Elisa Aaltola | University of Turku (original) (raw)

Books by Elisa Aaltola

Häpeä ja rakkaus: Ihmiseläinluonto, 2019

Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics, 2018

Empatia: Myötäelämisen tiede, 2017

Eläimet yhteiskunnassa, 2015

This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proo... more This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact rights@palgrave.com if you have any queries regarding use of the file.

Papers by Elisa Aaltola

Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2021

Love of nonhuman animals and nature is often presumed to have positive moral implications: if we ... more Love of nonhuman animals and nature is often presumed to have positive moral implications: if we love elks or forests, we will also better appreciate their moral value and treat them with more respect and care. This paper investigates perhaps the most common variety of love-here termed 'the biological definition of love'-as applied to other animals and nature. Introducing the notion of 'the love paradox', it suggests that biological love of other animals and nature can also have deeply negative and anthropocentric moral consequences, due to the self-directedness and biases inherent to it. The need for more other-directed definitions of love is underlined.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , 2020

The climate crisis is an enormous challenge for contemporary societies. Yet, public discussions o... more The climate crisis is an enormous challenge for contemporary societies. Yet, public discussions on it often lead to anger, mocking, denial and other defensive behaviours, one prominent example of which is the reception met by the climate advocate Greta Thunberg. The paper approaches this curious phenomenon via shame. It argues that the very idea of anthropogenic climate change invites feelings of human failure and thereby may also entice shame. The notion of "climate shame" is introduced and distinguished from "climate guilt". Whereas climate guilt prioritises the flourishing of the environment and is focused on actions and morality, climate shame is concerned with human identity and selfhood. The paper then explores whether shame is a morally destructive or constructive emotion. Making use of both psychological and philosophical literature on shame, it argues that although shame faces many challenges that question its usefulness in moral pedagogy, these challenges can be met with "moral maturity"-moreover, following a utilitarian approach, the overall benefits of climate shame can justify its costs to individuals. My argument is that climate shame holds the potential of being a highly effective moral psychological method of persuasion, capable of inviting wholesale critical reflection on current, environmentally damaging practices and cultivation of more virtuous ways of co-existing with the rest of the natural world and other species.

Telos, 2010

Animal ethics has presented challenging questions regarding the human-animalrelationship. Accordi... more Animal ethics has presented challenging questions regarding the human-animalrelationship. According to some philosophers, non-human animals have value inthemselves. This claim is most commonly based on sentience or consciousness inthe phenomenal sense: since it is like something to be an animal, animals cannotbe treated as mere biological matter. However, the claim has been met with criticism.This paper analyses three of the most common arguments against what ishere called the “individual value” of non-human animals. These arguments are thecapacity argument, the humanistic argument, and the special relations argument.It is maintained that they all face severe problems, which leave the door open forthe possibility that non-human animals may, indeed, have individual value.

Teorema Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 2010

RESUMEN Las descripciones externas cuya aproximación a los animales se lleva a cabo por medio de ... more RESUMEN Las descripciones externas cuya aproximación a los animales se lleva a cabo por medio de mecanismos externos en lugar de estados mentales, han ganado una posición preeminente. Sin embargo, de acuerdo con el objetivismo fuerte, la atención necesita colocarse sobre las presunciones que subyacen a las creencias dadas. Cuando esto se aplica al tema de la mente animal se pone de manifiesto que las descripciones internas, más bien que las externas, son quizás las que ofrecerían una opción más fructífera. Esta afirmación viene apoyada por la crítica wittgensteiniana del escepticismo que busca evitar la "deflación" y plantea una "postura afectiva". Con todo, para evitar el relativismo y el conservadurismo, las descripciones internas y la postura afectiva necesitan hacer hincapié en las ramificaciones epistemológicas que están detrás de las creencias concernientes a la mente animal y hacer del animal el punto de referencia central de la investigación.

