Eleonora Severini | University of Pavia (original) (raw)

Books by Eleonora Severini

Carocci, 2020

Quali sono le implicazioni dell’evoluzionismo per l’etica? Il volume esplora la relazione tra l’e... more Quali sono le implicazioni dell’evoluzionismo per l’etica? Il volume esplora la relazione tra l’evoluzionismo e la riflessione filosofica sull’etica, ricostruendo e facendo il punto su un dibattito tutt’ora in corso. In particolare, l’evoluzionismo viene preso in considerazione nelle varie declinazioni che esso ha attraversato, ossia a partire dalla formulazione originaria di Darwin, a quella della Sintesi moderna, fino ai suoi sviluppi più recenti. Ciò che si intende mostrare è che, sebbene rendere conto dell’etica in termini evolutivi sia spesso risultata un’operazione controversa, indagare la natura dell’etica a partire dalle sue basi biologiche, comprendere la sua origine e la sua evoluzione è un passo fondamentale per elaborare nuove e più proficue prospettive etiche e filosofiche.

Papers by Eleonora Severini

Rivista di filosofia, 2023

It has been argued that moral beliefs cannot be transmitted by testimony, and so that there canno... more It has been argued that moral beliefs cannot be transmitted by testimony, and so that there cannot be any moral testimony. The thesis that moral beliefs cannot be transmitted by testimony seems thus to cast some doubts on the existence of moral experts, i.e., people whose moral testimony has to be accepted. The paper explores the interplay among moral expertise and moral testimony from a metaethical point of view. More specifically, we focus on moral understanding rather than on moral knowledge, in order to test whether there is a way to rethink moral expertise without embracing moral realism. On this alternative view, moral expertise follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. The main theoretical gain is that such a conception of moral expertise is able to accommodate the suspiciousness of moral testimony, while the standard account is not. In this respect, some points have to be considered: first, in order for an understanding-based account of moral expertise to really count as an alternative to realist accounts of moral expertise, understanding, unlike knowledge, cannot be transmitted by testimony; second, moral understanding needs to be understood as a partly non-cognitive state. Thus, it will be argued, although the understanding-based conception of moral expertise forces us to conclude that there are no moral experts, there is still some room for moral testimony. The paper ends with an overall assessment of the strategy presented here by discussing a case from the literature on the testimony of oppression.

Iride, 2023

The article aims to analyze the role that evolutionism plays in Mary Midgley’s thought. To addres... more The article aims to analyze the role that evolutionism plays in Mary Midgley’s thought. To address this issue, I will focus on a question that has been widely explored by Midgely, namely the «origin» of altruism and its relationship with selfishness. Discussing the tough critiques raised by Midgley against Dawkins’ «selfish gene» and other Darwinian metaphors will shed light on the evolutionary view that emerges from Midgley’s work and how, according to her, the relationship between evolutionism and philosophical reflection on morality should be articulated. Midgley’s insights on these topics, I will argue, have to be taken seriously into considerations by anyone who wants to hold up a mature and sure-footed form of ethical naturalism.

Syzetesis, 2022

The aim of the paper is to assess two alternative explanations of morality in metaethics: the rea... more The aim of the paper is to assess two alternative explanations of morality in metaethics: the realist explanation of morality and the one provided by evolutionary theory. According to a traditional argument for moral realism, moral facts are part of the fabric of the world to the extent that postulating such entities is required in our best explanatory picture of what people think and do. In other terms, if moral facts figure in the best explanatory account for human moral thinking and behavior, they earn ontological rights and moral realism is secured. It will be analyzed how this issue might be renewed by taking into account evolutionary considerations and assessing their consequences in metaethics. I will consider the realist explanation of morality and compare it with the evolutionary explanation of morality. Finally, I will show how the realist attempts to reconcile the realist explanation of morality and the evolutionary explanation of morality can be undermined by connecting this discussion to the one about moral disagreement

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2021

The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it i... more The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it is nearly uncontroversial to note that morality makes progress of one sort or another, it is far from uncontroversial to define what constitutes moral progress. In a minimal sense, moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a preceding one. Moral realists conceive "it is better than" as something like "it more adequately reflects moral facts"; therefore, on a realist view, moral progress can be associated with accumulations of moral knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, since there cannot be something like moral knowledge, one might conclude there cannot even be such a thing as moral progress. More precisely, evolutionism urges us to ask whether we can acknowledge the existence of moral progress without being committed to moral realism. A promising strategy, I will argue, is to develop an account of moral progress based on moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. On this view, moral progress follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. Whether an understanding-based account of moral progress is feasible and what its implications for the notion itself of moral progress are, will be discussed.

