Julie Tangeten | University of Vienna (original) (raw)
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Thesis Chapters by Julie Tangeten
In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the “... more In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the “vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective of the world” (Sass and Parnas 2003, 428). Also referred to as the minimal self, this primitive form of I-awareness is not a linguistically mediated representation of oneself, but a pre-reflexive, implicit, non-conceptual sense of existing as a subject of awareness, which constitutes our primary presence in the world (Stanghellini 2009, 56). Against this, drawing on a language-based account of human-specific forms of thought, reference, and selfhood centred on grammar, Hinzen and Rosselló (2015) argue that the disturbance of self as witnessed in schizophrenia has its origin in an impairment of language. Not only do they deny the traditional definition of schizophrenia as thought disturbance, but also and more importantly here, that the self-disturbance in question is a disturbance of a fundamental and pre-reflective awareness of self, situated at a prelinguistic level. The aim of this master thesis is an interdisciplinary comparison between linguistic and phenomenological dimensions of the self in schizophrenia, in order to clarify the role language plays in this disorder: Is the self-disturbance schizophrenia essentially a linguistic disorder, or is it more fundamental than described by recent linguistic research?
Papers by Julie Tangeten
In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the &... more In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the "vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective of the world" (Sass and Parnas 2003, 428). Also referred to as the minimal self, this primitive form of I-awareness is not a linguistically mediated representation of oneself, but a pre-reflexive, implicit, non-conceptual sense of existing as a subject of awareness, which constitutes our primary presence in the world (Stanghellini 2009, 56). Against this, drawing on a language-based account of human-specific forms of thought, reference, and selfhood centred on grammar, Hinzen and Rosselló (2015) argue that the disturbance of self as witnessed in schizophrenia has its origin in an impairment of language. Not only do they deny the traditional definition of schizophrenia as thought disturbance, but also and more importantly here, that the self-disturbance in question is a disturbance of a fundamental and p...
In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the “... more In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the “vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective of the world” (Sass and Parnas 2003, 428). Also referred to as the minimal self, this primitive form of I-awareness is not a linguistically mediated representation of oneself, but a pre-reflexive, implicit, non-conceptual sense of existing as a subject of awareness, which constitutes our primary presence in the world (Stanghellini 2009, 56). Against this, drawing on a language-based account of human-specific forms of thought, reference, and selfhood centred on grammar, Hinzen and Rosselló (2015) argue that the disturbance of self as witnessed in schizophrenia has its origin in an impairment of language. Not only do they deny the traditional definition of schizophrenia as thought disturbance, but also and more importantly here, that the self-disturbance in question is a disturbance of a fundamental and pre-reflective awareness of self, situated at a prelinguistic level. The aim of this master thesis is an interdisciplinary comparison between linguistic and phenomenological dimensions of the self in schizophrenia, in order to clarify the role language plays in this disorder: Is the self-disturbance schizophrenia essentially a linguistic disorder, or is it more fundamental than described by recent linguistic research?
In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the &... more In phenomenological psychopathology, schizophrenia is described as a disruption of ipseity, the "vital and self-coinciding subject of experience or first-person perspective of the world" (Sass and Parnas 2003, 428). Also referred to as the minimal self, this primitive form of I-awareness is not a linguistically mediated representation of oneself, but a pre-reflexive, implicit, non-conceptual sense of existing as a subject of awareness, which constitutes our primary presence in the world (Stanghellini 2009, 56). Against this, drawing on a language-based account of human-specific forms of thought, reference, and selfhood centred on grammar, Hinzen and Rosselló (2015) argue that the disturbance of self as witnessed in schizophrenia has its origin in an impairment of language. Not only do they deny the traditional definition of schizophrenia as thought disturbance, but also and more importantly here, that the self-disturbance in question is a disturbance of a fundamental and p...