Daniel Balliet | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (original) (raw)

Papers by Daniel Balliet

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to fo... more Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta-analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well-established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate.

Interdependence is a fundamental characteristic of social interactions. Interdependence Theory st... more Interdependence is a fundamental characteristic of social interactions. Interdependence Theory states that 6 dimensions describe differences between social situations. Here we examine if these 6 dimensions describe how people think about their interdependence with others in a situation. We find that people (in situ and ex situ) can reliably differentiate situations according to 5, but not 6, dimensions of interdependence: (a) mutual dependence, (b) power, (c) conflict, (d) future interdependence, and (e) information certainty. This model offers a unique framework for understanding how people think about social situations compared to another recent model of situation construal (DIAMONDS). Furthermore, we examine factors that are theorized to shape perceptions of interdependence, such as situational cues (e.g., nonverbal behavior) and personality (e.g., HEXACO and Social Value Orientation). We also study the implications of subjective interdependence for emotions and cooperative behavior during social interactions. This model of subjective interdependence explains substantial variation in the emotions people experience in situations (i.e., happiness, sadness, anger, and disgust), and explains 24% of the variance in cooperation, above and beyond the DIAMONDS model. Throughout these studies, we develop and validate a multidimensional measure of subjective outcome interdependence that can be used in diverse situations and relationships—the Situational Interdependence Scale (SIS). We discuss how this model of interdependence can be used to better understand how people think about social situations encountered in close relationships, organizations, and society.

Some acts of human cooperation are not easily explained by traditional models of kinship or recip... more Some acts of human cooperation are not easily explained by traditional models of kinship or reciprocity. Fitness interdependence may provide a unifying conceptual framework, in which cooperation arises from the mutual dependence for survival or reproduction, as occurs among mates, risk-pooling partnerships and brothers-in-arms.

Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness ... more Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness of human cooperation observed among individuals who are not genetically related: reciprocity and conformity. We tested whether reciprocity outperformed conformity in promoting cooperation, especially when these psychological processes would promote a different cooperative or noncooperative response. To do so, across three studies, we observed participants’ cooperation with a partner after learning (a) that their partner had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials and (b) that their group members had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner. Although we found that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a stronger influence on cooperation.Moreover, we found that conformity can be partly explained by a concern about one’s reputation—a finding that supports a reciprocity framework.

International challenges such as climate change, poverty, and in-tergroup conflict require countr... more International challenges such as climate change, poverty, and in-tergroup conflict require countries to cooperate to solve these complex problems. However, the political tide in many countries has shifted inward, with skepticism and reluctance to cooperate with other countries. Thus, cross-societal investigations are needed to test theory about trust and cooperation within and between groups. We conducted an experimental study in 17 countries designed to test several theories that explain why, who, and where people trust and cooperate more with ingroup members, compared with outgroup members. The experiment involved several interactions in the trust game, either as a trustor or trustee. We manipulated partner group membership in the trust game (ingroup, outgroup, or unknown) and if their reputation was at stake during the interaction. In addition to the standard finding that participants trust and cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members, we obtained findings that reputational concerns play a decisive role for promoting trust and cooperation universally across societies. Furthermore, men discriminated more in favor of their ingroup than women. Individual differences in cooperative preferences, as measured by social value orientation, predicted cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Finally, we did not find support for three theories about the cross-societal conditions that influence the degree of ingroup favoritism observed across societies (e.g., material security, religiosity, and pathogen stress). We discuss the implications for promoting cooperation within and between countries. cooperation | trust | parochial altruism | reputation | culture H umans tend to engage in costly behaviors that extend benefits to ingroup members (i.e., cooperate) and also actively engage in aggressive actions toward outgroup members. This phenomenon, known as parochial altruism, is pervasive and omnipresent in human history and across cultures (1, 2). Parochial altruism exacerbates intergroup relations either indirectly through actions that exclusively favor the ingroup (i.e., ingroup favoritism) or directly by actions that harm the outgroup (3). Here, we focus on ingroup favoritism in trust and cooperation. Decades of research have focused on the function, form, and process of the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying ingroup favoritism. One prominent approach addresses why people engage in ingroup favoritism and suggests that this is a strategy that functions to acquire direct, and especially indirect, benefits from ingroup members (4). Other approaches have investigated individual differences and who is more likely to favor the ingroup, including a focus on gender and social preferences for cooperation (5). A third approach theorizes about how variation across ecologies can determine where people are more likely to engage in ingroup favoritism (6). Although each of the above approaches forwards hypotheses about human universals and/or variation across societies, most research on ingroup favoritism is based on student samples using ad-hoc groups created in the laboratory within a limited range of societies (7). These conditions limit the generalizability of research and fail to address cross-societal variability in ingroup favoritism. Thus, cross-societal investigations are needed to understand why people cooperate more with ingroup members, who is more willing to display this ingroup favoritism, and where people are more likely to discriminate cooperation in favor of ingroup members. Here, we address these three fundamental questions in an experimental study using nationally representative samples from 17 countries and observe ingroup favoritism in a trust game with partners who share nationality vs. partners from a different nationality. Why Do People Trust and Cooperate More with Ingroup Members? Decades of research have tried to solve the puzzle of why humans engage in costly cooperation that benefits others. Evolutionary perspectives propose that humans condition their cooperation when this behavior results in direct or indirect benefits. Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) proposes that people favor their group members because groups contain a network for reputation-based indirect reciprocity, and so this can be a strategy to maintain a positive reputation in the group, acquire indirect benefits from ingroup members, and avoid the cost of being ostracized from the group (8). From this perspective, humans have evolved to expect greater cooperation from ingroup members and to be more concerned about their reputation among ingroup, compared with outgroup, members (4). Support for BGR comes from studies that employed ad-hoc minimal groups created in the laboratory (7). These studies found that, even in contexts where people were categorized in groups according to some trivial category, ingroup favoritism was explained by expectations of partner cooperation. Furthermore, previous research used the common vs. unilateral knowledge paradigm to test the idea that ingroup favoritism is motivated by reputation-based indirect reciprocity (4). In this paradigm, individuals know that their interaction partner knows their group membership (common knowledge), or, alternatively, they know that their interaction Significance In a study including 17 societies, we found that people are motivated to trust and cooperate more with their ingroup, than harm the outgroup. Reputation-based indirect reciprocity may offset this ingroup favoritism, because we found that reputa-tional concern universally increases cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. We also found that people who are dispositionally cooperative are less parochial and more universal in their cooperation. In a time of increasing parochi-alism in both domestic and international relations, our findings affirm us of the danger of the strong human universal toward parochial altruism. Yet, our findings suggest that in all societies, there exist people whose cooperation transcends group boundaries and provides a solution to combating parochialism: reputation-based indirect reciprocity.

