Luis Quintas | UNSL Universidad Nacional de San Luis (original) (raw)
Papers by Luis Quintas
In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze ... more In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; MéxicoFil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; PortugalFil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional d...
This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargain... more This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargaining problem for 3 agents. It provides a helpful tool for game theorists, economists and other researchers and professionals in these areas in order to visualize and compare the solutions over a wide family of bargaining problems and gain intuition about general results. The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries to find reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a wide variety of possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations. There are a lot of parameters entering in the description of the problem and also a large number of appealing solutions that have been defined in the literature. In order to compare and analize the behavior of different solutions for the different situations, is very important to have a visualization tool. 1
El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a trave... more El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a traves de la modelizacion de los posibles comportamientos estrategicos de los agentes involucrados en la toma de decisiones de esta problematica, utilizando herramientas de la Teoria de Decisiones. La hipotesis subyacente en el trabajo es que la materializacion de la Ley de Coparticipacion debe pasar por un proceso politico de negociacion el cual, al ser modelizado, muestra el poder de negociacion de los distintos agentes y las posibles estrategias que podrian seguir a los efectos de conseguir las coaliciones necesarias para lograr una nueva ley que favorezca a sus intereses.
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Ban... more In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzhaf– Coleman Index of Power. Both indices describe the real power of the coalitions involved in strategic interactions. The system allows the study of complex Electoral Applications. The data input can be done in two di¤erent ways: by considering all the possible coalitions, or only the basic coalitions (political parties, sectorial groups, etc.). The system also allows to introduce restrictions (incompatibilities) among some coalitions. We present some applications for computing the Electoral Power in the election of authorities in Universidad Nacional de San Luis. We describe the client–server design and the implementation of these tools, using the languages C and Tcl/Tk. The server program is written in C and requires Linux. The Client Program is written in Tcl/Tk with namespace mechanism and it supports Linux and Windows.
In this paper we describe a computer system that calculates allocation to claims according to two... more In this paper we describe a computer system that calculates allocation to claims according to two kinds of bankruptcy rules. The first kind implemented are those whose results corresponds to the classical solutions of game theory: The Talmud rule, the Proportional rule, the Adjusted Proportional rule, the Constrained Equal Awards rule and the Random Arrival rule. The second type implemented generates assignations to claims that have no correspondence with the classical results, they are: Piniles ́ rule, the Constrained Egalitarian rule and Constrained Equal Losses rule. This computer system was developed in order to compute the different allocations to claims in Allocation problems, distribution problems and Assignment problems for real cases and to be used in education of game theory and decision problems. The system generates numerical and graphical results. It allows comparisons between the numerical results and their graphic representations. It also allows the exportation of the...
In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative game. There is a player, t... more In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative game. There is a player, the innovator, having a know how or relevant information which is not useful for himself but it can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information are involved in a market having all them the same characteristics. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by game. The Shapley value is the cooperative solution studied.
Desarrollamos un modelo de adopción de lenguaje basado en un modelo evolutivo genera-do por un ju... more Desarrollamos un modelo de adopción de lenguaje basado en un modelo evolutivo genera-do por un juego con dos poblaciones y tres estrategias y encontramos dos equilibrios estables, a saber: bilingüismo en ambas poblaciones y monolingüismo basado en la lengua vernácula de cada población.
By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementat... more By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989
This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declara... more This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declarative programming paradigm. We define a collection of functions that capture some of the functionality currently provided by multidimensional database product. This is done by defining operations which allow for classifying and reducing relations (tables). Suitably combined, these operations will make possible to carry out the multidimensional analysis of a relational database, and make possible the declarative specification and optimization of multidimensional database queries. The library works over an abstract model of the relational database calculus as defined by Maier, written in the style of model-oriented formal specification in the functional language Haskell (details can be found in [8].
This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declara... more This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declarative programming paradigm. We define a collection of functions that capture some of the functionality currently provided by multidimensional database product. This is done by defining operations which allow for classifying and reducing relations (tables). Suitably combined, these operations will make possible to carry out the multidimensional analysis of a relational database, and make possible the declarative specification and optimization of multidimensional database queries. The library works over an abstract model of the relational database calculus as defined by Maier, written in the style of model-oriented formal specification in the functional language Haskell (details can be found in [8].
This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargain... more This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargaining problem for 3 agents. It provides a helpful tool for game theorists, economists and other researchers and professionals in these areas in order to visualize and compare the solutions over a wide family of bargaining problems and gain intuition about general results. The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries to find reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a wide variety of possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations. There are a lot of parameters entering in the description of the problem and also a large number of appealing solutions that have been defined in the literature. In order to compare and analize the behavior of different solutions for the different situations, is very important to have a visualization tool.
During 1996 the world's attention was captured by the litigation posed by the United States' gove... more During 1996 the world's attention was captured by the litigation posed by the United States' government against Microsoft, blaming the latter of abusive use of its monopoly power in order to win what was known as the "browser's war". This paper presents the previous scenario to the web browser's battle carried out by Microsoft and Netscape, analyzing both firm's strategies in a short and also in a long term horizon game. The study provided is based on game theory tools and attempts to give a model that explains the firms' behavior. Although the presented model is quite simple, it accurately explains the strategic interaction between the firms and its predictions fits with the actual results.
In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze ... more In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models thatanalyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests.Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutionobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.Fil: Accinelli Gamba, Elvio. Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí; MéxicoFil: Martins, Felipe. Universidad de Porto; PortugalFil: Quintas, Luis Guillermo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - San Luis. Instituto de Matemática Aplicada de San Luis "Prof. Ezio Marchi". Universidad Nacional d...