Notizie di Politeia, 2020

Can feminism and Darwinism go together? The paper aims at analyzing that issue from an epistemolo... more Can feminism and Darwinism go together? The paper aims at analyzing that issue from an epistemological point of view. More precisely, it will be investigated whether a feminist and evolutionary-informed stance in epistemology is feasible. This inquiry will be framed in the context of the feminist epistemology and some basic aspects of it will be discussed. Then a case study from the philosophy of biology will be illustrated. That discussion will provide the opportunity to test the hypothesis that not only feminism and Darwinism can go hand in hand, but also that a synergy between the two is to be desired. Therefore, the question is whether a feminist and Darwinian epistemology is feasible and, in case it is, how we should understand it.

Paradigmi, 2019

This paper aims at shedding light on the debate about Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and moral ... more This paper aims at shedding light on the debate about Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and moral objectivity. I will assess the consequences of the evolutionary explanation of morality for moral objectivity, focusing on a recent realist argument that stems from the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. This argument presents some fallacies and thus fails in securing the realist conception of moral objectivity. I will argue that rethinking biological causation in terms of reciprocal causation rather than unidirectional causation, as the proximate/ultimate distinction presupposes, seems to push us toward a constructivist approach through the notion of niche construction.

Rivista di filosofia, 2018

Whether morality is objective is one of the most debated questions in moral philosophy. After all... more Whether morality is objective is one of the most debated questions in moral philosophy. After all, it is precisely on the idea that moral statements are more than subjective opinions of some individuals, that is based the very authority of morality. A robust conception of moral objectivity is a core feature of every realist position in ethics. In this regard, evolutionism provides us with an alternative account for moral objectivity according to which the claim to objectivity, though ingrained in ordinary moral thought and language, is rooted in our evolved psychology rather than on some external moral facts. Following this line of reasoning, the paper explores recent uses of evolutionism in metaethics focusing on the issue of objectivity. In particular, it will be shown how the evolutionary explanation of morality can undermine the realist conception of objectivity. In the light of these considerations, a final question can be raised: Is there still room for moral objectivity? In the final part of the article, it will be suggested how to rethink objectivity through the notion of moral progress in order to develop an alternative option to moral realism which does not necessarily lead to moral skepticism. More precisely, in the wake of Philip Kitcher, a naturalistic account of moral progress on evolutionary basis will be presented.

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 2017

The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of th... more The aim of this article is to explore the impact of Darwinism in metaethics and dispel some of the confusion surrounding it. While the prospects for a Darwinian metaethics appear to be improving, some underlying epistemological issues remain unclear. We will focus on the so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) which, when applied in metaethics, are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of moral beliefs so as to undermine their epistemic justification. The point is that an epistemic disanalogy can be identified in the debate on EDAs between moral beliefs and other kinds of beliefs, insofar as only the former are regarded as vulnerable to EDAs. First, we will analyze some significant debunking positions in metaethics in order to show that they do not provide adequate justification for such an epistemic disanalogy. Then, we will assess whether they can avoid the accusation of being epistemically incoherent by adopting the same evolutionary account for all kinds of beliefs. In other words, once it is argued that Darwinism has a corrosive impact on metaethics, what if its universal acid cannot be contained?

Philosophia. Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 2016

The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutiona... more The so-called Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. When applied to morality, such arguments are intended to undermine moral realism. In this paper I will discuss Andreas Mogensen’s recent effort to secure moral realism against EDAs. Mogensen attempts to undermine the challenge provided by EDAs in metaethics through the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biology. The problem with this move is that the proximate/ultimate distinction is misconceived. If ultimate and proximate causes are properly understood to be complementary, such distinction cannot affect EDAs in metaethics. Therefore, I will argue, Mogensen’s argument fails and moral realism is still in danger.

Riflessioni Sistemiche, 2015

Scopo del contributo è di offrire un’analisi critica della prospettiva femminista in filosofia de... more Scopo del contributo è di offrire un’analisi critica della prospettiva femminista in filosofia della scienza. Si partirà dalla seguente domanda: può esserci una “scienza femminista”? Si cercherà di mostrare che, affinché tale espressione non risulti un ossimoro, è necessario collocare l’epistemologia femminista all'interno della più ampia critica alla scienza intesa come indagine neutrale rispetto ai giudizi di valore.

