Carlo Carraro | Università Ca' Foscari Venezia (original) (raw)

Papers by Carlo Carraro

BRILL eBooks, 2013

This paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China generated by the Integrated As... more This paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China generated by the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH. A Business-as-Usual scenario is compared with five scenarios in which Greenhouse Gases emissions are taxed, at different levels. The elasticity of China's emissions is estimated by pooling observations from all scenarios and compared with the elasticity of emissions in OECD countries. China has a higher elasticity than the OECD for a carbon tax lower than 50$ per ton of CO2-eq. For higher taxes, emissions in OECD economies are more elastic than in China. Our best guess indicates that China would need to introduce a tax equal to about 750$ per ton of CO2-eq in 2050 to achieve the Major Economies Forum goal set for mid-century. In our preferred estimates, the discounted cost of following the 2°C trajectory is equal to 5.4% and to 2.7% of GDP in China and the OECD, respectively.

National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the N... more The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

It is unanimously recognized that emissions from China and India will be responsible for a large ... more It is unanimously recognized that emissions from China and India will be responsible for a large fraction of the incremental growth of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere in the next decades (IEA 2010; EIA 2011; Clarke et al. 2009). This explains, at least partly, the reluctance of the United States to take on any binding commitment to reduce GHGs emissions if China and other major developing economies do not make any steps to reduce their own GHGs emissions. At the same time, major developing countries are not willing to make costly efforts to reduce GHG emissions if developed economies do not rapidly commit to drastic emissions reductions. This contraposition has been one of the causes of the lack of substantial progress in international climate change negotiations. The Copenhagen Summit has marked a change. For the first time, all major developing countries have pledged to take steps to control the growth of their GHGs emissions. The ''Copenhagen Pledges'', although informal and insufficient according to some critics (UNEP 2010), have been confirmed at the Cancun climate talks in December 2010 and will very likely characterize the post-Kyoto climate agenda until 2020. This special issue collects a set of articles that take stock of the current status of the negotiations and suggest an unconventional, pragmatic way forward. All the articles recognize that China and India will not enter a textbook-style international climate agreement soon. They are also aware that the future international climate architecture will be fragmented and incomplete at least until 2020 (Carraro and Massetti 2011; Aldy and Stavins 2007). Therefore, the inability to build a large binding agreement with absolute targets is not seen as a tragedy, but rather as a fact that should be considered as a starting point for future steps toward global emission reductions. For this reason, all articles take a long-term perspective. As Zhang notes in his article, the real question when dealing with China and India is post-2020 and not pre-2020.

Journal of Policy Modeling

Social Science Research Network, 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory... more The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Springer eBooks, 2005

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

Journal of Sustainable Development, 2016

International negotiations on climate change control are moving away from a global cooperative ag... more International negotiations on climate change control are moving away from a global cooperative agreement (at least from the ambition to achieve it) to adopt a bottom-up framework composed of unilateral pledges of domestic measures and policies. This shift from cooperative to voluntary actions to control GHG emissions already started in Copenhagen at COP 15 in 2007 and became a platform formally adopted by a large number of countries in Paris at COP 21. The new architecture calls for a mechanism to review the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of the various signatories and assess their adequacy. Most importantly, countries’ voluntary pledges need to be compared to assess the fairness, and not only the effectiveness, of the resulting outcome. This assessment is crucial to support future, more ambitious, commitments to reduce GHG emissions. It is therefore important to identify criteria and quantitative indicators to assess and compare the NDCs.

Social Science Research Network, Jul 1, 2007

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jul 30, 2009

Social Science Research Network, Jun 1, 2004

... the adoption of an international agreement in which all countries find it profitable to coope... more ... the adoption of an international agreement in which all countries find it profitable to cooperate ... the Kyoto targets have been adopted (eg the EU Directive on emission trading or the ... new reports from the US Climate Change Technology Program, stressing the three pillars of the ...

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jun 26, 2003

Energy Markets and Sustainability in a Larger Europe,9th IAEE European Conference,June 10-31, 2007, Oct 1, 2006

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re, 2015

A natural outcome of the emerging "pledge and review" approach to international climate... more A natural outcome of the emerging "pledge and review" approach to international climate change policy is the interest in comparing mitigation efforts among countries. Many will want to know if similar or “peer” countries are undertaking (or planning to undertake) a “comparable” effort in mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions. The speakers at this side event on "Transparency, Policy Surveillance and Levels of Effort" presented a framework for comparing mitigation efforts across nations, drawing from a set of principles for designing and implementing informative metrics. The event was co-organized by FEEM, the Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth (RITE) and Resources for the Future (RFF).

