Anthony Dukes | University of Southern California (original) (raw)

Papers by Anthony Dukes

Research paper thumbnail of The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data

Management Science, 2010

T he Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits ... more T he Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006-2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.

Research paper thumbnail of Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?

Research paper thumbnail of Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry

Journal of Marketing Research, 2006

Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel do... more Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel dominance of "power retailers". This complaint might not be valid. An analytical model of competing manufacturers and multi-product retailers, might see manufacturers'

Research paper thumbnail of Best Practices for Online Procurement Intermediaries

Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2005

Industrial buyers who seek to procure inputs have the option of contracting the process out to pr... more Industrial buyers who seek to procure inputs have the option of contracting the process out to procurement intermediaries. Many of these intermediaries now operate using Internet-based software to enhance the efficiency of their services. We develop a theoretical model of a buyer who wishes to procure an input from one of many differentiated suppliers. The buyer chooses between conducting the

Research paper thumbnail of Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media Markets

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2003

We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) ... more We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) compete for audiences with their choice of programming variety in order to attract advertising revenues from advertisers. These advertisers (producers) compete in a differentiated product market and rely on advertising to inform consumers about their product. We use the model to show that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation between them. This incentive is an implication of the assumed role of advertising as information and as an ultimate nuisance to the audience. When stations minimally differentiate their programming offerings, producers choose lower levels of advertising. Consequently, lower levels of product information are available to consumers, permitting producers to gain higher margins on product sales. As a result, stations can negotiate higher payments for advertising space.

Research paper thumbnail of Dominant retailers’ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels

Marketing Letters, 2014

This paper investigates the diverging incentives for product quality in a channel with two asymme... more This paper investigates the diverging incentives for product quality in a channel with two asymmetric retailers and a common supplier. When retailers differ in terms of service provision and channel power, changes in manufactured quality cause channel conflicts. In particular, our results show that if the low service retailer becomes dominant in the channel, it may induce a low level of quality that is detrimental for the other members of the channel. The low service retailer benefits from quality reduction first by improving its competitive standing against its rival retailer by lessening the importance of quality for consumer choice and second by strengthening its relative bargaining position vis-à-vis its supplier. Our results also show that consumer surplus may increase as a result of quality reduction.

Research paper thumbnail of Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry

Journal of Marketing Research, 2006

Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel do... more Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel dominance of "power retailers". This complaint might not be valid. An analytical model of competing manufacturers and multi-product retailers, might see manufacturers'

Research paper thumbnail of In-Store Media and Channel Management

In this paper, we study the interesting and complicated effects of retailer in-store media on dis... more In this paper, we study the interesting and complicated effects of retailer in-store media on distribution channel relationships. With the help of advanced technology, retailers can open in-store media in their stores and allow manufacturers to advertise through the instore media. We show that opening in-store media is a strategic decision for a retailer, and a retailer may strategically subsidize manufacturers on their advertising through instore media to better coordinate the channel. Even when in-store media is more effective than commercial media (i.e., radio, TV, newspaper, etc.), a retailer may still charge an advertising rate lower than commercial media does. We also show that the benefit of instore media to a retailer can be a U-shaped curve of manufacturer bargaining power, and a retailer may introduce in-store media only when manufacturer bargaining power is either very high or very low, but not intermediate. With manufacturer competition, a retailer can strategically use ...

Research paper thumbnail of Local Competition and Impact of Entry by a Dominant Retailer

This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers ... more This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers who encounter entry from a dominant discount retailer. Our primary objective is to determine how entry affects the pricing and relative profits of the incumbent stores and the ...

Research paper thumbnail of Pricing in vitro fertilization procedures

Health Economics, 2009

This paper examines the economics of pricing practices at artificial reproductive clinics, which ... more This paper examines the economics of pricing practices at artificial reproductive clinics, which have introduced money-back guarantees (MBGs) for in vitro fertilization. We identify incentives for clinics to offer MBGs and evaluate the impact on couples' choices and on social welfare. Introducing MBGs allows a clinic to (i) segment couples simultaneously on their relative fertility and on risk preferences; (ii) offer quantity discounts to relatively infertile couples; and (iii) offer some risk-sharing to couples for this costly procedure, whose outcome is uncertain. Our results also show how the addition of MBGs can affect the overall social welfare.

