Michael Forsyth | US Army Command & General Staff College (original) (raw)

Papers by Michael Forsyth

Southern Strategies, 2021

In 2015, I had the opportunity to host a senior Chinese officer during his visit to the United St... more In 2015, I had the opportunity to host a senior Chinese officer during his visit to the United States. During our time together, he continually expressed that the United States should have respect for China, and that it should not pursue a policy of containment. No matter the topic of discussion, the official always circled back to this theme. It seemed to me that this perception of persecution bordered on paranoia.Assuming the Chinese officer's statements represented the views of his country's leaders, I was reminded of the historical situation with Imperial Germany before World War I. An unreasonable fear of encirclement influenced Germany's political and military class, a mentality that contributed to the start of World War I. I wondered if modern Chinese leaders, like German leaders of the past, were beginning to believe other countries in their region were attempting to encircle them. If so, historical precedent suggests that such paranoia on the part of China could...

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per res... more Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

Abstract : At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, firing units must... more Abstract : At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, firing units must provide 6400-mit fires in the low-intensity phase of the rotation, yet too many units come lacking proficiency in 6400-mit operations. Units tend to fail to conduct timely, effective 6400-mit operations because their home-station training has been designed with a live-fire mindset limited by their impact areas. The nonlinear JRTC battlefield is similar to the one we faced in Vietnam and requires 6400-mit fires to support maneuver elements. The purpose of this article is to provide tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for timely, accurate fires in any direction. Here are some of the most common problems that the observer/controllers (0/Cs) at the JRTC witness month after month. Units have a tendency to choose position areas (PAs) that do not facilitate 6400-mil operations. They fail to position equipment properly in the firing location, emplace their aiming references incorrectly or fail to compute the executive officer's minimum quadrant elevation (X0's min QE), terrain gun position corrections (TGPCs) and graphical firing table (GFT) settings for all eight octants. Failing to perform any of these steps leads to the unit's failure to deliver timely, massed and accurate fires in all directions.

Military Review, Jul 1, 2005

Military Review, Mar 1, 2003

Since the advent of indirect fire on the battlefield, the U.S. Field Artillery (FA) has used cann... more Since the advent of indirect fire on the battlefield, the U.S. Field Artillery (FA) has used cannon-based weapons systems as primary delivery platforms. The past several decades has witnessed an explosion of various technologies that lend themselves to improving field artillery weaponry, so it is now appropriate to examine current capabilities and needs for the future and to suggest how field artillery should change as the Army enters the 21st century. Where We Stand The Army's field artillery weapons are not unlike those used during World War II. The M119 105-millimeter (mm) howitzer, the M198 155-mm howitzer, and the M109A6 Paladin 155-mm howitzer have characteristics remarkably similar to their forerunners. They use either semi-fixed or separate loading ammunition and are best suited for area fire. The towed M119's and M198's telescopic sight systems use fixed aiming references that were invented before World War II. The M109A6 Paladin uses state-of-the-art onboard position-locating devices and computers to aim the howitzer at its target, but its ammunition remains almost exclusively area fire. In sum, field artillery systems were built for an organization developed decades earlier. While U.S. weapons have made modest technological advances since World War II, they are fast becoming antiquated. The Army has witnessed improvements in range, lethality, and accuracy, but this is not enough, given the furious pace of advance by other systems. Army systems, however, weigh more now than did similar World War II systems, but Army cannons are rapidly falling behind the capabilities of foreign-produced guns, such as Britain's AS-90, South Africa's G-5/6, and the North Korean Koksan gun. That the Army is falling behind should provide adequate incentive to press for a change that will place it head and shoulders above all other nations' armies in ground-based fire support. Future Battlefields In light of technological advances, the Army's FA arsenal is losing relevance at an increasing pace. Today's battlefield is far more lethal than the battlefields of either World War Il or the Persian Gulf war because precision munitions are becoming the preeminent weapons of choice. In the Persian Gulf war, less than 9 percent of munitions the U.S. Air Force (USAF) used were precision weapons. Eight years later, in Kosovo, the figure had risen to 29 percent. During the war in Afghanistan, the number of munitions expended soared to an astounding 70 percent. (1) Precision munitions have allowed the USAF to greatly reduce the number of sorties and bombs required to adequately service a target. For example, in World War II, one thousand sorties of B-17s with nine thousand bombs were required to destroy one target. Today, the USAF can fly one B-2 sortie delivering 16 global positioning system (GPS) bombs to 16 targets. The circular-error probable for bombs from the 1940s was 3,300 feet compared to the current 20 feet. (2) The Army's field artillery must use a similar concept to gain this capability with an all-weather, ground-based fire support system. The battlefield is likely to be far from the United States in a landlocked country. Because of limited USAF lift assets and the heavy weight of Army cannons, field artillery, except towed howitzers, has little strategic mobility. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a lighter weight precision-launch rocket system (PLRS) that lends itself to strategic airmobility. The military is reducing the long logistical tail traditionally associated with operations. Rather than maintaining large stockpiles of ammunition and other logistic items, the military is reducing stockpiles and replenishing just-in-time service. Cannon-based systems using area fire munitions belie the just-in-time concept. The Army's mode of operation--massed fires from multiple guns--requires enormous stocks of ammunition and a heavy lift capability. Logisticians report that the need to haul artillery ammunition generates approximately 70 percent of a division's logistical requirements. …

