Sonia Sikka | University of Ottawa | Université d'Ottawa (original) (raw)
Papers by Sonia Sikka
Through a critical analysis of the positions of Rawls and Habermas, the article argues against th... more Through a critical analysis of the positions of Rawls and Habermas, the article argues against the proviso that religious language be " translated " into an allegedly neutral vocabulary as a condition for full inclusion within public political reasoning. Defending and expanding the analysis of Maeve Cooke, it maintains that both Habermas and Rawls mischaracterize the nature of religious reasons in relation to reasons alleged to be " freestanding, " " secular, " or " postmetaphysical. " Reflection on the origins of religious discourse and the component thought to be retained when such discourse is " translated " demonstrates the untenability of a sharp distinction between " rational " and " religious " discourse on matters pertaining to morality. The article nonetheless affirms the need for common acceptance of the justificatory language of coercive political policies, but contends that this language is best conceived as a historically evolving wide (not universal) agreement, and as a confluence of various types of agreement. The difficulties of determining the appropriate place of religious discourse within the public life of a democratic society are well illustrated by the numerous shifts in the positions of Rawls and Habermas on this subject. While the general pattern is towards a loosening of restrictions on the presentation of religious reasons within public debate on political issues, the latest and least restrictive positions of both Rawls and Habermas retain a sense that naked religious reasons cannot be fully integrated into deliberations whose outcome will determine coercive state policies. That is because of a shared view that even where citizens do not agree with a particular policy or article of legislation, democratic legitimacy requires that the reasons given for its implementation are intelligible to them, being in some fashion reasons that all citizens can accept. Behind this view lies the Kantian idea
Joseph T. O'Connell drew attention to the relative scarcity of academic work on religion in South... more Joseph T. O'Connell drew attention to the relative scarcity of academic work on religion in South Asia, and offered as a plausible explanation for this state of affairs the tension between secular and religio ‑political communal interests. This paper explores the potential role of phi‑ losophy as an established academic discipline within this situation, in the context of India. It argues that objective study, including evaluation, of the truth claims of various religious traditions is an important aspect of academic as opposed to confessional engagement with religion, and that philosophy in India is especially well suited to undertake such reflection and to provide corresponding education. Unlike Western countries, philosophy and religion were never clearly separated in India and did not evolve in tension with one another. The history of Indian philosophy therefore includes and is included within the history of its 'religions', in a way that makes philosophical examination of the truth claims of Indian religions internal to those religions themselves. By tracing this history, the discipline of philosophy can help to unsettle the idea of religion as a matter of fixed dogma. It can also continue the procedure of interpreting and evaluating metaphysical and epistemological theses that has been an intrinsic component of Indian religious thought for most of its history. KEYWORDS Joseph T. O'Connell; philosophy of religion; religious pluralism; diversity of faith; religion and ideology; Hinduism; comparative study of religion
The Review of Politics, 2016
Issues in Religion and Education, 2000
For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 |
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2006
Politics and Religion, 2016
Politics and Religion, 2016
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 2000
Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward re... more Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic, and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share a common goal of minimizing conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue in this article that the operation of liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning inadvertently diminishes critical reflection and revision in the area of religion, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability. Measures to counter these dangers, I propose, include a relaxation of the restrictive rules that define liberal public reason, and education about religion in schools.
Through a critical analysis of the positions of Rawls and Habermas, the article argues against th... more Through a critical analysis of the positions of Rawls and Habermas, the article argues against the proviso that religious language be " translated " into an allegedly neutral vocabulary as a condition for full inclusion within public political reasoning. Defending and expanding the analysis of Maeve Cooke, it maintains that both Habermas and Rawls mischaracterize the nature of religious reasons in relation to reasons alleged to be " freestanding, " " secular, " or " postmetaphysical. " Reflection on the origins of religious discourse and the component thought to be retained when such discourse is " translated " demonstrates the untenability of a sharp distinction between " rational " and " religious " discourse on matters pertaining to morality. The article nonetheless affirms the need for common acceptance of the justificatory language of coercive political policies, but contends that this language is best conceived as a historically evolving wide (not universal) agreement, and as a confluence of various types of agreement. The difficulties of determining the appropriate place of religious discourse within the public life of a democratic society are well illustrated by the numerous shifts in the positions of Rawls and Habermas on this subject. While the general pattern is towards a loosening of restrictions on the presentation of religious reasons within public debate on political issues, the latest and least restrictive positions of both Rawls and Habermas retain a sense that naked religious reasons cannot be fully integrated into deliberations whose outcome will determine coercive state policies. That is because of a shared view that even where citizens do not agree with a particular policy or article of legislation, democratic legitimacy requires that the reasons given for its implementation are intelligible to them, being in some fashion reasons that all citizens can accept. Behind this view lies the Kantian idea
Joseph T. O'Connell drew attention to the relative scarcity of academic work on religion in South... more Joseph T. O'Connell drew attention to the relative scarcity of academic work on religion in South Asia, and offered as a plausible explanation for this state of affairs the tension between secular and religio ‑political communal interests. This paper explores the potential role of phi‑ losophy as an established academic discipline within this situation, in the context of India. It argues that objective study, including evaluation, of the truth claims of various religious traditions is an important aspect of academic as opposed to confessional engagement with religion, and that philosophy in India is especially well suited to undertake such reflection and to provide corresponding education. Unlike Western countries, philosophy and religion were never clearly separated in India and did not evolve in tension with one another. The history of Indian philosophy therefore includes and is included within the history of its 'religions', in a way that makes philosophical examination of the truth claims of Indian religions internal to those religions themselves. By tracing this history, the discipline of philosophy can help to unsettle the idea of religion as a matter of fixed dogma. It can also continue the procedure of interpreting and evaluating metaphysical and epistemological theses that has been an intrinsic component of Indian religious thought for most of its history. KEYWORDS Joseph T. O'Connell; philosophy of religion; religious pluralism; diversity of faith; religion and ideology; Hinduism; comparative study of religion
The Review of Politics, 2016
Issues in Religion and Education, 2000
For use by the Author only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 |
Journal of Philosophical Research, 2006
Politics and Religion, 2016
Politics and Religion, 2016
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 2000
Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward re... more Liberalism, as a political paradigm, is committed to maintaining a stance of neutrality toward religion(s), along with other comprehensive systems of belief. Multiculturalism is premised on the view that the political policies of internally diverse nations should respect the beliefs and practices of the various cultural, ethnic, and religious groups of which those nations are composed. Sometimes synthesized, sometimes standing in tension, these two political frameworks share a common goal of minimizing conflict while respecting diversity. Although this goal is, in principle, laudable, I argue in this article that the operation of liberal and multiculturalist forms of public reasoning inadvertently diminishes critical reflection and revision in the area of religion, with potentially dangerous consequences both for the health of religion and for social stability. Measures to counter these dangers, I propose, include a relaxation of the restrictive rules that define liberal public reason, and education about religion in schools.