Social Science Research Network, 2007

Nature Italy, Aug 8, 2022

BRILL eBooks, 2013

This paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China generated by the Integrated As... more This paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China generated by the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH. A Business-as-Usual scenario is compared with five scenarios in which Greenhouse Gases emissions are taxed, at different levels. The elasticity of China's emissions is estimated by pooling observations from all scenarios and compared with the elasticity of emissions in OECD countries. China has a higher elasticity than the OECD for a carbon tax lower than 50$ per ton of CO2-eq. For higher taxes, emissions in OECD economies are more elastic than in China. Our best guess indicates that China would need to introduce a tax equal to about 750$ per ton of CO2-eq in 2050 to achieve the Major Economies Forum goal set for mid-century. In our preferred estimates, the discounted cost of following the 2°C trajectory is equal to 5.4% and to 2.7% of GDP in China and the OECD, respectively.

National Bureau of Economic Research, 2000

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the N... more The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

It is unanimously recognized that emissions from China and India will be responsible for a large ... more It is unanimously recognized that emissions from China and India will be responsible for a large fraction of the incremental growth of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere in the next decades (IEA 2010; EIA 2011; Clarke et al. 2009). This explains, at least partly, the reluctance of the United States to take on any binding commitment to reduce GHGs emissions if China and other major developing economies do not make any steps to reduce their own GHGs emissions. At the same time, major developing countries are not willing to make costly efforts to reduce GHG emissions if developed economies do not rapidly commit to drastic emissions reductions. This contraposition has been one of the causes of the lack of substantial progress in international climate change negotiations. The Copenhagen Summit has marked a change. For the first time, all major developing countries have pledged to take steps to control the growth of their GHGs emissions. The ''Copenhagen Pledges'', although informal and insufficient according to some critics (UNEP 2010), have been confirmed at the Cancun climate talks in December 2010 and will very likely characterize the post-Kyoto climate agenda until 2020. This special issue collects a set of articles that take stock of the current status of the negotiations and suggest an unconventional, pragmatic way forward. All the articles recognize that China and India will not enter a textbook-style international climate agreement soon. They are also aware that the future international climate architecture will be fragmented and incomplete at least until 2020 (Carraro and Massetti 2011; Aldy and Stavins 2007). Therefore, the inability to build a large binding agreement with absolute targets is not seen as a tragedy, but rather as a fact that should be considered as a starting point for future steps toward global emission reductions. For this reason, all articles take a long-term perspective. As Zhang notes in his article, the real question when dealing with China and India is post-2020 and not pre-2020.

Journal of Policy Modeling

Social Science Research Network, 2007

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory... more The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players' strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with certainty to negotiating players. We construct the players' objective function with their direct input. We then test the applicability of our multiple players, multi-issues, stochastic framework to a specific water allocation problem and conduct comparative static analyses to assess sources of bargaining power. Finally, we explore the implications of different attitudes and beliefs over water availability.

Social Science Research Network, 2009

Springer eBooks, 2005

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

Journal of Sustainable Development, 2016

International negotiations on climate change control are moving away from a global cooperative ag... more International negotiations on climate change control are moving away from a global cooperative agreement (at least from the ambition to achieve it) to adopt a bottom-up framework composed of unilateral pledges of domestic measures and policies. This shift from cooperative to voluntary actions to control GHG emissions already started in Copenhagen at COP 15 in 2007 and became a platform formally adopted by a large number of countries in Paris at COP 21. The new architecture calls for a mechanism to review the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) of the various signatories and assess their adequacy. Most importantly, countries’ voluntary pledges need to be compared to assess the fairness, and not only the effectiveness, of the resulting outcome. This assessment is crucial to support future, more ambitious, commitments to reduce GHG emissions. It is therefore important to identify criteria and quantitative indicators to assess and compare the NDCs.

Social Science Research Network, Jul 1, 2007

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jul 30, 2009

Social Science Research Network, Jun 1, 2004

... the adoption of an international agreement in which all countries find it profitable to coope... more ... the adoption of an international agreement in which all countries find it profitable to cooperate ... the Kyoto targets have been adopted (eg the EU Directive on emission trading or the ... new reports from the US Climate Change Technology Program, stressing the three pillars of the ...

Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Jun 26, 2003

Energy Markets and Sustainability in a Larger Europe,9th IAEE European Conference,June 10-31, 2007, Oct 1, 2006

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics - Re, 2015

A natural outcome of the emerging "pledge and review" approach to international climate... more A natural outcome of the emerging "pledge and review" approach to international climate change policy is the interest in comparing mitigation efforts among countries. Many will want to know if similar or “peer” countries are undertaking (or planning to undertake) a “comparable” effort in mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions. The speakers at this side event on "Transparency, Policy Surveillance and Levels of Effort" presented a framework for comparing mitigation efforts across nations, drawing from a set of principles for designing and implementing informative metrics. The event was co-organized by FEEM, the Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth (RITE) and Resources for the Future (RFF).

Social Science Research Network, 2007

Nature Italy, Aug 8, 2022