Military Review, Jul 1, 2004

ACCORDING TO the Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, "War is an act of force t... more ACCORDING TO the Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz, "War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."1 This definition remains relevant today, but it needs a caveat for conflicts that include terrorist organizations, transnational crime groups, or drug cartels. I define war as an act of force by a nation-state, crime organization, terror group, drug cartel, revolutionary group, or coalition of states to compel an enemy to do one's will, accept a specific ideology, or prevent or allow unfettered criminal activity. The causes of war might include failures of diplomacy, communications, economic policies, or inadequate internal security. Wars should result in improved security for an affected nation's citizens, but often result in degraded or deteriorated social conditions. Many factors influence war. From the time of the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, governments have established the rules of when and where to make war according to national interests. Today, state dominance of war is eroding.2 Organizations with widely disparate beliefs have become major actors in war. Such groups use organized violence to achieve a political purpose, to force acceptance of an ideology, or to satisfy greed. Two more nebulous forces-friction and chance-also greatly affect the conduct and outcome of war. When all actors join the fight, considerable friction builds. Every act in war produces friction that inhibits the act's seamless execution. Chance is one aspect of friction. Clausewitz compared war to a game of cards.3 Despite the best planning, preparation, training, and execution, the unexpected can intervene to change the intended or expected outcome of a conflict. Probably the best example of this is the weather, which can change the course of any military operation. Chance makes war unpredictable and gives the most sanguine commander ulcers. Three other factors that affect war are technology, doctrine, and genius. Technology provides the tools with which armies, paramilitaries, or other groups force their opponents to a decision. Technology is in a constant state of change, and actors must continually press to find or produce better tools to provide a winning edge on the battlefield. Yet, with all the advantage that technology might provide, ideas are the real advantage in war. Ideas, as military doctrine, state how a force conducts operations under ideal conditions. According to historian Michael Howard, no military has its doctrine entirely correct at the outbreak of hostilities.4 Victory goes to the force that adapts its doctrine to existing circumstances faster than its adversary. Genius, which might come in the form of a brilliant politician, commander, or group leader, is an important factor in war, but genius is extremely rare. Clausewitz noted that the lack of genius can be compensated for by training leaders in a regimen of theoretical and historical study combined with practical experience.5 The well-trained leader can synthesize doctrine and technology to produce military forces capable of victory. Such leaders are the key factors that fuse all others to produce coherence. War encompasses insurrection, terrorist acts, and criminal acts. With certain exceptions, such as political demonstrations, random criminal acts, and some assassinations, war is any violent act aimed at producing a change in the sociopolitical status quo. War begins as a result of an unacceptable political or social situation. To resolve conflicts, state politicians, revolutionaries, dissidents, criminals, or terrorists might decide they are not satisfied with regional, international, or internal circumstances, such as diplomacy, information operations, economic pressure, or military force. In other cases, leaders will attempt to use all measures short of military force to attain their goals. When such measures fail, they might resort to military action. The 20th century saw many kinds of armed conflict. …

Gettysburg Magazine, 2015

Southern Strategies, 2021

Military Review, Jul 1, 2005

Military Review, Mar 1, 2003

Military Review, Jul 1, 2004

Gettysburg Magazine, 2015