Kamal Saggi | Vanderbilt University (original) (raw)
Papers by Kamal Saggi
This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the mos... more This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the most favored nation (MFN) clause on equilibrium tariffs and welfare when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to market structure as well as production costs. In the model, firms sell differentiated goods and compete in prices. We contrast two policy scenarios: one where the importing country is free to tariff discriminate among exporters and another where it must treat them the same (MFN). Relative to tariff discrimination, MFN benefits low cost (more concentrated) exporters and hurts high cost (less concentrated) ones. While MFN is generally preferable to discrimination from a global welfare perspective, such need not be the case when high cost exporters enjoy greater market power (because they are merged into a single unit) than low cost ones. Under such a situation, if cost differences between exporters are not too large then tariff discrimination favors low cost producers an...
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Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
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Foreign direct investment (fdi) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign …rms or... more Foreign direct investment (fdi) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign …rms or the acquisition of existing domestic …rms. The preferences of a foreign …rm and the host country govern-ment over these two modes of fdi are examined in the presence of costly technology transfer. The trade-o ¤ between technology transfer and market competition emerges as a key determinant of preferences. The paper identi…es the circumstances in which the government and foreign …rm’s choices diverge, and domestic welfare can be improved by restrictions on fdi which induce the foreign …rm to choose the socially preferred mode of entry.
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International Handbook of Development Economics, Volumes 1 & 2
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Journal of International Economics, 2017
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Social Science Research Network, 2012
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pure multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade
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The World Bank Research Observer, Sep 1, 2002
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The manufacturing sectors of less developed countries (LDCs) have traditionally been relatively p... more The manufacturing sectors of less developed countries (LDCs) have traditionally been relatively protected. They have also been subject to heavy regulation, much of which is biased in favor of large enterprises. Accordingly, it is often argued that manufacturers in these countries perform poorly in several respects: (1) markets tolerate inefficient firms, so cross-firm productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are unable or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go unexploited. In this paper I assess each of these conjectures, drawing on plant and firm-level studies of LDC manufacturers. I find none to be systematically supported. Productivity dispersion among LDC plants is not obviously higher than it is among plants in industrialized countries. Convincing demonstrations of monopoly rents are generally lacking, and unexploited scale economies are modest. Finally, while the evidence suggests that protection increases price-cost mark-ups and dampens productive efficiency, the general movement toward trade liberalization in LDCs has made this less of an issue today than it was 20 years ago. Each of these inferences is based on a limited body of crude evidence. There is substantial scope for improvement in the empirical literature, especially in terms of better measures of productive efficiency and the costs that firms incur to achieve it; better analyses of spillovers, and more attention to the effects of volatility and uncertainty on firm behavior. Progress on any of these fronts is likely to require improvements in the quality and quantity of primary data collection.
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Policy Research Working Papers, 1999
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
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World Trade Review, 2014
InUS–COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measur... more InUS–COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measure imposing country of origin labelling (COOL) requirements on livestock of domestic, foreign, and mixed origin was in violation of the obligation to avoid discrimination embedded in Article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). We argue that the AB could not and should not have reached this decision based on the information available to it. The AB adopted an erroneous methodology: under its view, the consistency of a measure coming under the purview of the TBT can be examined under Article 2.1 irrespective of its evaluation under Article 2.2 thereby making the two obligations distinct. The AB also failed to address the central question raised by this dispute: Does there exist an alternative to COOL that is less trade restrictive? We argue that the over-arching issue in this case should have been to determine what, if anything, the TBT Agreement did to alter or en...
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Journal of Transnational Management Development, 1998
SUMMARY This paper constructs a two period model to examine a firm's choice between exporting... more SUMMARY This paper constructs a two period model to examine a firm's choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the face of demand uncertainty. FDI involves higher fixed costs, some of which are sunk, whereas exporting involves a higher marginal cost. Initial exporting yields information about demand without incurring the fixed costs of FDIsince export sales reveal the state of demand abroad. It follows then that exporting carries an option val-ue-if a significant portion of fixed costs of FDI are sunk, a firm may initially export to a market and directly invest if demand conditions abroad are favorable.
