Lisa Ordonez | The University of Arizona (original) (raw)

Papers by Lisa Ordonez

Veterinary Parasitology, 1984

... Beresford-Jones, 1967W.P Beresford-Jones, Observations on Müllerius capillaris (Mueller, 1889... more ... Beresford-Jones, 1967W.P Beresford-Jones, Observations on Müllerius capillaris (Mueller, 1889)Cameron, 1927. III. ... Castañón Ordóñez et al., 1981L Castañón Ordóñez, Campillo M Cordero del and FA Rojo Vázquez, A method for experimental infection of Stylommatophora ...

At the heart of many debates about distributive justice is the widely assumed trade-off between e... more At the heart of many debates about distributive justice is the widely assumed trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975). In the present chapter, equality refers to the distribution of income within a society. Equality increases whenever income variability is reduced. Efficiency refers to the goods and services that result from a given input – production, physical capital, or human labor. Efficiency increases whenever society produces more from the same input. Trade-offs between equality and efficiency occur because increases in one often lead to decreases in the other. An egalitarian society satisfies basic needs by establishing programs that redistribute wealth. But those programs can reduce efficiency when they introduce bureaucratic waste or diminish financial incentives. A reduction in efficiency can lead to fewer investments, fewer jobs, and declining productivity.

Political economists agree that a trade-offexists between equality and efficiency. Using a hypoth... more Political economists agree that a trade-offexists between equality and efficiency. Using a hypothetical
society paradigm, we manipulated the mean income (representing efficiency) and income
variability (representing equality) of distributions of wealth and the correlation between wealth and
effort within a society. Subjects made all pairwise comparisons of distributions within societies of
differing meritocracy. A "maximin" principle best described trade-off resolution strategies when
effort and outcome were weakly linked: People maximized the minimum standard of living within
a society. A compromise principle best described preferences when income was tightly linked to
effort: People rejected distributions in which some citizens fell below the "poverty line" but maximized
efficiency above this constraint. Ideological polarization was pronounced under moderate
meritocracy; here liberals could focus on the role of chance and conservatives on the role of effort
and ability.

Systematically different preference orders are obtained when different procedures are used to eli... more Systematically different preference orders are obtained when different procedures are used to
elicit preferences for gambles. Three new experiments found different preference orders with
attractiveness ratings, risk ratings, buying prices, selling prices, avoidance prices, and strength-ofpreference
judgments. Preference reversals persisted even when Ss were given financial incentives
to motivate them to rank the gambles identically. Results were consistent with a change-ofprocess
theory in which Ss are assumed to use different strategies in different tasks with the same
scales. Attractiveness and risk ratings could be described by an additive combination of probability
and amount, and prices could be predicted by a multiplicative combination of the same scales.
Strength-of-preference judgments were consistent with a contrast-weighting model in which the
weight of a dimension (either probability or amount) depends on the contrast between the 2
gambles along that dimension.

Three experiments were conducted to investigate contextual effects and response mode effects (e.g... more Three experiments were conducted to investigate contextual effects and
response mode effects (e.g., preference reversals) in risky decision making.
Judgments of the worth of binary gambles were examined using two different
contexts (positively and negatively skewed distributions of expected values)
and two different response modes (attractiveness ratings and buying prices).
Changes in the response mode affected the preference order of gambles, and
changes in the context due to variations in skewing influenced the metric
properties of the judgments but had a minimal effect on preference orders.
Data were inconsistent with contingent weighting theory (Tversky, Sattath, &
Slavic, 1988) and expression theory (Goldstein & Einhom, 1987). Results
could be described by a change-of-process theory which assumes that the
method of elicitation influences the manner in which people combine information
and arrive at judgments. Under certain conditions, attractiveness ratings
could be described by an additive combination of subjective probability
and utility (s and u), whereas pricing judgments were accounted for by a
multiplicative function, with the same scales of s and u in both tasks. When the
range of outcomes included zero and negative values, preference orders for
attractiveness ratings of gambles changed. This change in rank order was
consistent with the hypothesis that inclusion of these levels caused more subjects
to use a multiplicative rule for combining u and s when rating the attractiveness
of gambles. Thus, preference reversals can be explained by the theory
that the combination rule changes, while utilities and subjective probabilities
remain constant.

