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A critical examination of ethical issues and problems arising from human interaction with non-hum... more A critical examination of ethical issues and problems arising from human interaction with non-human animals and the natural environment. Topics, such as the moral status of non-human animals, the moral bases of an environmental ethics, biodiversity, and sustainable development, will be considered by examining the writing of philosophers representing various perspectives.

This course engages with philosophers’ attempts to cope with the sexual aspects of humanity, both... more This course engages with philosophers’ attempts to cope with the sexual aspects of humanity, both the division of humanity along the lines of a male/female dichotomy, as well as the activities and categories involved in sex. Topics include norms around sexual desire, reproduction, sexual morality, and ethical issues with the organization of society along lines of gender- and sex-roles.

Becoming a parent is not a morally neutral decision. The more medical technology advances, the mo... more Becoming a parent is not a morally neutral decision. The more medical technology advances, the more choices for the manner in which we can become parents will be available, and thereby more ways in which we can go wrong. In vitro fertilization paired with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allows parents to choose amongst potential embryos, prenatal testing allows parents to know more about their pregnancies, and the development of genetic editing via CRISPR points to a future of design that opens up further choice. These choices present questions regarding the permissibility of selecting particular parenting relationships. Deciding to become a parent to certain children but not others draws out tensions in our understanding of the morality of the parental relationship itself. It is common for potential parents to screen for medical conditions in their children using current technology. In debates in biomedical ethics concerning the choice of potential parents to select against certain conditions that would lead to their child experiencing a life of more disadvantages, the focus has been on child-centered reasons. In noting this and expanding the discussion to contrast child-centered and parent-centered reasons for selecting children, I hope to make progress in articulating the framework of discussing the permissible attitudes towards advantage and disadvantage in a potential child's life. In this paper, I articulate the moral landscape of parental choice in terms of child-centered and parent-centered reasons and the conditionality of the commitment of parenthood. When the focus of the choice is on the child's flourishing, I suggest, as it is in child-centered reasons, then a potential parent is morally satisfactory so long as they meet epistemic standards of assessing that flourishing. The troubling forms of deliberation come in when parent-centered reasons are employed in particular circumstances. I articulate these deliberations as parent-centered conditional opting-in considerations.

A version of Introduction to Ethics that frames theories of ethics around short pieces of fiction... more A version of Introduction to Ethics that frames theories of ethics around short pieces of fiction.
For each unit, students engage with a short story or excerpt in a way that generates intuitions relevant to the theory before reading central philosophy texts of that theory.
To conclude the unit, we apply our understanding of the theory to a closing work of fiction, and the students write reflections analyzing the work of fiction given their understanding of the theory.

Morality of Virtual Gaming How does gaming relate to sports and art? How do actions taken in a ga... more Morality of Virtual Gaming
How does gaming relate to sports and art?
How do actions taken in a game relate to other actions?
How does your virtual identity relate to your other identities? How and why is representation in gaming significant?
How do esports relate to other sports?
What are the relevant labor ethics issues in esports and the gaming industry more broadly?

General Education Course How do societies value the individual? How do individuals understand and... more General Education Course
How do societies value the individual? How do individuals understand and value themselves?
Arguments about values made through dystopias.
After surveying different short stories as arguments about values, we go through three main texts - different dystopian styles.
Writing intensive course.

This course uses contemporary and historical texts to explore questions of how to live and how to... more This course uses contemporary and historical texts to explore questions of how to live and how to reason. We will address issues related to ethics and knowledge, and we will end the course by intertwining these themes. Here are some of the questions we will address:

-What does it mean to be a good person? Should it count more if the right thing comes easy to you or if you had to try especially hard to do it? What is human nature?

-What does it mean to know something, and when are we justified in believing things? Can we know anything objectively, without our desires and biases clouding our judgments?

-When are we believing things and each other in moral ways? What does it mean to be a morally responsible believer in today's world of fake news and with our lives saturated by stigma and prejudice?

COURSE DESCRIPTION This course will cover central issues in biomedical ethics with particular att... more COURSE DESCRIPTION This course will cover central issues in biomedical ethics with particular attention to the context of radical life extension and immortality. What is radical life extension? How might we achieve radically longer lives? Should we want to live much longer than we do? Would a radically longer life still be recognizably human? Is it unreasonably risky to pursue radical life extension? Would the pursuit of radical life extension be unjust? We will think through these issues by means of readings and films drawn from academic journals and the popular press and media.

Korsgaard claims that as reflective agents, we are committed to choosing a structure for our driv... more Korsgaard claims that as reflective agents, we are committed to choosing a structure for our drives that unifies us in a way that would remain stable in the face of changes both to the our drives and circumstances in the world because we are committed to being the efficacious source of our action. In this paper, I outline how Nietzsche provides a story of how agents can develop a normative structuring of their drives that is sufficient for unifying an agential perspective without appealing to Korsgaard’s Kantian standards. An agent, on Nietzsche’s view, can have a unified structure of her drives based on the norms they find in their environment, and on the drives they find themselves with, and yet nevertheless I show that they do in fact solve the problem of action. I argue that the success of Nietzsche’s account is a direct challenge to Korsgaard’s picture. It not only brings out the problems in her approach to the problem of action, but draws attention to the ways in which normativity applies to reflective agents in the context of particular actions and across actions.

