Gary Tian | University of Wollongong (original) (raw)
Papers by Gary Tian
This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese... more This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through intercorporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders" tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.
This paper investigates venture capitalists" monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining thei... more This paper investigates venture capitalists" monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on VC monitoring than managerial agency problems. Overall, our study suggests that venture capitalists' monitoring role is hampered in an emerging market where firms have complex ownership structures that contribute to severe agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders.
This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment d... more This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks' lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms' governance framework and ownership structure.
This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government owners... more This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.
This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect ... more This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity, and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.
Journal of Contemporary China, 1997
... elsewhere increased their real prices because processing was almost more profitable than prod... more ... elsewhere increased their real prices because processing was almost more profitable than producing ... to a lessor extent, the currency market (increasingly) have become the three pillars of the ... In addition to Shanghai's local companies, eighty-three listed compa-nies are from ...
Journal of Contemporary China, 1994
Shanghai's new role as an entrepôt centre has emerged since the mid‐1980s when the central procur... more Shanghai's new role as an entrepôt centre has emerged since the mid‐1980s when the central procurement system of export products was abolished. Along with Shanghai's investment, labour intensive industries have been shifted from Shanghai to its inland provinces. Consequently, the commodity composition of re‐exports has been rapidly changed from agricultural products to manufactured products. Meanwhile, the suppliers became much more concentrated in its immediately neighbouring provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. However, the changing in the commodity composition is not due to the rise in the heterogeneity which would increase the need of the services of middlemen in entrepôt as suggested by the theory which was developed by Yunwing Sung. In the absence of a well‐functioning market mechanism, Shanghai's re‐exports became increasingly depending on the products manufactured in Shanghai's FTCs (Foreign Trade Companies)’ joint ventures invested in other provinces, while its comparative advantage in trade as a middlemen has not been fully utilized since then.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed... more This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay-performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based payperformance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay-performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.
This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We dist... more This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We distinguish four firm types based on their controlling owners: state owned enterprises affiliated with state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises affiliated with the central government (SOECGs), state owned enterprises affiliated with a local government (SOELGs), and private firms controlled by private investors. We also distinguish
The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders reminds us of the necessity for an app... more The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders reminds us of the necessity for an appropriate level of managerial ownership that ensures management decisions align with the benefit of shareholders. Prior evidence has demonstrated associations between managerial ownership, financial decisions and firm value in developed markets. This paper extends prior research by examining the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital structure choices using examples of China's civilian-run listed firms from 2002 to 2007.
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines the relevance of currently... more Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines the relevance of currently accepted best practice recommendations regarding board structure on the survival likelihood of new economy initial public offering companies. We argue that industry context determines governance outcomes.Research Findings/Insights: We study 125 Australian new economy firms listed between 1994 and 2002. Each firm is tracked until the end of 2007 for monitoring their survival. We find that board independence is associated with an increase in the likelihood of corporate survival. We also find that the benefits of board independence increase at a decreasing rate.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The standard best practice recommendation of board independence stems from the monitoring role of directors and is based on agency theory. The results from our study suggest that the recommendation regarding board independence does not work well for new economy firms. While the agency theory based model implies a monotonic relation between board independence and performance, our research suggests that the relationship is nonlinear. This variation occurs because of increased monitoring costs faced by outsiders due to higher information asymmetry and complexity of new economy firms. Our empirical results suggest that inside directors play a complementary role to outsiders in mitigating firm failure.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our research offers insights to policy makers who are interested in setting best practice standards regarding board structure. Our research suggests that firm/industry characteristics play a crucial role in determining the optimal board structure. In firms/industries where outsiders face significantly higher information processing costs, insiders can play a valuable complementary role to outsiders in enhancing the effectiveness of the board. Thus future hard or soft regulations related to board structure should consider industry context.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed... more This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.
Australian Economic Papers, 2007
This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai... more This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai A and B-share market, and between these two markets and the Hong Kong, the Taiwanese, the Japanese and the US market of two sub periods between July 1993 and March 2007. On the basis of a new Granger non-causality test procedure developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995) and Johansen's (1988) cointegration test, my results suggest that a long-term equilibrium relationship measured by cointegration has been merged between the Chinese A-share market and the other markets in greater China region as well as the US market during the post-crisis period which covers the period since Chinese A-share market was opened to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. I also found that the Shanghai A-share market uni-directionally Granger-causes the other regional markets after the Asian financial crisis, while the A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market have had a significant feedback relationship since then. However, I found no evidence there has been cointegrating relationship between Shanghai B-share market and any other market ever since the B-share market was opened to the local retail investors in 2001.
This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in Chi... more This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative to those without foreign ownership.
