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Papers by Paul Simard Smith

Philosophy in review, 2015

(hereafter C.D. Wright). The edited volume contains an introduction and sixteen essays dealing wi... more (hereafter C.D. Wright). The edited volume contains an introduction and sixteen essays dealing with alethic pluralism. The book has three thematically organized parts. I will discuss some issues raised in part one of the volume in more detail below. However, first I provide a very brief statement of the topics covered in each of the sixteen essays in the anthology. Part one contains essays by Michael Lynch, Pedersen and C.D. Wright, Douglas Edwards and Crispin Wright (hereafter Wright). Most of the discussions in part one deal with a tradition of work on alethic pluralism that originates with Wright's pioneering Truth and Objectivity and Michael Lynch's influential functionalist variant of alethic pluralism discussed primarily in his Truth as One and Many. In an earlier helpful review of this anthology Matti Eklund calls this tradition Wright-Lynch pluralism. Part one also contains two papers by Marian David and Pascal Engel that raise critical challenges for Wright-Lynch pluralism.

An agnostic pluralist approaches inquiry with the assumption that it is possible for more than on... more An agnostic pluralist approaches inquiry with the assumption that it is possible for more than one account of the phenomenon in question to be correct. A monist approaches inquiry with the assumption that only one account of the phenomenon in question is correct. The purpose of my paper is to support the claim that agnostic pluralists are less susceptible to a type of bias that I call dialectical bias than monists.

Topoi, 2020

In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonabl... more In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement.

Informal Logic, 2009

Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history o... more Work on analogy has been done from a number of disciplinary perspectives throughout the history of Western thought. This work is a multidisciplinary guide to theorizing about analogy. It contains 1,406 references, primarily to journal articles and monographs, and primarily to English language material. classical through to contemporary sources are included. The work is classified into eight different sections (with a number of subsections). A brief introduction to each section is provided. Keywords and key expressions of importance to research on analogy are discussed in the introductory material. Electronic resources for conducting research on analogy are listed as well.

Philosophia, 2012

In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-soundi... more In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-sounding assertions that have been collected under the umbrella of Moore's Paradox. Our aim in these brief remarks is not to attempt to settle the question of what makes an utterance Moorean decisively, but rather to present some new data bearing on it, and to argue that this new data is best explained by a new account of Moorean absurdity.

Informal Logic, 2011

In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word... more In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or an act/object ambigu-ity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argu-ment’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?

In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-soundi... more In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-sounding assertions that have been collected under the umbrella of Moore’s Paradox. Our aim in these brief remarks is not to attempt to settle the question of what makes an utterance Moorean decisively, but rather to present some new data bearing on it, and to argue that this new data is best explained by a new account of Moorean absurdity.

Articles and papers by Paul Simard Smith

Topoi, 2021

Philosophy in review, 2015

Topoi, 2020

Informal Logic, 2009

Philosophia, 2012

Informal Logic, 2011

In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-soundi... more In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-sounding assertions that have been collected under the umbrella of Moore’s Paradox. Our aim in these brief remarks is not to attempt to settle the question of what makes an utterance Moorean decisively, but rather to present some new data bearing on it, and to argue that this new data is best explained by a new account of Moorean absurdity.

Topoi, 2021