Valerio Alfonso Bruno | Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart) (original) (raw)

Peer-reviewed articles and conference papers by Valerio Alfonso Bruno

Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 2021

During the Covid-19 pandemic, public trust necessarily shifted towards science and technical expe... more During the Covid-19 pandemic, public trust necessarily shifted towards science and technical expertise worldwide. In some liberal democracies, the Constitution and Parliament have been bypassed, with Executives using scientific and technical expertise to legitimate political choices within the crisis management process. In Italy (March-August 2020), the Executive set up expert teams (such as the Comitato Tecnico-Scientifico) acting mostly by Decrees of the President of Council of Ministers (DPCM). The Italian Parliament was not sufficiently consulted. After reviewing the current research literature on constitutional changes during emergency regimes within representative democracies, and using insights from Italy, we try to frame the discourse concerning Executive's choices during emergency regimes in terms of (i) decline of political responsiveness, (ii) prevalence of output legitimation and (iii) politicization of expertise (with the possibility for expertise, in turn, to influence policy making) to contribute to the overall debate on the reconfiguration of powers in times of crises.

Social Europe, Jul 13, 2018

In Europe, home to one of the most ambitious political and institutional experiments in recent hi... more In Europe, home to one of the most ambitious political and institutional experiments in recent history, the European Union, populist movements and technocratic elites have been among the most active actors in taking advantage of the use of fear, beginning immediately after the global financial and economic crisis of 2008.

German Politics and Society 36 (4), 50-77, 2018

The decade following the great economic and financial crisis of 2008 saw the European Union deman... more The decade following the great economic and financial crisis of 2008 saw the European Union demanding regional leadership. The EU has also suffered a number of other existential crises, such as the ongoing refugee crisis, the Ukraine-Russia military confrontation, the revival of nationalism and radical right-wing populism, alongside the “trade war” between the United States and the EU. The article develops a novel theoretical framework structuring leadership as a peculiar typology of power, characterized by the capacity of both including “followership” countries’ interests and providing crisis management. Our central argument is that Germany responded strategically to leadership demand in Europe through a positive power role, exhibiting the inclusion of followership and multilateral leadership rather than hegemonic, together with crisis management skills based on solid influence over regional outcomes. Conclusions are drawn from five key case studies drawn from different policy areas.

Giano, 2019

Drawing from the state-of-art of contemporary studies on the rise of radical right populism in th... more Drawing from the state-of-art of contemporary studies on the rise of radical right populism in the post-2008 Europe, the article focuses on an often under-researcher aspect: the complex relation existing between finance and social welfare. The central argument of the article is that contemporary radical right populism in the EU is on the rise not only for its xenophobic propaganda, rather in virtue of its challenge to notion of finance and social welfare as a zero sum game.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: Technocratic and Populist fears compressing Liberal Democracis, 2018

The paper deals with the use of fear made by Technocracies and Populisms (in particular right-win... more The paper deals with the use of fear made by Technocracies and Populisms (in particular right-wing populist parties) in post-crisis Europe (2013-2018), and the way it contributed to the crisis of Liberal Democracy, with institutions in need of popular legitimacy and constitutionalism requiring technocratic elements to function, highlighting an “elected-unelected” unavoidable tension. Using the mythological narration of Scylla and Charybdis as a metaphor, the paper builds upon the theoretical framework of complexity, and its connection with legitimacy. The central argument of this paper is that Technocracies and Populisms, as showed in Italy, take advantage of trivialization and the mis-use of complexity respectively, to implement a successful strategy based on evoking fears. In turn, these fears have profound implications, in undermining the stability of democratic societies, as demonstrated by the recent political crisis in Italy.

Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science (18), 2018

Since the Eurozone crisis, scholars framed different interpretations about the power role of Germ... more Since the Eurozone crisis, scholars framed different interpretations about the power role of Germany in Europe, pointing at the possible return of the “German question”. Recently, with the “Brexit”, the populist tensions within the EU and the election of Trump as US president, Germany on the contrary, was regarded as the last bastion of the liberal order by Western media. Starting from the premise that with the global economic crisis Germany acquired a supremacy position in Europe “by default”, we proceed by confuting the idea of Germany as a coercive hegemon, without falling into idealistic interpretations. To do so, we define an analytical framework distinguishing leadership and hegemony and insisting on the importance of the context of permanent multi-level crisis in Europe. The argument we advance is that between 2012 and 2015 Germany played a positive power role in Europe, exhibiting appreciable leadership skills, vast regional influence and, first of all, a style of power closer to a benign multilateral leadership than to a coercive unilateral hegemony. The empirical research is based on three case studies from dierent policy areas, the Banking Union (2012-2013), the European migration crisis (2014-2015) and the Russia-Ukraine conflict (2014-2015).