Asia-pacific Financial Markets, 2002
Numerous studies in the finance literature have investigated technical analysis to determine its ... more Numerous studies in the finance literature have investigated technical analysis to determine its validity as an investment tool. This study is an attempt to explore whether some forms of technical analysis can predict stock price movement and make excess profits based on certain trading rules in markets with different efficiency level. To avoid using arbitrarily selected 26 trading rules as did by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) and later by Bessembinder and Chan (1998), this paper examines predictive power and profitability of simple trading rules by expanding their universe of 26 rules to 412 rules. In order to find out the relationship between market efficiency and excess return by applying trading rules, we examine excess return over periods in U.S. markets and also compare the excess returns between U.S. market and Chinese markets. Our results found that there is no evidence at all supporting technical forecast power by these trading rules in U.S. equity index after 1975. During the 1990s break-even costs turned to be negative, –0.06%, even failing to beat a buy-holding strategyin U.S. equity market. In comparison, our results provide support for the technical strategies even in the presence of trading cost in Chinese stock markets.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2007
After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock ... more After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index, it was found that the open-to-open return variance is consistently greater than the close-to-close variance. Examining the volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests with five-minute intervals reveals an L-shaped pattern, or more precisely, two L-shaped patterns, starting with a small hump during both the morning and the afternoon sessions, with the morning session having a much higher interday volatility than the afternoon session. This L-shaped interday volatility is supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern. This result suggests that the high volatility of intraday returns for the market open is not entirely due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the accumulated overnight information and the trading halt effect. The five-minute breaks after the auction and blind auction procedures are the two major driving forces which exaggerate the high intraday volatility observed at the market open.
This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese... more This paper examines the effect of excess control rights on the leverage decisions made by Chinese non-SOEs before and after the Non-tradable share reform (NTS reform). We find that firms with excess control rights have more excess leverage and their controlling shareholders use the resources for tunneling rather than investing in positive NPV projects. We also find that excess leverage in firms with excess control rights decreases and the market reaction to announcements of related party transactions are more positive after NTS reform. This confirms that tunneling by the controlling shareholders actually reduced. We argue that in emerging markets where legal protection for creditors and shareholders is weak, controlling shareholders borrow excess debt to tunnel through intercorporate loans and related party transactions. Furthermore the privatization of these economies can reduce the controlling shareholders" tunneling activities and associated excess leverage which destroys firm value.
This paper investigates venture capitalists" monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining thei... more This paper investigates venture capitalists" monitoring of managerial behaviour by examining their impact on CEO pay-performance sensitivity across various controlling structures in Chinese firms. We find that the effectiveness of venture capitalists' monitoring depends on different types of agency conflict. In particular, we find that venture capital (VC) monitoring is hampered in firms that experience severe controlling-minority agency problems caused by disproportionate ownership structures. We provide further evidence that VC is more likely to exert close monitoring in firms that have greater managerial agency conflict, and thus require more direct monitoring. However, controlling-minority agency problems have a greater impact on VC monitoring than managerial agency problems. Overall, our study suggests that venture capitalists' monitoring role is hampered in an emerging market where firms have complex ownership structures that contribute to severe agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders.
This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment d... more This study investigates the effect of banks' dual holding on bank lending and firms' investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks' lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms' governance framework and ownership structure.
This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government owners... more This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in China's emerging market, as it is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, tournament incentives are weaker where firms are controlled by the government and where the CEO is politically connected, but it became stronger after the China's split-share structure reforms. Further, we find that in state controlled firms the satisfaction gained by meeting multiple economic and social goals largely reduces the effectiveness of tournament incentives, while the managerial agency problems inherent in private firms might mitigate them.
This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect ... more This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control-ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity, and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.
Journal of Contemporary China, 1997
... elsewhere increased their real prices because processing was almost more profitable than prod... more ... elsewhere increased their real prices because processing was almost more profitable than producing ... to a lessor extent, the currency market (increasingly) have become the three pillars of the ... In addition to Shanghai's local companies, eighty-three listed compa-nies are from ...
Journal of Contemporary China, 1994
Shanghai's new role as an entrepôt centre has emerged since the mid‐1980s when the central procur... more Shanghai's new role as an entrepôt centre has emerged since the mid‐1980s when the central procurement system of export products was abolished. Along with Shanghai's investment, labour intensive industries have been shifted from Shanghai to its inland provinces. Consequently, the commodity composition of re‐exports has been rapidly changed from agricultural products to manufactured products. Meanwhile, the suppliers became much more concentrated in its immediately neighbouring provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. However, the changing in the commodity composition is not due to the rise in the heterogeneity which would increase the need of the services of middlemen in entrepôt as suggested by the theory which was developed by Yunwing Sung. In the absence of a well‐functioning market mechanism, Shanghai's re‐exports became increasingly depending on the products manufactured in Shanghai's FTCs (Foreign Trade Companies)’ joint ventures invested in other provinces, while its comparative advantage in trade as a middlemen has not been fully utilized since then.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed... more This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay-performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based payperformance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay-performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.