Reputational concern is not restricted to interacting with ingroup members, but can also promote ... more Reputational concern is not restricted to interacting with ingroup members, but can also promote cooperation with outgroup members • Social identification did not affect cooperation with ingroup members • Reputational concern is a psychological mechanism operating also with outgroup members a b s t r a c t Bounded generalized reciprocity (BGR) predicts that people cooperate to maintain a positive reputation with ingroup, but not outgroup, members-and this explains ingroup favoritism in cooperation. We propose that the benefits of maintaining a positive reputation are not limited by group boundaries and so people may cooperate to maintain a good reputation among outgroup members when they will meet and interact with members of that group again. According to this unbounded indirect reciprocity perspective, reputation can promote cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Alternatively, social identity theory (SIT) favors social identity versus reputation as an explanation for cooperation among ingroup members. We test these hypotheses across five studies (Ns = 619, 607, 613, 360, and 615) that manipulate reputation, social identification, and partner's group membership in a cooperative decision making task. Across our studies, people were more cooperative with both ingroup and outgroup members when their reputation was at stake (Studies 1-5), and reputational concern mediated the effect of cues of gossip on cooperation in interactions with ingroup and outgroup members (Studies 1-4). Social identification did not affect cooperation with ingroup members. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the indirect benefits of cooperation that can transcend group boundaries.

In response to the same moral violation, some people report experiencing anger, and others report... more In response to the same moral violation, some people report experiencing anger, and others report feeling disgust. Do differences in emotional responses to moral violations reflect idiosyncratic differences in the communication of outrage, or do they reflect differences in motivational states? Whereas equivalence accounts suggest that anger and disgust are interchangeable expressions of condemnation, sociofunctional accounts suggest that they have distinct antecedents and consequences. We tested these accounts by investigating whether anger and disgust vary depending on the costs imposed by moral violations and whether they differentially correspond with aggressive tendencies. Results across four studies favor a sociofunctional account: When the target of a moral violation shifts from the self to another person, anger decreases, but disgust increases. Whereas anger is associated with high-cost, direct aggression, disgust is associated with less costly indirect aggression. Finally, whether the target of a moral violation is the self or another person influences direct aggression partially via anger and influences indirect aggression partially via disgust.

