Jolien C. Francken | University of Amsterdam (original) (raw)

Papers by Jolien C. Francken

Synthese

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces... more The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem, scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cog...

Sinds de jaren negentig, bekroond tot het 'Decennium van de hersenen', hebben de hersenwe... more Sinds de jaren negentig, bekroond tot het 'Decennium van de hersenen', hebben de hersenwetenschappen zich razendsnel ontwikkeld. In onze samenleving sijpelt de invloed van de nieuwe bevindingen door. Hersenonderzoek speelt een rol in marketing, onderwijs, zorg en recht. Het beinvloedt ook hoe wij over onszelf denken. Kunnen wij onszelf echt leren kennen door alleen naar de hersenen te kijken? Bestaat vrije wil of bepaalt ons brein ons? In Hersenwerk beschrijven zeven jonge neurowetenschappers op toegankelijke wijze de meest recente inzichten uit hun vakgebied. Ze staan stil bij de grenzen van het huidige hersenonderzoek en onderzoeken in hoeverre nieuwe technologieen de samenleving zullen veranderen. Er wordt een fascinerend beeld van de ontwikkelingen in de neurowetenschappen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw geschetst. Wat staat ons allemaal nog te wachten?

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, ... more We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC, 2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g., junior/senior faculty, graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom and that unconscious processi...

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, s... more A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one’s own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programmes or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that since consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of non-human animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics – the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Lastly...

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.

Brain and Cognition, 2017

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of resea... more To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example, when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-today life more effectively.

Consciousness and cognition, 2014

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and... more Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as 'mental realism'. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2015

Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive fun... more Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive functions. Several studies have demonstrated an influence of language on motion perception, but it remains debated at which level of processing this modulation takes place. Some studies argue for an interaction in perceptual areas, but it is also possible that the interaction is mediated by "language areas" that integrate linguistic and visual information. Here, we investigated whether language-perception interactions were specific to the language-dominant left hemisphere by comparing the effects of language on visual material presented in the right (RVF) and left visual fields (LVF). Furthermore, we determined the neural locus of the interaction using fMRI. Participants performed a visual motion detection task. On each trial, the visual motion stimulus was presented in either the LVF or in the RVF, preceded by a centrally presented word (e.g., "rise"). The word could be...

Consciousness and Cognition, 2012

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2019

The New Neurophilosophy: An Introduction to the ANTW special issueContemporary neurophilosophy is... more The New Neurophilosophy: An Introduction to the ANTW special issueContemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophilosophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cognitive concepts (CCC’s) like ‘free will’, ‘thoughts’, ‘consciousness’, ‘attention’ and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key idea...

ANTW, 2019

Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. I... more Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cog- nitive concepts (CCC’s) like‘free will’,‘thoughts’,‘consciousness’,‘attention’and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key ideas that characterize a new neurophilosophy.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

Brain and Cognition, 2017

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of resea... more To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example , when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-today life more effectively.

Previous studies have shown that language can modulate visual perception, by biasing and/ or enha... more Previous studies have shown that language can modulate visual perception, by biasing and/ or enhancing perceptual performance. However, it is still debated where in the brain visual and linguistic information are integrated, and whether the effects of language on perception are automatic and persist even in the absence of awareness of the linguistic material. Here, we aimed to explore the automaticity of language-perception interactions and the neural loci of these interactions in an fMRI study. Participants engaged in a visual motion discrimination task (upward or downward moving dots). Before each trial, a word prime was briefly presented that implied upward or downward motion (e.g., " rise " , " fall "). These word primes strongly influenced behavior: congruent motion words sped up reaction times and improved performance relative to incongruent motion words. Neural congruency effects were only observed in the left middle temporal gyrus, showing higher activity for congruent compared to incongruent conditions. This suggests that higher-level conceptual areas rather than sensory areas are the locus of language-perception interactions. When motion words were rendered unaware by means of masking, they still affected visual motion perception, suggesting that language-perception interactions may rely on automatic feed-forward integration of perceptual and semantic material in language areas of the brain.

Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 2015

Neuroscience of Consciousness

Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is uncle... more Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is unclear at which level of processing these interactions occur. Here we aim to dissociate between two competing models of language–perception interactions: a feed-forward and a feedback model. We capitalized on the fact that the models make different predictions on the role of feedback. We presented unmasked (aware) or masked (unaware) words implying motion (e.g. “rise,” “fall”), directly preceding an upward or downward visual motion stimulus. Crucially, masking leaves intact feed-forward information processing from low- to high-level regions, whereas it abolishes subsequent feedback. Under this condition, participants remained faster and more accurate when the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with the direction of the visual motion stimulus. This suggests that language–perception interactions are driven by the feed-forward convergence of linguistic and perceptual information at higher-level conceptual and decision stages.

Consciousness and Cognition

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and... more Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive fun... more Perception does not function as an isolated module but is
tightly linked with other cognitive functions. Several studies
have demonstrated an influence of language on motion perception,
but it remains debated at which level of processing this
modulation takes place. Some studies argue for an interaction
in perceptual areas, but it is also possible that the interaction is
mediated by “language areas” that integrate linguistic and visual
information. Here, we investigated whether language–perception
interactions were specific to the language-dominant left hemisphere
by comparing the effects of language on visual material
presented in the right (RVF) and left visual fields (LVF). Furthermore,
we determined the neural locus of the interaction
using fMRI. Participants performed a visual motion detection
task. On each trial, the visual motion stimulus was presented
in either the LVF or in the RVF, preceded by a centrally presented
motion word (e.g., “rise”). The motion word could be
congruent, incongruent, or neutral with regard to the direction
of the visual motion stimulus that was presented subsequently.
Participants were faster and more accurate when
the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with
the direction of the visual motion stimulus. Interestingly, the
speed benefit was present only for motion stimuli that were
presented in the RVF. We observed a neural counterpart of
the behavioral facilitation effects in the left middle temporal
gyrus, an area involved in semantic processing of verbal material.
Together, our results suggest that semantic information
about motion retrieved in language regions may automatically
modulate perceptual decisions about motion.

Frontiers in psychology, 2012

Recent years have seen a large amount of empirical studies related to "embodied cognition." While... more Recent years have seen a large amount of empirical studies related to "embodied cognition." While interesting and valuable, there is something dissatisfying with the current state of affairs in this research domain. Hypotheses tend to be underspecified, testing in general terms for embodied versus disembodied processing. The lack of specificity of current hypotheses can easily lead to an erosion of the embodiment concept, and result in a situation in which essentially any effect is taken as positive evidence. Such erosion is not helpful to the field and does not do justice to the importance of embodiment. Here we want to take stock, and formulate directions for how it can be studied in a more fruitful fashion. As an example we will describe few example studies that have investigated the role of sensori-motor systems in the coding of meaning ("embodied semantics"). Instead of focusing on the dichotomy between embodied and disembodied theories, we suggest that the field move forward and ask how and when sensori-motor systems and behavior are involved in cognition.

In their recent letter Desender and Van den Bussche (D&B) (2012) raise several issues with respec... more In their recent letter Desender and Van den Bussche (D&B) (2012) raise several issues with respect to our recent study , in which we describe a lack of relationship between how well a prime is perceived and its ability to influence behavior (i.e., priming). Here, we will shortly reply to these points.

Synthese

The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces... more The central task of cognitive neuroscience to map cognitive capacities to neural mechanisms faces three interlocking conceptual problems that together frame the problem of cognitive ontology. First, they must establish which tasks elicit which cognitive capacities, and specifically when different tasks elicit the same capacity. To address this operationalization problem, scientists often assess whether the tasks engage the same neural mechanisms. But to determine whether mechanisms are of the same or different kinds, we need to solve the abstraction problem by determining which mechanistic differences are and are not relevant, and also the boundary problem by distinguishing the mechanism from its background conditions. Solving these problems, in turn, requires understanding how cognitive capacities are elicited in tasks. These three problems, which have been noted and discussed elsewhere in the literature, together form a ‘cycle of kinds’ that frames the central problem-space of cog...

