Nara M Figueiredo | Universidade Estadual de Campinas (original) (raw)
Research by Nara M Figueiredo
Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactiv... more Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point.
This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents... more This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.
In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panora... more In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panoramic view of the theory of linguistic bodies. Following the book's structure, I first describe the authors’ notion of body, then refer to their notion ofdialectics, after that, I expose the steps of the model and, finally, get to their conception of languaging.
The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, bra... more The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something im-material such as private experiences is an illu-sion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foun-dations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field
Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental... more Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving’s view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
Doctoral Thesis, 2015
O trabalho sintetiza-se em três pontos principais. Primeiro, a desqualificação da visão de Gordon... more O trabalho sintetiza-se em três pontos principais. Primeiro, a desqualificação da visão de Gordon Baker sobre um dos papéis da filosofia como uma terapia do sujeito. Esta desqualificação se dá tanto por meio de uma crítica ao que ele propõe quanto aos seus fundamentos textuais. Segundo, a explicitação da visão de Waismann, que contribui para a crítica a Baker e para o esclarecimento do que entendemos pelo papel da Filosofia nas Investigações Filosóficas. E, em terceiro lugar, a consideração da concepção de Hacker da filosofia como uma atividade de análise conceitual, que desemboca em nossa proposta de avaliação conceitual.
This work can be summarized in three main points. First, the disqualification of Gordon Baker's view of philosophy as a therapy of the subject. This takes place both through a critique of what he proposes and through what it is based on. Second, the explanation of Waismann's view, which contributes to the criticism of Baker and clarifies what we understand as the role of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations. And, thirdly, the consideration of Hackers view of philosophy as an activity of conceptual analysis, which leads to our own view of conceptual evaluation.
WARNING - Viewing this document is conditioned on your acceptance of the following terms of use:
This document is only for private use for research and teaching activities. Reproduction for commercial use is forbidden. These rights cover the whole data about this document as well as its contents. Any uses or copies of this document in whole or in part must include the author's name.
Visit: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-15062015-105430/en.php
Master's Dissertation, 2009
Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigaçõ... more Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. No decorrer do texto, deparamonos com as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. E acredita que há uma solução cética para o paradoxo que flerta com o niilismo. Por outro lado, os comentadores ingleses apresentam o conceito de regra cumprindo um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem. Na medida em que estas se constituem como funções normativas de usos das palavras, são expressas na linguagem e determinadas contingentemente de acordo com os contextos de uso.
This work has as main objective the analysis of the role of the concept of rule in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Throughout the text, we have the readings of S. Kripke and G.P. Baker & P M S. Hacker. The first argues that the notion of rule, in spite of presenting a paradox, it is a very important point in the argument against private language. He believes there is a skeptical solution to the paradox which flirts with nihilism. Furthermore, the English commentators have the concept of rule fulfilling a key role in the explanation of Wittgenstein on the functioning of language. The rules are as functions of normative uses of words, they are expressed in the language and determinate according to the contexts of use.
WARNING - Viewing this document is conditioned on your acceptance of the following terms of use: This document is only for private use for research and teaching activities. Reproduction for commercial use is forbidden. These rights cover the whole data about this document as well as its contents. Any uses or copies of this document in whole or in part must include the author's name.
Visit: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-02122009-093554/en.php
Os Filósofos, Immanuel Kant, Benjamim Constant e Arthur Schopenhauer, divergem quando se trata de... more Os Filósofos, Immanuel Kant, Benjamim Constant e Arthur Schopenhauer, divergem quando se trata de um suposto direito de mentir. Cada um defende uma maneira através da qual os indivíduos praticariam ações moralmente boas; Kant acredita que os indivíduos não têm direito de mentir, Constant, defende que devemos dizer a verdade quando o ouvinte tiver direito a ela, e Schopenhauer, acredita que temos o direito de mentir em determinadas condições. Neste texto encontra-se uma breve análise das concepções de boa conduta de cada autor, com relação ao direito que um indivíduo tem, ou não, de mentir em algumas situações ou em nenhuma.
