Christopher Butler | University of New Mexico (original) (raw)

Papers by Christopher Butler

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state's decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for explaining this diplomatic behavior. We also find that civil war-but not civil conflict-in a state decreases the likelihood that other states will send ambassadors to that state. In addition, we find that both joint democracy and joint autocracy are significant, suggesting that regime similarity leads to reciprocal sending behavior.

Social Science Research Network, 2011

ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recen... more ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recent decades, particularly over issues such as self-determination. The vast ajority of these challengers are internally complex, typically divided into two or more factions. Despite this, most studies of civil conflict model non-state challengers as homoge- neous, unitary actors. In this paper, we explicitly model self-determination challengers as internally divided, with heterogeneous preferences in policy space. In the model, governments choose with whom to negotiate. After the agreement is made, interactions between factions and among the government and factions determine whether the agreement is stable. We illustrate the dynamics of the with the Bodo case in India.

International Politics, Dec 1, 2004

In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding o... more In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes. If any of the competing explanations of the democratic peace can also account for similar behavior among specific types of authoritarian regimes, we can have more confidence in the power of that approach for understanding the relationship between political regimes and international peace. Previous work using a data set compiled by Barbara Geddes indicates that single-party authoritarian regimes tend to be somewhat more peaceful than other types of authoritarian regimes, while personalist dictatorships tend to be more conflict prone. This article extends this research by examining the initiation of militarized disputes among all combinations of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes, including military, personalist, singleparty, and hybrid regimes that involve combinations of these three pure types. We find that this more comprehensive examination of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes suggests that there is indeed something distinctive about the behavior of single-party and personalist regimes. Single-party regimes are significantly less likely to initiate disputes against many of the specific types of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes. They are also less likely to be targeted by other types of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, personalist regimes are both more likely to initiate and be the target of disputes. This article suggests that the Bueno de Mesquita et al. 'selectorate' theory provides a useful approach for understanding this pattern of results.

We examine the interactions of non-state actors (specifically pastoralists and farmers) when stat... more We examine the interactions of non-state actors (specifically pastoralists and farmers) when state provided property-rights protection (PRP) is neither perfect nor absent. PRP is modeled as potentially biased towards one interpretation of property rights over another interpretation. Using a contest success function model, we demonstrate that the following non-monotonic result exists. If a society has a moderate level of PRP but some degree of bias away from equity, increasing PRP can result in either a decrease or an increase in total appropriative effort. Thus, simply increasing PRP without addressing equity issues can increase the level of conflict in the society. JEL: C72, P48, N47, N57, Q15

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state’s decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for explainin...

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2005

International Area Studies Review, 2016

Are levels of sexual violence committed by government security forces in a country prior to confl... more Are levels of sexual violence committed by government security forces in a country prior to conflict predictive of levels of sexual violence in that country during conflict? Most of the scholarship on sexual violence focuses on the phenomenon during armed conflict, and in general the assumption made by these scholars is that conflict exacerbates the sexual violence problem. Cross-sectional analysis appears to support this assertion; however, we argue that the comparison group used by cross-sectional analyses is inappropriate for answering the question of whether conflict impacts the amount of sexual violence in a country. Instead, we propose that the appropriate comparison is between peacetime levels of sexual violence and conflict levels of sexual violence for the same country. To test this relationship, we employ data on sexual violence committed by government security forces in a sample of 170 countries for the time period 1999–2011, using a measure similar to that from Butler, G...

International Interactions, 2014

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content")... more Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Versions of published Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open articles and Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open Select articles posted to institutional or subject repositories or any other third-party website are without warranty from Taylor & Francis of any kind, either expressed or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or noninfringement. Any opinions and views expressed in this article are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor & Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recen... more ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recent decades, particularly over issues such as self-determination. The vast ajority of these challengers are internally complex, typically divided into two or more factions. Despite this, most studies of civil conflict model non-state challengers as homoge- neous, unitary actors. In this paper, we explicitly model self-determination challengers as internally divided, with heterogeneous preferences in policy space. In the model, governments choose with whom to negotiate. After the agreement is made, interactions between factions and among the government and factions determine whether the agreement is stable. We illustrate the dynamics of the with the Bodo case in India.

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state's decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for expl...

Journal of Peace Research, 2004

ABSTRACT

Journal of Peace Research, 2012

This article examines the effect of climate change on a type of armed conflict that pits pastoral... more This article examines the effect of climate change on a type of armed conflict that pits pastoralists (cattle herders) against each other (range wars). Such conflicts are typically fought over water rights and/or grazing rights to unfenced/unowned land. The state is rarely involved directly. The rangeland of East Africa is a region particularly vulnerable to drought and livestock diseases associated with climate change. To analyze the possible effects of climate change on pastoral conflict, we focus our analysis on changes in resource availability, contrasting cases of abundance and scarcity. The role of resources is further contextualized by competing notions of property rights, and the role of the state in defining property and associated rights. We employ a contest success function (CSF) game-theoretic model to analyze the logic of range wars. This CSF approach emphasizes the low-level, non-binary nature of raiding behavior between pastoralist groups over limited natural resource...

Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country even after con... more Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country even after controlling for other factors? In a statistical analysis of a cross-sectional data set, the authors find evidence that this is indeed the case. Previous research in human rights suggests the importance of accountability in understanding the decision to violate human rights. On the one hand, when faced with armed threats and civil war, governments are more likely to engage in violations. On the other hand, when governments face being held accountable for their actions by withdrawal of public support or international trade and investment, they are more likely to exercise restraint. Democracy and international trade tend to reduce the likelihood of violations. The authors further develop the accountability logic and examine the alternative choice of evading accountability. The empirical results suggest that where governments have an opportunity of evading accountability levels of human rights violations will increase, even after controlling for the factors found influential in earlier research.

International Studies Quarterly, 2007

APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009

... 18. Butler, Christopher K., Tali Gluch and Neil J. Mitchell. 2007. Security forces and Sexual... more ... 18. Butler, Christopher K., Tali Gluch and Neil J. Mitchell. 2007. Security forces and Sexual ... Examining the Liberal Perspective.” International Interactions (April-June) 29:143-158. Hathaway,Oona A. 2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law ...

To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other g... more To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other groups do not. In this chapter, we argue that disgruntled groups face three main choices when addressing their dissatisfaction: suffering a disadvantageous peace, engaging in unconventional warfare, or engaging in conventional warfare. We further disaggregate the choice * This project has been funded by the Research Council of Norway and a EU 7 th Framework Project, EUSECON. We thank Daniel Arce, Martin Austvoll, Morten Bergsmo, Joakim Hammerlin, Pat James, and Todd Sandler for their valuable input.

International Interactions, 2009

The concept of relative power is ubiquitous and long-held in understanding conflict. As a ratio o... more The concept of relative power is ubiquitous and long-held in understanding conflict. As a ratio of the weaker side's capabilities compared to the stronger side's capabilities, relative power ranges from extreme asymmetry (where the weaker side has almost no capabilities) to parity (where the capabilities of the two sides are equal). Power theories link relative power to international outcomes, especially armed conflict. In this essay, we examine the applicability of power theories to civil armed conflicts, involving a government and a rebel group. Many theories of power and conflict build on Thucydides' adage of "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". These theories, however, provide only limited understanding of civil war. A different logic than that provided by international relations theory is required to understand civil armed conflict. This logic rests on the inability of the government to attack a rebel group directly if the rebel group engages in asymmetric warfare. INTERNATIONAL THEORIES OF BARGAINING POWER AND WAR Many theories of international conflict draw on bargaining models (see Reiter 2003 for an overview). Given its costs, war should occur only when at least one state is uncertain about the capabilities or resolve of the other, or when otherwise unwilling or unable to comply with a negotiated settlement. Banks' so-called Monotonicity Theorem regarding crisis bargaining formally demonstrates that "the probability of war is an increasing function of the expected benefits from war of the informed player" (Banks 1990, 600) in a game where one player has private information regarding his expected benefits and costs from war. Banks also shows that "the expected benefits from successfully concluding the bargaining short of war are also increasing in the informed player's expected benefits of war" (1990, 600). These expected benefits, in turn, relate to the relative power of the informed actor. From this, we see that as the

International Area Studies Review

A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation techni... more A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation technique of bivariate probit. This technique is used to examine the directed dispute-initiation behavior of the superpowers during the Cold War. Power-transition concepts of satisfaction and rates of capability change can be used to explain directed dispute-initiation behavior. In particular, the international influence of the rival translates into a superpower's dissatisfaction, making dispute initiation by that superpower more likely, ceteris paribus. Additionally, a rapid strengthening of the challenger, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of dispute initiation in either direction. Changes in the hegemon's capabilities, though consistent with power-transition theory, have no effect on dispute-initiation behavior. These effects hold even while controlling for various domestic conditions in each country.

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state's decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for explaining this diplomatic behavior. We also find that civil war-but not civil conflict-in a state decreases the likelihood that other states will send ambassadors to that state. In addition, we find that both joint democracy and joint autocracy are significant, suggesting that regime similarity leads to reciprocal sending behavior.