Sinds de jaren negentig, bekroond tot het 'Decennium van de hersenen', hebben de hersenwe... more Sinds de jaren negentig, bekroond tot het 'Decennium van de hersenen', hebben de hersenwetenschappen zich razendsnel ontwikkeld. In onze samenleving sijpelt de invloed van de nieuwe bevindingen door. Hersenonderzoek speelt een rol in marketing, onderwijs, zorg en recht. Het beinvloedt ook hoe wij over onszelf denken. Kunnen wij onszelf echt leren kennen door alleen naar de hersenen te kijken? Bestaat vrije wil of bepaalt ons brein ons? In Hersenwerk beschrijven zeven jonge neurowetenschappers op toegankelijke wijze de meest recente inzichten uit hun vakgebied. Ze staan stil bij de grenzen van het huidige hersenonderzoek en onderzoeken in hoeverre nieuwe technologieen de samenleving zullen veranderen. Er wordt een fascinerend beeld van de ontwikkelingen in de neurowetenschappen aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw geschetst. Wat staat ons allemaal nog te wachten?

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, ... more We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC, 2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, computer science) and at various stages of their careers (e.g., junior/senior faculty, graduate/undergraduate students). The results reveal that there remains considerable discussion and debate between the surveyed researchers about the definition of consciousness and the way it should be studied. To highlight a few observations, a majority of respondents believe that machines could have consciousness, that consciousness is a gradual phenomenon in the animal kingdom and that unconscious processi...

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, s... more A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one’s own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programmes or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that since consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of non-human animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics – the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Lastly...

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how. Incorporating this practical approach to intentional state ascription in psychopathological cases expands and improves traditional interpretivism.

Brain and Cognition, 2017

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of resea... more To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example, when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-today life more effectively.

Consciousness and cognition, 2014

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and... more Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as 'mental realism'. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

Journal of cognitive neuroscience, 2015

Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive fun... more Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive functions. Several studies have demonstrated an influence of language on motion perception, but it remains debated at which level of processing this modulation takes place. Some studies argue for an interaction in perceptual areas, but it is also possible that the interaction is mediated by "language areas" that integrate linguistic and visual information. Here, we investigated whether language-perception interactions were specific to the language-dominant left hemisphere by comparing the effects of language on visual material presented in the right (RVF) and left visual fields (LVF). Furthermore, we determined the neural locus of the interaction using fMRI. Participants performed a visual motion detection task. On each trial, the visual motion stimulus was presented in either the LVF or in the RVF, preceded by a centrally presented word (e.g., "rise"). The word could be...

Consciousness and Cognition, 2012

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2019

The New Neurophilosophy: An Introduction to the ANTW special issueContemporary neurophilosophy is... more The New Neurophilosophy: An Introduction to the ANTW special issueContemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophilosophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cognitive concepts (CCC’s) like ‘free will’, ‘thoughts’, ‘consciousness’, ‘attention’ and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key idea...

ANTW, 2019

Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. I... more Contemporary neurophilosophy is more pragmatic than the early neurophi- losophy of the 1980’s. It features two implicit ideas: First, commonsense cog- nitive concepts (CCC’s) like‘free will’,‘thoughts’,‘consciousness’,‘attention’and ‘self’, belong to a variety of disciplines and cannot be appropriated by either philosophy or cognitive neuroscience. Second, the description of biological processes in the brain and the description of behavioral processes by CCC’s are so far removed from each other that a simple reduction, or even a relation of implementation between them, is implausible. What is needed instead, is a relation of interpretation: which cognitive concepts should be used to describe specific brain processes is not fixed in advance but the outcome of an ongoing negotiation between common sense practice, philosophy, and cognitive neuroscience. All articles in this special issue shed light on these two key ideas that characterize a new neurophilosophy.

Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 2019

We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network app... more We argue that the explanatory role of intentional content in connecting symptoms in a network approach to psychopathology hinges neither on causality nor on rationality. Instead, we argue that it hinges on a pluralistic body of practical and clinical know-how.

Brain and Cognition, 2017

To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of resea... more To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For example , when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore, scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense, we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to be able to contribute to our day-today life more effectively.