Previous research has shown that preferences for options, such as gambles, can reverse depending ... more Previous research has shown that preferences for options, such as gambles, can reverse depending on the response mode. These preference reversals have been demonstrated when tasks were performed sequentially. That is, subjects completed one task before beginning another. In an attempt to eliminate preference reversals, we asked subjects to perform tasks simultaneously. That is, subjects made two types of responses for each pair of gambles before evaluating the next pair. In the condition with no financial incentives, preference reversal rates were slightly reduced. In another condition, subjects were paid for their participation and they were allowed to play a gamble with real monetary compensation. A gamble pair was randomly selected, and if a subject's responses in the two tasks were consistent for that pair, he or she was allowed to play the ‘preferred’ gamble. Otherwise, the experimenter selected the gamble from the pair. With these financial incentives, systematic preference reversals were eliminated for two of the three task combinations. Preference reversals continued to occur for attractiveness ratings versus selling prices, although, even for that pair of tasks, the reversal rate was significantly reduced. For all three task pairs, preference orders from the two tasks appeared to merge into more consistent orders.

PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

This article demonstrates that goal setting motivates unethical behavior. This is true for goals ... more This article demonstrates that goal setting motivates unethical behavior. This is true for goals both with and without economic incentives, and we find that the relationship between goal setting and unethical behavior is particularly strong when people are just short of reaching the goal. We explain our results in terms of the reference point adoption process and Prospect

PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

Previous research has documented the impact of self-derived expectations as reference points in t... more Previous research has documented the impact of self-derived expectations as reference points in the evaluation of outcomes (e.g. . In the present paper we extend these studies by investigating the effects of individuals' performance expectations on their subsequent evaluations of personally-relevant outcomes. In three separate studies, both in the laboratory and in the field, students' actual grade outcomes fell short, met, or exceeded grade expectations. From this information, the students evaluated their fairness and satisfaction with the actual grade outcome. The studies provide complementary results that distinguish fairness and satisfaction as different constructs based on the impact of expectations on evaluations of actual outcomes. Results demonstrate that expectations are important to perceptions of fairness and are less important to perceptions of satisfaction. Fairness judgments appear to be governed by an expectation matching proposition; whereby if the expectation is met, the outcome is fair. Whereas, satisfaction judgments are determined by the value of the actual outcome to the individual. Participants also evaluate the fairness of outcomes differently using hypothetical scenarios than they do when they experience actual outcomes in natural contexts.

and sharing with colleagues.

While extant research has examined return policies as a combination of time and effort, we invest... more While extant research has examined return policies as a combination of time and effort, we investigate both the independent and interactive impacts of time and effort on consumer decisions to return or retain products. We find that decreasing return deadlines can have the counterintuitive effect of increasing return rates under some conditions. Using construal level theory, we propose that perceived effort (both physical and cognitive) mediates the effect of return policy on return rates leading to suppressed returns. Further, when deadlines are framed as durations between store visits, overall product returns are exacerbated except when perceived effort is high. Published by Elsevier Inc. on behalf of Society for Consumer Psychology.

We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk-taking behavior in two types of ... more We examined the effects of two emotions, fear and anger, on risk-taking behavior in two types of tasks: Those in which uncertainty is generated by a randomizing device (''lottery risk'') and those in which it is generated by the uncertain behavior of another person (''person-based risk''). Participants first completed a writing task to induce fear or anger. They then made choices either between lotteries (Experiment 1) or between actions in risky two-person decisions (Experiments 2 and 3). The experiments involved substantial real-money payoffs. Replicating earlier studies (which used hypothetical rewards), Experiment 1 showed that fearful participants were more risk-averse than angry participants in lottery-risk tasks. However-the key result of this study-fearful participants were substantially less risk-averse than angry participants in a two-person task involving person-based risk (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 offered options and payoffs identical to those of Experiment 2 but with lottery-type risk. Risk-taking returned to the pattern of Experiment 1. The impact of incidental emotions on risk-taking appears to be contingent on the class of uncertainty involved. For lottery risk, fear increased the frequency of risk-averse choices and anger reduced it. The reverse pattern was found when uncertainty in the decision was person-based. Further, the effect was specifically on differences in willingness to take risks rather than on differences in judgments of how much risk was present. The impact of different emotions on risk-taking or riskavoiding behavior is thus contingent on the type, as well as the degree, of uncertainty the decision maker faces.

Veterinary Parasitology, 1984

PsycEXTRA Dataset, 2000

and sharing with colleagues.