Católica Graduate Research Conference for the Future of Law - Lisbon 2018, 2018

The paper adopts the access good theory, based on information provision as “access good”, to use ... more The paper adopts the access good theory, based on information provision as “access good”, to use the post-2008 EU Health Policy-making, still relatively recent and in an embryonal phase, as paradigmatic case in order to support studies on the impact of technical expertise on policy framing, in particular on structural weakness from EU Institutions. As the ongoing creation of EU health service policies is not a response to major interest group pressures, but a genuine EU initiative, European Institutions (information demanders) are not able to fully counterbalance technical expertise and scientific knowledge (technocracy), in a seemingly win-win situation that on the long- run exhibits dramatic unbalances in favour of interest groups (information providers). After conducting a meta-analysis on data provided by a vast research by Greer, de Fonseca and Adolph (2008) about lobbies and EU Policy-making, the paper reviews possible solutions to the issue of implicit lobbying power in the EU legislative process regarding health policy, including strengthening the role of EU Civil Servants in relation to technical and scientific expertise, and acknowledging the scarcity of theoretical and empirical studies regarding international public administrations, and EU Institutions in particular

Books and book chapters by Valerio Alfonso Bruno

Populism and Far-Right. Trends in Europe (Edited by Valerio Alfonso Bruno), 2022

The coalition between Fratelli d’Italia, Lega, Forza Italia and some minor allies is expected to ... more The coalition between Fratelli d’Italia, Lega, Forza Italia and some minor allies is expected to win the Italian general election on 25 September 2022 by a considerable margin, at least according to all the opinion polls. Rather surprisingly, much of the public debate in Italy, including the media, politicians and polling institutes, still refers to the right-wing bloc as a centre-right coalition despite the presence of two fully-fledged far-right parties. In this chapter, we will a) introduce the main political players competing in the September 2022 general election, i.e. the right-wing coalition, the centre-left coalition, the M5S and the ‘third pole’ (terzo polo) composed of Azione and Italia Viva; we will then b) consider the ways in which Fratelli d’Italia and Lega are competing on the same far-right platform and which characteristics may give FdI a competitive edge over Lega; and lastly we will c) reflect on the factors that may have enabled Italy’s far-right coalition to be considered moderate centre-right, a label used since 1994 to describe coalitions led by Berlusconi and which no longer seem fit-ting given the presence of the two far-right parties. In conclusion, we will identify at least two elements, in fact two sides of the same coin, supporting the persistence of the centre-right definition: a) the ambiguous and controversial role within the coalition of Forza Italia, whose alleged moderation has been cleverly sold to grant a sort of continuity to the use of the centrodestra label as opposed to ‘right wing’ or ‘far right’; and b) the skilful way in which the Italian far-right has managed to normalize itself and enter the mainstream over the last decade.

State of Emergency Italian democracy in times of pandemic (EDITED BY DAMIANO PALANO), 2022

While populism currently represents a vast field of research and includes those strands of schola... more While populism currently represents a vast field of research and includes those strands of scholarship interested in the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on populist parties, technocracy has generally attracted less interest among scholars. In this regard, Italy represents a rather unique case: since the outbreak of Covid-19 in February 2020, the country has seen populist parties both in government and within the opposition, being currently governed by a technocratic government, i.e. the Draghi executive, that is supported by a large coalition that includes populist parties. Specifically, in this chapter we (i) provide a reconstruction of the populist party family in Italy before and during the pandemic; (ii) assess the performances – through opinion polls and, thus, in terms of electoral support – of Italian populist parties during the Covid-19 crisis; (iii) briefly contextualise technocratic governments in recent Italian history, then analyse the formation of the Draghi executive and the case of the Piano Nazionale di Ripresa e Resilienza (PNRR or National Recovery and Resilience Plan). The concluding remarks provide for some tentative considerations around the impact of Covid-19 on the Italian political system, considering both populist parties and technocracy

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Futures, 2021

The role played by finance and the relevance of fiscal tools in order to enhance regional sustain... more The role played by finance and the relevance of fiscal tools in order to enhance regional sustainable development are here analytically considered. Regional development is increasingly related to sustainability and refers to a wide set of dynamics: among others, the wise use of natural resources, the transition to green/circular economy, job creation and tackling poverty, growth of clean technologies, production, and well-being. The debate on the sustainability of finance and financial instruments has seen, in the last decade, an important acceleration, including the analysis of best practices from specific countries and regions, or evidences from developing countries. In this respect, ethical and green finance, in contrast to predatory forms of financialization (a key feature of globalization), are emerging and currently regarded as necessary to accompany the sustainable development of regions. In particular, green finance and ethical finance play a role in sustainable regional development by encouraging policies, both public and private, in the direction of environmental and green initiatives. They also aim at building a typology of finance based upon the ethics of prudent risk-taking, while recognizing financial dilemmas as an area of possible consequences of the action.