Previous studies have shown that language can modulate visual perception, by biasing and/ or enha... more Previous studies have shown that language can modulate visual perception, by biasing and/ or enhancing perceptual performance. However, it is still debated where in the brain visual and linguistic information are integrated, and whether the effects of language on perception are automatic and persist even in the absence of awareness of the linguistic material. Here, we aimed to explore the automaticity of language-perception interactions and the neural loci of these interactions in an fMRI study. Participants engaged in a visual motion discrimination task (upward or downward moving dots). Before each trial, a word prime was briefly presented that implied upward or downward motion (e.g., " rise " , " fall "). These word primes strongly influenced behavior: congruent motion words sped up reaction times and improved performance relative to incongruent motion words. Neural congruency effects were only observed in the left middle temporal gyrus, showing higher activity for congruent compared to incongruent conditions. This suggests that higher-level conceptual areas rather than sensory areas are the locus of language-perception interactions. When motion words were rendered unaware by means of masking, they still affected visual motion perception, suggesting that language-perception interactions may rely on automatic feed-forward integration of perceptual and semantic material in language areas of the brain.

Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 2015

Neuroscience of Consciousness

Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is uncle... more Previous studies suggest that linguistic material can modulate visual perception, but it is unclear at which level of processing these interactions occur. Here we aim to dissociate between two competing models of language–perception interactions: a feed-forward and a feedback model. We capitalized on the fact that the models make different predictions on the role of feedback. We presented unmasked (aware) or masked (unaware) words implying motion (e.g. “rise,” “fall”), directly preceding an upward or downward visual motion stimulus. Crucially, masking leaves intact feed-forward information processing from low- to high-level regions, whereas it abolishes subsequent feedback. Under this condition, participants remained faster and more accurate when the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with the direction of the visual motion stimulus. This suggests that language–perception interactions are driven by the feed-forward convergence of linguistic and perceptual information at higher-level conceptual and decision stages.

Consciousness and Cognition

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and... more Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as ‘mental realism’. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

Perception does not function as an isolated module but is tightly linked with other cognitive fun... more Perception does not function as an isolated module but is
tightly linked with other cognitive functions. Several studies
have demonstrated an influence of language on motion perception,
but it remains debated at which level of processing this
modulation takes place. Some studies argue for an interaction
in perceptual areas, but it is also possible that the interaction is
mediated by “language areas” that integrate linguistic and visual
information. Here, we investigated whether language–perception
interactions were specific to the language-dominant left hemisphere
by comparing the effects of language on visual material
presented in the right (RVF) and left visual fields (LVF). Furthermore,
we determined the neural locus of the interaction
using fMRI. Participants performed a visual motion detection
task. On each trial, the visual motion stimulus was presented
in either the LVF or in the RVF, preceded by a centrally presented
motion word (e.g., “rise”). The motion word could be
congruent, incongruent, or neutral with regard to the direction
of the visual motion stimulus that was presented subsequently.
Participants were faster and more accurate when
the direction implied by the motion word was congruent with
the direction of the visual motion stimulus. Interestingly, the
speed benefit was present only for motion stimuli that were
presented in the RVF. We observed a neural counterpart of
the behavioral facilitation effects in the left middle temporal
gyrus, an area involved in semantic processing of verbal material.
Together, our results suggest that semantic information
about motion retrieved in language regions may automatically
modulate perceptual decisions about motion.

Frontiers in psychology, 2012

Recent years have seen a large amount of empirical studies related to "embodied cognition." While... more Recent years have seen a large amount of empirical studies related to "embodied cognition." While interesting and valuable, there is something dissatisfying with the current state of affairs in this research domain. Hypotheses tend to be underspecified, testing in general terms for embodied versus disembodied processing. The lack of specificity of current hypotheses can easily lead to an erosion of the embodiment concept, and result in a situation in which essentially any effect is taken as positive evidence. Such erosion is not helpful to the field and does not do justice to the importance of embodiment. Here we want to take stock, and formulate directions for how it can be studied in a more fruitful fashion. As an example we will describe few example studies that have investigated the role of sensori-motor systems in the coding of meaning ("embodied semantics"). Instead of focusing on the dichotomy between embodied and disembodied theories, we suggest that the field move forward and ask how and when sensori-motor systems and behavior are involved in cognition.

In their recent letter Desender and Van den Bussche (D&B) (2012) raise several issues with respec... more In their recent letter Desender and Van den Bussche (D&B) (2012) raise several issues with respect to our recent study , in which we describe a lack of relationship between how well a prime is perceived and its ability to influence behavior (i.e., priming). Here, we will shortly reply to these points.