This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We dist... more This paper investigates CEO pay and pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. We distinguish four firm types based on their controlling owners: state owned enterprises affiliated with state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises affiliated with the central government (SOECGs), state owned enterprises affiliated with a local government (SOELGs), and private firms controlled by private investors. We also distinguish
The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders reminds us of the necessity for an app... more The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders reminds us of the necessity for an appropriate level of managerial ownership that ensures management decisions align with the benefit of shareholders. Prior evidence has demonstrated associations between managerial ownership, financial decisions and firm value in developed markets. This paper extends prior research by examining the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital structure choices using examples of China's civilian-run listed firms from 2002 to 2007.
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines the relevance of currently... more Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study examines the relevance of currently accepted best practice recommendations regarding board structure on the survival likelihood of new economy initial public offering companies. We argue that industry context determines governance outcomes.Research Findings/Insights: We study 125 Australian new economy firms listed between 1994 and 2002. Each firm is tracked until the end of 2007 for monitoring their survival. We find that board independence is associated with an increase in the likelihood of corporate survival. We also find that the benefits of board independence increase at a decreasing rate.Theoretical/Academic Implications: The standard best practice recommendation of board independence stems from the monitoring role of directors and is based on agency theory. The results from our study suggest that the recommendation regarding board independence does not work well for new economy firms. While the agency theory based model implies a monotonic relation between board independence and performance, our research suggests that the relationship is nonlinear. This variation occurs because of increased monitoring costs faced by outsiders due to higher information asymmetry and complexity of new economy firms. Our empirical results suggest that inside directors play a complementary role to outsiders in mitigating firm failure.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our research offers insights to policy makers who are interested in setting best practice standards regarding board structure. Our research suggests that firm/industry characteristics play a crucial role in determining the optimal board structure. In firms/industries where outsiders face significantly higher information processing costs, insiders can play a valuable complementary role to outsiders in enhancing the effectiveness of the board. Thus future hard or soft regulations related to board structure should consider industry context.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed... more This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.
Australian Economic Papers, 2007
This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai... more This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai A and B-share market, and between these two markets and the Hong Kong, the Taiwanese, the Japanese and the US market of two sub periods between July 1993 and March 2007. On the basis of a new Granger non-causality test procedure developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995) and Johansen's (1988) cointegration test, my results suggest that a long-term equilibrium relationship measured by cointegration has been merged between the Chinese A-share market and the other markets in greater China region as well as the US market during the post-crisis period which covers the period since Chinese A-share market was opened to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. I also found that the Shanghai A-share market uni-directionally Granger-causes the other regional markets after the Asian financial crisis, while the A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market have had a significant feedback relationship since then. However, I found no evidence there has been cointegrating relationship between Shanghai B-share market and any other market ever since the B-share market was opened to the local retail investors in 2001.
This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in Chi... more This paper investigates managerial compensation and its relationship with firm performance in China's listed firms. In China, the largest shareholder dominates other shareholders, controls the firm and therefore exercises substantial impacts on manager compensation. After controlling for other firm and industry characteristics, we find that manager remuneration is greater and pay-performance relation is stronger for privately-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms. We also document that state-controlled firms exercise performance-based manager incentive schemes, which is contrary to evidence found in some earlier studies. Our results also indicate that top executives in firms with a foreign ownership are more highly compensated, relative to those without foreign ownership.
Asia-pacific Financial Markets, 2002
Numerous studies in the finance literature have investigated technical analysis to determine its ... more Numerous studies in the finance literature have investigated technical analysis to determine its validity as an investment tool. This study is an attempt to explore whether some forms of technical analysis can predict stock price movement and make excess profits based on certain trading rules in markets with different efficiency level. To avoid using arbitrarily selected 26 trading rules as did by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) and later by Bessembinder and Chan (1998), this paper examines predictive power and profitability of simple trading rules by expanding their universe of 26 rules to 412 rules. In order to find out the relationship between market efficiency and excess return by applying trading rules, we examine excess return over periods in U.S. markets and also compare the excess returns between U.S. market and Chinese markets. Our results found that there is no evidence at all supporting technical forecast power by these trading rules in U.S. equity index after 1975. During the 1990s break-even costs turned to be negative, –0.06%, even failing to beat a buy-holding strategyin U.S. equity market. In comparison, our results provide support for the technical strategies even in the presence of trading cost in Chinese stock markets.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2007
After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock ... more After examining both the interday and intraday return volatility of the Shanghai Composite Stock Index, it was found that the open-to-open return variance is consistently greater than the close-to-close variance. Examining the volatility of interday returns and variance ratio tests with five-minute intervals reveals an L-shaped pattern, or more precisely, two L-shaped patterns, starting with a small hump during both the morning and the afternoon sessions, with the morning session having a much higher interday volatility than the afternoon session. This L-shaped interday volatility is supported by the similarly shaped intraday volatility pattern. This result suggests that the high volatility of intraday returns for the market open is not entirely due to the trading mechanisms (call auction in the market opening) but also due to both the accumulated overnight information and the trading halt effect. The five-minute breaks after the auction and blind auction procedures are the two major driving forces which exaggerate the high intraday volatility observed at the market open.