Vittorio Morato | Università degli Studi di Padova (original) (raw)

Papers by Vittorio Morato

Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities

Analytic Philosophy, May 30, 2023

In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between c... more In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti‐Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.

Inquiry

Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. F... more Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. "Compatibilism" is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are "semantic compatibilism" (SC) and "cognitive compatibilism" (CC). According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the "real" version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are "really" in while thinking P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compatibilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on any form of what we call semantic or cognitive "recarving"; thus, EC avoids some sceptical problems that a ect the other two versions of compatibilism.

Journal of Applied Logics, 2021

So-called reverse Sobel sequences seem to pose a problem for the variably strict semantics for co... more So-called reverse Sobel sequences seem to pose a problem for the variably strict semantics for counterfactuals. The existence of such sequences is taken by some scholars to be the main evidence in favour of an alternative, dynamic approach to the semantics of counterfactuals. According to Moss, however, a pragmatic approach to RSSs would be able to save the standard account. Central to her proposal there is a principle called 'principle of epistemic irre-sponsibility', according to which it is irresponsible to assert a counterfactual which contradicts a possibility that has become salient in the discourse. While agreeing on a pragmatic take on RSSs, in this paper I discuss the EI principle and highlight some problems of it.

Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. F... more Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. 'Compatibilism' is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are 'semantic compatibilism' (SC) and 'cognitive compatibilism' (CC). According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the 'real' version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are 'really' in while thinking P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compatibilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on any form of what we call semantic or cognitive 'recarving'; thus, EC avoids some sceptical problems that affect the other two versions of compatibilism. ARTICLE HISTORY

Topoi, 2017

According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of... more According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of metaphysical necessities and possibilities is just a “spe- cial case” of our knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. This subsumption of modal under counterfactual think- ing mainly serves a methodological role: to sign the end of “philosophical exceptionalism” in modal epistemol- ogy, namely the view that our knowledge of metaphysical modalities is obtained by means of a special, dedicated, possibly a priori, capacity. In this paper, I show that a counterfactual approach to modal epistemology is struc- turally similar to more traditional “conceivability-based” approaches. On this basis, I then show that the counterfac- tual approach suffers some of the same problems and I con- clude that it is still based on a quite exceptional capacity to determine the truth of modal metaphysical claims. Given that, for Williamson, the epistemology of thought experi- ments should also be subsumed under the counterfactual approach, the problem I raise in this paper has conse- quences for his approach to thought experiments.

Logique et Analyse, 239, (2017), 317-335, 2017

According to D. K. Lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from t... more According to D. K. Lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from this, it follows that the negation of a would-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding "might-not"-counterfactual and that the negation of a might-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding "would-not"-counterfactual. there are cases, however, where we seem to be entitled to accept the would-counterfactual and we are also equally entitled to accept the corresponding might-not-counterfactual and cases where we seem to be entitled to accept the might-counterfactual without being equally entitled to reject the corresponding would-not-counterfactual. In this paper, I will show that a distinction between two types of rejections for counterfactuals (p-rejection and s-rejection) and the recognition that might-not-counterfactuals may play the role of p-rejections (by an application to counterfactuals of the lewisian approach to conversational scores) could explain why the problematic cases should not be seen as cases where the duality of would-and might-counterfactuals fails.

Argumenta, 2017

According to many actualist conceptions of modality, talk about possible worlds should be reduced... more According to many actualist conceptions of modality, talk about possible worlds should be reduced to talk about world stories. Intuitively, a world story is a complete description of how things could be. In this paper, I will claim that the world story approach not only suffers from the well-known, expressive problem of representing the thesis of the possible existence of non-actual objects, but it has troubles in representing, in an actualistically acceptable way, the apparently more tractable thesis of the possible non-existence of actual objects. To solve this problem, I will propose a refinement of the approach by the introduction of a novel notion of max-imality, local maximality.

Logique et Analyse, 2014

The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The f... more The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean valid- ity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators.

Erkenntnis, 2014

Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwel... more Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) has presented a dilemma aimed at showing that the necessity of a proposition cannot be explained either in the case where the explanans is another necessary proposition (necessity horn) or in the case where the explanans is a contingent proposition (contingency horn). Blackburn’s dilemma is intended to show that necessary truth is an explanatorily irreducible kind of truth: there is nothing that explains why propositions are necessary, nothing that makes necessary necessary truths. In this paper, I criticize the contingency horn of Blackburn’s dilemma. On the one hand, I show that the official reconstruction of the horn uses a principle that is incompatible with the notion of explanation plausibly needed to explain why propositions are necessary; on the other, I show that a simpler formulation of the horn, which does not make use of such a controversial principle, makes essential use of principles that are incompatible with the idea that possibilities can have explanatory roles. I then defend the view that possibilities can have explanatory roles, and that the explanatory role of possibilities is best represented, within possible worlds, as the existence of trans-world relations of explanation.

