Davide Pietroni | Università degli Studi "G. d'Annunzio" Chieti Pescara (original) (raw)
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Papers by Davide Pietroni
European Journal of Social Psychology - EUR J SOC PSYCHOL, 2008
In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescripti... more In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescriptions. Most games are characterized by divergence of interests among agents. Since divergences may elicit strong emotional reactions which may affect agents' coordination strategies, psychologists studying effects of salient and pervasive emotions as anger define behavioral models which could fruitfully integrate economic models to yield more accurate predictions of agents' strategies in coordination games. To respond the critique of behavioral models' limited generalization capacity, this paper reviews research on the role of anger in a variety of coordination games including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner's dilemma and resource dilemma. We reported two different type of effects of anger: intrapersonal and interpersonal effects. The former refers to the impact of agent's feelings of anger on their own strategy and the latter refers to the impact of on...
European Journal of Social Psychology, 2006
This paper focuses on the interactive effects of power and emotion in negotiation. Previous resea... more This paper focuses on the interactive effects of power and emotion in negotiation. Previous research has shown that negotiators concede more to angry opponents than to happy ones, and that power influences the amount of attention that is devoted to the social environment. Integrating these two lines of inquiry, we predicted that low-power negotiators would be influenced by their opponent's emotions (conceding more to an angry opponent than to a happy one), whereas high-power negotiators would not. Five studies using different methods (an experiment, a field simulation, and three scenario studies), different samples (students, general population, managers), and different operationalisations of power (BATNA, number of alternatives, legitimacy, support) support this hypothesis. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information processing model of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2008
Negotiators often fail to reach integrative ("win-win") agreements because they think that their ... more Negotiators often fail to reach integrative ("win-win") agreements because they think that their own and other's preferences are diametrically opposed-the so-called fixed-pie perception. We examined how verbal (Experiment 1) and nonverbal (Experiment 2) emotional expressions may reduce fixed-pie perception and promote integrative behavior. In a two-issue computer-simulated negotiation, participants negotiated with a counterpart emitting one of the following emotional response patterns: (1) anger on both issues, (2) anger on participant's high priority issue and happiness on participant's low-priority issue, (3) happiness on high priority issue and anger on low-priority issue, or (4) happiness on both issues. In both studies, the third pattern reduced fixed-pie perception and increased integrative behavior, whereas the second pattern amplified bias and reduced integrative behavior. Implications for how emotions shape social exchange are discussed.
Mind & Society, 2009
Previous research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation suggested that bargaine... more Previous research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes expressing anger, when it is not directed against the counterpart as a person and it is perceived as appropriate. Instead, other studies indicated that successful negotiators express positive emotions. To reconcile this inconsistency, we propose that the direction of the effects of emotions depends on their perceived target, that is, whether the negotiators’ emotions are directed toward their opponent’s proposals or toward their own ‘exit option’. An ultimatum game scenario experiment showed that negotiators who express positive emotion rather than negative, in addition to benefits in terms of relationship fortification, received better offers when participants perceived the negotiators’ emotions directed toward their own ‘exit option’. These findings indicate that positive emotions may signal the availability of better ‘exit option’, suggesting that happiness expressions can be strategically used to maximize both material and relational outcomes.
International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 2008
Negotiators may respond to each other's offers and demands in different ways. Whereas many negoti... more Negotiators may respond to each other's offers and demands in different ways. Whereas many negotiation experiments present participants with numerical information about offers and counteroffers (e.g., "I propose 6-8-2"; numerical response mode), real life negotiations often involve affective and evaluative statements (e.g., "I didn't like your last offer, but I would be happy to explore alternatives"; affective response mode). The present research explores the differential consequences of responding in affective as opposed to numerical terms. Specifically, we predicted and found that affective responses increase the impact of social and contextual cues on negotiation behavior. Three studies demonstrate that the impact of other's toughness (Experiment 1), other's respectability (Experiment 2), and other's appearance (Experiment 3) on a negotiator's demands and concessions is greater when the other provides affective rather than numerical feedback.
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European Journal of Social Psychology, 2008
In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models&... more In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescriptions. Most games are characterized by divergence of interests among agents. Since divergences may elicit strong emotional reactions which may affect agents' coordination strategies, psychologists studying effects of salient and pervasive emotions as anger define behavioral models which could fruitfully integrate economic models to yield more accurate predictions of agents' strategies in coordination games. To respond the critique of behavioral models' limited generalization capacity, this paper reviews research on the role of anger in a variety of coordination games including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner's dilemma and resource dilemma. We reported two different type of effects of anger: intrapersonal and interpersonal effects. The former refers to the impact of agent's feelings of anger on their own strategy and the latter refers to the impact of one agent's anger on the other's strategy. The main intrapersonal effects of anger is increasing competition strategy in all coordination games. In contrast, the interpersonal effects of anger differ across situations, with anger some times eliciting cooperation, sometimes eliciting competition, and sometimes having no effect depending on agent's relative power, anger's target and contextual factors as observers' presence.
