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Papers by Emma Black

Donna Haraway's “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s... more Donna Haraway's “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s” remains
a major reference point for twenty-frst century cyber- and techno- feminists. However, its broader political and
philosophical relevance has become increasingly obscured. Te emergence of twenty-frst century accelerationism,
I will argue, calls for renewed engagement with Haraway’s iconic text. Trough bringing accelerationism into
contact with cyborg ontology, I aim to show how accelerationism might beneft from further engagement with
the history of technofeminist thought. Such engagement, I will argue, not only assists in clarifying what
accelerationism is, but also contributes to developing what it might be, through providing productive responses to
some of its major criticisms. In reconfguring the cyborg as an “accelerationist prototype,” I hope to contribute to
the ongoing elaboration of accelerationist politics, as well as demonstrate the continuing and perhaps increasing
efficacy of technofeminist philosophy in the twenty-frst century.

Conference Presentations by Emma Black

Conference Presentation, Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy, 2017

This paper is an effort to redeem the figure of Prometheus—to transform him from a tragic victim ... more This paper is an effort to redeem the figure of Prometheus—to transform him from a tragic victim of his own hubris into a rational political agent. What makes Prometheus a tragic figure is the presumption that there is a “given,” “natural,” or “immutable” limit to our capacities for thought and
action—the transgression of which necessarily yields catastrophe. Against this presumption, I will argue that—while there are always limitations upon what we can know and what we can do—these limits are contingent and mutable, contestable and changeable. To argue otherwise is to endorse
an intrinsically theological notion of givenness that serves to naturalise and perpetuate present forms of oppression. By contrasting two very different notions of a limit—the “given” or “immutable” with the “contingent” or “changeable”—I hope to reconcile our image of Prometheus with that of the young Marx, who considers Prometheus’ defiance of transcendent authority to be the task of every philosopher.

In the concluding paragraph of What is Philosophy (1994), Deleuze and Guattari assert that, “Phil... more In the concluding paragraph of What is Philosophy (1994), Deleuze and Guattari assert that, “Philosophy needs a non-philosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs a non-art and science needs a non-science” (1994, p. 218). Affixed to this assertion is a footnote gesturing toward Francois Laruelle's nonphilosophy: “Laruelle proposes a comprehension of nonphilosophy as the 'real of science,' beyond the object of knowledge...but,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “we do not see why this real of science is not non-science as well” (p. 234). The following paper will examine the “reactivation of the real” undertaken by Francois Laruelle, and more recently, by Ray Brassier. For these theorists, the real is conceived of as aphilosophical, yet scientifically apprehendable. In the following, I will attempt to address Deleuze and Guattari's query as to why the “real of science” constitutes, for Laruelle and Brassier, the nonphilosophical real, and the implications of this for philosophy.

Other by Emma Black

MSCP Course Outline, 2019

In pursuing a problem, the philosopher inevitably comes up against the limits of a particular phi... more In pursuing a problem, the philosopher inevitably comes up against the limits of a particular philosophical framework to deal with that problem. At this juncture, she may either abandon the problem in the interests of the framework or abandon the framework in the interests of the problem. The former constitutes intellectual myopia. The latter constitutes thinking. In fearlessly and relentlessly pursuing philosophical problems, Ray Brassier not only transcends academic enclaves, he problematises the commodification of philosophy as a finished product to be marketed and exchanged. Above and beyond what he thinks, Brassier's contemporary significance consists in how-or rather, that-he thinks. This course will explore the philosophical and political implications of both. Renowned as Speculative Realism's unwitting founder, Ray Brassier is a philosopher in constant movement. Over the past twenty years, he has been synthesising New French Philosophers such as François Laruelle, Alain Badiou, and Quentin Meillassoux with the Anglo-American traditions of cognitive science (Paul Churchland) naturalism (Wilfrid Sellars) and inferentialism (Robert Brandom). While these anomalous exercises in conceptual subversion are often brilliantly disorientating, Brassier's infidelity to any particular philosophical tradition betrays a profound fidelity to particular philosophical problems. This course will take up the three major philosophical problems preoccupying Brassier: the problem of nihilism, the problem of naturalism, and the problem of normativity. Although they remain inextricable from one another, each problem becomes the focus of his work at a different point in time. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between Brassier's nihilistic phase (extending from his earliest articles up until the publication of Nihil Unbound in 2007); his naturalistic phase (consisting of a sustained engagement with Wilfrid Sellars between 2008 until 2013); and his normative phase (indexing an increasing interest, since 2014, in Anglo-American Hegelianism and Marxism).

