Paulius Rimkevičius | Vilnius University (original) (raw)
Papers by Paulius Rimkevičius
Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science, 2024
Believing that your life is shaped by internal forces, such as your own free will, is usually tho... more Believing that your life is shaped by internal forces, such as your own free will, is usually thought to lead to positive outcomes, such as being prosocial and happy. Believing that it is shaped by external forces, such as deterministic laws of nature, is usually thought to lead to negative outcomes. However, whether that is the case might vary with culture and with the nature of the force, specifically, whether the force is teleological. To test this, we investigated beliefs in five countries: China, India, Lithuania, Mongolia, and the USA. We investigated beliefs in the importance of choice (an internal, teleological force), gods and fate (external, teleological forces), and chance and luck (external, non-teleological forces). Participants (N = 1035) played a hypothetical dictator game, rated their happiness, and rated how much, in their opinion, their life is determined by these forces. Choice was perceived as the most important and its perceived importance was positively associated with subjective happiness across cultures. It was also positively associated with prosocial intentions, although only in India. Perceived importance of gods and fate was mostly positively associated with prosocial intentions. Perceived importance of gods, but not fate, was positively associated with subjective happiness across cultures. Finally, perceived importance of chance and luck was mostly either negatively associated with prosocial intentions and subjective happiness or not at all. Our results highlight the importance of studying agency beliefs in different cultures and distinguishing different kinds of determination: not just internal and external but also teleological and nonteleological.
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2023
People across cultures consider everyday choices in the context of perceived various external lif... more People across cultures consider everyday choices in the context of perceived various external life-determining forces: such as fate and gods (two teleological forces) and such notions as luck and chance (two non-teleological forces). There is little cross-cultural evidence (except for a belief in gods) showing how people relate these salient notions of life-determining forces to prosociality and a sense of well-being. The current paper provides preliminary cross-cultural data to address this gap. Results indicate that choice is the most important life-determining factor. Regression analyses indicate that choice and belief in gods and fate emerged as significant predictors of prosociality towards strangers. Moreover, luck was a significant predictor of decreased prosociality. A relation between life-determining forces and life satisfaction followed the same pattern: choice, gods, and fate emerged as significant predictors of greater life satisfaction, whereas luck was associated with decreased life satisfaction. The overall pattern of results indicates that participants across different cultures might sense being bounded to share or not to care depending on the perceived intentional agency and meaning in the external forces.
Synthese, 2021
I discuss the suggestion that conscious will is an illusion. I take it to mean that there are no ... more I discuss the suggestion that conscious will is an illusion. I take it to mean that there are no conscious decisions. I understand 'conscious' as accessible directly and 'decision' as the acquisition of an intention. I take the alternative of direct access to be access by interpreting behaviour. I start with a survey of the evidence in support of this suggestion. I argue that the evidence indicates that we are misled by external behaviour into making false positive and false negative judgements about our own decisions. Then I turn to a challenge to this suggestion. What could we interpret in cases when there is no external behaviour? I propose the response that we interpret internal behaviour. We can understand internal behaviour as mental simulation of external behaviour, which can proceed by way of conscious mental imagery. I argue that the proposal has the following advantages. It helps us explain more evidence than we could otherwise. It relies mostly on mechanisms that we already have reason to believe in. And it receives support from the available neurological evidence. I also suggest a way to test the proposal in future empirical research. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the proposal and its implications for the wider debates about the imagination and the will.
Consciousness and Cognition, 2021
It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically univers... more It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper, we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. What kind of people has been studied so far? A review of papers indicates that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We com- pared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongo- lian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi, and Mongolian lexical expres- sions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.
Problemos, 2020
The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own mind... more The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory's advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory's introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two criteria: whether the theory's six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory's predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful.