Futuri, Jun 2021

La lotta contro il SARS-CoV-2 rappresenta un'occasione di confronto, su larga scala e senza prece... more La lotta contro il SARS-CoV-2 rappresenta un'occasione di confronto, su larga scala e senza precedenti, tra leader politici e policy-maker con la scienza e la competenza tecnica. Nei termini di una possibile geopolitica dell'expertise, è innegabile che il soft power di paesi a guida populista, come il Brasile, l'India, o gli Stati Uniti sotto la guida di Trump, abbia ricevuto importanti contraccolpi proprio per aver adottato decisioni incomprensibili senza riguardo al parere degli esperti. Il nostro argomento è che chi riuscirà a gestire in maniera più efficace la fase di uscita dalla crisi pandemica e ad avviare una ripresa (non solo economica) davvero significativa, acquisterà un credito considerevole agli occhi della comunità internazionale. All'interno di questo quadro, le istituzioni dell'Unione europea dispongono di un'occasione per il loro rilancio che solo in parte è già ipotecata: rimangono margini importanti per valorizzare fino in fondo, e in maniera inedita, la sua eccentrica conformazione istituzionale.

Peuple et populisme, identité et nation : Quelle contribution à la paix? Quelles perspectives européennes?, 2020

The chapter deals with the use of fear made by technocracies and populisms (in particular right-w... more The chapter deals with the use of fear made by technocracies and populisms (in particular right-wing populist parties) in post-crisis Europe (2013-2018), and the way it contributed to the crisis of Liberal Democracy, with Institutions in need of popular legitimacy and liberal constitutionalism requiring technocratic elements to function, highlighting an "elected-unelected" unavoidable tension. Using the mythological narration of Scylla and Charybdis as a metaphor, the chapter builds upon the theoretical framework of complexity, and its connection with legitimacy, to explain the role of fear and the mutual implications between the actions of Technocracy and Populism. The central argument of this paper is that Technocracies and Populisms, as showed in Italy, take advantage of trivialization and the mis-use of complexity respectively, to implement a successful strategy based on evoking fears. In turn, these fears have profound implications, in undermining the stability of democratic societies, as demonstrated by the recent political crisis in Italy (2018).

Europa: che fare? L’Unione Europea tra crisi, nuovi conflitti e prospettive di rilancio federale, 2019

Populismi e tecnocrazie, come Scilla e Cariddi, agiscono in rapporto simbiotico e dialettico: il ... more Populismi e tecnocrazie, come Scilla e Cariddi, agiscono in rapporto simbiotico e dialettico: il proposito d’evitare un estremo porta irrimediabilmente verso l’altro, come può essere compreso, tra gli altri casi, dalla situazione italiana dell’ultimo decennio: al “populismo” degli esecutivi a guida di Silvio Berlusconi è succeduto, nel Novembre 2011, il governo tecnocratico di Mario Monti, che a colpi di decreti emergenziali ha applicato, senza mediazioni, politiche di austerity . Le successive esperienze dei governi Letta, Renzi e Gentiloni non si sono distanziate da tale solco, generando, nelle recenti elezioni politiche nazionali (4 Marzo 2018), una escalation di consensi in favore di partiti anti-sistema quali Movimento Cinque Stelle e Lega.

On line articles by Valerio Alfonso Bruno

The Loop ECPR, 2022

Russia’s war on Ukraine has split the Italian centre-left opposition between pacifists and those ... more Russia’s war on Ukraine has split the Italian centre-left opposition between pacifists and those arguing in favour of arming Ukraine. Disunity on how to respond to the crisis, write Valerio Alfonso Bruno, James F. Downes and Alessio Scopelliti, will likely weaken these parties and strengthen Meloni's right-wing coalition. War in Ukraine is thus likely to cause the greatest divisions, not within the governing coalition, but within the Italian centre-left opposition. These divisions may well give impetus to Meloni. Despite its own foreign policy differences, the current right-wing coalition appears, in the eyes of Italians, the ‘reliable’ choice to decide their country's fate. Italy's left-wing and centre-left parties will therefore continue to challenge each other on which is ‘purer’ in its representation of pacifist and progressive values

Open Democracy, 2021

In late 2012, when the Italian political party, Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), was founde... more In late 2012, when the Italian political party, Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), was founded, few would have bet that in less than a decade, it would lead the polls. Even in her wildest moments of optimism, the party’s charismatic leader, Giorgia Meloni, could hardly have dreamt that her party would one day not only be the first party of the Italian center-Right coalition, but of Italian politics, tout court.