Drafts by Nara M Figueiredo
Vol. 44 (2021) by Nara M Figueiredo
v. 44, n. 3: Em busca de uma ontologia para o paradigma 4e, 2021
Comentário Artigos / Articles Comentário a "o externalismo semiótiCo ativo de C. s. PeirCe e a Ca... more Comentário Artigos / Articles Comentário a "o externalismo semiótiCo ativo de C. s. PeirCe e a Cantoria de viola Como signo em ação": em busCa de uma ontologia Para o Paradigma 4e
Papers by Nara M Figueiredo
Philosophy & Technology
It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as compos... more It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (section 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one's engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (section 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (section 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, allusion, which means that the subject acts as if the virtual experiences are real (section 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind-given the current state of technology-between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science.
Manuscrito, 2022
In this paper we suggest that Duffley's sign-based semantics rests on two main claims: a methodol... more In this paper we suggest that Duffley's sign-based semantics rests on two main claims: a methodological one and an ontological one. The methodological one is the analysis of corpora and the ontological one is the postulate of mental content. By adopting a linguistic enactivist perspective with a Wittgensteinian twist, we endorse Duffley's methodological claim and suggest that
Manuscrito, 2022
In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Mean... more In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form. Duffley adopts the semiological principle that linguistic signs have stable meanings. I argue that this principle leads Duffley to an artificial description of the meaning of the preposition for, in attempting to avoid the charge of polysemy. Another issue is that the principle is not consistently followed throughout the book, such as in Duffley's analysis of the meaning of start, or in his acceptance of words with encyclopedic meanings. I also point out 1 I would like to thank
Manuscrito, 2022
In this introduction we present Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning meets Linguistic Form, ... more In this introduction we present Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning meets Linguistic Form, as well as the contributions that each scholar has brought into the debate on linguistic meaning and form. They deal with semantic and foundational issues regarding a sign-based approach to meaning.
Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986, Aug 27, 2020
Raciocínios analógicos são tradicionalmente concebidos como processos que envolvem a comparação d... more Raciocínios analógicos são tradicionalmente concebidos como processos que envolvem a comparação de representações mentais. Mais recentemente, com o surgimento de teorias não-representacionalistas da cognição humana, surge a questão de como explicar processos tradicionalmente concebidos como representacionais. Nesse contexto, levantamos a discussão sobre se representações mentais farão parte de uma explicação dos raciocínios analógicos, oferecendo um embate de perspectivas e tendo como principal objetivo o fomento do debate. Primeiramente, apresentamos a visão segundo a qual raciocínios analógicos são processos mentais representacionais. Em seguida, apresentamos alguns problemas levantados por Fodor para o seu tratamento computacional, mas sugerimos que esses problemas não afetam a ideia de que raciocínios analógicos envolvem representações mentais. Na seção seguinte, apresentamos a teoria enativista linguística e sugerimos a possibilidade de compatibilização dessa teoria com uma concepção de analogia enquanto processo de categorização não-representacional. Por fim, sintetizamos as duas propostas apresentadas e sugerimos que o contraste de perspectivas divergentes sobre capacidades cognitivas é especialmente frutífero para a nossa compreensão da mente.
Filosofia Unisinos
This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents... more This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology.
In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation... more In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation is justifiable by suggesting the conditions under which it can be accepted and how it can be related to mental states. We present mental states in terms of private experiences and public events. We argue that a representation is a relation involving three main elements as well as the user of the representation, and defend that the conditions in which we can conceive neural activity as representational are set by the context of observing a correlation between public events and patterns of neural activity. We aim at demonstrating that neural activity can be seen as both representational and non-representational - but rather constitutive - depending upon if we are considering public events under the perspective of the observer, or if we are considering private experiences under the subjective perspective.
Este trabalho tem como foco a análise do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittg... more Este trabalho tem como foco a análise do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein, considerando as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. Já os comentadores ingleses sugerem que o conceito de regra cumpre um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem.
Aufklärung journal of philosophy
Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactiv... more Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point.
This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents... more This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.
In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panora... more In this review, I briefly explain some of the key concepts of the book in order to offer a panoramic view of the theory of linguistic bodies. Following the book's structure, I first describe the authors’ notion of body, then refer to their notion ofdialectics, after that, I expose the steps of the model and, finally, get to their conception of languaging.
