Kelly T. Rowe | Pompeu Fabra University (original) (raw)
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Papers by Kelly T. Rowe
Party Politics, 2013
Economic voting claims that citizens will reward or punish the incumbent government based on the ... more Economic voting claims that citizens will reward or punish the incumbent government based on the state of the economy as a mechanism of democratic accountability. In negative economic voting, in order to vote against the government, citizens must have options (parties) in which to place their vote to voice discontent. If not, there is no opportunity to cast an ‘economic vote’ and abstention results, leading to a weakened economic effect. In this article I argue that the electoral system indirectly mediates the relationship between the economy and the vote by determining the number of viable parties which act as the conduit for punishing the incumbent. Cross-national data and individual-level data for the case of Spain are used to test the impact of the number of parties on economic voting. The findings suggest that when there are more viable parties competing, the probability of casting an economic vote increases.
Comparative European Politics, 2014
Journal of Professional Communication, 2013
How party strategies vary by electoral systems remains largely unexplored in election studies. Us... more How party strategies vary by electoral systems remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using a comparative statics analysis with qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies vary across two different electoral systems. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders of the main Spanish political parties to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts and/or the district-level electoral competitiveness. Our results show that the frequency of visits to districts by party leaders is clearly affected by electoral systems, mainly by the number of districts and district population.
Party Politics, 2013
Economic voting claims that citizens will reward or punish the incumbent government based on the ... more Economic voting claims that citizens will reward or punish the incumbent government based on the state of the economy as a mechanism of democratic accountability. In negative economic voting, in order to vote against the government, citizens must have options (parties) in which to place their vote to voice discontent. If not, there is no opportunity to cast an ‘economic vote’ and abstention results, leading to a weakened economic effect. In this article I argue that the electoral system indirectly mediates the relationship between the economy and the vote by determining the number of viable parties which act as the conduit for punishing the incumbent. Cross-national data and individual-level data for the case of Spain are used to test the impact of the number of parties on economic voting. The findings suggest that when there are more viable parties competing, the probability of casting an economic vote increases.
Comparative European Politics, 2014
Journal of Professional Communication, 2013
How party strategies vary by electoral systems remains largely unexplored in election studies. Us... more How party strategies vary by electoral systems remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using a comparative statics analysis with qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies vary across two different electoral systems. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders of the main Spanish political parties to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts and/or the district-level electoral competitiveness. Our results show that the frequency of visits to districts by party leaders is clearly affected by electoral systems, mainly by the number of districts and district population.