Social Europe, 2021

Elected federal secretary of the then Lega Nord in late 2013, from 2018 onwards Salvini slowly ov... more Elected federal secretary of the then Lega Nord in late 2013, from 2018 onwards Salvini slowly overlapped it with a new party, the Lega Salvini Premier (or simply the League)—renouncing, at the least for the time being, the word ‘North’ and with it the issue of independence for the putative ‘Padania’. This masterful move saw the creation of a brand-new nationalist far-right party, arriving in late 2018 to hit 35 per cent in opinion polls, far from the 4 per cent attained by its predecessor in the 2013 general election. However, underneath the carapace of populism, not much of substance remains for Salvini’s League. The two, rather trivial, pillars sustaining the party consensus are a ‘flat tax’ and xenophobia.

Culturico, 2021

Italian politics has been shaken by recent events surrounding neo-fascism. Giorgia Meloni’s radic... more Italian politics has been shaken by recent events surrounding neo-fascism. Giorgia Meloni’s radical right Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy) Party has been adopting an ambiguous stance on the issue of neo-fascism, with Meloni failing to distance her party from these recent events. This has sparked a furore in Italy and at the same time raises important questions about the (a) legacy of fascism within modern Italian politics, particularly with (b) the increasing political significance that radical right parties such as the Brothers of Italy Party have alongside broader right-wing movements in contemporary Italian politics.

Fair Observer, 2021

All political parties in the Italian parliament supported Draghi’s appointment except one: Giorgi... more All political parties in the Italian parliament supported Draghi’s appointment except one: Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy). Even the Euroskeptic and anti-immigration populistradical Lega (League) agreed to support Draghi. However, Fratelli d'Italia, which in the last year has moved from 10,7% to the current 17%- 18%, could vastly benefit from this “isolating abstention.” By simply waiting for the end of the honeymoon between Draghi’s technocratic executive and Italian political parties, the Brothers of Italy could easily build narratives based around blaming the incapacity of the current executive to efficiently utilize the EU funds; denouncing a technocratic agenda dictated by the European “bureaucrats” in Brussels or by “foreign” policymakers in Berlin and Paris; and by criticizing the opportunistic and inconsistent attitudes of other Italian parties, including the League.

CARR, 2020

In their latest CARR Insights article, Dr Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Dr James F. Downes and Alessio S... more In their latest CARR Insights article, Dr Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Dr James F. Downes and Alessio Scopelliti argue that despite the recent constitutional referendum result in favour of reducing the number of MPs in the Italian Parliament, electoral volatility is likely to continue in Italian politics-with no clear political victory emerging for M5S, nor for the governing coalition. Instead, three main patterns are likely to emerge from the aftermath of the referendum: (a) stability in the short-term for the Conte II Cabinet, (b) electoral decline for the populist radical right (PRR), Lega, and (c) the PRR Fratelli d'Italia experiencing an electoral rise in the long-term .These three patterns will have important and far-reaching implications for the future of Italian politics.

www.socialeurope.eu, 2018

Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 2021

Social Europe, Jul 13, 2018

German Politics and Society 36 (4), 50-77, 2018

Giano, 2019

Between Scylla and Charybdis: Technocratic and Populist fears compressing Liberal Democracis, 2018

Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science (18), 2018

Católica Graduate Research Conference for the Future of Law - Lisbon 2018, 2018

Populism and Far-Right. Trends in Europe (Edited by Valerio Alfonso Bruno), 2022

State of Emergency Italian democracy in times of pandemic (EDITED BY DAMIANO PALANO), 2022

The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Urban and Regional Futures, 2021

Futuri, Jun 2021

Peuple et populisme, identité et nation : Quelle contribution à la paix? Quelles perspectives européennes?, 2020

Europa: che fare? L’Unione Europea tra crisi, nuovi conflitti e prospettive di rilancio federale, 2019