The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, bra... more The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something im-material such as private experiences is an illu-sion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foun-dations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field
Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental... more Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving’s view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
Doctoral Thesis, 2015
O trabalho sintetiza-se em três pontos principais. Primeiro, a desqualificação da visão de Gordon... more O trabalho sintetiza-se em três pontos principais. Primeiro, a desqualificação da visão de Gordon Baker sobre um dos papéis da filosofia como uma terapia do sujeito. Esta desqualificação se dá tanto por meio de uma crítica ao que ele propõe quanto aos seus fundamentos textuais. Segundo, a explicitação da visão de Waismann, que contribui para a crítica a Baker e para o esclarecimento do que entendemos pelo papel da Filosofia nas Investigações Filosóficas. E, em terceiro lugar, a consideração da concepção de Hacker da filosofia como uma atividade de análise conceitual, que desemboca em nossa proposta de avaliação conceitual.
This work can be summarized in three main points. First, the disqualification of Gordon Baker's view of philosophy as a therapy of the subject. This takes place both through a critique of what he proposes and through what it is based on. Second, the explanation of Waismann's view, which contributes to the criticism of Baker and clarifies what we understand as the role of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations. And, thirdly, the consideration of Hackers view of philosophy as an activity of conceptual analysis, which leads to our own view of conceptual evaluation.
WARNING - Viewing this document is conditioned on your acceptance of the following terms of use:
This document is only for private use for research and teaching activities. Reproduction for commercial use is forbidden. These rights cover the whole data about this document as well as its contents. Any uses or copies of this document in whole or in part must include the author's name.
Visit: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-15062015-105430/en.php
Master's Dissertation, 2009
Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigaçõ... more Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal a análise do papel do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. No decorrer do texto, deparamonos com as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. E acredita que há uma solução cética para o paradoxo que flerta com o niilismo. Por outro lado, os comentadores ingleses apresentam o conceito de regra cumprindo um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem. Na medida em que estas se constituem como funções normativas de usos das palavras, são expressas na linguagem e determinadas contingentemente de acordo com os contextos de uso.
This work has as main objective the analysis of the role of the concept of rule in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Throughout the text, we have the readings of S. Kripke and G.P. Baker & P M S. Hacker. The first argues that the notion of rule, in spite of presenting a paradox, it is a very important point in the argument against private language. He believes there is a skeptical solution to the paradox which flirts with nihilism. Furthermore, the English commentators have the concept of rule fulfilling a key role in the explanation of Wittgenstein on the functioning of language. The rules are as functions of normative uses of words, they are expressed in the language and determinate according to the contexts of use.
WARNING - Viewing this document is conditioned on your acceptance of the following terms of use: This document is only for private use for research and teaching activities. Reproduction for commercial use is forbidden. These rights cover the whole data about this document as well as its contents. Any uses or copies of this document in whole or in part must include the author's name.
Visit: http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-02122009-093554/en.php
Os Filósofos, Immanuel Kant, Benjamim Constant e Arthur Schopenhauer, divergem quando se trata de... more Os Filósofos, Immanuel Kant, Benjamim Constant e Arthur Schopenhauer, divergem quando se trata de um suposto direito de mentir. Cada um defende uma maneira através da qual os indivíduos praticariam ações moralmente boas; Kant acredita que os indivíduos não têm direito de mentir, Constant, defende que devemos dizer a verdade quando o ouvinte tiver direito a ela, e Schopenhauer, acredita que temos o direito de mentir em determinadas condições. Neste texto encontra-se uma breve análise das concepções de boa conduta de cada autor, com relação ao direito que um indivíduo tem, ou não, de mentir em algumas situações ou em nenhuma.
v. 44, n. 3: Em busca de uma ontologia para o paradigma 4e, 2021
Comentário Artigos / Articles Comentário a "o externalismo semiótiCo ativo de C. s. PeirCe e a Ca... more Comentário Artigos / Articles Comentário a "o externalismo semiótiCo ativo de C. s. PeirCe e a Cantoria de viola Como signo em ação": em busCa de uma ontologia Para o Paradigma 4e
Philosophy & Technology
It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as compos... more It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (section 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one's engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (section 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (section 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, allusion, which means that the subject acts as if the virtual experiences are real (section 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind-given the current state of technology-between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science.