The standard view of practical reason, commonly called the “guise of the good thesis,” claims tha... more The standard view of practical reason, commonly called the “guise of the good thesis,” claims that agents are pursuers of value. Though there have been recent objections to the standard model of reasons for action, much of the discussion has centered on possible counter-examples, leaving the debate focused on how best to interpret a set of paradigm controversial cases. The most promising alternatives to the standard view of reasons on offer focus on practical reason’s explanatory function, claiming that reasons fundamentally explain action, and further that this doesn’t make necessary appeal to what the agent sees as valuable.In order to provide a true alternative to the standard view of reasons for action, we need to fill in what we mean when we say that a consideration counts in favor by rendering an action intelligible, and we need to address how such considerations can play a justificatory role.
Here I offer a potential account of practical reasons that would be a genuine alternative to the standard view. Using Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation, I provide an account of how reasons count in favor of actions. By incorporating a theory of explanation into our understanding of practical reasons, we get a framework for evaluating good and bad reasons for action, and thus can account for the justificatory role of practical reason.

The standard view of reasons for action, commonly called the guise of the good thesis, is that th... more The standard view of reasons for action, commonly called the guise of the good thesis, is that they count in favor of an action by highlighting the good there is in performing it. In recent decades, attempts to reject the view have focused largely on counter-examples. I argue that in order for a genuine alternative to the standard view of practical reasons to emerge, the view must meet two criteria, derived from the virtues of the standard view. I suggest that an explanation based view of practical reasons is the most viable alternative, and use two incomplete versions to develop lessons for a filled out view. I conclude by using these lessons to outline how a pragmatic account of explanation can serve as a genuine alternative to the standard view, going beyond the placeholders that have thus far overly focused on rejecting rather than replacing the status quo.

Papers by Meredith McFadden

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

We interact with value in two ways: we recognize objects as valuable and we take objects up as si... more We interact with value in two ways: we recognize objects as valuable and we take objects up as significant for our lives by valuing them. These two modes of interaction involve different kinds of reasons. Recognizing an object as valuable involves recognizing reasons that everyone shares, but agents can differ with respect to their reasons to value the object, and the reasons which are then involved in valuing. Using this observation, I argue that our relations to value and reasons are irreducible to each other by rejecting two views that attempt to interpret value in terms of reasons and vice versa.

A critical examination of ethical issues and problems arising from human interaction with non-hum... more A critical examination of ethical issues and problems arising from human interaction with non-human animals and the natural environment. Topics, such as the moral status of non-human animals, the moral bases of an environmental ethics, biodiversity, and sustainable development, will be considered by examining the writing of philosophers representing various perspectives.

This course engages with philosophers’ attempts to cope with the sexual aspects of humanity, both... more This course engages with philosophers’ attempts to cope with the sexual aspects of humanity, both the division of humanity along the lines of a male/female dichotomy, as well as the activities and categories involved in sex. Topics include norms around sexual desire, reproduction, sexual morality, and ethical issues with the organization of society along lines of gender- and sex-roles.

Becoming a parent is not a morally neutral decision. The more medical technology advances, the mo... more Becoming a parent is not a morally neutral decision. The more medical technology advances, the more choices for the manner in which we can become parents will be available, and thereby more ways in which we can go wrong. In vitro fertilization paired with pre-implantation genetic diagnosis allows parents to choose amongst potential embryos, prenatal testing allows parents to know more about their pregnancies, and the development of genetic editing via CRISPR points to a future of design that opens up further choice. These choices present questions regarding the permissibility of selecting particular parenting relationships. Deciding to become a parent to certain children but not others draws out tensions in our understanding of the morality of the parental relationship itself. It is common for potential parents to screen for medical conditions in their children using current technology. In debates in biomedical ethics concerning the choice of potential parents to select against certain conditions that would lead to their child experiencing a life of more disadvantages, the focus has been on child-centered reasons. In noting this and expanding the discussion to contrast child-centered and parent-centered reasons for selecting children, I hope to make progress in articulating the framework of discussing the permissible attitudes towards advantage and disadvantage in a potential child's life. In this paper, I articulate the moral landscape of parental choice in terms of child-centered and parent-centered reasons and the conditionality of the commitment of parenthood. When the focus of the choice is on the child's flourishing, I suggest, as it is in child-centered reasons, then a potential parent is morally satisfactory so long as they meet epistemic standards of assessing that flourishing. The troubling forms of deliberation come in when parent-centered reasons are employed in particular circumstances. I articulate these deliberations as parent-centered conditional opting-in considerations.

A version of Introduction to Ethics that frames theories of ethics around short pieces of fiction... more A version of Introduction to Ethics that frames theories of ethics around short pieces of fiction.
For each unit, students engage with a short story or excerpt in a way that generates intuitions relevant to the theory before reading central philosophy texts of that theory.
To conclude the unit, we apply our understanding of the theory to a closing work of fiction, and the students write reflections analyzing the work of fiction given their understanding of the theory.

