Pilar Terrés | Universitat de València (original) (raw)
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Papers by Pilar Terrés
Philosophical studies, Jun 13, 2024
Philosophical studies, Mar 4, 2024
Synthese, 2020
The aim of this paper is to give a general solution to the paradoxes of the material conditional,... more The aim of this paper is to give a general solution to the paradoxes of the material conditional, including the paradoxes generated by embedded conditionals. The solution consists in a pragmatic reinterpretation of the formal languages of classical logic LK and relevant logic LR (which rejects the validity of weakening and splits the connectives into two) as presented in Paoli [2002],[2007]. In particular I argue that the material conditional in the classical logic LK captures the truth conditions of "if...then", but ignores certain pragmatic enrichments that are associated to it, while relevant logic LR can give a systematic diagnostic of the cases in which a conditional is pragmatically enriched and those cases in which it is not. This diagnostic shows the reason why the paradoxes seem unacceptable and why they are, nevertheless, truth-preserving. This reinterpretation will also cover the solution that Paoli [2005] gives to McGee's paradoxes of the Modus Ponens.
My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of the logical c... more My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of the logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered linear logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of the logical constants and substructural logics enrich their meaning pragmatically. The paper is divided into four parts: first, I introduce the motivation for the pluralist thesis of the paper; second I introduce the calculus for the different logics endorsed in the pluralist thesis; third, I motivate how the different behaviors of the logical vocabulary of these logics can be pragmatically interpreted, and fourth, I motivate how the different inferential roles that each substructural logic attribute to the logical constants can coexist, and how we should reason with a logical constant c given this plurality.
I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of... more I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids the violation of certain Gricean maxims and captures a different inferential role for the same logical constants, enriching their meaning pragmatically.
Thesis Chapters by Pilar Terrés
In this dissertation, we argue for a Pragmatic Logical Pluralism, a pluralist thesis about logic ... more In this dissertation, we argue for a Pragmatic Logical Pluralism, a pluralist thesis about logic which endorses Classical, Relevant, Linear, and Ordered logic. We justify that the formal languages of these four logics are legitimate codifications of the logical vocabulary and capture legitimate senses of logical consequence. This will be justified given a particular interpretation of the four formal languages: logical consequence and conditional, disjunction, and conjunction of the four different logics codify different and legitimate senses of ‘follows from’, ‘if...then’, ‘or’ and ‘and’ which diverge in their different pragmatic enrichments. The dissertation is twofold. First, we will explore the effect that the lack of structural rules has on logical connectives, in four substructural logics, and its connection with certain pragmatic enrichments. Second, we will defend a pluralist thesis according to which pragmatics has an important role for capturing the inferential role of logical vocabulary, both of the notions of ‘follows from’ and the logical constants, although classical logic preserves truth and captures their literal meaning. In sum, we defend a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate translations from natural language to formal languages, arguing that more than one translation is legitimate for logical vocabulary, which makes it possible to adopt more than one logic.
Philosophical studies, Jun 13, 2024
Philosophical studies, Mar 4, 2024
Synthese, 2020
The aim of this paper is to give a general solution to the paradoxes of the material conditional,... more The aim of this paper is to give a general solution to the paradoxes of the material conditional, including the paradoxes generated by embedded conditionals. The solution consists in a pragmatic reinterpretation of the formal languages of classical logic LK and relevant logic LR (which rejects the validity of weakening and splits the connectives into two) as presented in Paoli [2002],[2007]. In particular I argue that the material conditional in the classical logic LK captures the truth conditions of "if...then", but ignores certain pragmatic enrichments that are associated to it, while relevant logic LR can give a systematic diagnostic of the cases in which a conditional is pragmatically enriched and those cases in which it is not. This diagnostic shows the reason why the paradoxes seem unacceptable and why they are, nevertheless, truth-preserving. This reinterpretation will also cover the solution that Paoli [2005] gives to McGee's paradoxes of the Modus Ponens.
My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of the logical c... more My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of the logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered linear logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of the logical constants and substructural logics enrich their meaning pragmatically. The paper is divided into four parts: first, I introduce the motivation for the pluralist thesis of the paper; second I introduce the calculus for the different logics endorsed in the pluralist thesis; third, I motivate how the different behaviors of the logical vocabulary of these logics can be pragmatically interpreted, and fourth, I motivate how the different inferential roles that each substructural logic attribute to the logical constants can coexist, and how we should reason with a logical constant c given this plurality.
I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of... more I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical and relevant logic can be resolved, given that both logics capture and formalize normative and legitimate senses of logical consequence: classical logic encodes “follows from” as truth preservation and captures the truth conditions of the logical constants, while relevant logic encodes a notion of “follows from” which, apart from preserving truth, avoids the violation of certain Gricean maxims and captures a different inferential role for the same logical constants, enriching their meaning pragmatically.
In this dissertation, we argue for a Pragmatic Logical Pluralism, a pluralist thesis about logic ... more In this dissertation, we argue for a Pragmatic Logical Pluralism, a pluralist thesis about logic which endorses Classical, Relevant, Linear, and Ordered logic. We justify that the formal languages of these four logics are legitimate codifications of the logical vocabulary and capture legitimate senses of logical consequence. This will be justified given a particular interpretation of the four formal languages: logical consequence and conditional, disjunction, and conjunction of the four different logics codify different and legitimate senses of ‘follows from’, ‘if...then’, ‘or’ and ‘and’ which diverge in their different pragmatic enrichments. The dissertation is twofold. First, we will explore the effect that the lack of structural rules has on logical connectives, in four substructural logics, and its connection with certain pragmatic enrichments. Second, we will defend a pluralist thesis according to which pragmatics has an important role for capturing the inferential role of logical vocabulary, both of the notions of ‘follows from’ and the logical constants, although classical logic preserves truth and captures their literal meaning. In sum, we defend a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate translations from natural language to formal languages, arguing that more than one translation is legitimate for logical vocabulary, which makes it possible to adopt more than one logic.