Social Science Research Network, 2011

ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recen... more ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recent decades, particularly over issues such as self-determination. The vast ajority of these challengers are internally complex, typically divided into two or more factions. Despite this, most studies of civil conflict model non-state challengers as homoge- neous, unitary actors. In this paper, we explicitly model self-determination challengers as internally divided, with heterogeneous preferences in policy space. In the model, governments choose with whom to negotiate. After the agreement is made, interactions between factions and among the government and factions determine whether the agreement is stable. We illustrate the dynamics of the with the Bodo case in India.

International Politics, Dec 1, 2004

In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding o... more In order to understand what makes democracies unique, we need to develop a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes. If any of the competing explanations of the democratic peace can also account for similar behavior among specific types of authoritarian regimes, we can have more confidence in the power of that approach for understanding the relationship between political regimes and international peace. Previous work using a data set compiled by Barbara Geddes indicates that single-party authoritarian regimes tend to be somewhat more peaceful than other types of authoritarian regimes, while personalist dictatorships tend to be more conflict prone. This article extends this research by examining the initiation of militarized disputes among all combinations of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes, including military, personalist, singleparty, and hybrid regimes that involve combinations of these three pure types. We find that this more comprehensive examination of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes suggests that there is indeed something distinctive about the behavior of single-party and personalist regimes. Single-party regimes are significantly less likely to initiate disputes against many of the specific types of authoritarian regimes coded by Geddes. They are also less likely to be targeted by other types of authoritarian regimes. In contrast, personalist regimes are both more likely to initiate and be the target of disputes. This article suggests that the Bueno de Mesquita et al. 'selectorate' theory provides a useful approach for understanding this pattern of results.

We examine the interactions of non-state actors (specifically pastoralists and farmers) when stat... more We examine the interactions of non-state actors (specifically pastoralists and farmers) when state provided property-rights protection (PRP) is neither perfect nor absent. PRP is modeled as potentially biased towards one interpretation of property rights over another interpretation. Using a contest success function model, we demonstrate that the following non-monotonic result exists. If a society has a moderate level of PRP but some degree of bias away from equity, increasing PRP can result in either a decrease or an increase in total appropriative effort. Thus, simply increasing PRP without addressing equity issues can increase the level of conflict in the society. JEL: C72, P48, N47, N57, Q15

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state’s decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for explainin...

Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2005

International Area Studies Review, 2016

Are levels of sexual violence committed by government security forces in a country prior to confl... more Are levels of sexual violence committed by government security forces in a country prior to conflict predictive of levels of sexual violence in that country during conflict? Most of the scholarship on sexual violence focuses on the phenomenon during armed conflict, and in general the assumption made by these scholars is that conflict exacerbates the sexual violence problem. Cross-sectional analysis appears to support this assertion; however, we argue that the comparison group used by cross-sectional analyses is inappropriate for answering the question of whether conflict impacts the amount of sexual violence in a country. Instead, we propose that the appropriate comparison is between peacetime levels of sexual violence and conflict levels of sexual violence for the same country. To test this relationship, we employ data on sexual violence committed by government security forces in a sample of 170 countries for the time period 1999–2011, using a measure similar to that from Butler, G...

International Interactions, 2014

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content")... more Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Versions of published Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open articles and Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open Select articles posted to institutional or subject repositories or any other third-party website are without warranty from Taylor & Francis of any kind, either expressed or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or noninfringement. Any opinions and views expressed in this article are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor & Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recen... more ABSTRACT Governments have faced an increasing number of challenges from non-state actors in recent decades, particularly over issues such as self-determination. The vast ajority of these challengers are internally complex, typically divided into two or more factions. Despite this, most studies of civil conflict model non-state challengers as homoge- neous, unitary actors. In this paper, we explicitly model self-determination challengers as internally divided, with heterogeneous preferences in policy space. In the model, governments choose with whom to negotiate. After the agreement is made, interactions between factions and among the government and factions determine whether the agreement is stable. We illustrate the dynamics of the with the Bodo case in India.

Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic ... more Despite their obvious importance to foreign policy, there has been little research on diplomatic relations between states. In particular, there has been insufficient systematic examination of the factors that help us to understand why two countries would choose to establish diplomatic ties. We present data on interstate diplomacy for the year. The dataset is designed to capture the exchange and the rank of diplomatic missions between states. We present here the findings of a two-equation model that we argue captures how many ambassadors a country will send and to whom the country will send these ambassadors. The 2000 data includes 36,290 directed dyads, only 21% of which have some kind of diplomatic ties. Based on this data, our initial results show that total and dyadic trade levels are a significant predictor of a state's decision to send ambassadors while military capabilities is not a consistent predictor, indicating that economic factors are perhaps more important for expl...

