Federico L. G. FAROLDI | University of Pavia (original) (raw)
Books by Federico L. G. FAROLDI
Drafts by Federico L. G. FAROLDI
In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal acco... more In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperinten-sional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: (i) an argument from the nature of reasons, (ii) an argument from substitutivity, (iii) an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a hy-perintensional logic of reasons based on justification logics. Eventually we discuss the philosophical import of this proposal and highlight some limitations and possible developments.
I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be ... more I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one is deductive and the other abductive. First, I simply prove that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I claim that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity, and explanatory power (e.g. Ross's paradox, the Gentle Murderer, The Good Samaritan, Free Choice Permission, and the Miners' Paradox disappear). I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis, and outline some consequences. In section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperinten-sionality. In section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are ill-fitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.
Normative notions are offen explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and ... more Normative notions are offen explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and combined, for instance in order to know what one ought to do. But what is their weight? How do they combine? This paper applies measurement theory to these questions. I argue that normative reasons cannot be consistently weighted and aggregated for purely formal, rather than substantial, reasons and that this is a prima facie novel, non ad hoc argument for normative particular-ism. In section 1, I make precise in what sense normative reasons are scalar, why an aggregation operation is needed, and introduce the most common types of scales. In section 2 I prove that normative reasons cannot be numerically measured (in a precise sense), and that the scale of normative reasons, if any, is therefore not ratio , interval, or ordinal (in a precise measurement-theoretic sense). In section 3 I argue that no representation theorem is possible, i.e. that, given certain standard assumptions, no consistent measure can be constructed. In section 4 I discuss the consequences of these results for normative theorizing, and especially for normative particularism.
Papers by Federico L. G. FAROLDI
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2023
Practical reasons can be aggregated to decide what one ought to do. This paper explores an operat... more Practical reasons can be aggregated to decide what one ought to do. This paper explores an operation that undoes aggregation: subtraction. I consider several distinctions concerning subtraction: subtracting content and subtracting strength; and subtracting one reason from one other reason or from a set of reasons. I put forward a precise understanding of subtracting the content of one reason from another, based on an operation of difference on a state-like, structured notion of content. Finally, I apply my approach to subtracting reasons to normative domains, and in particular to belief revision and norm change.
AI & Society, 2024
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is said to pose many risks, be they catastrophic, existenti... more Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is said to pose many risks, be they catastrophic, existential and otherwise. This paper discusses whether the notion of risk can apply to AGI, both descriptively and in the current regulatory framework. The paper argues that current definitions of risk are ill-suited to capture supposed AGI existential risks, and that the risk-based framework of the EU AI Act is inadequate to deal with truly general, agential systems.
Ratio Iuris, 2024
Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not suffic... more Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not sufficient to establish an obligation. I consider the extent to which partial reasons are reasons, and why they cannot be reduced to or identified with pro tanto reasons. I lay out two approaches to the content of reasons, the flat theory and the structured theory. I argue that parts of reasons are not partial reasons, by showing that natural ways to represent parts of reasons in the flat theory and the structured theory lead to overgeneration problems with regard to partial reasons. I then formulate two notions of partial reasons: one based on a notion of partial support, which is in turn captured by the notions of full support and partial content, and one based on the notion of in exact verification. I show under which conditions the two notions of partial reasons (based on partial content, and based on inexact verification) coincide.
WoLLIC, 2023
This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued t... more This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued to be better than Standard Deontic Logic at representing conditional and contrary-to-duty obligations, such as those exemplified by the notorious Chisholm’s puzzle. We consider the alethic-deontic system (E) and present the explicit version of this system (JE) by replacing the alethic Box-modality with proof terms and the dyadic deontic Circ-modality with justification terms. The explicit representation of strong factual detachment (SFD) is given and finally soundness and completeness of the system (JE) with respect to basic models and preference models is established.
Inquiry, 2020
In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity ... more In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity has been accounted for by recourse to the distinction, within the class of subjective adjectives, be...
Studia Semiotyczne, 2019
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi2.08 In this paper we discuss how and whether moral adjectiv... more DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi2.08 In this paper we discuss how and whether moral adjectives fit a well-known semantics for gradable adjectives. We first test whether moral adjectives are relative or absolute adjectives. The preliminary results suggest that moral adjectives don't fall neatly under either category. In the second part we tackle the question of the scale of moral adjectives in a more theoretical fashion, i.e. by investigating their possible scales with mathematically precise tools.