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European Journal of Social Psychology, 2008
ABSTRACT Negotiators' emotions strongly affect counterparts' behavioral reactions... more ABSTRACT Negotiators' emotions strongly affect counterparts' behavioral reactions. In particular, some research show that, compared to happy negotiators, angry negotiators get higher concessions, whereas other research indicate that happiness pays more than anger. This incongruence has been spelled out either in terms of diagnosticity of the emotions or in terms of intensity of the emotional contagion. We propose that the direction of the effects depends on the social context where the emotion is expressed, namely either in a public or a private context of the negotiation. In a negotiation by e-mail, sixty participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, while either no one else or a group of colleagues followed the communications in carbon copy. Private expressions of anger elicited larger concessions than private happiness, whereas public anger yielded smaller concessions than public happiness. This effect could be explained suggesting that in public contexts negotiator's gut reactions overrule strategic considerations which would recommend to concede more to an angry opponent than to an happy one. Indeed, in public negotiations participants' emotions were more affected by opponent's emotions than in private arenas. These findings suggested that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness could be the result of either strategic considerations or visceral reactions and that the dominance of one of these two factors is strongly determined by the characteristics of the negotiation social context.
European Psychologist, 2011
ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that people attach a different value to exemplars of money h... more ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that people attach a different value to exemplars of money having similar nominal values but dissimilar physical features. In particular, recent data have suggested that American people attach higher value to 1banknotesthanto1 banknotes than to 1banknotesthanto1 coins. These results have been explained in terms of familiarity since the 1coinwasintroducedrecentlyandis,therefore,lessfamiliarthanthe1 coin was introduced recently and is, therefore, less familiar than the 1coinwasintroducedrecentlyandis,therefore,lessfamiliarthanthe1 banknote. We suggest an alternative explanation based on the different mental accounts associated with the use of coins and banknotes. Experiments 1–3 show that people are willing to pay more when using coins than banknotes regardless of their familiarity with these exemplars of money. Experiment 3 also shows that people overestimate the amount of money at their disposal when they are provided with banknotes and underestimate it when using coins. Experiment 4 reveals that people using banknotes are more sensitive to discounts than people using coins. Finally, Experiment 5 indicates that people implicitly associate coins with low value products and banknotes with high value products. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
European Journal of Social Psychology - EUR J SOC PSYCHOL, 2008
In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescripti... more In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescriptions. Most games are characterized by divergence of interests among agents. Since divergences may elicit strong emotional reactions which may affect agents' coordination strategies, psychologists studying effects of salient and pervasive emotions as anger define behavioral models which could fruitfully integrate economic models to yield more accurate predictions of agents' strategies in coordination games. To respond the critique of behavioral models' limited generalization capacity, this paper reviews research on the role of anger in a variety of coordination games including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner's dilemma and resource dilemma. We reported two different type of effects of anger: intrapersonal and interpersonal effects. The former refers to the impact of agent's feelings of anger on their own strategy and the latter refers to the impact of on...
European Journal of Social Psychology, 2006
This paper focuses on the interactive effects of power and emotion in negotiation. Previous resea... more This paper focuses on the interactive effects of power and emotion in negotiation. Previous research has shown that negotiators concede more to angry opponents than to happy ones, and that power influences the amount of attention that is devoted to the social environment. Integrating these two lines of inquiry, we predicted that low-power negotiators would be influenced by their opponent's emotions (conceding more to an angry opponent than to a happy one), whereas high-power negotiators would not. Five studies using different methods (an experiment, a field simulation, and three scenario studies), different samples (students, general population, managers), and different operationalisations of power (BATNA, number of alternatives, legitimacy, support) support this hypothesis. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information processing model of the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiations.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2008
Negotiators often fail to reach integrative ("win-win") agreements because they think that their ... more Negotiators often fail to reach integrative ("win-win") agreements because they think that their own and other's preferences are diametrically opposed-the so-called fixed-pie perception. We examined how verbal (Experiment 1) and nonverbal (Experiment 2) emotional expressions may reduce fixed-pie perception and promote integrative behavior. In a two-issue computer-simulated negotiation, participants negotiated with a counterpart emitting one of the following emotional response patterns: (1) anger on both issues, (2) anger on participant's high priority issue and happiness on participant's low-priority issue, (3) happiness on high priority issue and anger on low-priority issue, or (4) happiness on both issues. In both studies, the third pattern reduced fixed-pie perception and increased integrative behavior, whereas the second pattern amplified bias and reduced integrative behavior. Implications for how emotions shape social exchange are discussed.