Logica Yearbook, 2014

In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “... more In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “general” validity), corresponding to distinction between a correct and an incorrect way of defining modal valid- ity, correspond instead to two substantive ways of conceiving modal truth. At the same time, I claim that the major logical manifestation of the real- world/general validity distinction in modal propositional languages with the actuality operator should not be taken seriously, but simply as a by-product of the way in which the semantics of such an operator is usually given.

in Defending Realism, edited by G. Bonino, G. Jesson, J. Cumpa , 2014

According to modal anti-realists, modal truth depends on and is explained by some mind-dependent,... more According to modal anti-realists, modal truth depends on and is explained by some mind-dependent, non modal, features of reality. Anti-realist accounts of modality, though still quite under-developed, have very desirable features, both epistemological and ontological. In this paper I will discuss three kinds of modal anti-realism (conventionalism, projectivism, response-dependent accounts) and I will present and develop a general argument against all forms of modal anti-realism. The argument, called “transparency objection”, is originally due to Sherratt (2010). In particular, I will show that, from a certain interpretation of the conclusion of the transparency objection, a restricted version of an argument, structurally similar to Fitch’s paradox of knowability (the “paradox of conceivability”) could be de- veloped. My claim is that by showing that the conclusion of the transparency objection implies, via the paradox of conceivability, a clearly false conclusion (at least for some classes of truths) one could have a more decisive objection against modal anti-realism.

On the Importance of Being Called Ernesto. Reference, Truth, and Logical Form. Essays for Ernesto Napoli

Grazer Philosophisce Studien, 2006

Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everyt... more Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everything necessarily exists using just three seemingly uncontroversial principles relating the notions of proposition with those of truth and existence. The argument, however, may be easily blocked once the distinction, introduced by R. M. Adams, between the notions of a proposition being true in a world and of (or at) a world is introduced. In this paper I defend the plausibility of the notion of a proposition's being true of a world by rejecting two criticisms of it raised by Williamson; in the final section, I present a conception of propositions, according to which they are equivalence classes of mental representations, for which at least one of the principles comes out as false.

Logica Yearbook, 2011

The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheicall... more The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the infor- mal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s counterexamples to Absorption and Assertion use in the meta- language a dialetheically unacceptable principle. Furthermore, we show that the rejection of Assertion undermines Priest’s claim that the entailment connective expresses the notion of logical consequence.

Il problema principale per coloro che ritengono che non esistano oggetti meramente possibili (pos... more Il problema principale per coloro che ritengono che non esistano oggetti meramente possibili (possibilia)è conciliare questa tesi metafisica, chiamata solitamente "attualismo" 1 , con il fatto che siamo disposti ad asserire, ritenendoli veri, enunciati la cui analisi standard sembra richiedere la postulazione di tali entità.

Towards a Formal Account of Similarity and Family Resemblance for Technical Functions

The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspec... more The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspects are taken into account; two of them concern main ideas of OntoClean, the third one is a study of a particular important application. The first section deals with the topic of identity: formal constraints on identity criteria, compatibility and identity among identity criteria. The second section deals with rigidity, dependence and existence. The final section investigates how meta-property criteria can be applied to the notion of artifact.

Drafts by Vittorio Morato

Teaching materials by Vittorio Morato

Questa bibliografia ragionata si compone di otto voci: logica filosofica e filosofia della logica... more Questa bibliografia ragionata si compone di otto voci: logica filosofica e filosofia della logica, identità, esistenza, verità, modalità, fatti, condizionali e vaghezza. Ciascuna voce è organizzata in due parti: nella prima si trova una rassegna (quanto più informata ed esaustiva) del tema, nella seconda sono stati selezionati e recensiti dei lavori che consideriamo particolarmente rilevanti (privilegiando le opere pubblicate più recentemente). Lo scopo è quello di fornire al lettore un utile strumento o, se non altro, degli spunti per approfondire alcuni dei temi fondamentali della logica filosofica.

Questo lavoro, non pubblicato, è una presentazione introduttiva di "Nome e Necessità" di Saul Kri... more Questo lavoro, non pubblicato, è una presentazione introduttiva di "Nome e Necessità" di Saul Kripke. Una versione modificata e più breve di questo lavoro è in fase di pubblicazione presso "Biblioteca Analitica. Linguaggio, Conoscenza e Mente" a cura di G. Bonino, C. Gabbani e P. Tripodi, Carocci.

