Shale Horowitz | University of Wisconsin Milwaukee (original) (raw)

Papers by Shale Horowitz

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2023

In ethno-territorial civil wars, which factors influence whether rebels choose and retain convent... more In ethno-territorial civil wars, which factors influence whether rebels
choose and retain conventional warfare as their primary military strategy
throughout the conflict, or whether they use guerrilla warfare as a primary
strategy during periods judged to be less advantageous to conventional
warfare? The existing literature almost exclusively emphasizes relative
power as the determining factor: rebels use guerrilla warfare because
they typically lack the capability to fight conventional wars effectively
against states. I find some support for this hypothesis: ethno-territorial
rebels are much more likely to fight exclusively conventional wars when
external states intervene conventionally on the rebel side. I also find that
rebel leaders with more intense, far-reaching nationalist goals are more
likely to employ guerrilla warfare as a primary war strategy. For such
leaders, the higher costs of using guerrilla methods pending an eventual
transition to conventional warfare are made more acceptable by a higher
valuation of the far-reaching gains delivered by military victory—gains
expected to be made more likely by interim periods in which guerrilla
warfare is the primary strategy. Turning to other factors, I do not find that
status quo conditions or a high level of state democracy have a significant
influence.

Academic Questions, 2023

The newest Left, when its old economic utopia died, was left only with a hate figure. The now-dom... more The newest Left, when its old economic utopia died, was left only with a hate figure. The now-dominant image of the hate figure—the product of a worldview obsessed with group-thought—is the European West as an ethnic and racial group. It vilifies all ethnic Europeans who do not bow down before Western self-hatred. This hate, unconstrained by coherent positive ideals, has no clear standards for appraising or prioritizing its increasingly incoherent array of allied mini-utopias—and merely defaults to its already failed, anti-traditional experiments in cultural hedonism and economic collectivism. The ideology serves only the moral and intellectual privilege of the self-hating elites, while harming most the less fortunate whom the self-haters falsely claim to represent.

Middle East Quarterly, 2023

When compared to other states involved in similar conflicts, Israel is more moderate in its goals... more When compared to other states involved in similar conflicts, Israel is more moderate in its goals and methods, and its enemies more extreme in their goals and methods, than in almost all of other cases. Israel is also more threatened than all other states in similar conflicts.

Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2023

Since coming to power in 2012, China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, has systematically overturned ... more Since coming to power in 2012, China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, has systematically overturned the “Reform and Opening Up” institutional and policy consensus, which was created by Deng Xiaoping and sustained by Xi’s two predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Since 2020, a flurry of policies have disrupted China’s already slowing economy. These include a many-sided regulatory assault on China’s most advanced high-tech businesses; sudden debt restrictions that plunged the real estate sector into crisis; and a stubborn zero-Covid policy that forces ongoing, unpredictable lockdowns.

Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2022

Each state threatened by China must respond with its own strategy, tailored to its own threats an... more Each state threatened by China must respond with its own strategy, tailored to its own threats and capacities. States more threatened by China will feel the need to take more far-reaching countermeasures. More threatened states with more limited means will try to avoid becoming the focus of CCP ire and sanctions by speaking softly and acting more informally. Nevertheless, such states are not the same as largely unthreatened, more indifferent neutrals, and should be assisted by allies and partners in the same soft-spoken and informal manner. The most threatened and capable states, flexibly acting together in pursuit of the common goals of military and economic security, form a natural alternative core in the world economy with the capacity to better secure their joint security and independence, while offering similar benefits to less threatened states. Because of the varied situations of all of these states and the fast-changing security issues raised by different sectors and supply chains, different approaches to economic and military security will be necessary. Such a patchwork is complex and hard to manage, but necessary. The most critical infrastructure and supply chains to be secured in the alternative core will naturally tend to mirror those that the CCP regime most jealously reserves for its own control. The CCP regime, by its increasingly brazen intrusiveness, propels the process of defensive reaction. The “dual-use” manner in which measures taken by Chinese firms to protect the CCP’s internal political control and national security are seamlessly used abroad to control and threaten other states, almost necessitates excluding or limiting the presence of such firms in any state that feels threatened. Threatened states should focus on effectively working together to minimize such Chinese threats, without departing from traditional sound principles of national security and economic development. States must protect critical infrastructure and supply chains, using an inner circle of more secure supply for emergency use in wartime, along with an outer circle where a broader, freer division of labor develops among mutually trustworthy partners.