Mind & Society, 2009
Previous research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation suggested that bargaine... more Previous research on the interpersonal effects of emotions in negotiation suggested that bargainers obtain higher outcomes expressing anger, when it is not directed against the counterpart as a person and it is perceived as appropriate. Instead, other studies indicated that successful negotiators express positive emotions. To reconcile this inconsistency, we propose that the direction of the effects of emotions depends on their perceived target, that is, whether the negotiators’ emotions are directed toward their opponent’s proposals or toward their own ‘exit option’. An ultimatum game scenario experiment showed that negotiators who express positive emotion rather than negative, in addition to benefits in terms of relationship fortification, received better offers when participants perceived the negotiators’ emotions directed toward their own ‘exit option’. These findings indicate that positive emotions may signal the availability of better ‘exit option’, suggesting that happiness expressions can be strategically used to maximize both material and relational outcomes.
International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 2008
Negotiators may respond to each other's offers and demands in different ways. Whereas many negoti... more Negotiators may respond to each other's offers and demands in different ways. Whereas many negotiation experiments present participants with numerical information about offers and counteroffers (e.g., "I propose 6-8-2"; numerical response mode), real life negotiations often involve affective and evaluative statements (e.g., "I didn't like your last offer, but I would be happy to explore alternatives"; affective response mode). The present research explores the differential consequences of responding in affective as opposed to numerical terms. Specifically, we predicted and found that affective responses increase the impact of social and contextual cues on negotiation behavior. Three studies demonstrate that the impact of other's toughness (Experiment 1), other's respectability (Experiment 2), and other's appearance (Experiment 3) on a negotiator's demands and concessions is greater when the other provides affective rather than numerical feedback.
[
European Journal of Social Psychology, 2008
In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models&... more In coordination games agents' strategies often differ from normative models' prescriptions. Most games are characterized by divergence of interests among agents. Since divergences may elicit strong emotional reactions which may affect agents' coordination strategies, psychologists studying effects of salient and pervasive emotions as anger define behavioral models which could fruitfully integrate economic models to yield more accurate predictions of agents' strategies in coordination games. To respond the critique of behavioral models' limited generalization capacity, this paper reviews research on the role of anger in a variety of coordination games including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner's dilemma and resource dilemma. We reported two different type of effects of anger: intrapersonal and interpersonal effects. The former refers to the impact of agent's feelings of anger on their own strategy and the latter refers to the impact of one agent's anger on the other's strategy. The main intrapersonal effects of anger is increasing competition strategy in all coordination games. In contrast, the interpersonal effects of anger differ across situations, with anger some times eliciting cooperation, sometimes eliciting competition, and sometimes having no effect depending on agent's relative power, anger's target and contextual factors as observers' presence.
[
European Journal of Social Psychology, 2008
ABSTRACT Negotiators' emotions strongly affect counterparts' behavioral reactions... more ABSTRACT Negotiators' emotions strongly affect counterparts' behavioral reactions. In particular, some research show that, compared to happy negotiators, angry negotiators get higher concessions, whereas other research indicate that happiness pays more than anger. This incongruence has been spelled out either in terms of diagnosticity of the emotions or in terms of intensity of the emotional contagion. We propose that the direction of the effects depends on the social context where the emotion is expressed, namely either in a public or a private context of the negotiation. In a negotiation by e-mail, sixty participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, while either no one else or a group of colleagues followed the communications in carbon copy. Private expressions of anger elicited larger concessions than private happiness, whereas public anger yielded smaller concessions than public happiness. This effect could be explained suggesting that in public contexts negotiator's gut reactions overrule strategic considerations which would recommend to concede more to an angry opponent than to an happy one. Indeed, in public negotiations participants' emotions were more affected by opponent's emotions than in private arenas. These findings suggested that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness could be the result of either strategic considerations or visceral reactions and that the dominance of one of these two factors is strongly determined by the characteristics of the negotiation social context.
European Psychologist, 2011
ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that people attach a different value to exemplars of money h... more ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that people attach a different value to exemplars of money having similar nominal values but dissimilar physical features. In particular, recent data have suggested that American people attach higher value to 1banknotesthanto1 banknotes than to 1banknotesthanto1 coins. These results have been explained in terms of familiarity since the 1coinwasintroducedrecentlyandis,therefore,lessfamiliarthanthe1 coin was introduced recently and is, therefore, less familiar than the 1coinwasintroducedrecentlyandis,therefore,lessfamiliarthanthe1 banknote. We suggest an alternative explanation based on the different mental accounts associated with the use of coins and banknotes. Experiments 1–3 show that people are willing to pay more when using coins than banknotes regardless of their familiarity with these exemplars of money. Experiment 3 also shows that people overestimate the amount of money at their disposal when they are provided with banknotes and underestimate it when using coins. Experiment 4 reveals that people using banknotes are more sensitive to discounts than people using coins. Finally, Experiment 5 indicates that people implicitly associate coins with low value products and banknotes with high value products. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)