Heikki Ikäheimo | The University of New South Wales (original) (raw)

Books by Heikki Ikäheimo

Now out in affordable paperback: https://bit.ly/3IoFe7Y Chapter 5 permanently available for fr... more Now out in affordable paperback: https://bit.ly/3IoFe7Y

Chapter 5 permanently available for free on the Routledge website via this link: https://bit.ly/38lPYXm

"Ikäheimo develops a distinctive and cogent case for the centrality of recognition to our nature as social animals and grounds it in a highly sophisticated analysis of the philosophical foundations of the concept of recognition. The resulting account of the complex, multifaceted, nature of social recognition is a significant contribution to the field."

Cillian McBride, Queen’s University Belfast, UK

"It takes an unusual combination of philosophical talents to accomplish what is so splendid and original about this book: presenting an overview of the origins and further elaborations of the German notion of 'recognition' by simultaneously outlining a systematic account of recognition’s role in the human form of life. Ikäheimo’s synthesis of conceptual history and systematization is at the same time hermeneutically sensitive and analytically rigorous, knowledgeable both of the history of German Idealism and of the current debates on human nature. For anyone interested in the richly layered role of recognition in human life this well-written and strongly argued book is a must-read."

Axel Honneth, Columbia University, USA

"Ikäheimo’s book proves his outstanding competence regarding one of the most influential theories in modern social philosophy: mutual recognition. He is both expert in its main sources—German idealism, critical theory, and pragmatism—and well versed with modern psychological and sociological evidence. Perhaps the most important achievement of the book is a justification of the universal claim to recognition on the basis of a constant human form of life, constituted by social cooperation under shared norms, aimed at future well-being and the development of 'full-fledged personhood'."

Ludwig Siep, University of Münster, Germany

"Because of the breadth and its always acute argumentation, Ikäheimo's book is not only essential reading for philosophers interested in the philosophy of recognition, but even more essential reading for those who believe that philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and moral theory can be done in the absence of a theory recognition."

Jay Bernstein, The New School

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2022

"This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific coll... more "This fascinating encounter between Judith Butler and Axel Honneth—accompanied by a terrific collection of critical essays—advances the theoretical conversation about the political valence of recognition, casts a clarifying eye on its past, and shows how much patient labor is required to achieve understanding across differences in philosophical approach and political perspective. Indispensable!"
Patchen Markell, Cornell University

"This book brings together a diverse array of scintillating essays from some of the most important proponents and critics of recognition theory today. One pervasive theme is the ambiguity of recognition—its dangers as well as its indispensability to human life. In this respect Recognition and Ambivalence implicitly makes Rousseau rather than Hegel into the true founder of recognition theory, while at the same time developing it in ways that illuminate such contemporary phenomena as racism, gender inequality, postcolonial domination, reification, and emancipatory social movements."
Frederick Neuhouser, author of Rousseau's Critique of Inequality: Reconstructing the Second Discourse

"Recognition and Ambivalence explores key issues regarding the merits and problems of considering the concept of recognition as a primary driver of critical social theory. By encouraging the contributors to think through the potential ambivalences, and negative impact, of such a focus, the editors have provided a uniquely valuable volume that facilitates a nuanced and qualified defense of critical recognition theory by taking us beyond the current debates that have engaged supporters and detractors."
Shane O'Neill, coauthor of Recognition Theory as Social Research: Investigating the Dynamics of Social Conflict

Edited by Heikki Ikäheimo, Kristina Lepold and Titus Stahl.

Includes 70 entries on the theme of recognition, dealing with the concept, the main authors, the ... more Includes 70 entries on the theme of recognition, dealing with the concept, the main authors, the history of the theme, its applications, and its presence in various disciplines. Edited by Ludwig Siep, Heikki Ikäheimo and Michael Quante. Published in December 2021.

Entries available online:
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8

"1. Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen: Recognition and Social Ontology – Introduction I Reco... more "1. Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen:
Recognition and Social Ontology – Introduction
I Recognition and the Social Ontology of Personhood
2. Robert B. Brandom:
The Structure of Desire and Recognition: Self-Consciousness and Self-Constitution
3. Robert B. Pippin:
On Hegel’s Claim that Self-Consciousness is “Desire Itself” (“Begierde überhaupt”)
4. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer:
Intuition, Understanding, and the Human Form of Life

II Hegel, Marx, and Beyond: Recognition, Spirit and Species Being
5. Ludwig Siep:
Mutual Recognition: Hegel and Beyond
6. Heikki Ikäheimo:
Holism and Normative Essentialism in Hegel’s Social Ontology
7. Paul Redding:
The Relevance of Hegel’s “Absolute Spirit” to Social Normativity
8. Michael Quante:
Recognition as the Social Grammar of Species Being in Marx
III Groups, Institutions and Recognition
9. Margaret Gilbert:
Mutual Recognition and Some Related Phenomena
10. Italo Testa:
Social Space and the Ontology of Recognition
11. Arto Laitinen:
Recognition, Acknowledgement, and Acceptance
12. Titus Stahl:
Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance, and Recognition
13. Vincent Descombes:
The Problem of Collective Identity: The Instituting We and the Instituted We