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry wit... more I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry with consuetudo, because consuetudo cannot be fully captured by a game-theoretic analysis, while desuetudo, properly understood as a dynamic, diachronic process, can. A norm (not necessarily a consuetudo) ceases to exist because there’s no need anymore, in an interactive situation, to foster certain equilibria, even though the same norm which is going in desuetudo might not have emerged as a consuetudo. While this kind of norm dynamics cannot explain all kinds of consuetudines, it can explain desuetudo, understood as a dynamic process ending with normative indifference, from a state which was normatively relevant. In this game-theoretic account the dynamicity is captured by the repeated occurence of the game, while desuetudo is the opposite process, in terms of normativity, with which a norm emerges (regardless of the fact whether the initial norm was a consuetudo or posited).
Journal of Logic and Computation
Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justif... more Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, textbfjd\textbf {jd}textbfjd, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity, 2019
Normative notions are often explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and ... more Normative notions are often explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and combined, for instance in order to know what one ought to do. But what is their weight? How do they combine? This chapter applies measurement theory to these questions. I argue that normative reasons cannot be consistently weighted and aggregated for purely formal, rather than substantial, reasons and that this is a prima facie novel, non ad hoc argument for normative particularism.
I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normative... more I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normatively heterogeneous but metaphysically homogenous.
In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal acco... more In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional, and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperinten-sional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: (i) an argument from the nature of reasons, (ii) an argument from substitutivity, (iii) an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a hy-perintensional logic of reasons based on justification logics. Eventually we discuss the philosophical import of this proposal and highlight some limitations and possible developments.
I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be ... more I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, that is, logical equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one is deductive and the other abductive. First, I simply prove that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I claim that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity, and explanatory power (e.g. Ross's paradox, the Gentle Murderer, The Good Samaritan, Free Choice Permission, and the Miners' Paradox disappear). I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis, and outline some consequences. In section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperinten-sionality. In section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are ill-fitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of de-ontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.
Normative notions are offen explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and ... more Normative notions are offen explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and combined, for instance in order to know what one ought to do. But what is their weight? How do they combine? This paper applies measurement theory to these questions. I argue that normative reasons cannot be consistently weighted and aggregated for purely formal, rather than substantial, reasons and that this is a prima facie novel, non ad hoc argument for normative particular-ism. In section 1, I make precise in what sense normative reasons are scalar, why an aggregation operation is needed, and introduce the most common types of scales. In section 2 I prove that normative reasons cannot be numerically measured (in a precise sense), and that the scale of normative reasons, if any, is therefore not ratio , interval, or ordinal (in a precise measurement-theoretic sense). In section 3 I argue that no representation theorem is possible, i.e. that, given certain standard assumptions, no consistent measure can be constructed. In section 4 I discuss the consequences of these results for normative theorizing, and especially for normative particularism.
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2023
Practical reasons can be aggregated to decide what one ought to do. This paper explores an operat... more Practical reasons can be aggregated to decide what one ought to do. This paper explores an operation that undoes aggregation: subtraction. I consider several distinctions concerning subtraction: subtracting content and subtracting strength; and subtracting one reason from one other reason or from a set of reasons. I put forward a precise understanding of subtracting the content of one reason from another, based on an operation of difference on a state-like, structured notion of content. Finally, I apply my approach to subtracting reasons to normative domains, and in particular to belief revision and norm change.
AI & Society, 2024
Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is said to pose many risks, be they catastrophic, existenti... more Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is said to pose many risks, be they catastrophic, existential and otherwise. This paper discusses whether the notion of risk can apply to AGI, both descriptively and in the current regulatory framework. The paper argues that current definitions of risk are ill-suited to capture supposed AGI existential risks, and that the risk-based framework of the EU AI Act is inadequate to deal with truly general, agential systems.
Ratio Iuris, 2024
Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not suffic... more Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not sufficient to establish an obligation. I consider the extent to which partial reasons are reasons, and why they cannot be reduced to or identified with pro tanto reasons. I lay out two approaches to the content of reasons, the flat theory and the structured theory. I argue that parts of reasons are not partial reasons, by showing that natural ways to represent parts of reasons in the flat theory and the structured theory lead to overgeneration problems with regard to partial reasons. I then formulate two notions of partial reasons: one based on a notion of partial support, which is in turn captured by the notions of full support and partial content, and one based on the notion of in exact verification. I show under which conditions the two notions of partial reasons (based on partial content, and based on inexact verification) coincide.