Babelonline.net – Rivista di Filosofia online, 2012

In questo intervento verrà proposta una lettura critica del paradigma morale elaborato da Marc D.... more In questo intervento verrà proposta una lettura critica del paradigma morale elaborato da Marc D. Hauser a partire dall’analisi del modello linguistico di Francesco Ferretti. Si tratterà, in sostanza, di muovere ad Hauser le obiezioni che Ferretti solleva nei confronti di Noam Chomsky. Questo rappresenterà l’occasione anche per individuare e discutere le condizioni di possibilità con cui una teoria linguistica – così come un’etica – deve fare i conti: la plausibilità evoluzionistica e la plausibilità cognitiva. Obiettivo del saggio è mostrare come talvolta le convinzioni teoriche vincolino a tal punto l’indagine speculativa da rappresentare un ostacolo alla corretta impostazione di un problema. In particolare ciò verrà messo in luce discutendo una criticità metodologica alla base della grammatica universale tanto in rapporto al linguaggio quanto alla morale.

APhEx. Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 2012

Il contributo prende in esame i neuroni specchio con l'intento di fornire un'introduzione alla ta... more Il contributo prende in esame i neuroni specchio con l'intento di fornire un'introduzione alla tappe salienti di questa scoperta alla luce di una discussione critica. Dapprima viene ripercorso il dibattito che si è creato nella comunità scientifica riguardo all'esistenza, o meno, negli esseri umani di queste particolari cellule nervose. Successivamente si esamina la discussione circa la loro rilevanza nella cognizione e in particolare nel processo di mind reading. Questo costituisce l'occasione per valutarne le ricadute filosofiche e, in particolare, antropologiche e etiche. Lo scopo del saggio è infatti quello di presentare un esempio di come scienza e filosofia possano misurarsi, al fine di mostrare le debolezze di alcuni paradigmi antropologici e di elaborare una concezione di essere umano più adeguata.

Book Chapters by Eleonora Severini

L'Astorina A., Mangia C. (Eds.) Una comunità estesa di pari nella ricerca ambientale: la conoscenza situata come ampliamento dell’epistemologia, CNR Edizioni, 2022., 2022

L’idea di una “comunità estesa di pari”, uno dei pilastri dell’approccio post-normale, si scontra... more L’idea di una “comunità estesa di pari”, uno dei pilastri dell’approccio post-normale, si scontra con uno dei fondamenti della scienza moderna, vale a dire la produzione di fatti scientifici come frutto del pensiero collettivo dei soli esperti. Le difficoltà di allargare le comunità di esperti sono state oggetto di diversi studi. Un contributo rilevante è dato dalle epistemologhe femministe che per prime si sono scontrate con la concezione standard di scienza. In particolare, l’“epistemologia dei punti vista” mette in discussione la presunta oggettività della conoscenza scientifica e ne propone un’idea alternativa come traguardo sociale da perseguire collettivamente. Proprio la lente dell’epistemologhe femministe risulterà preziosa per osservare e interpretare gli ostacoli insiti nel riconoscimento di una “comunità estesa di pari” nei contesti di ricerca post-normale e per ri-descrivere il ruolo di esperti e non esperti nel processo di produzione di conoscenza scientifica.

Ceccarelli D., Frezza G. (Eds.), Predictability and the Unpredictable. Life, Evolution and Behaviour, 2018

The paper explores the role that predictability may play in a cross-disciplinary and normative fi... more The paper explores the role that predictability may play in a cross-disciplinary and normative field such as evolutionary ethics. Although predictability is generally understood as a crucial notion for the descriptive components of evolutionary ethics, here, it will be investigated its role for the claim of normativity itself. In particular, it will be assessed the epistemic status of our judgements about what matters in the light of evolutionism. On a realist view about what matters, there are things in the world that matter insofar as they necessarily matter. Contrary to that, if one embraces evolutionism, what matters is rooted in our biological history, and it is a matter of pure contingency; therefore, since what matters does not necessarily matter, it is not possible to predict what matters and nihilism appears to be the only viable route. After having clarified in which sense we may intend predictability in evolutionary ethics, the paper assesses whether a better understanding of contingency in the evolutionary process can point out an alternative conception of normativity than the realist one without being forced to embrace nihilism.

Book Reviews by Eleonora Severini

APhEx. Portale italiano di filosofia analitica, 2018

ReF - RecensioniFilosofiche, 2012