Other by Vittorio Morato

In "The Importance of Being Called Ernesto: Reference, Truth, and Logical Form", edited by A. Bianchi, V. Morato, and G. Spolaore, Padova University Press, Padova, pp. 1-4, 2016

Many years ago, in the Nineties, we three editors of this book attended a philosophy of language ... more Many years ago, in the Nineties, we three editors of this book attended a philosophy of language class taught by Ernesto Napoli. Ernesto's style was unconventional, at least compared with the standards we were used to. He stood there, asking questions and making objections to our attempts at an answer. He could be intimidating at times, and not all of our fellow students seemed to appreciate his approach. But for those of us who got those classes right they have remained memorable. Ernesto was taking us, and even more philosophy, seriously. This made a world of difference.

Kripkean conceivability and epistemic modalities

Analytic Philosophy, May 30, 2023

In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between c... more In this article, I show that (i) from what I call a “Kripkean” account of the relations between conceivability and metaphysical necessities, (ii) an apparently plausible principle relating conceivability and epistemic modality, and (iii) the duality of epistemic modalities, one can show the utterly anti‐Kripkean result that every metaphysical necessity is an epistemic necessity. My aim is to present and diagnose the problem and evaluate the costs of some possible Kripkean reactions. In particular, I will evaluate the consequences and theoretical costs of rejecting the main ingredients of the argument, namely that we cannot genuinely conceive the negations of metaphysical necessities, that there is no postulated relation between conceivability and epistemic possibility (actually, between unconceivability and epistemic impossibility), and that epistemic possibility and necessity are not dualities.

Inquiry

Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. F... more Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. "Compatibilism" is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are "semantic compatibilism" (SC) and "cognitive compatibilism" (CC). According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the "real" version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are "really" in while thinking P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compatibilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on any form of what we call semantic or cognitive "recarving"; thus, EC avoids some sceptical problems that a ect the other two versions of compatibilism.

Journal of Applied Logics, 2021

So-called reverse Sobel sequences seem to pose a problem for the variably strict semantics for co... more So-called reverse Sobel sequences seem to pose a problem for the variably strict semantics for counterfactuals. The existence of such sequences is taken by some scholars to be the main evidence in favour of an alternative, dynamic approach to the semantics of counterfactuals. According to Moss, however, a pragmatic approach to RSSs would be able to save the standard account. Central to her proposal there is a principle called 'principle of epistemic irre-sponsibility', according to which it is irresponsible to assert a counterfactual which contradicts a possibility that has become salient in the discourse. While agreeing on a pragmatic take on RSSs, in this paper I discuss the EI principle and highlight some problems of it.

Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. F... more Conflicts between our best philosophical theories (BPTs) and our common beliefs are widespread. For example, if eliminativism is our BPT, then our BPT conflicts with common beliefs about the existence of middle-sized composite artifacts. 'Compatibilism' is the name usually given to a theoretical attitude, according to which, in the case of a conflict between BPT and a common belief P, we should try to find a reconciliation. The two major variants of compatibilism are 'semantic compatibilism' (SC) and 'cognitive compatibilism' (CC). According to SC, to be reconciled with BPT is the 'real' version of the content of our ordinary assertions; according to CC, to be reconciled with BPT is the mental state we are 'really' in while thinking P. In this paper, we present a new kind of compatibilism, epistemic compatibilism (EC). According to EC, to be reconciled with BPT is the explanation of why we believe that P. After presenting EC, we will argue that it fares better than SC and CC for at least two related reasons: EC does not rely on any form of what we call semantic or cognitive 'recarving'; thus, EC avoids some sceptical problems that affect the other two versions of compatibilism. ARTICLE HISTORY

Topoi, 2017

According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of... more According to Williamson (The philosophy of philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), our knowledge of metaphysical necessities and possibilities is just a “spe- cial case” of our knowledge of counterfactual conditionals. This subsumption of modal under counterfactual think- ing mainly serves a methodological role: to sign the end of “philosophical exceptionalism” in modal epistemol- ogy, namely the view that our knowledge of metaphysical modalities is obtained by means of a special, dedicated, possibly a priori, capacity. In this paper, I show that a counterfactual approach to modal epistemology is struc- turally similar to more traditional “conceivability-based” approaches. On this basis, I then show that the counterfac- tual approach suffers some of the same problems and I con- clude that it is still based on a quite exceptional capacity to determine the truth of modal metaphysical claims. Given that, for Williamson, the epistemology of thought experi- ments should also be subsumed under the counterfactual approach, the problem I raise in this paper has conse- quences for his approach to thought experiments.

