Giuliana Mancuso | Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart) (original) (raw)
Books by Giuliana Mancuso
After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously ( § 1... more After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously ( § 1), I focus on Enoch's taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it ( § 2). Enoch's argument from impartiality is then reconstructed ( § 3) to show how these assumptions are at work ( § 4). Next ( § § 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally ( § 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.
Papers by Giuliana Mancuso
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2013
Inkoj Philosophy Artificial Languages New Series, Oct 1, 2012
Per prendere seriamente la moralità bisogna essere realisti? David Enoch ritiene di sì e propone ... more Per prendere seriamente la moralità bisogna essere realisti? David Enoch ritiene di sì e propone una forma decisa di realismo etico non-naturalistico, in base al quale ci sono fatti e verità morali che non dipendono da reazioni soggettive o accordi e convenzioni intersoggettivi né sono riducibili ai fatti e alle verità naturali studiati dalle scienze empiriche. E ormai qualche anno che la scena metaetica ha visto tornare alla ribalta il realismo morale nella sua veste ontologicamente più impegnativa, quella non-naturalistica appunto, ed Enoch si trova quindi in buona e nutrita compagnia, come peraltro nota egli stesso (p. 6 s.): l'originalità della sua proposta mi sembra invece vada cercata nel fatto che egli chiami in causa, per emendarla (se con successo o noè un'altra questione), la tesi classica sulla neutralità normativa della metaetica e che gli argomenti presentati nel testo a sostegno del realismo forte siano costruiti esattamente sulle ricadute negative che avrebbe sul piano pratico, normativo e deliberativo la scelta di una metaetica diversa dal realismo non-naturalistico che viene qui difeso.
Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, 2009
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2007
... della relazione di campo tra l'io e il mondo. Il secondo intervento, intitolato La verit... more ... della relazione di campo tra l'io e il mondo. Il secondo intervento, intitolato La verità attuale dei cervelli in una vasca di Putnam, è stato tenuto da Simona Chiodo. La relatrice ha inserito il famoso esperi-mento mentale entro ...
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2004
This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian co... more This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian context. The very little attention the literature paid to them was almost always guided by the only aim to single the themes out which can be used as signs of Scheler’s future “conversion” to phenomenology. In consequence of this predominant approach, the neo-Kantianism that characterizes Scheler’s early works has been treated as a vague notion and never examined as such. The paper specifies this notion through an examination of Scheler’s early works which shows their most significant theoretical debts (to R. Eucken, W. Windelband and particularly to H. Cohen) and the questions they deal with, i.e. the relation between knowledge and morality as different kinds of objective forms of experience; the methodological problem in philosophy; the working out of a transcendental logic as general science of objectivity.
Drafts by Giuliana Mancuso
After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1)... more After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch's taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch's argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§ § 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.
After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously ( § 1... more After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously ( § 1), I focus on Enoch's taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it ( § 2). Enoch's argument from impartiality is then reconstructed ( § 3) to show how these assumptions are at work ( § 4). Next ( § § 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally ( § 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2013
Inkoj Philosophy Artificial Languages New Series, Oct 1, 2012
Per prendere seriamente la moralità bisogna essere realisti? David Enoch ritiene di sì e propone ... more Per prendere seriamente la moralità bisogna essere realisti? David Enoch ritiene di sì e propone una forma decisa di realismo etico non-naturalistico, in base al quale ci sono fatti e verità morali che non dipendono da reazioni soggettive o accordi e convenzioni intersoggettivi né sono riducibili ai fatti e alle verità naturali studiati dalle scienze empiriche. E ormai qualche anno che la scena metaetica ha visto tornare alla ribalta il realismo morale nella sua veste ontologicamente più impegnativa, quella non-naturalistica appunto, ed Enoch si trova quindi in buona e nutrita compagnia, come peraltro nota egli stesso (p. 6 s.): l'originalità della sua proposta mi sembra invece vada cercata nel fatto che egli chiami in causa, per emendarla (se con successo o noè un'altra questione), la tesi classica sulla neutralità normativa della metaetica e che gli argomenti presentati nel testo a sostegno del realismo forte siano costruiti esattamente sulle ricadute negative che avrebbe sul piano pratico, normativo e deliberativo la scelta di una metaetica diversa dal realismo non-naturalistico che viene qui difeso.
Rivista di Storia della Filosofia, 2009
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2007
... della relazione di campo tra l'io e il mondo. Il secondo intervento, intitolato La verit... more ... della relazione di campo tra l'io e il mondo. Il secondo intervento, intitolato La verità attuale dei cervelli in una vasca di Putnam, è stato tenuto da Simona Chiodo. La relatrice ha inserito il famoso esperi-mento mentale entro ...
Rivista Di Storia Della Filosofia, 2004
This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian co... more This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian context. The very little attention the literature paid to them was almost always guided by the only aim to single the themes out which can be used as signs of Scheler’s future “conversion” to phenomenology. In consequence of this predominant approach, the neo-Kantianism that characterizes Scheler’s early works has been treated as a vague notion and never examined as such. The paper specifies this notion through an examination of Scheler’s early works which shows their most significant theoretical debts (to R. Eucken, W. Windelband and particularly to H. Cohen) and the questions they deal with, i.e. the relation between knowledge and morality as different kinds of objective forms of experience; the methodological problem in philosophy; the working out of a transcendental logic as general science of objectivity.
After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1)... more After a brief outline of Enoch's defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch's taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch's argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§ § 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.