Journal of Peace Research, 2004

ABSTRACT

Journal of Peace Research, 2012

This article examines the effect of climate change on a type of armed conflict that pits pastoral... more This article examines the effect of climate change on a type of armed conflict that pits pastoralists (cattle herders) against each other (range wars). Such conflicts are typically fought over water rights and/or grazing rights to unfenced/unowned land. The state is rarely involved directly. The rangeland of East Africa is a region particularly vulnerable to drought and livestock diseases associated with climate change. To analyze the possible effects of climate change on pastoral conflict, we focus our analysis on changes in resource availability, contrasting cases of abundance and scarcity. The role of resources is further contextualized by competing notions of property rights, and the role of the state in defining property and associated rights. We employ a contest success function (CSF) game-theoretic model to analyze the logic of range wars. This CSF approach emphasizes the low-level, non-binary nature of raiding behavior between pastoralist groups over limited natural resource...

Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country even after con... more Does the presence of a pro-government militia worsen the human rights of a country even after controlling for other factors? In a statistical analysis of a cross-sectional data set, the authors find evidence that this is indeed the case. Previous research in human rights suggests the importance of accountability in understanding the decision to violate human rights. On the one hand, when faced with armed threats and civil war, governments are more likely to engage in violations. On the other hand, when governments face being held accountable for their actions by withdrawal of public support or international trade and investment, they are more likely to exercise restraint. Democracy and international trade tend to reduce the likelihood of violations. The authors further develop the accountability logic and examine the alternative choice of evading accountability. The empirical results suggest that where governments have an opportunity of evading accountability levels of human rights violations will increase, even after controlling for the factors found influential in earlier research.

International Studies Quarterly, 2007

APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009

... 18. Butler, Christopher K., Tali Gluch and Neil J. Mitchell. 2007. Security forces and Sexual... more ... 18. Butler, Christopher K., Tali Gluch and Neil J. Mitchell. 2007. Security forces and Sexual ... Examining the Liberal Perspective.” International Interactions (April-June) 29:143-158. Hathaway,Oona A. 2002. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law ...

To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other g... more To comprehend why a group would intentionally target civilians, we need to understand why other groups do not. In this chapter, we argue that disgruntled groups face three main choices when addressing their dissatisfaction: suffering a disadvantageous peace, engaging in unconventional warfare, or engaging in conventional warfare. We further disaggregate the choice * This project has been funded by the Research Council of Norway and a EU 7 th Framework Project, EUSECON. We thank Daniel Arce, Martin Austvoll, Morten Bergsmo, Joakim Hammerlin, Pat James, and Todd Sandler for their valuable input.

International Interactions, 2009

The concept of relative power is ubiquitous and long-held in understanding conflict. As a ratio o... more The concept of relative power is ubiquitous and long-held in understanding conflict. As a ratio of the weaker side's capabilities compared to the stronger side's capabilities, relative power ranges from extreme asymmetry (where the weaker side has almost no capabilities) to parity (where the capabilities of the two sides are equal). Power theories link relative power to international outcomes, especially armed conflict. In this essay, we examine the applicability of power theories to civil armed conflicts, involving a government and a rebel group. Many theories of power and conflict build on Thucydides' adage of "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". These theories, however, provide only limited understanding of civil war. A different logic than that provided by international relations theory is required to understand civil armed conflict. This logic rests on the inability of the government to attack a rebel group directly if the rebel group engages in asymmetric warfare. INTERNATIONAL THEORIES OF BARGAINING POWER AND WAR Many theories of international conflict draw on bargaining models (see Reiter 2003 for an overview). Given its costs, war should occur only when at least one state is uncertain about the capabilities or resolve of the other, or when otherwise unwilling or unable to comply with a negotiated settlement. Banks' so-called Monotonicity Theorem regarding crisis bargaining formally demonstrates that "the probability of war is an increasing function of the expected benefits from war of the informed player" (Banks 1990, 600) in a game where one player has private information regarding his expected benefits and costs from war. Banks also shows that "the expected benefits from successfully concluding the bargaining short of war are also increasing in the informed player's expected benefits of war" (1990, 600). These expected benefits, in turn, relate to the relative power of the informed actor. From this, we see that as the

International Area Studies Review

A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation techni... more A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation technique of bivariate probit. This technique is used to examine the directed dispute-initiation behavior of the superpowers during the Cold War. Power-transition concepts of satisfaction and rates of capability change can be used to explain directed dispute-initiation behavior. In particular, the international influence of the rival translates into a superpower's dissatisfaction, making dispute initiation by that superpower more likely, ceteris paribus. Additionally, a rapid strengthening of the challenger, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of dispute initiation in either direction. Changes in the hegemon's capabilities, though consistent with power-transition theory, have no effect on dispute-initiation behavior. These effects hold even while controlling for various domestic conditions in each country.