Problemos, 2019
The interpretive-sensory access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mi... more The interpretive-sensory access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mind by turning one’s capacity to know other minds onto oneself. Previously, researchers mostly debated whether the theory receives the most support from the results of empirical research. They have given much less attention to the question whether the theory is the simplest of the available alternatives. I argue that the question of simplicity should be considered in light of the well-established theories surrounding the ISA theory. I claim that the ISA theory then proves to be the simplest. I reply to objections to this claim related to recent developments in this area of research: the emergence of a unified transparency theory of self-knowledge and the relative establishment of the predictive processing theory.
This dissertation examines the problem of self-knowledge. It takes the viewpoint of the interpret... more This dissertation examines the problem of self-knowledge. It takes the viewpoint of the interpretive-sensory access theory (Carruthers 2011). The theory claims that one comes to know one’s own and other people’s propositional attitudes (e.g., decisions) using one and the same mental faculty that has sensory access to its own domain, that has interpretive, but not transparent, access to most of one’s own attitudes, and that evolved for acquiring knowledge about other people’s mental states. The main claim defended in the dissertation is that the theory receives support from empirical research on intuition, meditation, and free will. The main claim is supported by three main arguments. First, empirical research on intuition supports the theory since they both suggest that self-knowledge is acquired either unconsciously, or by conscious interpretation. Second, empirical research on meditation supports the theory since they both suggest that even meditators misattribute attitudes to themselves and find their thoughts difficult to control. Third, empirical research on free will supports the theory since they both suggest that people attribute attitudes to themselves based on both external evidence (perceived behaviour) and internal evidence (mental imagery). Arguments for and against the theory presented by other authors are also examined. The broad conclusion that this dissertation makes is that the theory is superior to its main rivals.
Disertacijoje nagrinėjama savižinos problema. Palaikoma interpretacinės-sensorinės prieigos saviž... more Disertacijoje nagrinėjama savižinos problema. Palaikoma interpretacinės-sensorinės prieigos savižinos teorija (Carruthers 2011). Pasak šios teorijos, žmogus sužino savo paties ir kitų žmonių propozicines nuostatas (pvz.: sprendimus) naudodamasis vienu ir tuo pačiu psichiniu gebėjimu, kuris turi prieigą prie paties žmogaus sensorinių būvių, kurio prieiga prie daugumos paties žmogaus nuostatų yra interpretacinė, o ne skaidri, ir kuris išsivystė tam, kad įgalintų žmogų sužinoti kitų žmonių psichinius būvius. Ginama bendroji tezė, kad šią savižinos teoriją paremia intuicijos, meditacijos ir laisvos valios empirinių tyrimų rezultatai. Pateikiami trys pagrindiniai bendrąją tezę paremiantys argumentai. Pirma, intuicijos empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad intuityviai žmonėms atrodo, kad nuostatos priskiriamos arba nesąmoningai, arba sąmoningai interpretuojant. Antra, meditacijos empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad ir medituodami žmonės klysta dėl savo nuostatų bei susiduria su sunkumais mėgindami suvaldyti savo mintis. Trečia, laisvos valios empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad žmonės priskiria sau sprendimus remdamasi tiek išoriniais dalykais (jusliškai suvokiamu elgesiu), tiek vidiniais (mentaliniais vaizdiniais). Nagrinėjami kitų autorių argumentai už ir prieš šią teoriją. Daroma bendra išvada, kad ji yra pranašesnė už pagrindines jos alternatyvas.