Notes"

"1. Introduction 2. Barbara Merker (University of Frankfurt): ‘Embodied Normativity – Revitali... more "1. Introduction

2. Barbara Merker (University of Frankfurt): ‘Embodied Normativity – Revitalizing Hegel’s Account of the Human Organism’

3. Italo Testa (University of Parma): ‘How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings’

4. Heikki Ikäheimo (UNSW): ‘The Times of Desire, Hope and Fear – On the Temporality of Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia’

5. Simon Lumsden (UNSW): 'Habit, Sittlichkeit and Second Nature'

6. Emmanuel Renault (University of Lyon): 'The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism'

7. Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie University): Review of Terry Pinkard’s Hegel’s Naturalism – Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life"

"Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen: Editors' Introduction Lynne Rudder Baker: Persons and Other Th... more "Heikki Ikäheimo & Arto Laitinen: Editors' Introduction
Lynne Rudder Baker: Persons and Other Things
Eric Olson: What Are We?
Michael Quante: The Social Nature of Personal Identity
Dieter Sturma: Person as Subject
Robin Dillon: Arrogance, Self-Respect and Personhood
Andreas Wildt: Unconscious Knowledge of One’s Own Mind
Manfred Frank: Non-objectal Subjectivity
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Persons and Practices
Shaun Gallagher: Moral Agency, Self-Consciousness, and Practical Wisdom
Heikki Ikäheimo: Recognizing Persons
Arto Laitinen: Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood

Introduction:
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/14_5-6_introduction.pdf

http://www.amazon.com/Dimensions-Personhood-Heikki-Ikaheimo/dp/1845400860

Published also as a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 14., No. 5-6."

What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money or law ... more What is the nature of the social reality? How do the major social institutions like money or law exist? What are the limits of individualistically-oriented social theories?These and related problems are intensely discussed in philosophy, in legal theory and in the methodology of social sciences. This collection brings together the different traditions of the contemporary discussion. It includes thought-provoking articles by John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Ota Weinberger, Raimo Tuomela, Eerik Lagerspetz, Michael Quante, Cristina Redondo and Paolo Comanducci.”Wonderful selection of articles that contribute in important ways to the growing field of social ontology... A ’must-have’ for anyone working on issues of social ontology.” Deborah Tollefsen, University of Memphis

http://www.amazon.com/Nature-Social-Institutional-Reality/dp/951390704X

Papers by Heikki Ikäheimo

Published in Douglas Moggach, Nadime Mooren, Michael Quante (eds.) (2020): Perfektionismus der Autonomie. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

In this chapter, we take up the connection between perfectionism and autonomy, or more generally ... more In this chapter, we take up the connection between perfectionism and autonomy, or more generally freedom, from the Hegelian perspective. As one might expect of Hegel, his understanding of both concepts, as well as the nature of their interconnection, is highly original, at times difficult to discern and quite often misunderstood. On our interpretation, Hegel’s perfectionism is a form of “evaluative essentialism”, while his understanding of freedom turns around the concept of “concrete freedom” [konkrete Freiheit]. “Evaluative essentialism” refers to the view whereby an entity’s essence, or in Hegel’s terms “concept”, is in effect its immanent evaluative criterion, the realization of which is a measure of the “goodness” specific to that entity. “Concrete freedom”, to give a preliminary characterization, is a relationship obtaining between self and other (whether other subjects, society, or internal or external nature) wherein the former is genuinely reconciled with the latter. The connection between these two principles—perfectionism as evaluative essentialism and freedom as concrete freedom—is encapsulated in Hegel’s claim that the “essence” [Wesen] of Geist, or as we interpret the latter, the “human life-form”, is concrete freedom. As we will show in more
detail below, Hegel’s conceptualization of the interconnection of the relevant concepts not only marks a continuation with the Kantian tradition, but also a partial break with it, to the extent that it embraces aspects of Aristotelianism. We will begin by introducing the main features of the unique brand of ethical perfectionism that Hegel espouses, evaluative essentialism that is (Section I). Following this, we will adumbrate Hegel’s concept of concrete freedom with specific reference to its various “dimensions” (Section 2). By way of conclusion (section 3), we will consider the relationship of concrete freedom to autonomy, and discuss the various “opposites” of concrete freedom, in particular the alternative ideal of abstract freedom and its dialectical reversals into relations of domination. We will end by suggesting that the ideal of collective autonomy put in practice without the guidance of the meta-principle
of concrete freedom amounts to a pathological development of the life-form.