The Loop ECPR, 2022

Open Democracy, 2021

Social Europe, 2021

Culturico, 2021

Fair Observer, 2021

CARR, 2020

www.socialeurope.eu, 2018

Social Europe, 2020

The Covid-19 pandemic demands we reconsider the role of scientific expertise and the relationship... more The Covid-19 pandemic demands we reconsider the role of scientific expertise and the relationship between knowledge and policy-making, giving new life to an otherwise heavily polarised public debate on this theme. The struggle against the coronavirus represents an occasion of contestation for science and politics, on a large scale in a globalised world. These are two fundamental human enterprises, but their coexistence has historically been complex and problematic: while science aims at an objective understanding of the world that is testable and verifiable (or, in Popper’s view, falsifiable), political activity focuses on making decisions concerning people and societies (from Greek politiká, or ‘the affairs of the city’). The sudden centrality assumed by knowledge and technical expertise in the last few months is already having direct and far-reaching political consequences, within and among states.

Fair Observer, 2020

As the COVID-19 crisis is gradually slowing down, the world is bracing itself for a very likely s... more As the COVID-19 crisis is gradually slowing down, the world is bracing itself for a very likely second wave of the pandemic. While the shortcomings of the global response and the preparedness of individual countries will be open for debate and analysis for a long time to come, attempting to forecast what architecture the international system will assume after the immediate health crisis is over may prove to be even more challenging. While experts offer a wide variety of perspectives, the debate on the post-coronavirus world is characterized by some recurring themes, such as the future of globalization, the fraught relationship between the United States and China, the challenges facing the European Union or the future role of populism and the radical right. Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, professor of international relations at the Catholic University of Milan and author of “The Vulnerable: How the Pandemic Will Change the World,” proposes three possible alternative scenarios on the international system after COVID-19. Two are rather gloomy, with the international order characterized by a cynical return to “business as usual” or a turn toward self-centered nation-states, ruled by populist, nationalist leaders. A third scenario does give some hope, provided we recognize and effectively protect the most vulnerable members of our societies that form the most fragile part of the system.

Rantt Media, 2020

Generalizing from the Italian case to the comparative European level, our main argument is that (... more Generalizing from the Italian case to the comparative European level, our main argument is that (a) PRR Parties will continue to lose out as the pandemic continues. We will most likely see more of a ‘rally around the flag effect’ for incumbent governing parties. However, we argue that there is likely to be an (b) important ‘caveat’ to this electoral ‘decline.’ Once the COVID-19 crisis is over, this is when mainstream parties may lose their perceived competence in how they handled COVID-19, and doubts about trust may resurface amongst voters, particularly towards the resulting economic impact. In turn, voters in Europe may be likely to hold incumbent mainstream parties to account, and PRR parties will likely be the main beneficiaries from protest politics, alongside a ‘rise’ in Euroscepticism, renewed anti-immigrant sentiment and increased salience of this key issue. Therefore, we argue that the ‘end’ of COVID-19 may lead to a resurgence in support for the PRR electorally. Other ‘populist’ parties are also likely to flourish. Declining economic conditions across Europe may also lead to increased support for populist radical left parties. Linked to this, a more volatile political landscape across Europe for ‘new’ entrant parties may also take place, with previous fragmentation in European politics and party competition continuing.

Fair Observer, 2020

With the COVID-19 outbreak unfolding worldwide, with around 35,000 cases confirmed outside China ... more With the COVID-19 outbreak unfolding worldwide, with around 35,000 cases confirmed outside China to date, it is possible to attempt a preliminary analysis of the politics of coronavirus and the efficiency of policies adopted by national governments and international bodies. Unfortunately, the measures seen so far have not always displayed the degree of leadership, responsiveness and institutional responsibility needed to manage such a large-scale outbreak. Italy and the US currently lack these essential elements, exhibiting some of the highest mortality ratios from COVID-19. Italy’s political response to the outbreak has been marked by leaks and sudden turnarounds on decision-making, while the US has displayed little transparency, with crisis management politicized and driven by electoral calculus.

Fair Observer, 2020

While other countries come together in the face of emergency, Italy is missing the opportunity to... more While other countries come together in the face of emergency, Italy is missing the opportunity to exhibit a sense of national cohesion — its Achilles’ heel since unification in 1861. The country looks to be in a state of chaos, once again politically polarized and socially divided into opposite teams: Salvini versus Conte, the central executive versus the regions, the north versus the south.