Problemos, 2016
Santrauka. Psichologizmas yra loginių ir psichologinių terminų reikšmių tapatinimas. Husserlio Pr... more Santrauka. Psichologizmas yra loginių ir psichologinių terminų reikšmių tapatinimas. Husserlio Prole-gomenai yra žymiausias psichologizmą kritikuojantis tekstas. Iki šiol buvo atviras klausimas, kas bū-tent juose įrodyta. Šio straipsnio tikslas yra į jį atsakyti. Pagrindinis straipsnyje ginamas teiginys yra toks: Prolegomenuose Husserlis įrodė, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas, bet neįrodė reliatyvizmo ar psichologizmo klaidingumo, nes jis neįrodė, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia. Pirmiausia nagrinėjami du kartais Husserliui priskiriami įrodymai: paremtasis prielaida, kad logika yra normatyvi, ir paremtasis prielaida, kad psichologija remiasi logika. Tvirtinama, kad jie nesuderinami su logikos samprata Prolegomenuose. Tuomet nagrinėjami likę įrodymai ir parodoma, kaip iš jų plaukia, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas. Galiausiai nagrinėjamas įrodymas, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia vienu ar kitu būdu: ar savaime, ar tuomet, kai yra išreiškiamas, ar tada, kai įrodinėjamas kitam. Teigiama, kad reliatyvizmo klaidingumas juo neįrodytas. Straipsnio išvados reikš-mingos bet kokiam logiką reliatyvizuojančiam požiūriui.
Problemos, 2014
Santrauka. Straipsnis nagrinėja, kaip Shaunas Gallagheris sprendžia fenomenologijos ir natūralizm... more Santrauka. Straipsnis nagrinėja, kaip Shaunas Gallagheris sprendžia fenomenologijos ir natūralizmo suderinamumo klausimą. Pirmoje dalyje aptariamas Gallagherio tyrimų atspirties taškas: fenomenolo ginės kūno schemos sampratos pritaikymas interpretuojant trečiojo asmens prieiga gautus duomenis. Antroje dalyje aptariamas bendras Gallagherio fenomenologijos natūralizavimo projektas: argumentai už tai, kad į natūralistinę programą būtų įtrauktos ne paskiros fenomenologų įžvalgos, bet metodiškas pirmojo asmens prieigos taikymas. Trečioje dalyje aptariami argumentai prieš fenomenologijos natū ralizavimą. Teigiama, kad pagrindinė problema fenomenologiją ir natūralizmą derinančiam filosofui – mąstymo fenomenologijos natūralizavimas. Galiausiai bandoma apibrėžti fenomenologijos natūraliza vimo projekto perspektyvas.
Books by Paulius Rimkevičius
Vilnius University Proceedings, 2022
Contemporary Western discourse on freedom and choice – some of the most championed modern values ... more Contemporary Western discourse on freedom and choice – some of the most championed modern values – is usually anchored in the concept cluster of free will and autonomous choice. In turn, academic research on free will in philosophy (including experimental philosophy) and psychology is largely based on a limited conceptual framework with roots in particular debates in Christianity and European philosophy. This framework is currently challenged by multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches applied in the fields of area and Asian studies, comparative philosophy, and also empirical research in cross-cultural psychology, and anthropology. One reason for this challenge is that the dominant Western academic approach, with its almost exclusive focus on concepts of free will and causal determinism, neglects the multitude of non-Western cultural traditions. In most parts of the world, these traditions continue to shape everyday practices and conceptualizations of free action, choice, and decision. Traditions also provide various strategies for navigating the constraints on human agency.
In the present multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary conference, we invited scholars from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, Asian studies, religious studies and other related fields to discuss theoretical alternatives to the dominant framework that are sensitive to cultural differences and local contexts as well as empirical research – especially cross-cultural and cross-linguistic – on conceptualizations of free and constrained action and cultural practices in dealing with these constraints.