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2021

Direct, large-sample measures of leadership preferences on both sides of ethno-territorial civil ... more Direct, large-sample measures of leadership preferences on both sides of ethno-territorial civil wars have not hitherto been available. As a result, statistical research diverges from case study research in omitting analysis of causes and consequences of leadership preferences. We present a new database that directly measures variation in the nationalist ideological preferences of state and ethnic rebel group leaders for post-World War II, ethno-territorial civil wars. Our measures, four-level ordinal scales of minimum acceptable demands, capture both the extent and the intensity of leaders’ upside goals. We examine institutional and cultural sources of these measures while controlling for material sources. Institutionally, regime type more strongly predicts state-side demands than rebel-side demands. Among cultural sources, we find that religious identity-based predictors are significant and powerful predictors. Among material sources, we find that both relative power and status quo predictors have weak statistical and substantive significance. These results indicate that variation in leadership preferences is best explained by institutional and cultural forces, rather than by material conditions related to relative power or status quo conditions.

Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2021

U.S.-China economic relations seem to have reached a turning point. As China’s development and Xi... more U.S.-China economic relations seem to have reached a turning point. As China’s development and Xi Jinping’s leadership heighten economic and security challenges, what are the most realistic and effective policy responses? One approach is to use economic bargaining and diplomatic engagement to convince the CCP regime to continue down the road to a Western-style market economy, while coexisting under the geopolitical status quo. It is argued that this option no longer exists. China’s economic and security policies have developed too far in the direction of upending the economic and geopolitical status quo, and Xi is markedly more committed to such disruption than his predecessors.

Asian Survey, 2020

Within international relations theory, there is significant disagreement on the nature and signif... more Within international relations theory, there is significant disagreement on the nature and significance of leaders’ dispute outcome preferences. While many variants of realism assume that such preferences are relatively fixed and homogeneous, both the liberal and the constructivist schools view them as significant variables. This debate remains unresolved because, for the standard large-sample conflict data sets, there are no direct measures of leadership preferences over outcomes in given types of international disputes. Using a conflict bargaining experiment, we ask whether, after controlling for the effects of relative power and initial conditions, leadership preferences have a statistically significant impact. We use two different country samples—from China and the United States—to examine whether the impact of leadership preferences varies internationally. We find that realist-style preferences are a special rather than a general case, and that such differences have significant implications for understanding continuities and changes in Chinese and US foreign policies.

Indian Growth and Development Review, 2020

Purpose: In explaining ethno-territorial conflicts, leadership preferences have an odd status. In... more Purpose: In explaining ethno-territorial conflicts, leadership preferences have an odd status. In case studies, leadership preferences are often viewed as highly significant causes but are not usually defined and measured explicitly. In large-sample statistical studies, leadership preferences are only captured by weakly related proxy variables. This paper aims to fill this gap by developing suitable theory, which can be used consistently in both case study and statistical applications. Design/methodology/approach: Formal bargaining models are used to examine the expected impact of variation in leadership preferences. Relevant leadership characteristics are then used to construct measures of variation in leadership preferences, which are applied in case studies. Findings: In bargaining models, variation in leadership preferences is expected to have a significant impact on ethno-territorial conflict outcomes. More extreme nationalist leaders and, more conditionally, strongly power-seeking leaders, should be more likely to be willing to use force to modify the status quoalthough more moderate nationalist leaderships are also willing to do so under certain conditions. In five case studies, these formally derived hypotheses receive initial empirical support. Originality/value-Theoretically and empirically, further refinement of research on variation in leadership preferences promises to add significant value. Formally, it is worth investigating the expected impact of additional preference types. Empirically, it is important to invest in measures of leadership preferences across large samples.

