Emer O'Hagan | University of Saskatchewan (original) (raw)

Papers by Emer O'Hagan

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibiiographic Services services... more Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibiiographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wdüngm Street 395. me Wellingfcm OaawadN KlAONs ûitawaON KlAûN4 canada CaMda The author has granted a non-L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aiiowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, Ioan, distriiute or seU reproduire, prêter, distriiuer ou copies of this thesis in microfom, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la fonne de microfichelfilm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts tiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation.

European Journal of Philosophy, 2017

Non-Self and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes Are persons best understood as a series of happe... more Non-Self and Ethics: Kantian and Buddhist Themes Are persons best understood as a series of happenings, or as having a kind of unity that merits the appellation "self"? Or to put the question another way: Is the self explainable entirely by reference to temporal units constitutive of it, or are these units better understood as temporal parts of a whole? In recent discussions of the nature of the self in Western philosophy, the distinction between constructionist and non-constructionist views marks these two options. 1 A constructionist like Derek Parfit argues that because the self is not united over time in any deep metaphysical way, it is not real, and a person is just the subject of experiences. 2 This view of persons is said to have moral implications because if persons aren't discrete wholes but merely a series of happenings, then it seems arbitrary to privilege the happenings in one series rather than another. It is morally problematic to concern myself with my own future states over others' future states; they are not really mine. Christine Korsgaard, a non-constructionist, challenges Parfit's un-argued assumption, that it is only legitimate to treat future experiences as mine, and so serving as reasons for me, if

Philosophy in review, 2006

Virtue’s Reasons, Feb 17, 2017

Philosophia, 2018

The concept of identification is often appealed to in explanations of how it is that some actions... more The concept of identification is often appealed to in explanations of how it is that some actions are authored by an agent, and so autonomous, or free. Over the last several decades, different conceptions of identification have been advanced and refined, and the term is now commonplace in moral psychology and metaethics. In this paper I argue that two dominant accounts of identification implicated in self-unity (represented respectively by Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt) fail to acknowledge the significance of a related form of self-unifying activity, self-recognition. Self-recognition is self-authoring because it involves identification with a new description of oneself, but it is excluded by standard accounts of identification which over-emphasize action and volition in autonomous agency. Although self-recognition is unlikely to produce immediate action, it accords with the activity of self-unity that is said to be constitutive of identification.

Social Theory and Practice, 2009

Teaching Philosophy, 2011

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2009

Ethics without Self, Dharma without Atman, 2018

After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative-strategy interpretation of the no... more After distinguishing between a metaphysical and a contemplative-strategy interpretation of the no-self doctrine, I argue that the latter allows for the illumination of significant and under-discussed Kantian affinities with Buddhist views of the self and moral psychology. Unlike its metaphysical counterpart, the contemplative-strategy interpretation understands the doctrine of no-self as a technique of perception undertaken from the practical standpoint of action. I argue that if we think of the contemplative-strategy version of the no-self doctrine as a process that is undertaken in order to free oneself from delusion and to see things more objectively (inter alia, in order to promote right action), then we find a clear parallel in Kant’s duty of self-knowledge, which demands that we rid ourselves of deluded moral self-descriptions. While in Buddhism the aim is a selflessness that liberates one from suffering, for Kant the aim is an agency free of the conceit that interferes with clear moral vision, sound judgement, and dutiful action. I conclude by responding to objections advanced by Charles Goodman which aim to show that the Kantian position is deeply at odds with Buddhist thinking, arguing that neither Kantian agency nor Kantian self-legislation is undermined by the doctrine of no-self.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2014

In metaethics and other branches of metanormativity, constitutivism is the view that rational nor... more In metaethics and other branches of metanormativity, constitutivism is the view that rational norms can be grounded in the constitution of agency or action, by way of appeal to standards, capacities, motives, or aims which are themselves constitutive of agency or action. Some constitutivists are persuaded that understanding the normativity of theoretical and practical reasons requires an investigation of the nature of agency, the hope being that such an investigation will help to explain the categorical or objective nature of the norms of rationality and morality. Norms are constitutive of agency and action, the thinking goes, and so an inescapable part of human reality; thus opting out of rational agency is not (in the relevant sense) possible. 1 Constitutivists differ in what they take to be the relevant capacities, aims, or motives constitutive of agency or action, and in what they take to be the limitations and appeal of the constitutivist view. 2 Korsgaard has argued both that action is selfconstitution and that agency is constituted by acts of reflective endorsement and its implicit standards. 3 David Velleman has argued that the desire for self-understanding or intelligibility is constitutive of action. 4 Constitutivism has been discussed in more general terms by Peter Railton who has argued that analysis of categorical reasons for

Descartes's mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks th... more Descartes's mechanistic account of the passions is sometimes dismissed as one which lacks the resources to adequately explain the cognitive aspect of emotion. By some, he is taken to be "feeling theorist", reducing the passions to a mere awareness of the physiological state of the soul-body union. If this reading of Descartes's passions is correct, his theory fails not only because it cannot account for the intentional nature of the passions, but also because the passions cannot play the role in Descartes's moral theory they are meant to play. I argue that Descartes's account is not best read as a feeling theory. I defend a reading of the Cartesian passions which acknowledges their mechanistic nature, arguing that for Descartes, passions are modes of the soul with cognitive significance, they are perceptions of relational axiological properties. Thus, Descartes's theory of the passions has the resources to connect it with an account of good conduct...

Ratio, 2012

Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to h... more Most commonplace moral failure is not conditioned by evil intentions or the conscious desire to harm or humiliate others. It is more banal and ubiquitous -a form of moral stupidity that gives rise to rationalization, self-deception, failures of due moral consideration, and the evasion of responsibility. A kind of crude, perceptiondistorting self-absorption, moral stupidity is the cause of many moral missteps; moral development demands the development of self-knowledge as a way out of moral stupidity. Only once aware of the presence or absence of particular desires and beliefs can an agent have authority over them or exercise responsibility for their absence. But what is the connection between self-knowledge and moral development? I argue that accounts (such as Kant's and Richard Moran's) which construe instances of self-knowledge as like the verdicts of a judge cannot explain its potential role in moral development, and claim that it must be conceived of in a way that makes possible a process of self-refinement and selfregulation. Making use of Buddhist moral psychology, I argue that when self-knowledge plays a role in moral development, it includes a quality of attention to one's experience best modeled as the work of the craftsperson, not as judge.

Philosophical Explorations, 2005

In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because acco... more In this paper I advance a constitutive argument for the authority of rational norms. Because accountability to reasons is constitutive of rational agency and rational norms are implicit in reasons for action and belief, the justification of rational norms is of a piece with the practice of reasoning. Peter Railton has objected that the constitutive view fails to defend the categorical authority of reason over agents. I respond to his objections, arguing that they presuppose a foundationalist conception of justification that demands a ground for reason's authority outside of the practice of reasoning.

The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2000