Journal of Cultural Cognitive Science, 2024
Believing that your life is shaped by internal forces, such as your own free will, is usually tho... more Believing that your life is shaped by internal forces, such as your own free will, is usually thought to lead to positive outcomes, such as being prosocial and happy. Believing that it is shaped by external forces, such as deterministic laws of nature, is usually thought to lead to negative outcomes. However, whether that is the case might vary with culture and with the nature of the force, specifically, whether the force is teleological. To test this, we investigated beliefs in five countries: China, India, Lithuania, Mongolia, and the USA. We investigated beliefs in the importance of choice (an internal, teleological force), gods and fate (external, teleological forces), and chance and luck (external, non-teleological forces). Participants (N = 1035) played a hypothetical dictator game, rated their happiness, and rated how much, in their opinion, their life is determined by these forces. Choice was perceived as the most important and its perceived importance was positively associated with subjective happiness across cultures. It was also positively associated with prosocial intentions, although only in India. Perceived importance of gods and fate was mostly positively associated with prosocial intentions. Perceived importance of gods, but not fate, was positively associated with subjective happiness across cultures. Finally, perceived importance of chance and luck was mostly either negatively associated with prosocial intentions and subjective happiness or not at all. Our results highlight the importance of studying agency beliefs in different cultures and distinguishing different kinds of determination: not just internal and external but also teleological and nonteleological.
Journal of Cognition and Culture, 2023
People across cultures consider everyday choices in the context of perceived various external lif... more People across cultures consider everyday choices in the context of perceived various external life-determining forces: such as fate and gods (two teleological forces) and such notions as luck and chance (two non-teleological forces). There is little cross-cultural evidence (except for a belief in gods) showing how people relate these salient notions of life-determining forces to prosociality and a sense of well-being. The current paper provides preliminary cross-cultural data to address this gap. Results indicate that choice is the most important life-determining factor. Regression analyses indicate that choice and belief in gods and fate emerged as significant predictors of prosociality towards strangers. Moreover, luck was a significant predictor of decreased prosociality. A relation between life-determining forces and life satisfaction followed the same pattern: choice, gods, and fate emerged as significant predictors of greater life satisfaction, whereas luck was associated with decreased life satisfaction. The overall pattern of results indicates that participants across different cultures might sense being bounded to share or not to care depending on the perceived intentional agency and meaning in the external forces.
Synthese, 2021
I discuss the suggestion that conscious will is an illusion. I take it to mean that there are no ... more I discuss the suggestion that conscious will is an illusion. I take it to mean that there are no conscious decisions. I understand 'conscious' as accessible directly and 'decision' as the acquisition of an intention. I take the alternative of direct access to be access by interpreting behaviour. I start with a survey of the evidence in support of this suggestion. I argue that the evidence indicates that we are misled by external behaviour into making false positive and false negative judgements about our own decisions. Then I turn to a challenge to this suggestion. What could we interpret in cases when there is no external behaviour? I propose the response that we interpret internal behaviour. We can understand internal behaviour as mental simulation of external behaviour, which can proceed by way of conscious mental imagery. I argue that the proposal has the following advantages. It helps us explain more evidence than we could otherwise. It relies mostly on mechanisms that we already have reason to believe in. And it receives support from the available neurological evidence. I also suggest a way to test the proposal in future empirical research. I conclude by discussing the limitations of the proposal and its implications for the wider debates about the imagination and the will.
Consciousness and Cognition, 2021
It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically univers... more It has been argued that belief in free will is socially consequential and psychologically universal. In this paper, we look at the folk concept of free will and its critical assessment in the context of recent psychological research. What kind of people has been studied so far? A review of papers indicates that, overall, 91% of participants in studies on belief in free will were WEIRD. Is there a widespread consensus about the conceptual content of free will? We com- pared English “free will” with its lexical equivalents in Lithuanian, Hindi, Chinese and Mongo- lian languages and found that unlike Lithuanian, Chinese, Hindi, and Mongolian lexical expres- sions of “free will” do not refer to the same concept free will. Thus, given that free will has no cross-culturally universal conceptual content and that most of the reviewed studies were based on WEIRD samples, belief in free will is not a psychological universal.