Published in: https://brill.com/view/title/53261?language=de
See: https://philarchive.org/archive/GLEHPA-4

Despite its central importance in Hegel’s mature system, the section Subjective Spirit in his Enc... more Despite its central importance in Hegel’s mature system, the section Subjective Spirit in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences has attracted relatively little attention in the reception history of Hegel’s work. The most influential early readers of Hegel were mostly interested in other parts of Hegel’s system; and relatively soon after Hegel’s death more empirically oriented approaches to the topics of Subjective Spirit won the day, displacing the overly ‘speculative’, armchair philosophical approach that Hegel was seen as representing. Hegel’s direct disciples and moderate ‘centre Hegelians’ Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz and Karl Ludwig Michelet did write extensive commentaries on Hegel’s Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, but their influence paled in comparison to the more politically astute and independently creative Hegelian ‘left’ who mostly focused on the Philosophy of Right or the Phenomenology of Spirit, as well as to the Hegelian ‘right’ who were mostly interested in Hegel’s views on religion and history. The long neglect of Subjective Spirit shows even today in the curious way in which the recent revival of Hegel as an epistemologist and a philosopher of mind, or of “mindedness”, has mostly ignored this text —even if systematically speaking Subjective Spirit is the part of Hegel’s system where issues of knowledge and of the mind are explicitly at stake.
There is also a widely spread view according to which Hegel was engaged in his Jena-writings in a project of ‘detranscendentalizing’ the Kantian subject of knowledge and action problematically divided between the empirical and transcendental, or in other words of consistently conceptualizing it as a living individual human person embedded in the natural and social world, in language and in intersubjective interaction. According to this view, after Jena Hegel for whatever reason gave up this project and in his later work regressed into a dubious metaphysics of a ‘spirit’ which obfuscates the concrete lived reality of the human individual. Whatever the truth about Hegel’s metaphysics, this article aims to show that in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit Hegel develops a thoroughly ‘detranscendentalized’ account of the human person as the “concrete” flesh and blood subject of knowledge and action, an account which deserves much more attention than it has so far received.
In short, whereas the section ‘Anthropology—Soul’ of Subjective Spirit (see previous chapter) deals with the bodily aspects of the concrete subject, the section ‘Phenomenology of Spirit—Consciousness’ deals with the various dimensions of intentionality, or in other word of the subject’s theoretical and practical relation to objectivity, and finally the section ‘Psychology—Spirit’ deals with the intrasubjective or mental processes and activities at work in the various object-relations. Eventually all of the three chapters contribute to a holistic picture of the human person as the “concrete subject” of knowing and acting, yet reconstructing this picture requires a proper understanding of the structure of the text which at first sight, on a simple linear reading, appears rather fragmentary and thus confusing. This article focuses on the Psychology-section, and the thematically closely connected Phenomenology-section.
I will first (1.) reconstructs the ‘parallel architectonics’ of the Phenomenology and Psychology, the understanding of which is essential for comprehending the substantial views Hegel puts forth in them. I will then (2.) draw on this reconstruction and introduce central elements of Hegel’s account of the human person as the concrete subject of knowledge and action as it unfolds in the text.

"What exactly are the subjective features or capacities that distinguish humans from animals on H... more "What exactly are the subjective features or capacities that distinguish humans from animals on Hegel’s account in the Encyclopaedia? Hegel demarcates sharply between animals and humans in a quite traditional way by saying that humans, in contrast to animal, are thinking beings. Also, according to what I take to be Hegel’s “official account” only humans have consciousness (Bewusstsein). My topic in this article is a serious problem that the latter thought involves. Considering what Hegel means by ‘consciousness’, the idea that animals wholly lack consciousness is incomprehensible. For if it were true, distinctively animal life were impossible."

Ajatus, The Journal of the Philosophical Association of Finland, 2024

Responses to Onni Hirvonen, Sauli Havu, Danika Harju, Arto Laitinen, and Jaakko Syrén. Book sympo... more Responses to Onni Hirvonen, Sauli Havu, Danika Harju, Arto Laitinen, and Jaakko Syrén. Book symposium on Recognition and the Human Life-Form, in Ajatus, The Journal of the Philosophical Association of Finland, vol. 81, 2024. (In Finnish.)

Justice and Freedom in Hegel, edited by Diego Bubbio and Andrew Buchwalter, 2024

This chapter examines first two broadly Hegelian variations of the freedom-justice connection by ... more This chapter examines first two broadly Hegelian variations of the freedom-justice connection by Axel Honneth and Rainer Forst, and then critically contrasts them with Hegel’s own concept of “concrete freedom” as the immanent ideal of social life and Hegel’s state as its “actuality.” I argue that this concept is capacious enough to do justice both to the human capacity in principle for context-transcending reflection on the justness of the social order central for Forst and to the limitations in practice of individuals and groups for .transcending the embeddedness and particularity of their perspectives emphasized by Honneth. The question of what makes a theory of a good society also a theory of justice is raised at the beginning with regard to Honneth’s account, and a reason stemming from the ontology of objective spirit is suggested at the end with regard to Hegel’s.