Fair Observer, 2020

This week, the delegations of the European Union and the United Kingdom started the institutional... more This week, the delegations of the European Union and the United Kingdom started the institutional meetings concerning the Brexit deal negotiations. The transition period during which the two sides may possibly find an agreement on a variety of issues — almost everything from trade to migration — and avoid a no-deal Brexit is set to the end on December 31, 2020. A few days ago, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned that if “good progress” were not possible, a no-deal Brexit would be envisaged because “the UK would not trade away its national sovereignty.” On the opposite side, Michel Barnier, the EU chief negotiator, quickly replied by stating that “the EU will stick to its prior commitments,” indicating that the European Union will keep its intransigent stance in the coming talks, firmly rejecting the possibility of a EU-Canada style deal. Amalie de Montchalin, the French minister of European affairs, has echoed this sentiment. Each side’s entrenched stances are reminiscent of the negotiations that went into agreeing on Brexit to begin with.

Democratic Audit, 2020

With several parties in Italy competing on the right and far right, Valerio Alfonso Bruno and Jam... more With several parties in Italy competing on the right and far right, Valerio Alfonso Bruno and James F. Downes look at the recent growth in support for Fratelli d’Italia. They argue that this party is building domestic support, along with a network of contacts of likeminded populist radical-right actors globally, which demonstrates the increased mainstreaming of populist radical-right ideas in liberal democracies.

Fair Observer, 2020

Today, the far right faces a watershed year. After the 2019 European Parliament elections, the Eu... more Today, the far right faces a watershed year. After the 2019 European Parliament elections, the European far-right bloc has doubled in size, and Boris Johnson has finally extricated the UK from the European Union — a dream of the far right for some time. On the other hand, Trump heads into an election year amid his own impeachment trial. The success of the Brexit referendum and Trump’s long-shot presidential bid in 2016 signaled a global turn to the right. Will 2020 deliver a different verdict?

The Fair Observer, 2020

Salvini’s defeat in Emilia Romagna was not a fiasco, as the center-right coalition did well in el... more Salvini’s defeat in Emilia Romagna was not a fiasco, as the center-right coalition did well in electoral terms. In particular, the League’s vote gain in a region considered, until few years ago, the most left-leaning in Italy, is an excellent result. The inventory of the populist propaganda was enriched by Salvini with new items — the intercom stunt, the muscular face-to-face with the sardines. Moreover, if in Emilia Romagna two out of three of M5S voters abandoned the movement to support the PD, in other Italian regions they may vote for Salvini in the future. As for the sardines movement, its capacity to effectively influence Italian politics remains to still be determined.

Fair Observer, 2019

The EU needs to regain control of the political debate around social welfare, which has been mast... more The EU needs to regain control of the political debate around social welfare, which has been masterfully monopolized by European populist parties in the last decade. The European economy is expanding for the seventh year in a row despite a slowdown at the global level. However, social and economic inequalities within EU member states have been increasing significantly in the last decade. Not all citizens are benefitting from the current economic growth and the advancement in productivity, which creates an excellent window of opportunity for the populist radical rights to thrive and amass electoral support.

Social Europe, 2019

The European Union has been on a path-dependent trajectory since its foundation towards market-cl... more The European Union has been on a path-dependent trajectory since its foundation towards market-clearing. Its mission needs to be redefined as social-embedding. Despite the current slowdown, the European economy is expanding, for the seventh year in a row. Social and economic inequalities within EU member states have however increased dramatically in recent decades. It's clear that not all citizens are benefiting from that growth. If we do not want to facilitate the rise of populist leaders such as Matteo Salvini and Marine Le Pen, this is the right time to rethink the EU's original sin-the asymmetry between the economic dimension and the social question within European governance. It is key to recapturing the political debate around social welfare, so far masterfully monopolised by European populist parties, in particular radical-right nationalist parties.

Fair Observer , 2019

Salvini was able to build a narrative positioning not only the Italian middle class against the i... more Salvini was able to build a narrative positioning not only the Italian middle class against the immigrants on the basis of safety and security, but also the lower classes, developing a strategy of a “war between the poor,” in which Italians struggling economically are pitted against immigrants in the field of social welfare. Before analyzing Salvini’s political strategy more closely, we provide a fuller picture of issues around work and social welfare in Italy in the last decade

Public Seminar (The New School for Social Research), 2019

In May 2019, the Italian government approved an anti-immigration “decreto sicurezza” (or security... more In May 2019, the Italian government approved an anti-immigration “decreto sicurezza” (or security decree). Among other nationalist policies, the new law foresees a ne against anyone who is found transporting a migrant into the country. In response, the students of Sicilian high school teacher Rosa Maria dell’Aria produced a short video that compared the decree, which was pushed forward by the Italian executive (composed Lega and Movimento Cinque Stelle populist parties), to the fascist racial laws introduced by Benito Mussolini in 1938. Dell’Aria was disciplined at her school for the video and suspended from work for 15 days.