Donna Haraway's “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s... more Donna Haraway's “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist-Feminism in the 1980s” remains
a major reference point for twenty-frst century cyber- and techno- feminists. However, its broader political and
philosophical relevance has become increasingly obscured. Te emergence of twenty-frst century accelerationism,
I will argue, calls for renewed engagement with Haraway’s iconic text. Trough bringing accelerationism into
contact with cyborg ontology, I aim to show how accelerationism might beneft from further engagement with
the history of technofeminist thought. Such engagement, I will argue, not only assists in clarifying what
accelerationism is, but also contributes to developing what it might be, through providing productive responses to
some of its major criticisms. In reconfguring the cyborg as an “accelerationist prototype,” I hope to contribute to
the ongoing elaboration of accelerationist politics, as well as demonstrate the continuing and perhaps increasing
efficacy of technofeminist philosophy in the twenty-frst century.

Conference Presentation, Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy, 2017

This paper is an effort to redeem the figure of Prometheus—to transform him from a tragic victim ... more This paper is an effort to redeem the figure of Prometheus—to transform him from a tragic victim of his own hubris into a rational political agent. What makes Prometheus a tragic figure is the presumption that there is a “given,” “natural,” or “immutable” limit to our capacities for thought and
action—the transgression of which necessarily yields catastrophe. Against this presumption, I will argue that—while there are always limitations upon what we can know and what we can do—these limits are contingent and mutable, contestable and changeable. To argue otherwise is to endorse
an intrinsically theological notion of givenness that serves to naturalise and perpetuate present forms of oppression. By contrasting two very different notions of a limit—the “given” or “immutable” with the “contingent” or “changeable”—I hope to reconcile our image of Prometheus with that of the young Marx, who considers Prometheus’ defiance of transcendent authority to be the task of every philosopher.

In the concluding paragraph of What is Philosophy (1994), Deleuze and Guattari assert that, “Phil... more In the concluding paragraph of What is Philosophy (1994), Deleuze and Guattari assert that, “Philosophy needs a non-philosophy that comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs a non-art and science needs a non-science” (1994, p. 218). Affixed to this assertion is a footnote gesturing toward Francois Laruelle's nonphilosophy: “Laruelle proposes a comprehension of nonphilosophy as the 'real of science,' beyond the object of knowledge...but,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “we do not see why this real of science is not non-science as well” (p. 234). The following paper will examine the “reactivation of the real” undertaken by Francois Laruelle, and more recently, by Ray Brassier. For these theorists, the real is conceived of as aphilosophical, yet scientifically apprehendable. In the following, I will attempt to address Deleuze and Guattari's query as to why the “real of science” constitutes, for Laruelle and Brassier, the nonphilosophical real, and the implications of this for philosophy.

MSCP Course Outline, 2019

In pursuing a problem, the philosopher inevitably comes up against the limits of a particular phi... more In pursuing a problem, the philosopher inevitably comes up against the limits of a particular philosophical framework to deal with that problem. At this juncture, she may either abandon the problem in the interests of the framework or abandon the framework in the interests of the problem. The former constitutes intellectual myopia. The latter constitutes thinking. In fearlessly and relentlessly pursuing philosophical problems, Ray Brassier not only transcends academic enclaves, he problematises the commodification of philosophy as a finished product to be marketed and exchanged. Above and beyond what he thinks, Brassier's contemporary significance consists in how-or rather, that-he thinks. This course will explore the philosophical and political implications of both. Renowned as Speculative Realism's unwitting founder, Ray Brassier is a philosopher in constant movement. Over the past twenty years, he has been synthesising New French Philosophers such as François Laruelle, Alain Badiou, and Quentin Meillassoux with the Anglo-American traditions of cognitive science (Paul Churchland) naturalism (Wilfrid Sellars) and inferentialism (Robert Brandom). While these anomalous exercises in conceptual subversion are often brilliantly disorientating, Brassier's infidelity to any particular philosophical tradition betrays a profound fidelity to particular philosophical problems. This course will take up the three major philosophical problems preoccupying Brassier: the problem of nihilism, the problem of naturalism, and the problem of normativity. Although they remain inextricable from one another, each problem becomes the focus of his work at a different point in time. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between Brassier's nihilistic phase (extending from his earliest articles up until the publication of Nihil Unbound in 2007); his naturalistic phase (consisting of a sustained engagement with Wilfrid Sellars between 2008 until 2013); and his normative phase (indexing an increasing interest, since 2014, in Anglo-American Hegelianism and Marxism).