Inquiry, 2023

Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social ... more Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social thought. It aims to overcome the ‘liberal abstinence’, which forbids criticizing the ethical fabric of social life, and proposes to connect normative evaluation with a serious social-ontological model of ‘forms of life’. In this article we argue, however, that Jaeggi’s ontological characterization of the concept of form of life is problematic in ways that introduce a number of adverse consequences for social critique. In section 1, we lay out the main components of Jaeggi’s account. In section 2, we present four interconnected problems that beset Jaeggi’s substantializing conception of forms of life. In section 3, we present an alternative construal of the idea of forms of life, one which does not utilize the concept for grasping substantial unities, but rather focuses on the ‘forms’ that specifically human life takes, and which grasps social practices as concrete collaborative
activities involving expectations of recognition. We thereby bring together the recognition-theoretical strand of critical social thought with Jaeggi’s welcome new gambit. In section 4 we briefly put forth three mutually
complementary ways to conceive of recognitive expectations immanent in social life understood as a collaborative endeavor.

In this article I argue that the currently ongoing epochal changes are bringing about a shift in ... more In this article I argue that the currently ongoing epochal changes are bringing about a shift in concerns and saliences that are pushing Hegel-reception in a direction that can be characterized as anthropological or humanist. Three default assumptions making particular perspectives to Hegel more, or less, enticing are on the retreat: Kantian constructivism or subjectivism, historical or cultural relativism, and the “ethical abstinence” of liberal political thought. What will, or should, take their place are a rehabilitated realism, a rehabilitated universalism, and an urgent interest in philosophical means for evaluating and debating better and worse forms of human life across cultural and other differences. I will elaborate on three basic principles crucial to grasp for a Hegelian critical social philosophy fit for purpose in the new crisis-ridden era: multiplicity of levels of conceptual abstraction, realism about freedom, and the recognitive constitution of all human life as a “fundamental ethics”.

One of the strands in the debates on Marx concerns his relationship with and possible philosophic... more One of the strands in the debates on Marx concerns his relationship with and possible philosophical debt to Hegel, and most recently the Hegelian theme of recognition, intensively discussed in social and political philosophy, has been one of the angles from which Marx has been interpreted. In this article I wish to clarify some of the conceptual issues concerning the Hegel-Marx relation to do with the notion of recognition. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will analyse what I think are the main elements of Hegel’s concept of recognition, yet starting with another, even more fundamental concept in Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit: the concept of ‘concrete freedom’. Secondly, I aim to provide a clear picture of how exactly the concepts of concrete freedom and recognition figure in what is probably the most prominent text for a reading of Marx from this point of view, namely the Comments on James Mill written in Paris in 1844. Here I wish to elucidate what exactly of Hegel’s conception of concrete freedom and recognition is present and what remains absent in Marx’s Comments.

As I will show, these concepts are in both thinkers closely related to a particular philosophical program: that of evaluative essentialism about the human life-form, or of ‘spirit’ ( Geist) or ‘species essence’ (Gattungswesen) to use their respective vocabularies. My point is to show that also in this regard the old Hegel and the young Marx are very close to each other, despite the differences in terminology, and independently of the degree to which Marx was conscious of this proximity. Throughout the essay, I will mostly abstract from questions of Marx’s own understanding and interpretation of Hegel.

Eventually, my aim is not merely scholarly, but also systematic since I believe that the idea of an evaluative ontology of the human life-form based on the concepts of recognition and concrete freedom is worth a more serious philosophical scrutiny than quick rejections of anything smacking of ‘essentialism’ common in philosophy and social theory during the last several decades have allowed for. In this article however, rather than trying to defend this idea at length, I will concentrate merely on reconstructing and comparing the two articulations of it by Hegel and Marx.

Published in: https://www.academia.edu/35926223/Reassessing_Marxs_Social_and_Political_Philosophy_Freedom_Recognition_and_Human_Flourishing

Inquiry, 2023

Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social ... more Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social thought. It aims to overcome the ‘liberal abstinence’, which forbids criticizing the ethical fabric of social life, and proposes to connect normative evaluation with a serious social-ontological model of ‘forms of life’. In this article we argue, however, that Jaeggi’s ontological characterization of the concept of form of life is problematic in ways that introduce a number of adverse consequences for social critique. In section 1, we lay out the main components of Jaeggi’s account. In section 2, we present four interconnected problems that beset Jaeggi’s substantializing conception of forms of life. In section 3, we present an alternative construal of the idea of forms of life, one which does not utilize the concept for grasping substantial unities, but rather focuses on the ‘forms’ that specifically human life takes, and which grasps social practices as concrete collaborative activities involving expectations of recognition. We thereby bring together the recognition-theoretical strand of critical social thought with Jaeggi’s welcome new gambit. In section 4 we briefly put forth three mutually complementary ways to conceive of recognitive expectations immanent in social life understood as a collaborative endeavor.

Now out in affordable paperback: https://bit.ly/3IoFe7Y Chapter 5 permanently available for fr... more Now out in affordable paperback: https://bit.ly/3IoFe7Y

Chapter 5 permanently available for free on the Routledge website via this link: https://bit.ly/38lPYXm

Cillian McBride, Queen’s University Belfast, UK

Axel Honneth, Columbia University, USA

Ludwig Siep, University of Münster, Germany

Jay Bernstein, The New School

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2022

Edited by Heikki Ikäheimo, Kristina Lepold and Titus Stahl.

