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Frontiers in Psychology
In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontolog... more In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our firstpersonal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity.
Subject and MeMory. a neo naturaliSt approach In this paper I will introduce the Neo Naturalist a... more Subject and MeMory. a neo naturaliSt approach In this paper I will introduce the Neo Naturalist account of Personal Identity. To defend this account, I will reconsider two key notions for psychological continuity theories, which are theoretically based on internalism and representionalism, the notion of present and the notion of memory. I will recast those two concepts under the light of the Spread Mind Theory, which is grounded on the idea that one's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. Adopting this premise, memories are not considered as mental states anymore, but they are physical objects, which present a causal proximity, with ours bodies, different from normal perception. In the same way, what we call our present is not a spatio-temporal point, but it is a set of physical objects connected with our physical bodies. Finally, following the physicalist hypothesis proposed by the Spread Mind, I will claim that we are not a bunch of ideas or mental states, neither are we the mechanical functioning of our brain-body, rather, we are identical with that part of physical world which takes place relative to our physical body.
Compiani L (2019) The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self. Front. Psychol. 10:202. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00202, 2019
In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontolog... more In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our firstpersonal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity.
Complete Issues by Lucrezia Compiani
![Research paper thumbnail of Memoria e Filosofia • vol. 1/2 - La memoria individuale tra cognizione e individuazione [XXVIII, 2019 (I)]](https://attachments.academia-assets.com/62463552/thumbnails/1.jpg)
](Lo Sguardo, 2019
Why do we remember? And, for that matter, what is remembering? Placed between body and mind, the ... more Why do we remember? And, for that matter, what is remembering? Placed between body and mind, the phenomenon of memory simultaneously involves biological, psychological, semiotic, and metaphysical elements. Memory’s place at the heart of our understanding of ourselves is why many of the greatest philosophers of all the time have dealt with the problem – or, better, have had to deal with it. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Russell, and Wittgenstein, are just a few among many who have proffered explanations. While all such proposals have been deficient in their own ways, each has advanced our understanding of the myriad phenomena associated with memory. With recent developments in phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and the empirical sciences interest in memory has intensified. In the 20th century, philosophers were particularly interested in identifying its causes, the ontology of mnemonic traces, the mechanisms of recall, and its epistemic characteristics. Moreover, as philosophy has directed its sight towards social objects and structures, questions involving memory have developed political and social dimensions as well – extending the debate to collective memory. What are the mechanisms of intersubjective memorization and recall of information, ideas, and representations? What are the ethical dimensions and consequences of public memory?
Frontiers in Psychology
In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontolog... more In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our firstpersonal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity.
Subject and MeMory. a neo naturaliSt approach In this paper I will introduce the Neo Naturalist a... more Subject and MeMory. a neo naturaliSt approach In this paper I will introduce the Neo Naturalist account of Personal Identity. To defend this account, I will reconsider two key notions for psychological continuity theories, which are theoretically based on internalism and representionalism, the notion of present and the notion of memory. I will recast those two concepts under the light of the Spread Mind Theory, which is grounded on the idea that one's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. Adopting this premise, memories are not considered as mental states anymore, but they are physical objects, which present a causal proximity, with ours bodies, different from normal perception. In the same way, what we call our present is not a spatio-temporal point, but it is a set of physical objects connected with our physical bodies. Finally, following the physicalist hypothesis proposed by the Spread Mind, I will claim that we are not a bunch of ideas or mental states, neither are we the mechanical functioning of our brain-body, rather, we are identical with that part of physical world which takes place relative to our physical body.
Compiani L (2019) The Chimeric Self: A Neo Naturalist Bundle Theory of the Self. Front. Psychol. 10:202. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00202, 2019
In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontolog... more In the contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind debate the definition of the ontology of the Self is difficult if not downright dubious. Thus, different theories aim to provide an account, especially where further neuroscientific research could be implemented. To this extent, the identity of the Self is suggested to be pinpointed by virtue of its specific set of mechanical features or brain functions, or it is considered the product of cognitive and conceptual capacities that build representations and narratives about ourselves. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach, based on the Spread Mind Theory (Manzotti, 2017a). Starting from the idea that the Self isn't just an aprioristic or transcendental form, I claim, endorsing a Neo Naturalist approach, that our firstpersonal experience is identical to the external objects which, due to a physical relation, constitute the same experience. Thanks to an externalist explanation of the experience of the Self it is possible to avoid multiple ontologies, causal foundationalism, naïve materialism and questions begging about what we should explain. Clarifying the concept of the Self, as a bundle of relative objects which are identical with the experiences themselves, allows us to draw a physical ontology, based on the neutral (and natural) idea of relative existence rather than any posited concept of subjectivity.
Lo Sguardo, 2019
Why do we remember? And, for that matter, what is remembering? Placed between body and mind, the ... more Why do we remember? And, for that matter, what is remembering? Placed between body and mind, the phenomenon of memory simultaneously involves biological, psychological, semiotic, and metaphysical elements. Memory’s place at the heart of our understanding of ourselves is why many of the greatest philosophers of all the time have dealt with the problem – or, better, have had to deal with it. Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Russell, and Wittgenstein, are just a few among many who have proffered explanations. While all such proposals have been deficient in their own ways, each has advanced our understanding of the myriad phenomena associated with memory. With recent developments in phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and the empirical sciences interest in memory has intensified. In the 20th century, philosophers were particularly interested in identifying its causes, the ontology of mnemonic traces, the mechanisms of recall, and its epistemic characteristics. Moreover, as philosophy has directed its sight towards social objects and structures, questions involving memory have developed political and social dimensions as well – extending the debate to collective memory. What are the mechanisms of intersubjective memorization and recall of information, ideas, and representations? What are the ethical dimensions and consequences of public memory?