Martina Piantoni | Università Europea di Roma (original) (raw)
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Papers by Martina Piantoni
Topoi, Apr 9, 2024
Within this framework, they propose that practical knowledge in ethical actions, such as acting j... more Within this framework, they propose that practical knowledge in ethical actions, such as acting justly or courageously, shares meaningful similarities with expertise in activities like driving or playing a musical instrument. According to the Aristotelian picture, each distinct virtue is a complex and stable disposition to excel in the relevant domain: to be courageous amounts in excellent conduct in front of dangers, to be generous amounts in excellent conduct about giving goods to others, to be compassionate amounts in excellent conduct facing other's suffering. At the same time, Aristotle holds that in order to be fully virtuous, each token of conduct must encompass phronesis, the intellectual virtue that harmonises and unifies the distinct ethical virtues that constitute character (NE 1144 a 6-9; 1139a 12-13). So, Aristotle conceives the education of character as the acquisition of individual distinct virtuous traits-courage, generosity, compassion, and so on-through exercise, practice, and habituation plus the activity of phronesis. Therefore, character education seems to be composed of two main parts. (i) During childhood and adolescence-when reason is not fully developed-character is shaped through repetition and emulation of appropriate ways of acting and feeling. Then, (ii) gradually, as reason becomes entirely present, the exercise of phronesis makes rational and properly virtuous each distinct disposition previously formed. As we will 1 All authors contributed equally.
Topoi
Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theo... more Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between phronesis and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller (2023) has classified as Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing phronesis understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model.
Topoi, Apr 9, 2024
Within this framework, they propose that practical knowledge in ethical actions, such as acting j... more Within this framework, they propose that practical knowledge in ethical actions, such as acting justly or courageously, shares meaningful similarities with expertise in activities like driving or playing a musical instrument. According to the Aristotelian picture, each distinct virtue is a complex and stable disposition to excel in the relevant domain: to be courageous amounts in excellent conduct in front of dangers, to be generous amounts in excellent conduct about giving goods to others, to be compassionate amounts in excellent conduct facing other's suffering. At the same time, Aristotle holds that in order to be fully virtuous, each token of conduct must encompass phronesis, the intellectual virtue that harmonises and unifies the distinct ethical virtues that constitute character (NE 1144 a 6-9; 1139a 12-13). So, Aristotle conceives the education of character as the acquisition of individual distinct virtuous traits-courage, generosity, compassion, and so on-through exercise, practice, and habituation plus the activity of phronesis. Therefore, character education seems to be composed of two main parts. (i) During childhood and adolescence-when reason is not fully developed-character is shaped through repetition and emulation of appropriate ways of acting and feeling. Then, (ii) gradually, as reason becomes entirely present, the exercise of phronesis makes rational and properly virtuous each distinct disposition previously formed. As we will 1 All authors contributed equally.
Topoi
Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theo... more Character education is an increasingly discussed topic drawing upon virtue ethics as a moral theory. Scholars have predominantly understood educating character as a process that entails the formation of certain distinct character traits or functions through practice and habituation. However, these approaches present some problems. This paper explores the educational implications of various accounts focusing on the relationship between phronesis and other virtues. In particular, our focus will be on those that Miller (2023) has classified as Standard Model and Eliminativist Model of practical wisdom. Starting from these accounts, we will outline three specific problems that the latter models appear to generate at a theoretical level in character education. Finally, we will address the task of demonstrating why the monist account of moral virtue recently proposed by the Aretai group—which conceives being virtuous in possessing phronesis understood as ethical expertise—might offer a refined response to these challenges. In addition, we will illustrate three educational pathways that can emerge from the same model.