Manuscrito, 2022
In this paper we suggest that Duffley's sign-based semantics rests on two main claims: a methodol... more In this paper we suggest that Duffley's sign-based semantics rests on two main claims: a methodological one and an ontological one. The methodological one is the analysis of corpora and the ontological one is the postulate of mental content. By adopting a linguistic enactivist perspective with a Wittgensteinian twist, we endorse Duffley's methodological claim and suggest that
Manuscrito, 2022
In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Mean... more In this paper I critically address some ideas presented in Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning Meets Linguistic Form. Duffley adopts the semiological principle that linguistic signs have stable meanings. I argue that this principle leads Duffley to an artificial description of the meaning of the preposition for, in attempting to avoid the charge of polysemy. Another issue is that the principle is not consistently followed throughout the book, such as in Duffley's analysis of the meaning of start, or in his acceptance of words with encyclopedic meanings. I also point out 1 I would like to thank
Manuscrito, 2022
In this introduction we present Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning meets Linguistic Form, ... more In this introduction we present Patrick Duffley's book Linguistic Meaning meets Linguistic Form, as well as the contributions that each scholar has brought into the debate on linguistic meaning and form. They deal with semantic and foundational issues regarding a sign-based approach to meaning.
Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986, Aug 27, 2020
Raciocínios analógicos são tradicionalmente concebidos como processos que envolvem a comparação d... more Raciocínios analógicos são tradicionalmente concebidos como processos que envolvem a comparação de representações mentais. Mais recentemente, com o surgimento de teorias não-representacionalistas da cognição humana, surge a questão de como explicar processos tradicionalmente concebidos como representacionais. Nesse contexto, levantamos a discussão sobre se representações mentais farão parte de uma explicação dos raciocínios analógicos, oferecendo um embate de perspectivas e tendo como principal objetivo o fomento do debate. Primeiramente, apresentamos a visão segundo a qual raciocínios analógicos são processos mentais representacionais. Em seguida, apresentamos alguns problemas levantados por Fodor para o seu tratamento computacional, mas sugerimos que esses problemas não afetam a ideia de que raciocínios analógicos envolvem representações mentais. Na seção seguinte, apresentamos a teoria enativista linguística e sugerimos a possibilidade de compatibilização dessa teoria com uma concepção de analogia enquanto processo de categorização não-representacional. Por fim, sintetizamos as duas propostas apresentadas e sugerimos que o contraste de perspectivas divergentes sobre capacidades cognitivas é especialmente frutífero para a nossa compreensão da mente.
Filosofia Unisinos
This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents... more This paper addresses the notion of dialectics in the linguistic bodies theory. First, it presents it as a three-aspect concept, namely, the ontological aspect, the methodological aspect, and the dialectical model. Subsequently, it discusses the ontological aspect and the dialectical model and, based on the enactivist linguistic notions of concreteness and abstraction, suggests that it can be conceived as a two-fold concept: methodological and epistemological. This suggestion intends to avoid the paradox we are led to by acknowledging three ontological enactivist claims and a few assumptions of the methodological approach.Keywords: Dialectics, Enactivism, Language, Epistemology, Ontology.
In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation... more In this paper we investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation is justifiable by suggesting the conditions under which it can be accepted and how it can be related to mental states. We present mental states in terms of private experiences and public events. We argue that a representation is a relation involving three main elements as well as the user of the representation, and defend that the conditions in which we can conceive neural activity as representational are set by the context of observing a correlation between public events and patterns of neural activity. We aim at demonstrating that neural activity can be seen as both representational and non-representational - but rather constitutive - depending upon if we are considering public events under the perspective of the observer, or if we are considering private experiences under the subjective perspective.
Este trabalho tem como foco a análise do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittg... more Este trabalho tem como foco a análise do conceito de regra nas Investigações Filosóficas de Wittgenstein, considerando as leituras de S. Kripke e G.P. Baker & P.M.S. Hacker. O primeiro defende que a noção de regra, apesar de apresentar um paradoxo, cumpre um importante papel no argumento contra a linguagem privada. Já os comentadores ingleses sugerem que o conceito de regra cumpre um papel fundamental na explicação de Wittgenstein acerca do funcionamento da linguagem.
Aufklärung journal of philosophy
Filosofia Unisinos
Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental... more Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving's view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker's distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving's conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
Discurso
The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, bra... more The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.
Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactiv... more Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural cou...