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Papers by Philipp Schwind

Meiner Verlag, 2020

W. D. Ross über moralische Erkenntnis, das Richtige und das Gute1 William David Ross (1877-1971) ... more W. D. Ross über moralische Erkenntnis, das Richtige und das Gute1 William David Ross (1877-1971) widmete sein langes Wissenschaftlerleben in erster Linie der Aristotelesforschung. Sein Name ist jedoch ebenso sehr mit der von ihm entwickelten Moralphilosophie verbunden-und das, obwohl seine Beschäftigung mit dieser Disziplin nur eine Episode blieb: Fast alle ethischen Schriften von Ross erschienen in dem relativ kurzen Zeitraum von 1927 bis 1939. Sie kulminieren in den beiden 1930 bzw. 1939 erschienenen Monographien The Right and the Good (= RG) und Foundations of Ethics (= FE),2 von denen die erste hier erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung vorgelegt wird. RG bildet bereits einen vorläufigen Abschluss der Ross'schen Moralphilosophie, die durch das auf die Gifford Lectures von 1935/36 zurück

Ethics, Apr 2022

The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligat... more The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligations, and the residual duties they entail upon being violated, have various surprising features. We give an account to explain these features. Promises have a point. The point of a promise to φ is a promise-independent reason to φ for the promisee's sake. A promise turns this reason into a duty. This explains the mechanics of promises. And it grounds a nuanced picture of immoral promises, an argument against promissory bare wrongings, and a constraint on theories of why we have promissory obligations in the first place.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 2019

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to found... more Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs (such as Ross’ list of prima facie duties) can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against SinnottArmstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, SinnottArmstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism.

Philosophy and Society, 2017

Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien-und Lie... more Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien-und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer "besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit" (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die "Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen" innerhalb unzähliger "Vorstellung[en] vom Guten" als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als "Facette[n] der konstitutive[n] Idee der individuellen Autonomie" (RF 35) verstanden werden müssen. Wir argumentieren, dass Honneths Erörterung des Werts von Freundschaft in dreierlei Hinsicht sein Ziel verfehlt: Erstens zwingt sie Honneth zu einer radikalen Beschneidung des Freundschaftsbegriffs, indem er einen überzogenen Kontrast zwischen antiken und modernen Konzeptionen von Freundschaft zeichnet. Zweitens marginalisiert Honneth mit seiner Betrachtung andere Axiologien der Freundschaft, welche dieser gewichtige instrumentelle, konstitutive und finale Werte zuweisen. Drittens scheint selbst eine schwächer angelegte These, die den Wert, den Freundschaften für die individuelle Freiheit haben, auf die Stellung eines primus inter pares zurückstuft, immer noch den zentralen Wert, den Freundschaften für uns haben sollten, zu verfehlen. Dadurch wird Honneths Kernthese von der Exklusivität des Wertes der Freiheit für unsere Gesellschaft in Frage gestellt.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral the... more It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross's normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2020

This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or comp... more This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or complete indifference) towards severe harm to a sentient being is (2) manifested in the action. The manifestation can take either of two forms: expressing the pro-attitude or attempting to realize its object. In order to exclude cases where the pro-attitude is the result of a positive attitude and the action does therefore not count as evil, the pro-attitude (3) must be generated from a morally reprehensible attitude such as greed or sadistic pleasure. As an implication of this definition, not every evil action is extremely bad, and some ‘merely’ wrong acts might be worse than some evil acts.

PhD-Dissertation (University of Miami)

Ethical intuitionists like W.D. Ross adopt the common sense view that there is an irreducible plu... more Ethical intuitionists like W.D. Ross adopt the common sense view that there is an irreducible plurality of types of ethically relevant considerations. They furthermore hold that there is no explicit method determining how to move from facts about which considerations are present to a conclusion about what it would be right to do. In order to systematize our moral reasoning, ethical intuitionists provide an account of the types of considerations that are ethically relevant.

Meiner Verlag, 2020

W. D. Ross über moralische Erkenntnis, das Richtige und das Gute1 William David Ross (1877-1971) ... more W. D. Ross über moralische Erkenntnis, das Richtige und das Gute1 William David Ross (1877-1971) widmete sein langes Wissenschaftlerleben in erster Linie der Aristotelesforschung. Sein Name ist jedoch ebenso sehr mit der von ihm entwickelten Moralphilosophie verbunden-und das, obwohl seine Beschäftigung mit dieser Disziplin nur eine Episode blieb: Fast alle ethischen Schriften von Ross erschienen in dem relativ kurzen Zeitraum von 1927 bis 1939. Sie kulminieren in den beiden 1930 bzw. 1939 erschienenen Monographien The Right and the Good (= RG) und Foundations of Ethics (= FE),2 von denen die erste hier erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung vorgelegt wird. RG bildet bereits einen vorläufigen Abschluss der Ross'schen Moralphilosophie, die durch das auf die Gifford Lectures von 1935/36 zurück

Ethics, Apr 2022

The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligat... more The normative mechanics of promising seem complex. The strength and content of promissory obligations, and the residual duties they entail upon being violated, have various surprising features. We give an account to explain these features. Promises have a point. The point of a promise to φ is a promise-independent reason to φ for the promisee's sake. A promise turns this reason into a duty. This explains the mechanics of promises. And it grounds a nuanced picture of immoral promises, an argument against promissory bare wrongings, and a constraint on theories of why we have promissory obligations in the first place.

