Richard Healey | The University of Arizona (original) (raw)
Papers by Richard Healey
The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2014
Compendium of Quantum Physics, 2009
The Journal of Philosophy, 1996
Analysis, 2010
describe them. Truth is more fundamental than representation. It is only because we are in the fi... more describe them. Truth is more fundamental than representation. It is only because we are in the first place able to make true judgements about hot and cold bodies, the motions of planets and the geometrical forms of objects, as well as about the behaviour of measuring devices, that we can (truly) assert that the temperature of a body is 37.38C, that Mars revolves around the sun in 687 days and that the rectangular table-top of my desk is 113 cm  187 cm. The indexicality of our scientific representations is not a threat to the truth of statements that describe the facts on which their success relies. In a predicative statement, we may (indeed, we must) abstract some characteristics of the described phenomenon, but this does not prevent it from really possessing some properties, a fact which can also be ascertained by other observers. At the end of the day, true statements grounded on facts attested by observation provide the inescapable basis for the success of our scientific representations. 2
The American Historical Review, 1989
1 In addition to multiple variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, we now have Everettian inter... more 1 In addition to multiple variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, we now have Everettian interpretations of several kinds (many worlds, many minds, ...), the existential interpretation, the transactional interpretation, decoherent histories interpretations, relational interpretations, modal interpretations, de Broglie-Bohm interpretations, quantum Bayesian interpretations, etc.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, Jun 1, 2004
Those looking for holism in contemporary physics have focused their attention primarily on quantu... more Those looking for holism in contemporary physics have focused their attention primarily on quantum entanglement. But some gauge theories arguably also manifest the related phenomenon of nonseparability. While the argument is strong for the classical gauge theory describing electromagnetic interactions with quantum "particles", it fails in the case of general relativity even though that theory may also be formulated in terms of a connection on a principal fiber bundle. Anandan has highlighted the key difference in his analysis of a supposed gravitational analog to the Aharonov-Bohm effect. By contrast with electromagnetism in the original Aharonov-Bohm effect, gravitation is separable and exhibits no novel holism in this case. Whether the nonseparability of classical gauge theories of nongravitational interactions is associated with holism depends on what counts as the relevant part-whole relation. Loop representations of quantized gauge theories of non-gravitational interactions suggest that these conclusions about holism and nonseparability may extend also to quantum theories of the associated fields.
Foundations of Physics, 2011
A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several asp... more A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These include the relations between classical descriptions and different quantum treatments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking.
Philosophy of Science, 1991
Philosophy of Science, 1985
All change involves temporal variation of properties. There is change in the physical world only ... more All change involves temporal variation of properties. There is change in the physical world only if genuine physical magnitudes take on different values at different times. I defend the possibility of change in a general relativistic world against two skeptical arguments recently presented by John Earman. Each argument imposes severe restrictions on what may count as a genuine physical magnitude in general relativity. These restrictions seem justified only as long as one ignores the fact that genuine change in a relativistic world is frame-dependent. I argue on the contrary that there are genuine physical magnitudes whose values typically vary with the time of some frame, and that these include most familiar measurable quantities. Frame-dependent temporal variation in these magnitudes nevertheless supervenes on the unchanging values of more basic physical magnitudes in a general relativistic world. Basic magnitudes include those that realize an observer's occupation of a frame. Change is a significant and observable feature of a general relativistic world only because our situation in such a world naturally picks out a relevant class of frames, even if we lack the descriptive resources to say how they are realized by the values of basic underlying physical magnitudes.
Philosophy of Science, 1996
Philosophy of Science, 1987
Page 1. 1 How Quantum Theory Helps us Explain © Richard Healey “In the beginning natural philosop... more Page 1. 1 How Quantum Theory Helps us Explain © Richard Healey “In the beginning natural philosophers tried to understand the world around them. ... Bose-Einstein condensation, and the interference between certain separately prepared samples of a dilute gas BEC. ...
Philosophy of Science, Jul 30, 2012
The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pra... more The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judicious appeal to decoherence. On this interpretation, quantum theory provides situated agents with resources for predicting and explaining what happens in the physical world---not conscious observations of it. Even in Wigner's friend scenarios, differently situated agents agree on the objective content of statements about the values of physical magnitudes. In more realistic circumstances quantum Darwinism also permits differently situated agents equal observational access to evaluate their truth. In this view, quantum theory has nothing to say about consciousness or conscious experiences of observers. But it does prompt us to reexamine the significance even of everyday claims about the physical world.