Doctoral Thesis , 2017

Until mid 2000s considered “the sick man of Europe”, Germany, following the economic crisis of 20... more Until mid 2000s considered “the sick man of Europe”, Germany, following the economic crisis of 2008 and the Eurozone crisis, reached a supremacy position over Europe “by default”. Domestic restraints played an important role in preventing Germany from covering a full leadership position on the Region (ordo-liberalism culture of order and stability, avoidance of the military mean, strong geo-economic paradigm, struggle to accept a recent dramatic history); nonetheless, Germany under Angela Merkel Chancellorship was able to exercise a constructive leadership by trying to balance, (not always successfully), the ‘leadership demand’ of a Region severely hit by a permanent condition of crisis and the highly different and heterogenous interests of a ‘Followership’ composed currently by 28 EU Member States

Fribourg (Switzerland), 8 April 2018, 2018

The presentation builds on the connection between expertise and implicit lobbying by Transnationa... more The presentation builds on the connection between expertise and implicit lobbying by Transnational firms and European associations in the European Union. The EU is selected as paradigmatic case to understand the connection expertise-implicit lobbying. The theoretical perspective is based on the “access good” theory, conceived by Bouwen and Chalmers. The presentation ends with a philosophical dilemma regarding Expertise, Influence and Democracy.

ITALIAN INSTITUTE FOR THE FUTURE, 2020

In questo saggio affrontiamo alcuni dei principali megatrend che stanno caratterizzando e caratte... more In questo saggio affrontiamo alcuni dei principali megatrend che stanno caratterizzando e caratterizzeranno sempre di più i futuri possibili delle relazioni e dei processi internazionali. Più in dettaglio, in questo lavoro di scavo e analisi ci soffermiamo sia sulla dimensione “puramente” internazionale dell’Ordine globale, sia su quella regionale, prendendo, in quest’ultimo caso, in considerazione l’area del Medio Oriente e Nord-Africa e, in una sezione interamente dedicata, l’Unione Europea.
La lettrice e il lettore troveranno un affresco di alcune delle tendenze chiave del mondo globale: dal consolidamento del mondo multipolare alla de-globalizzazione, dal ripiegamento degli USA al soft power cinese, dalla instabilità del Medio Oriente alla ‘nuova guerra fredda araba’, fino ai diversi scenari che caratterizzeranno l’integrazione europea – e l’Unione – nei prossimi anni.

Sezione 1: L’ORDINE GLOBALE TRA CRISI DELLA GLOBALIZZAZIONE E ASCESA DI NUOVE POTENZE. QUALI SCENARI DOPO IL COVID?

Sezione 2: L’UNIONE EUROPEA TRA NUOVE SFIDE E INCERTI SCENARI FUTURI

Fair Observer , Jul 12, 2022

The war in Ukraine has had an immediate effect on the security and defense discourse in Europe. T... more The war in Ukraine has had an immediate effect on the security and defense discourse in Europe. This discourse reflects how the European security architecture might evolve in the future.

German Politics and Society

Western Extremists and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2022 All Talk, But Not a Lot of Walk, 2022

Chapter on Italy of an analysis of the far-right and right-wing extremist scenes in seven countri... more Chapter on Italy of an analysis of the far-right and right-wing extremist scenes in seven countries—the United States, Canada, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, and Poland—reveals that the current conflict has not led to a significant flow of extremists to the war zone.

Interdisciplinary Political Studies (special issue), 2021

Technocracy is one of the main issues in contemporary social sciences scholarship. While many aut... more Technocracy is one of the main issues in contemporary social sciences scholarship. While many authors have written on, among others themes, the rise of technocracy, the concept and definition of technocracy, or the typologies of technocratic governments, the specific question of the relation between technocracy (and technocrats) and state transformations has been less explored. Through the study of the Italian case, we analyze the role of technocrats in three critical junctures (since the early 1980s to the present), and in light of the intertwined process of state transformation and neoliberalization. The paper thus provides for a long-term analysis of technocracy and the state, asking when, how, and in what conditions technocrats not only came to hold top-government positions, but also concurred to redefine intra-state institutional relations especially as regards the strengthening of executive power.

e-Extreme, 2021

“Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach” by Maurits J. Meijers and ... more “Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach” by Maurits J. Meijers and Andrej Zaslove sets out from the discouraging consideration that, despite a large number of authoritative studies on populism in political parties in Europe, we are not yet able to measure it in a valid and precise manner. The aim of the authors, after having carefully listed in detail the weaknesses of existing approaches, is to address this issue of measuring political parties’ populism.
They propose a new approach for operationalizing and measuring populism through the use of expert surveys, and illustrate its advantages. In particular, the approach proposed is conceived to offer full coverage for all European political parties.

e-Extreme, 2021

Vittorio Emanuele Parsi’s latest work, The Wrecking of the Liberal World Order starts from the di... more Vittorio Emanuele Parsi’s latest work, The Wrecking of the Liberal World Order starts from the discouraging consideration that the Liberal World Order (LWO) today is in a severe crisis and argues that since the 1980s it has been gradually replaced by what Parsi defines as the ‘Neoliberal Global Order’. It asks what can help us make sense of this current state of the liberal global order and its identity crisis?