This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargain... more This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargaining problem for 3 agents. It provides a helpful tool for game theorists, economists and other researchers and professionals in these areas in order to visualize and compare the solutions over a wide family of bargaining problems and gain intuition about general results. The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries to find reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a wide variety of possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations. There are a lot of parameters entering in the description of the problem and also a large number of appealing solutions that have been defined in the literature. In order to compare and analize the behavior of different solutions for the different situations, is very important to have a visualization tool. 1
El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a trave... more El Trabajo pretende demostrar el perfil de una futura Ley de Coparticipacion de Impuestos a traves de la modelizacion de los posibles comportamientos estrategicos de los agentes involucrados en la toma de decisiones de esta problematica, utilizando herramientas de la Teoria de Decisiones. La hipotesis subyacente en el trabajo es que la materializacion de la Ley de Coparticipacion debe pasar por un proceso politico de negociacion el cual, al ser modelizado, muestra el poder de negociacion de los distintos agentes y las posibles estrategias que podrian seguir a los efectos de conseguir las coaliciones necesarias para lograr una nueva ley que favorezca a sus intereses.
In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Ban... more In this paper we present algorithms and computational implementation of the Shapley Value and Banzhaf– Coleman Index of Power. Both indices describe the real power of the coalitions involved in strategic interactions. The system allows the study of complex Electoral Applications. The data input can be done in two di¤erent ways: by considering all the possible coalitions, or only the basic coalitions (political parties, sectorial groups, etc.). The system also allows to introduce restrictions (incompatibilities) among some coalitions. We present some applications for computing the Electoral Power in the election of authorities in Universidad Nacional de San Luis. We describe the client–server design and the implementation of these tools, using the languages C and Tcl/Tk. The server program is written in C and requires Linux. The Client Program is written in Tcl/Tk with namespace mechanism and it supports Linux and Windows.
In this paper we describe a computer system that calculates allocation to claims according to two... more In this paper we describe a computer system that calculates allocation to claims according to two kinds of bankruptcy rules. The first kind implemented are those whose results corresponds to the classical solutions of game theory: The Talmud rule, the Proportional rule, the Adjusted Proportional rule, the Constrained Equal Awards rule and the Random Arrival rule. The second type implemented generates assignations to claims that have no correspondence with the classical results, they are: Piniles ́ rule, the Constrained Egalitarian rule and Constrained Equal Losses rule. This computer system was developed in order to compute the different allocations to claims in Allocation problems, distribution problems and Assignment problems for real cases and to be used in education of game theory and decision problems. The system generates numerical and graphical results. It allows comparisons between the numerical results and their graphic representations. It also allows the exportation of the...
In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative game. There is a player, t... more In this paper we analyze the value of the information in a cooperative game. There is a player, the innovator, having a know how or relevant information which is not useful for himself but it can be sold to some potential buyers. The n potential users of the information are involved in a market having all them the same characteristics. The expected utility of each of them can be improved by game. The Shapley value is the cooperative solution studied.
Desarrollamos un modelo de adopción de lenguaje basado en un modelo evolutivo genera-do por un ju... more Desarrollamos un modelo de adopción de lenguaje basado en un modelo evolutivo genera-do por un juego con dos poblaciones y tres estrategias y encontramos dos equilibrios estables, a saber: bilingüismo en ambas poblaciones y monolingüismo basado en la lengua vernácula de cada población.
By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementat... more By A. Neme and L. Quintas; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of Repeated Games with Cost of Implementation.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology
International Journal of Game Theory, 1989
This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declara... more This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declarative programming paradigm. We define a collection of functions that capture some of the functionality currently provided by multidimensional database product. This is done by defining operations which allow for classifying and reducing relations (tables). Suitably combined, these operations will make possible to carry out the multidimensional analysis of a relational database, and make possible the declarative specification and optimization of multidimensional database queries. The library works over an abstract model of the relational database calculus as defined by Maier, written in the style of model-oriented formal specification in the functional language Haskell (details can be found in [8].
This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declara... more This paper describes an approach to On Line Analytical Processing (OLAP), expresed in the declarative programming paradigm. We define a collection of functions that capture some of the functionality currently provided by multidimensional database product. This is done by defining operations which allow for classifying and reducing relations (tables). Suitably combined, these operations will make possible to carry out the multidimensional analysis of a relational database, and make possible the declarative specification and optimization of multidimensional database queries. The library works over an abstract model of the relational database calculus as defined by Maier, written in the style of model-oriented formal specification in the functional language Haskell (details can be found in [8].
This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargain... more This paper presents a visualization in three dimensions of the classical solutions of the bargaining problem for 3 agents. It provides a helpful tool for game theorists, economists and other researchers and professionals in these areas in order to visualize and compare the solutions over a wide family of bargaining problems and gain intuition about general results. The theory of bargaining, a branch of the Cooperative Game Theory, tries to find reasonable solutions when two or more agents have to decide over a wide variety of possible agreements among a family of conflictive situations. There are a lot of parameters entering in the description of the problem and also a large number of appealing solutions that have been defined in the literature. In order to compare and analize the behavior of different solutions for the different situations, is very important to have a visualization tool.
During 1996 the world's attention was captured by the litigation posed by the United States' gove... more During 1996 the world's attention was captured by the litigation posed by the United States' government against Microsoft, blaming the latter of abusive use of its monopoly power in order to win what was known as the "browser's war". This paper presents the previous scenario to the web browser's battle carried out by Microsoft and Netscape, analyzing both firm's strategies in a short and also in a long term horizon game. The study provided is based on game theory tools and attempts to give a model that explains the firms' behavior. Although the presented model is quite simple, it accurately explains the strategic interaction between the firms and its predictions fits with the actual results.