Entries available online:
https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8

Notes"

"1. Introduction 2. Barbara Merker (University of Frankfurt): ‘Embodied Normativity – Revitali... more "1. Introduction

2. Barbara Merker (University of Frankfurt): ‘Embodied Normativity – Revitalizing Hegel’s Account of the Human Organism’

3. Italo Testa (University of Parma): ‘How Does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings’

4. Heikki Ikäheimo (UNSW): ‘The Times of Desire, Hope and Fear – On the Temporality of Concrete Subjectivity in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia’

5. Simon Lumsden (UNSW): 'Habit, Sittlichkeit and Second Nature'

6. Emmanuel Renault (University of Lyon): 'The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism'

7. Jean-Philippe Deranty (Macquarie University): Review of Terry Pinkard’s Hegel’s Naturalism – Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life"

Introduction:
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/14_5-6_introduction.pdf

http://www.amazon.com/Dimensions-Personhood-Heikki-Ikaheimo/dp/1845400860

Published also as a special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 14., No. 5-6."

http://www.amazon.com/Nature-Social-Institutional-Reality/dp/951390704X

Published in Douglas Moggach, Nadime Mooren, Michael Quante (eds.) (2020): Perfektionismus der Autonomie. Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

Published in: https://brill.com/view/title/53261?language=de
See: https://philarchive.org/archive/GLEHPA-4

Ajatus, The Journal of the Philosophical Association of Finland, 2024

Justice and Freedom in Hegel, edited by Diego Bubbio and Andrew Buchwalter, 2024

Inquiry, 2023

Published in: https://www.academia.edu/35926223/Reassessing_Marxs_Social_and_Political_Philosophy_Freedom_Recognition_and_Human_Flourishing

Inquiry, 2023

Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social ... more Rahel Jaeggi’s Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social thought. It aims to overcome the ‘liberal abstinence’, which forbids criticizing the ethical fabric of social life, and proposes to connect normative evaluation with a serious social-ontological model of ‘forms of life’. In this article we argue, however, that Jaeggi’s ontological characterization of the concept of form of life is problematic in ways that introduce a number of adverse consequences for social critique. In section 1, we lay out the main components of Jaeggi’s account. In section 2, we present four interconnected problems that beset Jaeggi’s substantializing conception of forms of life. In section 3, we present an alternative construal of the idea of forms of life, one which does not utilize the concept for grasping substantial unities, but rather focuses on the ‘forms’ that specifically human life takes, and which grasps social practices as concrete collaborative activities involving expectations of recognition. We thereby bring together the recognition-theoretical strand of critical social thought with Jaeggi’s welcome new gambit. In section 4 we briefly put forth three mutually complementary ways to conceive of recognitive expectations immanent in social life understood as a collaborative endeavor.

Krisis, 2022

We first identity eleven theses of critical naturalism which contemporary critical theory should ... more We first identity eleven theses of critical naturalism which contemporary critical theory should take into consideration. We then identify the historical crises and catastrophes that critical naturalism seeks to respond to, dispelling the prejudices against naturalism in contemporary critical thought, and considering alternative answers to these questions such as social constructivism, accelerationism, xenofeminism, flat ontologism, and monist world ecology. By sketching the notions of nature and naturalism, we anchor critical naturalism in the history of materialism and critical theory, understood initially as that of the Frankfurt School, but expanded and enriched by other approaches to social critique. Finally, we sketch models and projects of critical naturalism, which are exemplary fragments of varying ways to practice naturalist social critique.

Australia experienced the most devastating bush-fire season in recorded history, and right after ... more Australia experienced the most devastating bush-fire season in recorded history, and right after that the world economy stalled due to a global virus outbreak the severity of which has no modern precedent. Crises tend to speed up paradigm shifts, and the one that begun in 2020 certainly will. In this paper I will contribute to a shift that has been gathering momentum for some time now, the need for which the current crisis has made all too obvious. This is a shift in Kant and Hegel influenced philosophy from thinking of ‘spirit’ (Geist) as an abstract realm or dimension insulated from nature—frictionlessly spinning without touching it, or at least with a tendency to do this as essential to it—to thinking of spirit as a life-form, situated in nature at large, just as all life is. I will work on this theme by elaborating on three broadly Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of ‘spirit’, that is to say the psychological and social structures distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form, or as I call it more technically ‘the life-form of persons’. Secondly, that recognition (Anerkennung) as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as collective autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of ‘pathology’.

The complete book can be downloaded from here: https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110698510-004/html

Mutatis Mutandis: Revista Internacional de Filosof ́ıa, n ́um. 18, pp. 155-169, 2022

El concepto de "reconocimiento" es ampliamente utilizado en los debates contemporáneos, pero en o... more El concepto de "reconocimiento" es ampliamente utilizado en los debates contemporáneos, pero en ocasiones refiere a fenómenos de distinta naturaleza o presenta matices a primera vista inadvertidos. Afortunadamente, el objetivo principal de este trabajo del Prof. Heikki Ikäheimo es clarificar el concepto de reconocimiento para la teoría crítica, para lo cual se elabora un mapa analítico con el cual se revisan las manifestaciones del concepto de reconocimiento en autores seleccionados. La primera sección revisa las diversas acepciones del término reconocimiento y elabora un mapa analítico que expone las relaciones se observan en el reconocimiento entre personas. La segunda sección explora la importancia del concepto de reconocimiento en la filosofía política y social de Charles Taylor y Axel Honneth, revisando el debate de esté ultimo con Nancy Fraser. La tercera sección revisa las manifestaciones del concepto de reconocimiento en los trabajos de Judith Butler y Louis Althusser. La cuarta sección explora el concepto de reconocimiento en la ontología social analítica John Searle y en autores neo-hegelianos estadounidenses.