DYSTOPIAN WORLDS BEYOND STORYTELLING. Representations of Dehumanized Societies in Literature, Med... more DYSTOPIAN WORLDS BEYOND STORYTELLING. Representations of Dehumanized Societies in Literature, Media and Political Discourses: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. International Conference (Milano, 15-16 september 2022)

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE Dystopian Worlds beyond Storytelling. Representations of Dehumanized Soc... more INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Dystopian Worlds beyond Storytelling.
Representations of Dehumanized Societies in Literature, Media and Political Discourses: Multidisciplinary Perspectives
Milano, 15-16 September 2022

In the last two decades, media and cultural production has been characterized by an increasing representation of dystopian worlds and alternative and “possible universes”, as narrative tools to describe fears and contradictions of human beings face to the uncertainty of the future as well as the reworkings of the past and the memory. The pandemic emergence has accentuated this particular creative process, not only in the direction of health and epidemiological topics, but – more in general – towards a reconfiguration of new imageries about catastrophes and other social, cultural and technological upheavals. As part of a wider project on the so-called “clash of narratives” and its media representation and political use and mobilization, carried out by Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore also through the project of an “Atlas of dystopian storytelling” (www.unicatt.it/atlantedistopiemediali), the International Conference aims to focus, from a strong multidisciplinary perspective - including media, political, literary, linguistic, sociological and cultural studies - on the various ways the theme of dystopia has become relevant and massive in contemporary popular culture, both in traditional and digital forms, highlighting how it has changed across different languages and formats, also in the direction of a strong transmediality (novels, comics, movies, TV series, videogames, digital and social platforms, political discourses and so on). Dystopic societies have always been present in literature, film and media studies, but there is no doubt that they heavily emerged in recent cultural production as the result of deep social and political transformations that occurred in Western and non-Western societies after the collapse of twentieth-century ideologies and traumatic events – such as the attack on the Twin Towers or the current pandemic crisis. Thus, new narratives have emerged, often representing neo-populist or conspiracy theories on one hand, and apocalyptic future or “parallel present” on the other. The scenario of popular culture products reflects and also forges contemporary fears and anxieties within a society characterized by the domain of the technique, migrations and nomadic processes, democratic and environmental crisis, health emergencies; all aspects that underline the fragility of our societies and reconfigure concepts of space (production and representation of places, both real and fictional) and time (the role of past, present and future in dystopic media narratives), providing a cartography of complex trajectories and hybridizations of media, genres, and discourses of dystopias in popular culture and social practices. Possible topics for proposals may include (but are not limited to):
• Digital dystopias and dystopias within the digital eco-system;
• Technological dystopias in past and present narratives;
• Health emergencies and pandemic;
• Environmental catastrophes as critical rethorics against current ecological and economic models and in favour of sustainable and green policies;
• Relationship between human beings and technology and role and representation of AI;
• Crisis of democratic societies and consequences for geopolitical balances in light of the emergence of conspiracy theories;
• Conflicts and splits in contemporary societies and struggles for power;
• Migrations and allegorical use of diversity and new forms of cohabitation;
• Integration of dystopic dynamics and narrative pipe within conventional media products;
• Ucronic stories, “what if” mechanisms and the reinvention of the past;
• Geographical references in dystopic media products: places, imaginaries, architectures, symbols, but also markets, production hubs and industry locative elements that help specific types of dystopic stories;
• Time as narrative mechanism to strenghten apocalyptic and disturbing disquiets;
• Transmediality and adaptation of literature and media contents and the creation of “dystopic” media franchises;
• Soundscapes and the description of dystopic worlds through digital and popular music.
We invite abstract submissions for 20-minute papers. Abstracts should be between 150-200 words in length and should be accompanied by a brief biographical note of the speaker/s. The deadline for submissions is 1st June. Accepted papers will be confirmed by 20th June. The language of the conference will be English.
Please send abstracts to atlante.distopie@unicatt.it.