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Journal of International Economics, 2005
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GTA Policy Brief, http://www …, 2005
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
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This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the mos... more This paper constructs a three-country partial equilibrium model to examine the effects of the most favored nation (MFN) clause on equilibrium tariffs and welfare when exporting countries are asymmetric with respect to market structure as well as production costs. In the model, firms sell differentiated goods and compete in prices. We contrast two policy scenarios: one where the importing country is free to tariff discriminate among exporters and another where it must treat them the same (MFN). Relative to tariff discrimination, MFN benefits low cost (more concentrated) exporters and hurts high cost (less concentrated) ones. While MFN is generally preferable to discrimination from a global welfare perspective, such need not be the case when high cost exporters enjoy greater market power (because they are merged into a single unit) than low cost ones. Under such a situation, if cost differences between exporters are not too large then tariff discrimination favors low cost producers an...
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Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
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Foreign direct investment (fdi) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign …rms or... more Foreign direct investment (fdi) can take place either through the direct entry of foreign …rms or the acquisition of existing domestic …rms. The preferences of a foreign …rm and the host country govern-ment over these two modes of fdi are examined in the presence of costly technology transfer. The trade-o ¤ between technology transfer and market competition emerges as a key determinant of preferences. The paper identi…es the circumstances in which the government and foreign …rm’s choices diverge, and domestic welfare can be improved by restrictions on fdi which induce the foreign …rm to choose the socially preferred mode of entry.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
International Handbook of Development Economics, Volumes 1 & 2
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Journal of International Economics, 2017
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Social Science Research Network, 2012
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
pure multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The World Bank Research Observer, Sep 1, 2002
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
The manufacturing sectors of less developed countries (LDCs) have traditionally been relatively p... more The manufacturing sectors of less developed countries (LDCs) have traditionally been relatively protected. They have also been subject to heavy regulation, much of which is biased in favor of large enterprises. Accordingly, it is often argued that manufacturers in these countries perform poorly in several respects: (1) markets tolerate inefficient firms, so cross-firm productivity dispersion is high; (2) small groups of entrenched oligopolists exploit monopoly power in product markets; and (3) many small firms are unable or unwilling to grow, so important scale economies go unexploited. In this paper I assess each of these conjectures, drawing on plant and firm-level studies of LDC manufacturers. I find none to be systematically supported. Productivity dispersion among LDC plants is not obviously higher than it is among plants in industrialized countries. Convincing demonstrations of monopoly rents are generally lacking, and unexploited scale economies are modest. Finally, while the evidence suggests that protection increases price-cost mark-ups and dampens productive efficiency, the general movement toward trade liberalization in LDCs has made this less of an issue today than it was 20 years ago. Each of these inferences is based on a limited body of crude evidence. There is substantial scope for improvement in the empirical literature, especially in terms of better measures of productive efficiency and the costs that firms incur to achieve it; better analyses of spillovers, and more attention to the effects of volatility and uncertainty on firm behavior. Progress on any of these fronts is likely to require improvements in the quality and quantity of primary data collection.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Policy Research Working Papers, 1999
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
SSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
World Trade Review, 2014
InUS–COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measur... more InUS–COOL, the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) found that the US measure imposing country of origin labelling (COOL) requirements on livestock of domestic, foreign, and mixed origin was in violation of the obligation to avoid discrimination embedded in Article 2.1 of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). We argue that the AB could not and should not have reached this decision based on the information available to it. The AB adopted an erroneous methodology: under its view, the consistency of a measure coming under the purview of the TBT can be examined under Article 2.1 irrespective of its evaluation under Article 2.2 thereby making the two obligations distinct. The AB also failed to address the central question raised by this dispute: Does there exist an alternative to COOL that is less trade restrictive? We argue that the over-arching issue in this case should have been to determine what, if anything, the TBT Agreement did to alter or en...
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Journal of Transnational Management Development, 1998
SUMMARY This paper constructs a two period model to examine a firm's choice between exporting... more SUMMARY This paper constructs a two period model to examine a firm's choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the face of demand uncertainty. FDI involves higher fixed costs, some of which are sunk, whereas exporting involves a higher marginal cost. Initial exporting yields information about demand without incurring the fixed costs of FDIsince export sales reveal the state of demand abroad. It follows then that exporting carries an option val-ue-if a significant portion of fixed costs of FDI are sunk, a firm may initially export to a market and directly invest if demand conditions abroad are favorable.
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
Journal of International Economics, 2005
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GTA Policy Brief, http://www …, 2005
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020
Bookmarks Related papers MentionsView impact
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