Logique et Analyse, 239, (2017), 317-335, 2017

According to D. K. Lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from t... more According to D. K. Lewis (1973), would-couterfactuals and might-counterfactuals are duals. from this, it follows that the negation of a would-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding "might-not"-counterfactual and that the negation of a might-counterfactual is equivalent to the corresponding "would-not"-counterfactual. there are cases, however, where we seem to be entitled to accept the would-counterfactual and we are also equally entitled to accept the corresponding might-not-counterfactual and cases where we seem to be entitled to accept the might-counterfactual without being equally entitled to reject the corresponding would-not-counterfactual. In this paper, I will show that a distinction between two types of rejections for counterfactuals (p-rejection and s-rejection) and the recognition that might-not-counterfactuals may play the role of p-rejections (by an application to counterfactuals of the lewisian approach to conversational scores) could explain why the problematic cases should not be seen as cases where the duality of would-and might-counterfactuals fails.

Argumenta, 2017

According to many actualist conceptions of modality, talk about possible worlds should be reduced... more According to many actualist conceptions of modality, talk about possible worlds should be reduced to talk about world stories. Intuitively, a world story is a complete description of how things could be. In this paper, I will claim that the world story approach not only suffers from the well-known, expressive problem of representing the thesis of the possible existence of non-actual objects, but it has troubles in representing, in an actualistically acceptable way, the apparently more tractable thesis of the possible non-existence of actual objects. To solve this problem, I will propose a refinement of the approach by the introduction of a novel notion of max-imality, local maximality.

Logique et Analyse, 2014

The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The f... more The notion of validity for modal languages could be defined in two slightly different ways. The first is the original definition given by S. Kripke, for which a formula φ of a modal language L is valid if and only if it is true in every actual world of every interpretation of L. The second is the definition that has become standard in most textbook presentations of modal logic, for which a formula φ of L is valid if and only if it is true in every world in every interpretation of L. For simple modal languages, “Kripkean validity” and “Textbook validity” are extensionally equivalent. According to E. Zalta, however, Textbook validity is an “incorrect” definition of validity, because: (i) it is not in full compliance with Tarski’s notion of truth; (ii) in expressively richer languages, enriched by the actuality operator, some obviously true formulas count as valid only if the Kripkean notion is used. The purpose of this paper is to show that (i) and (ii) are not good reasons to favor Kripkean valid- ity over Textbook validity. On the one hand, I will claim that the difference between the two should rather be seen as the result of two different conceptions on how a modal logic should be built from a non-modal basis; on the other, I will show the advantages, for the question at issue, of seeing the actuality operator as belonging to the family of two-dimensional operators.

Erkenntnis, 2014

Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwel... more Can we explain why some propositions are necessary? Blackburn (Fact, science, and value. Blackwell, Oxford, 1987) has presented a dilemma aimed at showing that the necessity of a proposition cannot be explained either in the case where the explanans is another necessary proposition (necessity horn) or in the case where the explanans is a contingent proposition (contingency horn). Blackburn’s dilemma is intended to show that necessary truth is an explanatorily irreducible kind of truth: there is nothing that explains why propositions are necessary, nothing that makes necessary necessary truths. In this paper, I criticize the contingency horn of Blackburn’s dilemma. On the one hand, I show that the official reconstruction of the horn uses a principle that is incompatible with the notion of explanation plausibly needed to explain why propositions are necessary; on the other, I show that a simpler formulation of the horn, which does not make use of such a controversial principle, makes essential use of principles that are incompatible with the idea that possibilities can have explanatory roles. I then defend the view that possibilities can have explanatory roles, and that the explanatory role of possibilities is best represented, within possible worlds, as the existence of trans-world relations of explanation.