Civil Wars, 2018

Ethno-national territorial disputes typically involve conflicting homeland claims between states... more Ethno-national territorial disputes typically involve conflicting homeland
claims between states and minority ethnic groups. Where such minority
have cross-border ethnic kin who themselves constitute a dominant or influential ethnic group in a neighbouring state, separatist goals may take the form of either irredentism or independence. We conjecture that external sympathy for irredentism and independence may vary significantly, and that this variation may be an important influence in situations where secessionist groups and ethnic kin states have a choice between the two goals. Using a bargaining framework that controls for variation in relative power, status quo conditions and minority-side leadership preferences, we present experimental evidence indicating that external audiences are likely to support more confrontational policies in pursuit of independence than in pursuit of irredentism. Our evidence also indicates that independence attracts greater support largely because outsiders perceive it as a
more legitimate goal; and that practical efficacy is not important in stimulating sympathy for either independence or irredentism. These results also support a broader argument in the literature on international norms – that such norms receive support not only because they may justify pre-existing goals or interests, but also because they are perceived as having greater legitimacy per se.

Chinese Journal of International Relations, 2017

The territory contested in island disputes is often of low intrinsic value from the national secu... more The territory contested in island disputes is often of low intrinsic value from the national security and economic perspectives. This generally implies a stable status quo where both sides prefer peace to war. Yet island disputes commonly produce a variation whereby states engage in some degree of 'hawk-talk'-more or less confrontational rhetoric and related, symbolically important policies. Theoretically, hawk-talk should be more likely when the disputing countries have a strong, nationalistically salient history of conflict and less likely when they have high levels of cooperation in other national security areas or economic relations. Hawk-talk is expected to beget more hawk-talk, thus to increase the ideological and diversionary political value of assertiveness in island disputes, and to limit or reduce cooperation. Nationalistically salient histories of conflict amplified by hawk-talk can most easily be shown to raise the stakes and risks in low intrinsic value disputes. Yet such histories are expected to have an even greater potential impact on high intrinsic value disputes. We illustrate this logic by analysing the low-intrinsic-value dispute between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands. Both the theory and the case study imply that cooperation in other areas does not constitute a reliable antidote to hawk-talk-driven dispute escalation. Countervailing national interest ideologies, which emphasise other objectives imperilled by dispute escalation, are the most promising complement to increased cooperation.

Foreign Policy Analysis, 2017

In the conflict bargaining literature, three variables have a primary explanatory role: relative ... more In the conflict bargaining literature, three variables have a primary explanatory role: relative power, status quo conditions, and leadership preferences. While leadership preferences loom large in case study research, they are either absent or poorly proxied in large-N statistical studies. Using a series of three experiments, we test for the effects of relative power, status quo conditions, and leadership preferences on decisions to apply various levels of nonviolent and violent pressure in ethnoterritorial disputes. The experimental designs presented in this study offer the opportunity to isolate the impact of leadership preferences on political strategy choices in ethno-territorial disputes. The results demonstrate that, at least in an experimental setting, leadership preferences are, in fact, significant predictors of political strategy choices, even after controlling for relative power and status quo conditions.

Post-Soviet Affairs, 2016

Following the collapse of the old communist regimes, 28 post-communist countries chose from among... more Following the collapse of the old communist regimes, 28 post-communist
countries chose from among three main foreign security arrangements:
commonwealth of independent states (CIS)/collective security treaty
organization (CSTO) membership, north atlantic treaty organization
(NATO) membership, or neutrality. What explains these choices? We are
most interested theoretically in the role played by regime type. The alliances literature typically uses a narrow institutional theory of the effects of regime type, which implies that more democratic regimes are more attractive alliance partners than more authoritarian regimes. Post-communist area specialists will be aware that this institutional theory fails to explain the apparent tendency of more authoritarian post-communist regimes to join the CIS/CSTO. We develop a broader ideological theory of how regime type affects alliances, in which political institutions are complemented by substantive ideological and policy goals. Applying the ideological approach to the post-communist world, we define and measure two main ideological regime types – liberal nationalist regimes and neo-communist authoritarian regimes. Multinomial logit regressions indicate that more democratic, liberal nationalist regimes are more likely to affiliate with NATO, whereas more authoritarian, neocommunist regimes are more likely to join the CIS/CSTO. Moreover, the desire of neo-communist authoritarianism regimes to affiliate with the CIS/CSTO is as strong or stronger than that of neo-liberal democracies to affiliate with NATO – largely because NATO is more reluctant than Russia to accept aspirants. We conclude that the ideological approach to regime type may offer significant explanatory value as a refinement of the institutional approach.