Disability & Society, 2022

Policy efforts addressing abuse of people with disability tend to focus on more extreme forms of ... more Policy efforts addressing abuse of people with disability tend to focus on more extreme forms of violence, sometimes at the expense of attending to everyday indignities and insults experienced when receiving support. Recognition theory provides a lens for identifying actions and attitudes of misrecognition that can cause hurt, humiliation or degradation, and have a negative effect on identity formation. Honneth’s concept of misrecognition is used to analyse qualitative data from 42 pairs of young people with intellectual disability and support workers. Many of the casual interactions that signalled misrecognition highlight the everyday harms that people receiving or giving support are exposed to in their paired relationship. Systems must respond to the high likelihood of these risks of misrecognition. Supervision, training, reflective practice and support activities can expose the problems and demonstrate practices more likely to positively impact the identity formation and wellbeing for both people with disability and support workers.

Hegel Bulletin

NOTE: The 'Download'-link works and delivers the correct (draft) pdf, even though the online appe... more NOTE: The 'Download'-link works and delivers the correct (draft) pdf, even though the online appearance is for some reason corrupted.

A recently widely accepted view has it that the nature-spirit distinction in Hegel is to be understood as a distinction between a space or realm that is not normative or does not involve norms, and one that is or does. Notwithstanding the merits of this view, it has tended to create a separation between nature and spirit which is both philosophically troubling and difficult to reconcile with the picture of Hegel as the arch enemy of abstract or unreconciled dualisms. In this paper I aim to show that the defining phenomenon for this view—collective self-administration by norms—is on Hegel’s account both dependent on living nature that involves normativity broadly conceived all the way down and also subject to the normative or evaluative super-principle of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit—concrete freedom—the essence of spirit according to him. This is to say that for Hegel the normativity of collectively administered norms is neither the most basic nor the highest form of normativity.

The final version of the paper is published online in the Hegel Bulletin, 27 January 2021: https://bit.ly/3iUiYpU

Recognition and Personhood (for Handbuch Anerkennung)

It is widely thought that recognition is somehow important or even essential for human persons. T... more It is widely thought that recognition is somehow important or even essential for human persons. This general thought comes however in many variations which are what this entry aims to systematize. Comprehending the several variations and what is rational in them requires, firstly, systematizing the many concepts of personhood present in the various relevant discourses, secondly systematizing the many concepts of recognition present in them, and thirdly grasping the many possible and actual ways in which recognition according to the different concepts of recognition is important or essential for persons according to the different concepts of personhood. Finally, the entry discusses briefly Fichte's and Hegel's theorizing on the connection between personhood and recognition.

To appear in Handbuch Anerkennung. Edited by Ludwig Siep, Heikki Ikäheimo & Michael Quante. Springer.

Entries available online first: https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8

Handbuch Anerkennung

People whose person-making capacities or status are diminished or who lack them altogether are mo... more People whose person-making capacities or status are diminished or who lack them altogether are mostly ignored in mainstream theories of recognition. This entry clarifies the conceptual landscape around and some of the key questions about recognition in relation to these people. The concept of personhood is analyzed into three different sub-concepts – juridical, moral and psychological – and the connection of these to recognition on relevant concepts of recognition is discussed.

To appear in Siep, Ikäheimo, Quante (eds.): Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer.

Entries available online first: https://link.springer.com/referencework/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8

What is the relationship of the ontological foundations of the human life-form to ethical or mora... more What is the relationship of the ontological foundations of the human life-form to ethical or moral goodness? I will discuss in this article two opposing conceptual approaches to this issue present in social ontology broadly construed. The first approach, represented by Max Weber and John Searle, is distinguished by the two interlocking features of, firstly, pinning down the basic concepts for dealing with the human social world in terms of definitions by necessary and sufficient conditions, and, secondly, trying to keep these foundational conceptual operations neutral with regard to ethical evaluation or normativity. As I will show, both Weber and Searle nevertheless end up in introducing ethical considerations into their conceptions, which in Weber’s case introduces an interesting internal tension and in Searle’s case an outright contradiction with the official ethical neutrality of the conceptual approach of the respective author. The second approach, represented by Hegel, is distinguished by, first, positing a normative essence for distinctively human social phenomena, and, secondly, by conceiving the normativity involved explicitly as of an ethical or moral kind. For Hegel, introducing ethical considerations into his social ontology, or his ontology of life with the human, essentially social form does not introduce the kinds of conceptual tensions or troubles found in Weber and Searle, and his strategy has also other arguable advantages which make it worthy of closer scrutiny.