Logica Yearbook, 2014

In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “... more In this paper, I claim that two ways of defining validity for modal languages (“real-world” and “general” validity), corresponding to distinction between a correct and an incorrect way of defining modal valid- ity, correspond instead to two substantive ways of conceiving modal truth. At the same time, I claim that the major logical manifestation of the real- world/general validity distinction in modal propositional languages with the actuality operator should not be taken seriously, but simply as a by-product of the way in which the semantics of such an operator is usually given.

in Defending Realism, edited by G. Bonino, G. Jesson, J. Cumpa , 2014

According to modal anti-realists, modal truth depends on and is explained by some mind-dependent,... more According to modal anti-realists, modal truth depends on and is explained by some mind-dependent, non modal, features of reality. Anti-realist accounts of modality, though still quite under-developed, have very desirable features, both epistemological and ontological. In this paper I will discuss three kinds of modal anti-realism (conventionalism, projectivism, response-dependent accounts) and I will present and develop a general argument against all forms of modal anti-realism. The argument, called “transparency objection”, is originally due to Sherratt (2010). In particular, I will show that, from a certain interpretation of the conclusion of the transparency objection, a restricted version of an argument, structurally similar to Fitch’s paradox of knowability (the “paradox of conceivability”) could be de- veloped. My claim is that by showing that the conclusion of the transparency objection implies, via the paradox of conceivability, a clearly false conclusion (at least for some classes of truths) one could have a more decisive objection against modal anti-realism.

On the Importance of Being Called Ernesto. Reference, Truth, and Logical Form. Essays for Ernesto Napoli

Grazer Philosophisce Studien, 2006

Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everyt... more Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everything necessarily exists using just three seemingly uncontroversial principles relating the notions of proposition with those of truth and existence. The argument, however, may be easily blocked once the distinction, introduced by R. M. Adams, between the notions of a proposition being true in a world and of (or at) a world is introduced. In this paper I defend the plausibility of the notion of a proposition's being true of a world by rejecting two criticisms of it raised by Williamson; in the final section, I present a conception of propositions, according to which they are equivalence classes of mental representations, for which at least one of the principles comes out as false.

Logica Yearbook, 2011

The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheicall... more The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the infor- mal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s counterexamples to Absorption and Assertion use in the meta- language a dialetheically unacceptable principle. Furthermore, we show that the rejection of Assertion undermines Priest’s claim that the entailment connective expresses the notion of logical consequence.

Il problema principale per coloro che ritengono che non esistano oggetti meramente possibili (pos... more Il problema principale per coloro che ritengono che non esistano oggetti meramente possibili (possibilia)è conciliare questa tesi metafisica, chiamata solitamente "attualismo" 1 , con il fatto che siamo disposti ad asserire, ritenendoli veri, enunciati la cui analisi standard sembra richiedere la postulazione di tali entità.

Towards a Formal Account of Similarity and Family Resemblance for Technical Functions

The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspec... more The aim of this paper is to refine, integrate and apply the methodology of OntoClean. Three aspects are taken into account; two of them concern main ideas of OntoClean, the third one is a study of a particular important application. The first section deals with the topic of identity: formal constraints on identity criteria, compatibility and identity among identity criteria. The second section deals with rigidity, dependence and existence. The final section investigates how meta-property criteria can be applied to the notion of artifact.

Questa bibliografia ragionata si compone di otto voci: logica filosofica e filosofia della logica... more Questa bibliografia ragionata si compone di otto voci: logica filosofica e filosofia della logica, identità, esistenza, verità, modalità, fatti, condizionali e vaghezza. Ciascuna voce è organizzata in due parti: nella prima si trova una rassegna (quanto più informata ed esaustiva) del tema, nella seconda sono stati selezionati e recensiti dei lavori che consideriamo particolarmente rilevanti (privilegiando le opere pubblicate più recentemente). Lo scopo è quello di fornire al lettore un utile strumento o, se non altro, degli spunti per approfondire alcuni dei temi fondamentali della logica filosofica.

Questo lavoro, non pubblicato, è una presentazione introduttiva di "Nome e Necessità" di Saul Kri... more Questo lavoro, non pubblicato, è una presentazione introduttiva di "Nome e Necessità" di Saul Kripke. Una versione modificata e più breve di questo lavoro è in fase di pubblicazione presso "Biblioteca Analitica. Linguaggio, Conoscenza e Mente" a cura di G. Bonino, C. Gabbani e P. Tripodi, Carocci.

In "The Importance of Being Called Ernesto: Reference, Truth, and Logical Form", edited by A. Bianchi, V. Morato, and G. Spolaore, Padova University Press, Padova, pp. 1-4, 2016

Many years ago, in the Nineties, we three editors of this book attended a philosophy of language ... more Many years ago, in the Nineties, we three editors of this book attended a philosophy of language class taught by Ernesto Napoli. Ernesto's style was unconventional, at least compared with the standards we were used to. He stood there, asking questions and making objections to our attempts at an answer. He could be intimidating at times, and not all of our fellow students seemed to appreciate his approach. But for those of us who got those classes right they have remained memorable. Ernesto was taking us, and even more philosophy, seriously. This made a world of difference.