Korea Observer, 2008

Can China be relied upon to pressure North Korea to give up nuclear weapons and weapons-related t... more Can China be relied upon to pressure North Korea to give up nuclear weapons and weapons-related technology, and to prevent North Korea from cheating on any agreement to do so? We argue that China's post-Deng leaders are more concerned with domestic political legitimacy and intra-regime rivalries than their predecessors. Therefore, we expect their priorities to be avoiding a second Korean War and preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime. The North Korean nuclear capability and its geopolitical consequences, by contrast, do not appear to pose serious threats. China's behavior toward the North before and during the Six-Party Talks is consistent with this reasoning. China seems concerned to prevent an economic collapse of the North Korean regime, and to prevent North Korea from miscalculating and acting in a way that will lead to a second Korean War. But, at the same time, China does not seem willing to make the kinds of credible threats that would force the North to denuclearize.

Palgrave Macmillan US eBooks, 2007

In Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. Thi... more In Taiwan, since the early 1990s, Taiwanese identity has rapidly supplanted Chinese identity. This has pushed all the main political parties to adopt policies favorable to the new identity, and brought the Democratic Progressive Party to power. Rising Taiwanese identity has also affected military strategies. It has accelerated the cross-Strait arms race by alarming Beijing, which in turn has led to an offsetting buildup in Taiwan. It has also strengthened Taiwan’s will to retain her independence and, thereby, has led to newer, more unconventional defense strategies. One such policy is to enhance the ideological legitimacy of Taiwanese nationalism in the United States and Japan. Another policy is to embrace economic integration with China—a development hitherto seen as threatening. A third policy is to deter a Chinese attack by credibly committing Taiwan and its allies to a more dogged fight to preserve Taiwanese independence, even under conditions where such a fight seems hopeless. Finally, a strong Taiwanese identity makes it more likely that China’s increasing conventional military predominance will ultimately call forth a Taiwanese nuclear deterrent.

Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts: China, Taiwan, and the Koreas, 2007

Since September 11, 2001, international relations and conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia... more Since September 11, 2001, international relations and conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia have attracted the lion’s share of attention from analysts and journalists. This is especially true in the United States, given that tens of thousands of U.S. troops are fighting insurgent-terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, there has been corresponding neglect in covering and analyzing other regions. Of these other regions, East Asia is undoubtedly the most important. Most people are well aware of the economic prowess of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and over the last 25 years, of China’s rise to become the “factory of the world.” There is less awareness that the region harbors two of the world’s most dangerous conflicts—between China and Taiwan, and between North and South Korea. Both of these conflicts could involve the United States and its key ally Japan in massive conventional wars, which might escalate into nuclear wars.

Identity and Change in East Asian Conflicts, 2007

Changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratizat... more Changing national identities have transformed the China-Taiwan and Korean conflicts. Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea and liberalization in China have forced leaders to compete for popular legitimacy by appealing to national identities. Along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, these contested national identities have been the main factors driving change in the conflicts, pushing China and Taiwan apart, while propping up what appeared to be a mortally wounded North Korea.

In bargaining models of internal ethno-territorial conflicts, variation in leadership preferences... more In bargaining models of internal ethno-territorial conflicts, variation in leadership preferences has a significant impact on expected conflict outcomes. Relative power has an impact conditional on leadership preferences. Conflict among cost-conscious narrow nationalists is expected to be relatively peaceful and episodic - in a manner that is weakly but not perfectly correlated with variation in relative power. Conflict involving cost-flouting extremists is likely to be protracted, irrespective of relative power. Conflict involving power-seekers that care only about internal political effects of conflict may mimic either or both of the other two outcomes. Bargaining outcomes are further constrained by the relative indivisibility of contested homeland territory. A resulting four-fold typology of conflicts is then applied to case studies from Russia and the former Yugoslavia. The case studies illustrate the expected variation in conflict types - including the conditional effects of re...