Studies in Social and Political Thought, 2015

In contemporary Hegel-influenced philosophy recognition is mostly thought of as a good thing. Som... more In contemporary Hegel-influenced philosophy recognition is mostly thought of as a good thing. Some see it as a pre-condition of positive, individual or collective self-conceptions or -identities, others even as ontologically foundational for the human life-form and thus as something without which we could not exist as the kinds of beings we are at all. But if recognition is indeed such an important and good thing, and if it is in principle something humans can give each other, why is there so often a lack of it? Why is it the case that people so often fail to give others recognition, at least adequately? There are several candidates for an explanation. First, it may be that recognition—the giving or receiving of it or both—requires capacities or skills that are not always available. Secondly, it may be that recognition, even though (all things considered) good, involves costs, which leads to reluctance to grant it. Thirdly and relatedly, even if recognition is objectively good for the individuals or groups involved, fathoming this, or being able to experience its goodness, especially against experienced costs that it may incur, may nevertheless require intellectual capacities or understanding that individuals do not necessarily possess. […]

Rahel Jaeggi's Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social ... more Rahel Jaeggi's Critique of Forms of Life represents a welcome new development in critical social thought. It aims to overcome the "liberal abstinence" from criticizing the ethical fabric of social life and to connect normative evaluation with a serious social-ontological model of "forms of life". In this article we argue, however, that Jaeggi's ontological characterisation of the concept of form of life is problematic in ways that introduce a number of adverse consequences for social critique. In section 1, we lay out the main components of Jaeggi's account. In section 2, we present four interconnected problems that beset Jaeggi's substantialising conception of forms of life. In section 3, we present an alternative construal of the idea of forms of life, one which does not utilize the concept for grasping substantial unities, but rather focuses on the "forms" that specifically human life takes, and which grasps social practices as concrete collaborative activities involving expectations of recognition. We thereby bring together the recognition-theoretical strand of critical social thought with Jaeggi's welcome new gambit. In section 4 we briefly put forth three mutually complementary ways to conceive of recognitive expectations immanent in social life understood as a collaborative endeavor.

Recognition in general comes in many flavours and so do desires and hopes for recognition. The s... more Recognition in general comes in many flavours and so do desires and hopes for recognition. The same is true of recognition of agency in particular. In this short paper I will engage in some basic conceptual work that may be useful for thinking about the theme of this special issue. I will, first, distinguish between several forms of agency that matter in international relations (though not only there) and that can be either recognized or unrecognized. I will, secondly, reflect on what exactly it may mean to “recognize” agency of these various kinds. Finally, I will discuss possible uses of denial of agency in international relations.

Draft open for feedback and discussion here: https://www.academia.edu/s/ae001941ff

This chapter will focus on the importance of intersubjective attitudes of recognition for the bas... more This chapter will focus on the importance of intersubjective attitudes of recognition for the basic structures of the life-form of human persons. The first section lays out three constitutive facts about this life-form which apply in all human societies. The basic idea defended in the chapter is that to be a person is to be a member of the life-form, and this means more concretely to participate in the life-activities determined by the three constitutive facts. In order to participate in these activities one needs to be included in them by the other participants, and their attitudes of intersubjective recognition are the main way by which such inclusion takes place. To be included is constitutive of what I call the intersubjective status-layer of full-fledged personhood, or of being a person in intersubjective status, and this is the topic of the second section of the chapter. On the other hand, to include others by having intersubjective attitudes of recognition towards them is a central constituent of the psychological layer of full-fledged personhood, or of being a psychological person—the topic of the third section. Finally, the fourth section briefly discusses the ontology of the life-form of human persons as a ‘fundamental ethics’, addresses two questions concerning it, and introduces two further layers of full-fledged personhood--the institutional and the moral.

Is there an ideal for inter-human relations? What I mean is not ideals, but an ideal, or rather t... more Is there an ideal for inter-human relations? What I mean is not ideals, but an ideal, or rather the Ideal for inter-human relations in general. For many in contemporary social and political philosophy, as well as in the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory this way of putting a question may sound strange, if not blatantly absurd. How can we possibly talk of something like “The Ideal for inter-human relations in general”? Talking about ideals is talking about ‘the good’, and that, we have learned, is an issue on which there are many views and no perspective from which to adjudicate between them. The received view in liberal political philosophy after Rawls has been that the state should remain neutral on views of the good, or of ‘the good life’ – and the more critical theorists accommodate themselves to liberal political philosophy, the more they are prone to accepting that so should critical theory. [...]