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 2019

Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to found... more Foundationalism in moral epistemology is a core tenet of ethical intuitionism. According to foundationalism, some moral beliefs (such as Ross’ list of prima facie duties) can be known without inferential justification; instead, all that is required is a proper understanding of the beliefs in question. In an influential criticism against this view, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that certain psychological facts undermine the reliability of moral intuitions. He claims that foundationalists would have to show that non-inferentially justified beliefs are not subject to those defeaters, but this would already constitute a form of inference and hence undermine the possibility of noninferential justification. The goal of my paper is to defend foundationalism against SinnottArmstrong’s criticism. After presenting his challenge, I first argue that the most promising objection to it fails. This objection makes the case that defeater-defeaters are not part of the justification, but merely preserve the justification which the original claim provides. I object to this argument by distinguishing between weak and robust defeaters; only weak defeaters, I argue, fall outside the scope of justification, and it is an open question whether Sinnott-Armstrong’s defeaters fall into that category. This leads the way to my own criticism of Sinnott-Armstrong’s challenge: foundationalists in moral epistemology are entitled to the use of defeater-defeaters as part of the justification for moral beliefs as long as those defeater-defeaters themselves do not entail moral claims. Therefore, SinnottArmstrong’s challenge does not undermine foundationalism.

Philosophy and Society, 2017

Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien-und Lie... more Recht der Freiheit (RF) dienen persönliche Beziehungen, zu welchen Honneth neben Familien-und Liebesbeziehungen auch die Freundschaft zählt, der Verwirklichung einer "besondere[n], schwer zu charakterisierende[n] Form von Freiheit" (RF 233). Diese Behauptung fügt sich ein in die Kernthese des Rechts der Freiheit. Demnach vermochte es die "Freiheit im Sinne der Autonomie des Einzelnen" innerhalb unzähliger "Vorstellung[en] vom Guten" als einzige, die moderne Gesellschaft nachhaltig zu prägen, wohingegen alle anderen Werte, die in der Moderne wirkmächtig geworden sind, als "Facette[n] der konstitutive[n] Idee der individuellen Autonomie" (RF 35) verstanden werden müssen. Wir argumentieren, dass Honneths Erörterung des Werts von Freundschaft in dreierlei Hinsicht sein Ziel verfehlt: Erstens zwingt sie Honneth zu einer radikalen Beschneidung des Freundschaftsbegriffs, indem er einen überzogenen Kontrast zwischen antiken und modernen Konzeptionen von Freundschaft zeichnet. Zweitens marginalisiert Honneth mit seiner Betrachtung andere Axiologien der Freundschaft, welche dieser gewichtige instrumentelle, konstitutive und finale Werte zuweisen. Drittens scheint selbst eine schwächer angelegte These, die den Wert, den Freundschaften für die individuelle Freiheit haben, auf die Stellung eines primus inter pares zurückstuft, immer noch den zentralen Wert, den Freundschaften für uns haben sollten, zu verfehlen. Dadurch wird Honneths Kernthese von der Exklusivität des Wertes der Freiheit für unsere Gesellschaft in Frage gestellt.

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017

It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral the... more It is a central tenet of ethical intuitionism as defended by W. D. Ross and others that moral theory should reflect the convictions of mature moral agents. Hence, intuitionism is plausible to the extent that it corresponds to our well-considered moral judgments. After arguing for this claim, I discuss whether intuitionists offer an empirically adequate account of our moral obligations. I do this by applying recent empirical research by John Mikhail that is based on the idea of a universal moral grammar to a number of claims implicit in W. D. Ross's normative theory. I argue that the results at least partly vindicate intuitionism.

Grazer Philosophische Studien, 2020

This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or comp... more This article defends a novel definition of evil. An action is evil if (1) a pro-attitude (or complete indifference) towards severe harm to a sentient being is (2) manifested in the action. The manifestation can take either of two forms: expressing the pro-attitude or attempting to realize its object. In order to exclude cases where the pro-attitude is the result of a positive attitude and the action does therefore not count as evil, the pro-attitude (3) must be generated from a morally reprehensible attitude such as greed or sadistic pleasure. As an implication of this definition, not every evil action is extremely bad, and some ‘merely’ wrong acts might be worse than some evil acts.

PhD-Dissertation (University of Miami)

Ethical intuitionists like W.D. Ross adopt the common sense view that there is an irreducible plu... more Ethical intuitionists like W.D. Ross adopt the common sense view that there is an irreducible plurality of types of ethically relevant considerations. They furthermore hold that there is no explicit method determining how to move from facts about which considerations are present to a conclusion about what it would be right to do. In order to systematize our moral reasoning, ethical intuitionists provide an account of the types of considerations that are ethically relevant.