts. He also dismisses the view that battles only took place at nearby frontiers and only to a manageable extent. This image, portrayed by literary sources, was revised insofar as that the emperor had to defy the empire’s opponents in tedious wars. He reacted on changes in the periphery of the frontiers and propagated his victories as well as his victoriousness. In addition, at least two attempts of usurpation prove that Antonius Pius’ reign was not undisputed. The image of a peacemaking emperor is attributed to his objectives of reign (Regierungsprogrammatik). The maxim of these objectives was the on-guard foreign policy of an empire, placed under the protection of the gods. Initially, even though the army of this empire was meant to act primarily as a deterrent, it was also, at all times, supposed to enforce the interests of the princeps, who was considered by the gentes, who lived extra fines. as the decision-making authority.
In chapter 4, the study of the foreign policy under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, as well as under the sole rule of the former, illustrates that the previously described concept was destined to fail. Here, the war with the Parthians, which was fought directly at the beginning of the dual leadership of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, resulted in power-political frictions. At that time, the military successes of Lucius Verus threatened the hitherto clear distribution of power between the two Principes. Hence, Marcus Aurelius was faced with the problem of having to prove his supremacy qua auctoritate. To scotch any potential criticism, the senior Augustus had to associate military success with his name. This is of vital importance for the prehistory of the Marcomannic Wars as these are regarded as a result of two key factors. On the one hand, Marcus Aurelius and his counsellors took the changes within the societies in the Transdanubian territories, which had started during the reign of Antonius Pius, very seriously. Marcus Aurelius and his counsellors had realized that they had to react preventively towards these changes. This, on the other hand, put the emperor in the position of having to produce his own military success, in order to legitimize his position through victories, having shown his personal victoriousness in the field.
In this study, archaeologically certifiable traces of destruction support the subsequent reconstruction of the Marcomannic Wars. As a result, two horizons will be gained as historically evaluable evidence from this kind of source.
Initially, the Roman offensive was directed at the Iazyges of the Hungarian lowlands. At that time, Rome was still at peace with the Marcomanni and Quadi. It was only after Rome had suffered a devastating defeat, presumably at the Lower-Pannonian frontier, that the Germani invaded the empire. They progressed as far as modern day Northern Italy, which etched deeply into the collective memory of the Romans. It was not until 171/172 A.D. that Rome found itself in the position of taking the war to the enemy’s settlement zones beyond the Danube. It can be established that the emperor tried to break the enemy’s coalition, particularly by diplomatic means. He thereby pursued the isolation of the Elb-Germannic gentes in Inner-Germania and intended to keep the Rhine-border calm.
The thesis presented in this chapter is that, after a forced ceasefire caused by the usurpation of Avicius Cassius, Marcus Aurelius intended to establish at least one new province: Marcomannia. Even though the Iazyges can be identified as the main adversaries in the Marcomannic Wars, the archaeological finding speak against alleged plans to seize the Sarmatian territory.
Chapter 5 deals with Commodus’ significant decisions, made after Marcus Aurelius’ death. In the years following the Danube Wars, which had been instigated by his father, Commodus initially appears to be a prudent Princeps, who realised a comprehensive construction project in the Danube provinces in cooperation with his counsellors. It was supposed to meet the latest requirements and was to be premised on the experiences of the war years, which can specifically be seen in the border fortifications and in the deployment of troops. The last chapter provides an overview on the development of Rome’s foreign policy. In the summary, the decisions on foreign-policy and the developments of the examined period of time will be discussed in terms of causes, manifestations and aftermath.

Marcomannic Wars and Antonine Plague Selected essays on two disasters that shook the Roman World, 2020

Maximiniana -Zu einem ehrenden Beinamen militärischer Formationen im frühen 3. Jh. n.