Axel Honneth’s book Reification is an important attempt at rehabilitating a central concept in th... more Axel Honneth’s book Reification is an important attempt at rehabilitating a central concept in the left-Hegelian tradition, an attempt that nevertheless remains curiously left aside in Honneth’s subsequent work. Perhaps discouraged by a somewhat negative reception of the book, perhaps by internal problems in his elaborations in it, or perhaps both, Honneth has not continued developing the ideas he presents in it, and at least in one publicized occasion he seems to have more or less abandoned the project. In my view there is much to recommend in the book in particular, and in the attempt at rehabilitating reification as a critical concept in social philosophy in general. What I wish to do in this article is to elaborate further on themes in Honneth’s Reification, as well as in Judith Butler’s critical discussion of it. I will start by making a few conceptual clarifications on the different applications of the concept or concepts of reification, and I will then concentrate on one of these applications—reification of other persons. I will have quite a few things to say about a centrally important topic in Honneth’s treatise of reification, one which Butler rightly puts her finger on in her discussion of Honneth: what exactly it means to take up the perspective of the other person. Like Honneth, I will connect this theme to the concept of recognition, yet I will do this in a way that differs from Honneth’s. Also, though I will draw on several ideas in Honneth’s account of recognition, both in Reification and in his path-breaking The Struggle for Recognition, his conceptualization of the theme is burdened with certain ambiguities and unresolved tensions which I will try to clarify, working thereby towards a more conceptually controlled and thus practically useful conception of reification as a tool for immanent social critique. To connect with the general theme of this volume, a particular kind of ambivalence will become apparent in the course of my discussion, one having to do with the uncertainty of what exactly we have in mind when we talk of ‘recognition’: though on a first, rough approximation, recognition of other persons can be thought of as the opposite of their reification, there are in fact important phenomena that are cases of ‘recognition’ in a widely accepted sense, yet at the same time they involve something intuitively paradigmatically ‘reifying’. These are not merely questions of consistent nomenclature, but more importantly of conceptual precision and thus empirical lucidity required for utilizing the concepts of reification and recognition in critical social philosophy.

Judith Butler and Kate Manne shed, in different ways, doubt on the capacity of the recognition-pa... more Judith Butler and Kate Manne shed, in different ways, doubt on the capacity of the recognition-paradigm to comprehend phenomena of crucial ethical and political importance: whereas Butler argues that deeper than recognition are “frames” in light of which individuals and groups appear as recognizable human beings at all, Manne argues that too much has been made of the capacity of the idea of being recognized as human or person to explain interhuman cruelty and violence. There's much to learn from both challenges and from a synthesis of them.

A more detailed published version of the argument available here: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jtsb.12352

Recording available on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3nnOkdWFJN8

An unpublished paper based on a presentation at ‘Forum on Gratitude in Cancer Care’ organized in ... more An unpublished paper based on a presentation at ‘Forum on Gratitude in Cancer Care’ organized in Sydney, 19th October 2018.

A talk for the '5 Minuten Hegel' web initiative by Thomas Meyer & Tobias Rosefeldt (Humboldt-Univ... more A talk for the '5 Minuten Hegel' web initiative by Thomas Meyer & Tobias Rosefeldt (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) on Hegel's 250'th birthday. Available online: https://5minutenhegel.wordpress.com/anerkennung/

Talk at 'Law and Recognition', University of Auckland, September 10-11, 2018.

A workshop paper from 1998 trying to figure out the relationship of Levinas', Hegel's and Honneth... more A workshop paper from 1998 trying to figure out the relationship of Levinas', Hegel's and Honneth's take on 'recognition of the other'.

Humanity is facing multiple intertwined crises on a global scale: environmental disasters, biodiv... more Humanity is facing multiple intertwined crises on a global scale: environmental disasters, biodiversity collapse, zoonotic pandemics, capitalist acceleration and monopolization, rising inequalities, increased control and manipulation at the hands of states and corporations, the list goes on. A hallmark of Hegelian and post-Hegelian social thought has been to elaborate conceptual tools to grasp the features, problems, and crises of an age, as well as the paths that could lead beyond them. The conference explores the resources that Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophy provides to think through our current predicament and to confront the many crises we are facing.

This conference seeks to explore ideas around nature and naturalism that can work as critical, em... more This conference seeks to explore ideas around nature and naturalism that can work as critical, emancipatory, transformative conceptual tools for addressing some of the most compelling crises faced by our form(s) of life today. Given the fact that the reference to nature plays a decisive role in some of these crises, it seems no longer enough for contemporary critical thought to equate naturalism with reductive naturalism on the one hand, and ideological naturalism (or ideological justification by naturalization) on the other. This conference wants therefore to discuss the following questions: Which are the most convincing forms of critique of antinaturalism? In what sense a naturalism can be critical? Which are the main theoretical inspirations and models for a non-reductive and non-ideological naturalism with critical intent?
The talks will be held in presence, but if you want to participate in the conference online, please write an email to fedegregoratto@gmail.com

Krisis, 2024

In this paper, we comment and discuss the fifteen replies that interpret, solicit, problematize, ... more In this paper, we comment and discuss the fifteen replies that interpret, solicit, problematize, and further develop our Critical Naturalism: A Manifesto, which has been published in Krisis 43(1). In the paper, we address four overarching topics that we see emerging from the replies: Histories and traditions of critical naturalism; the relation between theory and praxis; the question of what is critical about critical naturalism; and finally the question of utopia. Additionally, we discuss three general types of attitudes that our critics take to the Manifesto.