The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 2014
Compendium of Quantum Physics, 2009
The Journal of Philosophy, 1996
Analysis, 2010
describe them. Truth is more fundamental than representation. It is only because we are in the fi... more describe them. Truth is more fundamental than representation. It is only because we are in the first place able to make true judgements about hot and cold bodies, the motions of planets and the geometrical forms of objects, as well as about the behaviour of measuring devices, that we can (truly) assert that the temperature of a body is 37.38C, that Mars revolves around the sun in 687 days and that the rectangular table-top of my desk is 113 cm  187 cm. The indexicality of our scientific representations is not a threat to the truth of statements that describe the facts on which their success relies. In a predicative statement, we may (indeed, we must) abstract some characteristics of the described phenomenon, but this does not prevent it from really possessing some properties, a fact which can also be ascertained by other observers. At the end of the day, true statements grounded on facts attested by observation provide the inescapable basis for the success of our scientific representations. 2
The American Historical Review, 1989
1 In addition to multiple variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, we now have Everettian inter... more 1 In addition to multiple variants of the Copenhagen interpretation, we now have Everettian interpretations of several kinds (many worlds, many minds, ...), the existential interpretation, the transactional interpretation, decoherent histories interpretations, relational interpretations, modal interpretations, de Broglie-Bohm interpretations, quantum Bayesian interpretations, etc.
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, Jun 1, 2004
Those looking for holism in contemporary physics have focused their attention primarily on quantu... more Those looking for holism in contemporary physics have focused their attention primarily on quantum entanglement. But some gauge theories arguably also manifest the related phenomenon of nonseparability. While the argument is strong for the classical gauge theory describing electromagnetic interactions with quantum "particles", it fails in the case of general relativity even though that theory may also be formulated in terms of a connection on a principal fiber bundle. Anandan has highlighted the key difference in his analysis of a supposed gravitational analog to the Aharonov-Bohm effect. By contrast with electromagnetism in the original Aharonov-Bohm effect, gravitation is separable and exhibits no novel holism in this case. Whether the nonseparability of classical gauge theories of nongravitational interactions is associated with holism depends on what counts as the relevant part-whole relation. Loop representations of quantized gauge theories of non-gravitational interactions suggest that these conclusions about holism and nonseparability may extend also to quantum theories of the associated fields.
Foundations of Physics, 2011
A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several asp... more A closer look at some proposed Gedanken-experiments on BECs promises to shed light on several aspects of reduction and emergence in physics. These include the relations between classical descriptions and different quantum treatments of macroscopic systems, and the emergence of new properties and even new objects as a result of spontaneous symmetry breaking.
Philosophy of Science, 1991
Philosophy of Science, 1985
All change involves temporal variation of properties. There is change in the physical world only ... more All change involves temporal variation of properties. There is change in the physical world only if genuine physical magnitudes take on different values at different times. I defend the possibility of change in a general relativistic world against two skeptical arguments recently presented by John Earman. Each argument imposes severe restrictions on what may count as a genuine physical magnitude in general relativity. These restrictions seem justified only as long as one ignores the fact that genuine change in a relativistic world is frame-dependent. I argue on the contrary that there are genuine physical magnitudes whose values typically vary with the time of some frame, and that these include most familiar measurable quantities. Frame-dependent temporal variation in these magnitudes nevertheless supervenes on the unchanging values of more basic physical magnitudes in a general relativistic world. Basic magnitudes include those that realize an observer's occupation of a frame. Change is a significant and observable feature of a general relativistic world only because our situation in such a world naturally picks out a relevant class of frames, even if we lack the descriptive resources to say how they are realized by the values of basic underlying physical magnitudes.
Philosophy of Science, 1996
Philosophy of Science, 1987
Page 1. 1 How Quantum Theory Helps us Explain © Richard Healey “In the beginning natural philosop... more Page 1. 1 How Quantum Theory Helps us Explain © Richard Healey “In the beginning natural philosophers tried to understand the world around them. ... Bose-Einstein condensation, and the interference between certain separately prepared samples of a dilute gas BEC. ...
Philosophy of Science, Jul 30, 2012
The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pra... more The paradox of Wigner's friend challenges the objectivity of description in quantum theory. A pragmatist interpretation can meet this challenge by judicious appeal to decoherence. On this interpretation, quantum theory provides situated agents with resources for predicting and explaining what happens in the physical world---not conscious observations of it. Even in Wigner's friend scenarios, differently situated agents agree on the objective content of statements about the values of physical magnitudes. In more realistic circumstances quantum Darwinism also permits differently situated agents equal observational access to evaluate their truth. In this view, quantum theory has nothing to say about consciousness or conscious experiences of observers. But it does prompt us to reexamine the significance even of everyday claims about the physical world.