The present study aims at examining the Roman foreign policy during the reigns of Antonius Pius a... more The present study aims at examining the Roman foreign policy during the reigns of Antonius Pius and Marcus Aurelius as well as in the first half of the reign of Commodus. The main emphasis put here is on the regions of the Lower- and Mid-Danube. In addition to literary, numismatic and epigraphic sources, archaeological sources and research findings in particular will be evaluated for the ensuing argumentation.
For that matter, the principes’ decisions can be regarded as a result of structurally conditioned forms of individual depiction of power in contrast to or in connection with the emperors’ predecessors. These decisions can also be seen as reactions to certain domestic as well as foreign-policy constellations.
After an extensive preface, the presentation of source material, the analysis of the term ‘foreign policy’ and policymakers in regard of foreign policy in the Principate as well as with an underlying knowledge of Roman frontiers, the main body of this paper will be structured into four larger parts, followed by an appendix. Here, the description of the armies of Raetia, Noricum, and western Dacia provide the basis for the analysis of the decisions regarding the frontier policy pursued by the three named principes.
Chapter 2 deals with the development of frontier policies under Hadrian and thus provides the background of the analysis of Antonius Pius’ decisions on foreign-policy. In doing so, the author of this paper conceives the frontier policy undertaken by Hadrian in order to established the concept of an on-guard defense as point of origin for his successor’s policy.
In chapter 3 the author extensively covers Antonius Pius’ foreign policy. The text elaborates on how deliberately the emperor distinguished himself from his predecessor from the outset of his reign. Whilst Antonius Pius extended the frontiers of the Roman Empire, he remained true to his predecessor’s concept of fortified frontiers, which he enlarged. The emperor also resumed the policy of his predecessor in other areas, such as increasing the discipline within the army.
The author, however, rejects the notion that for the most part, the reign of Antonius Pius proceeded peacefully and without any major conflicts. He also dismisses the view that battles only took place at nearby frontiers and only to a manageable extent. This image, portrayed by literary sources, was revised insofar as that the emperor had to defy the empire’s opponents in tedious wars. He reacted on changes in the periphery of the frontiers and propagated his victories as well as his victoriousness. In addition, at least two attempts of usurpation prove that Antonius Pius’ reign was not undisputed. The image of a peacemaking emperor is attributed to his objectives of reign (Regierungsprogrammatik). The maxim of these objectives was the on-guard foreign policy of an empire, placed under the protection of the gods. Initially, even though the army of this empire was meant to act primarily as a deterrent, it was also, at all times, supposed to enforce the interests of the princeps, who was considered by the gentes, who lived extra fines. as the decision-making authority.
In chapter 4, the study of the foreign policy under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, as well as under the sole rule of the former, illustrates that the previously described concept was destined to fail. Here, the war with the Parthians, which was fought directly at the beginning of the dual leadership of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, resulted in power-political frictions. At that time, the military successes of Lucius Verus threatened the hitherto clear distribution of power between the two Principes. Hence, Marcus Aurelius was faced with the problem of having to prove his supremacy qua auctoritate. To scotch any potential criticism, the senior Augustus had to associate military success with his name. This is of vital importance for the prehistory of the Marcomannic Wars as these are regarded as a result of two key factors. On the one hand, Marcus Aurelius and his counsellors took the changes within the societies in the Transdanubian territories, which had started during the reign of Antonius Pius, very seriously. Marcus Aurelius and his counsellors had realized that they had to react preventively towards these changes. This, on the other hand, put the emperor in the position of having to produce his own military success, in order to legitimize his position through victories, having shown his personal victoriousness in the field.
In this study, archaeologically certifiable traces of destruction support the subsequent reconstruction of the Marcomannic Wars. As a result, two horizons will be gained as historically evaluable evidence from this kind of source.
Initially, the Roman offensive was directed at the Iazyges of the Hungarian lowlands. At that time, Rome was still at peace with the Marcomanni and Quadi. It was only after Rome had suffered a devastating defeat, presumably at the Lower-Pannonian frontier, that the Germani invaded the empire. They progressed as far as modern day Northern Italy, which etched deeply into the collective memory of the Romans. It was not until 171/172 A.D. that Rome found itself in the position of taking the war to the enemy’s settlement zones beyond the Danube. It can be established that the emperor tried to break the enemy’s coalition, particularly by diplomatic means. He thereby pursued the isolation of the Elb-Germannic gentes in Inner-Germania and intended to keep the Rhine-border calm.
The thesis presented in this chapter is that, after a forced ceasefire caused by the usurpation of Avicius Cassius, Marcus Aurelius intended to establish at least one new province: Marcomannia. Even though the Iazyges can be identified as the main adversaries in the Marcomannic Wars, the archaeological finding speak against alleged plans to seize the Sarmatian territory.
Chapter 5 deals with Commodus’ significant decisions, made after Marcus Aurelius’ death. In the years following the Danube Wars, which had been instigated by his father, Commodus initially appears to be a prudent Princeps, who realised a comprehensive construction project in the Danube provinces in cooperation with his counsellors. It was supposed to meet the latest requirements and was to be premised on the experiences of the war years, which can specifically be seen in the border fortifications and in the deployment of troops. The last chapter provides an overview on the development of Rome’s foreign policy. In the summary, the decisions on foreign-policy and the developments of the examined period of time will be discussed in terms of causes, manifestations and aftermath.