Animals, 2019

Simple Summary: Psychologists have used the term "meat paradox" to explain why people may emphasi... more Simple Summary: Psychologists have used the term "meat paradox" to explain why people may emphasize their concern for animal welfare and yet eat meat, the production of which has caused suffering to nonhuman creatures. This paper explores the meat paradox through the philosophical concept "akrasia". Akrasia refers to a situation, where one believes in a fact or value x, and yet acts against that fact or value. The paper uses the term "omnivore's akrasia" to denote a state where one believes in the value of animal wellbeing and nonetheless consumes products which have caused animal suffering. The claim of the paper is that understanding of the meat paradox can be significantly broadened with the use of philosophical takes on akrasia, which underline notions such as moral reason and virtue. Another claim is that it is through enhancing one's moral ability that both the meat paradox and omnivore's akrasia may be reduced. Specific factors included in such enhancement are introduced and compared with "nudging". In the conflicting era when the meat industry is rapidly growing on a global scale whilst attitudes toward other animals are becoming increasingly positive, exploring the phenomenon of both eating and caring for animals is of clear societal, political, and moral significance. Abstract: Western cultures have witnessed an intriguing phenomenon in recent years: People are both more concerned for animal wellbeing and consume more animal products than ever before. This contradiction has been explored in psychology under the term "meat paradox". However, what has been omitted from the explorations is the age-old philosophical notion of "akrasia", within which one both knows "the good" and acts against it. The paper seeks to address this omission by comparing psychological research on the meat paradox with philosophy of akrasia. Applying Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Spinoza, I investigate the underlying factors of and solutions to what is here called "omnivore's akrasia". Whilst contemporary research on the meat paradox focuses on various descriptive cognitive errors (such as cognitive dissonance), philosophy of akrasia has tended to focus more prescriptively on moral reason and virtue. After discussing "nudging" as an implication of the descriptive approach, the paper supports the prescriptive perspective and "the cultivation argument". The claim is that contemporary research on the contradictions concerning attitudes toward other animals would greatly benefit from paying more attention to the value-laden mental factors underlying moral agency.

Routledge Handbook of Love, 2019

Love of nonhuman animals has become a prominent theme in Western cultures, particularly since the... more Love of nonhuman animals has become a prominent theme in Western cultures, particularly since the 19th century. Yet, Western societies also kill and consume more animals than perhaps ever in the history of our species. The chapter explores what love towards nonhuman others entails, and what type of love would lead to the soundest moral implications, thus also enabling one to acknowledge the intrinsic value and subjectivity of other animals. The philosophies of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch will be used as the foundation for this exploration, and it will be suggested that attention (or what here is often termed “attentiveness”) entwines or correlates with morally laden love, capable of manifesting the realities of other animals. Routes towards such “love as metalevel attention” include other-directedness, humility and approaching others as art—all factors arguably lacking in anthropocentric attitudes towards nonhuman creatures.

Journal of Disability & Religion , 2019

According to the narrative approach, illness and suffering are disruptions that test our ability ... more According to the narrative approach, illness and suffering are disruptions that test our ability to retell and govern ourselves. For instance, Arthur Frank and Rita Charon argue that it is via narratives, “selves,” and control that the challenges of illness and affliction can be met. The author explores this approach in light of Simone Weil’s philosophy and Zen Buddhist thought, both of which question the primacy of selfhood, control, and discourse. Using disability as a case study, the author argues that both Weil and Zen Buddhist philosophy offer a radical alternative to narrative ethics, worthy of further scrutiny.

Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society, 2018

The sort of meanings which suffering is depicted with influence both individual experiences of an... more The sort of meanings which suffering is depicted with influence both individual experiences of and social responses to it. In contemporary research, these meanings have been explored via mapping out individual narratives on illness and suffering, and by locating common typologies underlying them. Much less emphasis has been placed on philosophical narratives on suffering and the manner in which they both echo and strengthen culturally common Western meanings concerning human travails. The paper takes its impetus from here and examines three distinct philosophical narratives on suffering presented by Emmanuel Levinas, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Simone Weil. Moreover, it investigates the cultural influences behind them, ranging from Homeric tragedies to Medieval Christianity and Holocaust portrayals. The suggestion is that analysing philosophical narratives facilitates moral comparisons between the varieties of cultural meanings given to suffering. This, again, enables one to locate the societal and political consequences that narratives of suffering have on how we approach, for instance, vulnerability and disability.

The Intellectual Landscape in the Works of J.M. Coetzee, 2018

Propositional, rational language is often used to form three distinctions between humans and othe... more Propositional, rational language is often used to form three distinctions between humans and other animals: epistemological, ontological, and normative. It is positioned as the tool of knowing animality, outside of which animals themselves remain mysteries; it is also viewed as the necessary foundation of mindedness, beyond which no conscious mental states can take place; and finally, it is set as the criterion for our moral worth as individuals. Pigs, thereby, are creatures reduced to human lingual descriptions of them, and we cannot know "pigness" directly, via other methods (such as direct, embodied encounters). Due to the absence of language, pigs are also still all too often presumed to lack internal, mental lives, and this again is positioned as a reason for the belief that it is absurd to speak of the "rights of pigs."

Häpeä ja rakkaus: Ihmiseläinluonto, 2019

Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics, 2018

Empatia: Myötäelämisen tiede, 2017

Eläimet yhteiskunnassa, 2015

Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2021

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics , 2020

Telos, 2010

Teorema Revista Internacional De Filosofia, 2010

Animals, 2019

Routledge Handbook of Love, 2019

Journal of Disability & Religion , 2019

Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society, 2018

The Intellectual Landscape in the Works of J.M. Coetzee, 2018

Critical Animal Studies, 2018

Ethical and Political Approaches to Nonhuman Animal Issues, 2017

In her chapter, Elisa Aaltola notes how “shame” and “guilt” are powerful moral emotions. They inf... more In her chapter, Elisa Aaltola notes how “shame” and “guilt” are powerful moral emotions. They influence how we construct and construe moral values and norms and may motivate key normative outlooks on other beings. They are often treated synonymously, yet there are important differences between the two. Observing this, Aaltola investigates these differences and their impact on our moral agency in the context of interspecies ethics. Aaltola asks: what are shame and guilt, and what are their implications in how nonhuman animals are valued and treated? Using both psychological literature and philosophical analysis, she suggests that whereas shame can be quite destructive from the viewpoint of a morally inclusive approach to other animals, guilt can advance our moral ability in relation to the nonhuman world and may even be necessary for interspecies ethics.

Philosophy and the Politics of Animal Liberation, 2016

Akrasia refers to a state, where one knows what the morally sound course of action is, but volunt... more Akrasia refers to a state, where one knows what the morally sound course of action is, but voluntarily fails to pursue it. According to Plato, akrasia stems from misleading desires and emotions, which muddle the original, rationally produced moral judgement. In order to avoid akrasia, the aim, therefore, would be to cultivate our rational ability. The chapter explores this suggestion from the viewpoint of omnivore’s akrasia—a state wherein one knows consumption of other animals to be wrong, but still takes part in such consumption. It approaches the notion of rational cultivation from an Aristotelian perspective, and argues that since social practices and discourses maintain ambivalence in relation to nonhumans, cultivation cannot take place without wider societal change. Rational animal ethics needs to entwine with social and political transformation.