Morality of Virtual Gaming How does gaming relate to sports and art? How do actions taken in a ga... more Morality of Virtual Gaming
How does gaming relate to sports and art?
How do actions taken in a game relate to other actions?
How does your virtual identity relate to your other identities? How and why is representation in gaming significant?
How do esports relate to other sports?
What are the relevant labor ethics issues in esports and the gaming industry more broadly?

General Education Course How do societies value the individual? How do individuals understand and... more General Education Course
How do societies value the individual? How do individuals understand and value themselves?
Arguments about values made through dystopias.
After surveying different short stories as arguments about values, we go through three main texts - different dystopian styles.
Writing intensive course.

This course uses contemporary and historical texts to explore questions of how to live and how to... more This course uses contemporary and historical texts to explore questions of how to live and how to reason. We will address issues related to ethics and knowledge, and we will end the course by intertwining these themes. Here are some of the questions we will address:

-What does it mean to be a good person? Should it count more if the right thing comes easy to you or if you had to try especially hard to do it? What is human nature?

-What does it mean to know something, and when are we justified in believing things? Can we know anything objectively, without our desires and biases clouding our judgments?

-When are we believing things and each other in moral ways? What does it mean to be a morally responsible believer in today's world of fake news and with our lives saturated by stigma and prejudice?

COURSE DESCRIPTION This course will cover central issues in biomedical ethics with particular att... more COURSE DESCRIPTION This course will cover central issues in biomedical ethics with particular attention to the context of radical life extension and immortality. What is radical life extension? How might we achieve radically longer lives? Should we want to live much longer than we do? Would a radically longer life still be recognizably human? Is it unreasonably risky to pursue radical life extension? Would the pursuit of radical life extension be unjust? We will think through these issues by means of readings and films drawn from academic journals and the popular press and media.

Korsgaard claims that as reflective agents, we are committed to choosing a structure for our driv... more Korsgaard claims that as reflective agents, we are committed to choosing a structure for our drives that unifies us in a way that would remain stable in the face of changes both to the our drives and circumstances in the world because we are committed to being the efficacious source of our action. In this paper, I outline how Nietzsche provides a story of how agents can develop a normative structuring of their drives that is sufficient for unifying an agential perspective without appealing to Korsgaard’s Kantian standards. An agent, on Nietzsche’s view, can have a unified structure of her drives based on the norms they find in their environment, and on the drives they find themselves with, and yet nevertheless I show that they do in fact solve the problem of action. I argue that the success of Nietzsche’s account is a direct challenge to Korsgaard’s picture. It not only brings out the problems in her approach to the problem of action, but draws attention to the ways in which normativity applies to reflective agents in the context of particular actions and across actions.

The standard view of practical reason, commonly called the “guise of the good thesis,” claims tha... more The standard view of practical reason, commonly called the “guise of the good thesis,” claims that agents are pursuers of value. Though there have been recent objections to the standard model of reasons for action, much of the discussion has centered on possible counter-examples, leaving the debate focused on how best to interpret a set of paradigm controversial cases. The most promising alternatives to the standard view of reasons on offer focus on practical reason’s explanatory function, claiming that reasons fundamentally explain action, and further that this doesn’t make necessary appeal to what the agent sees as valuable.In order to provide a true alternative to the standard view of reasons for action, we need to fill in what we mean when we say that a consideration counts in favor by rendering an action intelligible, and we need to address how such considerations can play a justificatory role.
Here I offer a potential account of practical reasons that would be a genuine alternative to the standard view. Using Bas van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory of explanation, I provide an account of how reasons count in favor of actions. By incorporating a theory of explanation into our understanding of practical reasons, we get a framework for evaluating good and bad reasons for action, and thus can account for the justificatory role of practical reason.

The standard view of reasons for action, commonly called the guise of the good thesis, is that th... more The standard view of reasons for action, commonly called the guise of the good thesis, is that they count in favor of an action by highlighting the good there is in performing it. In recent decades, attempts to reject the view have focused largely on counter-examples. I argue that in order for a genuine alternative to the standard view of practical reasons to emerge, the view must meet two criteria, derived from the virtues of the standard view. I suggest that an explanation based view of practical reasons is the most viable alternative, and use two incomplete versions to develop lessons for a filled out view. I conclude by using these lessons to outline how a pragmatic account of explanation can serve as a genuine alternative to the standard view, going beyond the placeholders that have thus far overly focused on rejecting rather than replacing the status quo.

KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy

We interact with value in two ways: we recognize objects as valuable and we take objects up as si... more We interact with value in two ways: we recognize objects as valuable and we take objects up as significant for our lives by valuing them. These two modes of interaction involve different kinds of reasons. Recognizing an object as valuable involves recognizing reasons that everyone shares, but agents can differ with respect to their reasons to value the object, and the reasons which are then involved in valuing. Using this observation, I argue that our relations to value and reasons are irreducible to each other by rejecting two views that attempt to interpret value in terms of reasons and vice versa.