Research paper thumbnail of The End of the Robinson-Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data

Management Science, 2010

T he Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits ... more T he Robinson-Patman Act (RP), an antitrust statute aimed at protecting small businesses, limits price setting in distribution channels. To avoid costly penalties under RP, managers take a variety of precautions when pricing to retailers and wholesalers. But how likely is a court to find a defendant guilty of violating the RP? We find that this likelihood has dropped drastically as a result of recent Supreme Court rulings from more than 1 in 3 before 1993 to less than 1 in 20 for the period 2006-2010. The analysis also points to an increased success of the no harm to competition defense, which reflects the view that the courts have raised the hurdle for plaintiffs to establish competitive harm. Finally, our results indicate that smaller plaintiffs over time have fared worse than larger ones, a trend that challenges the notion that RP protects small businesses.

Research paper thumbnail of Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel?

Research paper thumbnail of Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry

Journal of Marketing Research, 2006

Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel do... more Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel dominance of "power retailers". This complaint might not be valid. An analytical model of competing manufacturers and multi-product retailers, might see manufacturers'

Research paper thumbnail of Best Practices for Online Procurement Intermediaries

Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2005

Industrial buyers who seek to procure inputs have the option of contracting the process out to pr... more Industrial buyers who seek to procure inputs have the option of contracting the process out to procurement intermediaries. Many of these intermediaries now operate using Internet-based software to enhance the efficiency of their services. We develop a theoretical model of a buyer who wishes to procure an input from one of many differentiated suppliers. The buyer chooses between conducting the

Research paper thumbnail of Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media Markets

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2003

We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) ... more We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) compete for audiences with their choice of programming variety in order to attract advertising revenues from advertisers. These advertisers (producers) compete in a differentiated product market and rely on advertising to inform consumers about their product. We use the model to show that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation between them. This incentive is an implication of the assumed role of advertising as information and as an ultimate nuisance to the audience. When stations minimally differentiate their programming offerings, producers choose lower levels of advertising. Consequently, lower levels of product information are available to consumers, permitting producers to gain higher margins on product sales. As a result, stations can negotiate higher payments for advertising space.

Research paper thumbnail of Dominant retailers’ incentives for product quality in asymmetric distribution channels

Marketing Letters, 2014

This paper investigates the diverging incentives for product quality in a channel with two asymme... more This paper investigates the diverging incentives for product quality in a channel with two asymmetric retailers and a common supplier. When retailers differ in terms of service provision and channel power, changes in manufactured quality cause channel conflicts. In particular, our results show that if the low service retailer becomes dominant in the channel, it may induce a low level of quality that is detrimental for the other members of the channel. The low service retailer benefits from quality reduction first by improving its competitive standing against its rival retailer by lessening the importance of quality for consumer choice and second by strengthening its relative bargaining position vis-à-vis its supplier. Our results also show that consumer surplus may increase as a result of quality reduction.

Research paper thumbnail of Channel Bargaining with Retailer Asymmetry

Journal of Marketing Research, 2006

Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel do... more Manufacturers of consumer products often complain of lower profits in light of growing channel dominance of "power retailers". This complaint might not be valid. An analytical model of competing manufacturers and multi-product retailers, might see manufacturers'

Research paper thumbnail of In-Store Media and Channel Management

In this paper, we study the interesting and complicated effects of retailer in-store media on dis... more In this paper, we study the interesting and complicated effects of retailer in-store media on distribution channel relationships. With the help of advanced technology, retailers can open in-store media in their stores and allow manufacturers to advertise through the instore media. We show that opening in-store media is a strategic decision for a retailer, and a retailer may strategically subsidize manufacturers on their advertising through instore media to better coordinate the channel. Even when in-store media is more effective than commercial media (i.e., radio, TV, newspaper, etc.), a retailer may still charge an advertising rate lower than commercial media does. We also show that the benefit of instore media to a retailer can be a U-shaped curve of manufacturer bargaining power, and a retailer may introduce in-store media only when manufacturer bargaining power is either very high or very low, but not intermediate. With manufacturer competition, a retailer can strategically use ...

Research paper thumbnail of Local Competition and Impact of Entry by a Dominant Retailer

This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers ... more This paper analyzes the competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers who encounter entry from a dominant discount retailer. Our primary objective is to determine how entry affects the pricing and relative profits of the incumbent stores and the ...

Research paper thumbnail of Pricing in vitro fertilization procedures

Health Economics, 2009

This paper examines the economics of pricing practices at artificial reproductive clinics, which ... more This paper examines the economics of pricing practices at artificial reproductive clinics, which have introduced money-back guarantees (MBGs) for in vitro fertilization. We identify incentives for clinics to offer MBGs and evaluate the impact on couples' choices and on social welfare. Introducing MBGs allows a clinic to (i) segment couples simultaneously on their relative fertility and on risk preferences; (ii) offer quantity discounts to relatively infertile couples; and (iii) offer some risk-sharing to couples for this costly procedure, whose outcome is uncertain. Our results also show how the addition of MBGs can affect the overall social welfare.