Problemos, 2020
The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own mind... more The interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge claims that we come to know our own minds by turning our capacities for knowing other minds onto ourselves. Peter Carruthers argues that two of the theory's advantages are empirical adequacy and scientific fruitfulness: it leaves few of the old discoveries unexplained and makes new predictions that provide a framework for new discoveries. A decade has now passed since the theory's introduction. I review the most important developments during this time period regarding the two criteria: whether the theory's six main predictions were supported, and whether the theory's predictions contributed to new empirical studies. I argue that the interpretive-sensory access theory of self-knowledge remains empirically adequate and scientifically fruitful.
Problemos, 2019
The interpretive-sensory access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mi... more The interpretive-sensory access (ISA) theory of self-knowledge claims that one knows one’s own mind by turning one’s capacity to know other minds onto oneself. Previously, researchers mostly debated whether the theory receives the most support from the results of empirical research. They have given much less attention to the question whether the theory is the simplest of the available alternatives. I argue that the question of simplicity should be considered in light of the well-established theories surrounding the ISA theory. I claim that the ISA theory then proves to be the simplest. I reply to objections to this claim related to recent developments in this area of research: the emergence of a unified transparency theory of self-knowledge and the relative establishment of the predictive processing theory.
This dissertation examines the problem of self-knowledge. It takes the viewpoint of the interpret... more This dissertation examines the problem of self-knowledge. It takes the viewpoint of the interpretive-sensory access theory (Carruthers 2011). The theory claims that one comes to know one’s own and other people’s propositional attitudes (e.g., decisions) using one and the same mental faculty that has sensory access to its own domain, that has interpretive, but not transparent, access to most of one’s own attitudes, and that evolved for acquiring knowledge about other people’s mental states. The main claim defended in the dissertation is that the theory receives support from empirical research on intuition, meditation, and free will. The main claim is supported by three main arguments. First, empirical research on intuition supports the theory since they both suggest that self-knowledge is acquired either unconsciously, or by conscious interpretation. Second, empirical research on meditation supports the theory since they both suggest that even meditators misattribute attitudes to themselves and find their thoughts difficult to control. Third, empirical research on free will supports the theory since they both suggest that people attribute attitudes to themselves based on both external evidence (perceived behaviour) and internal evidence (mental imagery). Arguments for and against the theory presented by other authors are also examined. The broad conclusion that this dissertation makes is that the theory is superior to its main rivals.
Disertacijoje nagrinėjama savižinos problema. Palaikoma interpretacinės-sensorinės prieigos saviž... more Disertacijoje nagrinėjama savižinos problema. Palaikoma interpretacinės-sensorinės prieigos savižinos teorija (Carruthers 2011). Pasak šios teorijos, žmogus sužino savo paties ir kitų žmonių propozicines nuostatas (pvz.: sprendimus) naudodamasis vienu ir tuo pačiu psichiniu gebėjimu, kuris turi prieigą prie paties žmogaus sensorinių būvių, kurio prieiga prie daugumos paties žmogaus nuostatų yra interpretacinė, o ne skaidri, ir kuris išsivystė tam, kad įgalintų žmogų sužinoti kitų žmonių psichinius būvius. Ginama bendroji tezė, kad šią savižinos teoriją paremia intuicijos, meditacijos ir laisvos valios empirinių tyrimų rezultatai. Pateikiami trys pagrindiniai bendrąją tezę paremiantys argumentai. Pirma, intuicijos empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad intuityviai žmonėms atrodo, kad nuostatos priskiriamos arba nesąmoningai, arba sąmoningai interpretuojant. Antra, meditacijos empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad ir medituodami žmonės klysta dėl savo nuostatų bei susiduria su sunkumais mėgindami suvaldyti savo mintis. Trečia, laisvos valios empiriniai tyrimai paremia šią teoriją, nes jie, kaip ir ši teorija, skatina manyti, kad žmonės priskiria sau sprendimus remdamasi tiek išoriniais dalykais (jusliškai suvokiamu elgesiu), tiek vidiniais (mentaliniais vaizdiniais). Nagrinėjami kitų autorių argumentai už ir prieš šią teoriją. Daroma bendra išvada, kad ji yra pranašesnė už pagrindines jos alternatyvas.