Ethics, Policy and Environment, 2015

Wilderness experiences were celebrated by the Great Romantics, and figures such as Wordsworth and... more Wilderness experiences were celebrated by the Great Romantics, and figures such as Wordsworth and Thoreau emphasized the need to seek direct contact with the non-human world. Later deep ecologists accentuated the way in which wilderness experiences can spark moral epiphanies and lead to action on behalf of the natural environment. In recent years, psychological studies have manifested how the observations made by the Romantics, nature authors and deep ecologists apply to laypeople: contact with the wilderness does tend to lead to epistemological, ontological and normative ‘epiphanies.’ This paper analyses four different umbrella terms with which to make sense of the content of wilderness experiences. First, mystical experience (William James), peak experience (Abraham Maslow) and elevation (Jonathan Haidt) are explored. Although all three offer promising models for explicating the nature of wilderness experiences, they also run the risk of reducing those experiences to sheer experiential hedonism. Second, attentiveness as emphasized in the tradition of mindfulness and in the philosophy of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch will be mapped out. Attentiveness not only helps one to understand the nature of wilderness experiences, but also offers a model with which to approach non-human nature and thereby acts as a barrier against hedonism.

Politics and Animals, 2015

In Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.) Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy. L... more In Elisa Aaltola & John Hadley (eds.) Animal Ethics and Philosophy: Questioning the Orthodoxy. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Anthrozoös 27:1, 2014

Animal advocacy uses images of nonhuman suffering as a form of normative rhetoric and a method of... more Animal advocacy uses images of nonhuman suffering as a form of normative rhetoric and a method of persuasion. Although much attention has been given to various facets of the depiction of human suffering, images of animal suffering have, to a large extent, escaped closer scrutiny. This paper seeks to remedy the situation by investigating four issues—the risk of aesthetics, the risk of perpetuating moral wrongs, the problem of privacy, and compassion fatigue—as they relate to images of farmed animal suffering. The paper will argue that images of nonhuman suffering are in danger of being interpreted as a form of visual intrigue, and that they invite seldom-asked questions concerning the justification of the act of looking, together with the privacy of nonhuman animals. Moreover, it will be maintained that compassion fatigue commonly affects how these images are perceived. Making use of the views of Susan Sontag, J. M. Coetzee, and Stanley Cohen (among others), it will be argued that, in order to escape the problematic connotations and consequences of the aforementioned issues, a normative dimension pointing toward action must be explicated.

In Helena Siipi & Markku Oksanen (eds.) The Ethics of Animal Recreation and Modification. Basings... more In Helena Siipi & Markku Oksanen (eds.) The Ethics of Animal Recreation and Modification. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Environmental Philosophy 10:2, 2013

The aim of this paper is to investigate key works on empathy and intersubjectivity and to compare... more The aim of this paper is to investigate key works on empathy and intersubjectivity and to compare how they relate to non-human animals. It will be suggested that intersubjectivity forms a powerful objection to skepticism concerning the minds of other animals and lays the grounds for normatively loaded empathic responses. It will also be argued that the core of intersubjectivity takes place outside of propositional language, thus defying the linguocentric stance often adopted in relation to other animals. Although descriptions of non- or pre-lingual responses is challenging, the type of “attention” brought forward by Simone Weil is offered as one alternative way of understanding what it is to pay heed to animal others, and the work of the ethologist Barbara Smuts is brought forward as an example of such attention.

Topoi 33:1, 2014

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the ... more Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency.

Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10:4, 2013

The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legisla... more The suffering of nonhuman animals has become a noted factor in deciding public policy and legislative change. Yet, despite this growing concern, skepticism toward such suffering is still surprisingly common. This paper analyzes the merits of the skeptical approach, both in its moderate and extreme forms. In the first part it is claimed that the type of criterion for verification concerning the mental states of other animals posed by skepticism is overly (and, in the case of extreme skepticism, illogically) demanding. Resting on Wittgenstein and Husserl, it is argued that skepticism relies on a misguided epistemology and, thus, that key questions posed by it face the risk of absurdity. In the second part of the paper it is suggested that, instead of skepticism, empathy together with intersubjectivity be adopted. Edith Stein’s take on empathy, along with contemporary findings, are explored, and the claim is made that it is only via these two methods of understanding that the suffering of nonhuman animals can be perceived.