WoLLIC, 2023
This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued t... more This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued to be better than Standard Deontic Logic at representing conditional and contrary-to-duty obligations, such as those exemplified by the notorious Chisholm’s puzzle. We consider the alethic-deontic system (E) and present the explicit version of this system (JE) by replacing the alethic Box-modality with proof terms and the dyadic deontic Circ-modality with justification terms. The explicit representation of strong factual detachment (SFD) is given and finally soundness and completeness of the system (JE) with respect to basic models and preference models is established.
Inquiry, 2020
In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity ... more In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity has been accounted for by recourse to the distinction, within the class of subjective adjectives, be...
Studia Semiotyczne, 2019
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi2.08 In this paper we discuss how and whether moral adjectiv... more DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxi2.08 In this paper we discuss how and whether moral adjectives fit a well-known semantics for gradable adjectives. We first test whether moral adjectives are relative or absolute adjectives. The preliminary results suggest that moral adjectives don't fall neatly under either category. In the second part we tackle the question of the scale of moral adjectives in a more theoretical fashion, i.e. by investigating their possible scales with mathematically precise tools.
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry wit... more I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry with consuetudo, because consuetudo cannot be fully captured by a game-theoretic analysis, while desuetudo, properly understood as a dynamic, diachronic process, can. A norm (not necessarily a consuetudo) ceases to exist because there’s no need anymore, in an interactive situation, to foster certain equilibria, even though the same norm which is going in desuetudo might not have emerged as a consuetudo. While this kind of norm dynamics cannot explain all kinds of consuetudines, it can explain desuetudo, understood as a dynamic process ending with normative indifference, from a state which was normatively relevant. In this game-theoretic account the dynamicity is captured by the repeated occurence of the game, while desuetudo is the opposite process, in terms of normativity, with which a norm emerges (regardless of the fact whether the initial norm was a consuetudo or posited).
Journal of Logic and Computation
Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justif... more Different notions of the consistency of obligations collapse in standard deontic logic. In justification logics, which feature explicit reasons for obligations, the situation is different. Their strength depends on a constant specification and on the available set of operations for combining different reasons. We present different consistency principles in justification logic and compare their logical strength. We propose a novel semantics for which justification logics with the explicit version of axiom D, textbfjd\textbf {jd}textbfjd, are complete for arbitrary constant specifications. Consistency is sometimes formulated in terms of permission. We therefore study permission in the context of justification logic, introducing a notion of free-choice permission for the first time. We then discuss the philosophical implications with regard to some deontic paradoxes.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity, 2019
Normative notions are often explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and ... more Normative notions are often explained in terms of reasons, which (allegedly) can be weighted and combined, for instance in order to know what one ought to do. But what is their weight? How do they combine? This chapter applies measurement theory to these questions. I argue that normative reasons cannot be consistently weighted and aggregated for purely formal, rather than substantial, reasons and that this is a prima facie novel, non ad hoc argument for normative particularism.
I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normative... more I introduce the novel concept of normative events and I defend the thesis that they are normatively heterogeneous but metaphysically homogenous.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity, 2019
I now move to the hyperintensionality of normative properties. Since there is already work on the... more I now move to the hyperintensionality of normative properties. Since there is already work on the topic, I tackle the main objection to this position, namely reductivism, and I argue that a higher-order supervenience principle, together with a hyperintensional account of properties, deflect Jackson-style arguments against nonreductive normative nonnaturalism.
Hyperintensionality and Normativity, 2019
In this chapter I briefly give a philosophical introduction to truthmaker semantics and I present... more In this chapter I briefly give a philosophical introduction to truthmaker semantics and I present Fine’s logic and semantics for imperatives, I discuss two philosophical difficulties for Fine’s account (but really, for every truthmaker semantics similar to his) and propose some technical solutions.
We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with eve... more We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics.
"The Frege-Geach problem is an objection to theories Expressivism included) holding that normativ... more "The Frege-Geach problem is an objection to theories Expressivism included) holding that normative sentences are not truth-apt.
We put forward two strategies to avoid the problem: one negative,
one positive.
First and negatively, the Frege{Geachers are entrapped in a categorial mistake. Logical relations concern propositions, not things.
Even if it might be acceptable for Frege{Geachers to speak metonymically of things (beliefs) as truth-apt referring to their content (propositions), this is unacceptable if speaking of other non-propositional mental states (those that Expressivists take to be the source of the normative).
Second and positively, we can try to develop an Expressivist theory of law making that can face the Frege{Geach according to which external negation is explained by means of rejection."