Problemos, 2016
Santrauka. Psichologizmas yra loginių ir psichologinių terminų reikšmių tapatinimas. Husserlio Pr... more Santrauka. Psichologizmas yra loginių ir psichologinių terminų reikšmių tapatinimas. Husserlio Prole-gomenai yra žymiausias psichologizmą kritikuojantis tekstas. Iki šiol buvo atviras klausimas, kas bū-tent juose įrodyta. Šio straipsnio tikslas yra į jį atsakyti. Pagrindinis straipsnyje ginamas teiginys yra toks: Prolegomenuose Husserlis įrodė, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas, bet neįrodė reliatyvizmo ar psichologizmo klaidingumo, nes jis neįrodė, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia. Pirmiausia nagrinėjami du kartais Husserliui priskiriami įrodymai: paremtasis prielaida, kad logika yra normatyvi, ir paremtasis prielaida, kad psichologija remiasi logika. Tvirtinama, kad jie nesuderinami su logikos samprata Prolegomenuose. Tuomet nagrinėjami likę įrodymai ir parodoma, kaip iš jų plaukia, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas. Galiausiai nagrinėjamas įrodymas, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia vienu ar kitu būdu: ar savaime, ar tuomet, kai yra išreiškiamas, ar tada, kai įrodinėjamas kitam. Teigiama, kad reliatyvizmo klaidingumas juo neįrodytas. Straipsnio išvados reikš-mingos bet kokiam logiką reliatyvizuojančiam požiūriui.
Problemos, 2014
Santrauka. Straipsnis nagrinėja, kaip Shaunas Gallagheris sprendžia fenomenologijos ir natūralizm... more Santrauka. Straipsnis nagrinėja, kaip Shaunas Gallagheris sprendžia fenomenologijos ir natūralizmo suderinamumo klausimą. Pirmoje dalyje aptariamas Gallagherio tyrimų atspirties taškas: fenomenolo ginės kūno schemos sampratos pritaikymas interpretuojant trečiojo asmens prieiga gautus duomenis. Antroje dalyje aptariamas bendras Gallagherio fenomenologijos natūralizavimo projektas: argumentai už tai, kad į natūralistinę programą būtų įtrauktos ne paskiros fenomenologų įžvalgos, bet metodiškas pirmojo asmens prieigos taikymas. Trečioje dalyje aptariami argumentai prieš fenomenologijos natū ralizavimą. Teigiama, kad pagrindinė problema fenomenologiją ir natūralizmą derinančiam filosofui – mąstymo fenomenologijos natūralizavimas. Galiausiai bandoma apibrėžti fenomenologijos natūraliza vimo projekto perspektyvas.
Vilnius University Proceedings, 2022
Contemporary Western discourse on freedom and choice – some of the most championed modern values ... more Contemporary Western discourse on freedom and choice – some of the most championed modern values – is usually anchored in the concept cluster of free will and autonomous choice. In turn, academic research on free will in philosophy (including experimental philosophy) and psychology is largely based on a limited conceptual framework with roots in particular debates in Christianity and European philosophy. This framework is currently challenged by multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches applied in the fields of area and Asian studies, comparative philosophy, and also empirical research in cross-cultural psychology, and anthropology. One reason for this challenge is that the dominant Western academic approach, with its almost exclusive focus on concepts of free will and causal determinism, neglects the multitude of non-Western cultural traditions. In most parts of the world, these traditions continue to shape everyday practices and conceptualizations of free action, choice, and decision. Traditions also provide various strategies for navigating the constraints on human agency.
In the present multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary conference, we invited scholars from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, Asian studies, religious studies and other related fields to discuss theoretical alternatives to the dominant framework that are sensitive to cultural differences and local contexts as well as empirical research – especially cross-cultural and cross-linguistic – on conceptualizations of free and constrained action and cultural practices in dealing with these constraints.