Across five studies using samples from both Japan and United States (N = 2345), we take a multi-m... more Across five studies using samples from both Japan and United States (N = 2345), we take a multi-method approach to test the prediction from life history theory that a slow, compared to fast, life history strategy promotes investment in cooperative relationships. Studies 1 and 2 examined how different measures as proxies for life history strategy (i.e., Mini-K and High-K Strategy Scale) relate to cooperation in various economic games. Studies 3 to 5 measured early childhood environments (i.e., childhood harshness and unpredictability), manipulated resource scarcity using previously validated methods, and then measured cooperation. Across our studies, we also examined four hypothesized psychological mechanisms that could explain the relation between life history strategy and cooperation: temporal discounting, concern for reputation, social value orientation, and trust in others. Overall, we found no support for the hypothesis that life history strategy predicts cooperation or that early childhood environments interact with current resource scarcity to predict cooperation. Thus, our initial findings imply that life history theory may not account for individual variation in cooperation with unknown others.

Social interactions are characterized by distinct forms of interdependence, each of which has uni... more Social interactions are characterized by distinct forms of interdependence, each of which has unique effects on how behavior unfolds within the interaction. Despite this, little is known about the psychological mechanisms that allow people to detect and
respond to the nature of interdependence in any given interaction. We propose that interdependence theory provides clues
regarding the structure of interdependence in the human ancestral past. In turn, evolutionary psychology offers a framework
for understanding the types of information processing mechanisms that could have been shaped under these recurring
conditions. We synthesize and extend these two perspectives to introduce a new theory: functional interdependence theory
(FIT). FIT can generate testable hypotheses about the function and structure of the psychological mechanisms for inferring
interdependence. This new perspective offers insight into how people initiate and maintain cooperative relationships, select
social partners and allies, and identify opportunities to signal social motives.

Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more li... more Theories suggest that political ideology relates to cooperation, with conservatives being more likely to pursue selfish outcomes, and liberals more likely to pursue egalitarian outcomes. In study 1, we examine how political ideology and political party affiliation (Republican vs. Democrat) predict cooperation with a partner who self-identifies as Republican or Democrat in two samples before (n = 362) and after (n = 366) the 2012 US presidential election. Liberals show slightly more concern for their partners' outcomes compared to conservatives (study 1), and in study 2 this relation is supported by a meta-analysis (r = .15). However, in study 1, political ideology did not relate to cooperation in general. Both Republicans and Democrats extend more cooperation to their in-group relative to the out-group, and this is explained by expectations of cooperation from in-group versus out-group members. We discuss the relation between political ideology and cooperation within and between groups.

We extended research linking individual differences in consideration of future consequences (Stra... more We extended research linking individual differences in consideration of future consequences (Strathman et al., 1994) with health behaviors by (1) testing whether individual differences in regulatory focus would mediate that link and (2) highlighting the value of a revised, two-factor CFC-14 scale with subscales assessing concern with future consequences (CFC-Future) and concern with immediate consequences (CFC-Immediate) proper. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of the revised CFC-14 scale supported the presence of two highly reliable factors (CFC-Future and CFC-Immediate; alphas from .80 to .84). Moreover, structural equation modeling consistently showed that those high in CFC-Future engage in exercise and health eating because they adopt a promotion orientation. Future use of the two-factor CFC-14 scale is encouraged to shed additional light on how concern with future and concern with immediate consequences (proper) differentially impact the way people resolve a host of inter-temporal dilemmas (e.g., health, financial, and environmental behavior).

We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperatio... more We advance a framework for understanding why and how gossip may promote generosity and cooperation, especially in situations that can result in greater indirect benefits from others. Drawing on evolutionary theory, we derive novel hypotheses about how two reliably recurring properties of human social networks – they are “small” and contain fewer well-connected people – provide insight about when people may maximize indirect benefits of generosity. Across three studies, we find support for the hypothesis that people increase their generosity when the recipient (or an observer) is connected and can gossip to at least one or many others whom they might interact with in the future. Moreover, reputational concern, rather than expected indirect benefits from one's future partners, primarily mediated this observed gossip-based generosity, and the mediation effect of reputational concern was statistically more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials. We discuss the importance of these findings in the context of evolutionary perspectives on human cooperation, along with some novel insights about how properties of social networks influence social behavior.

Previous research has found that some people suppress their emotions when making a sacrifice for ... more Previous research has found that some people suppress their emotions when making a sacrifice for their relationship partner – and that this can reduce relationship satisfaction. We suggest that trust in one’s partner determines who suppresses their emotions during a sacrifice. We hypothesize that individuals with low, compared to high, trust in their partners will be more likely to suppress their emotions when they sacrifice for their partner – and that this, in turn, will reduce satisfaction with the outcome of sacrifice, and will subsequently affect personal and relational outcomes (e.g., mood and relationship satisfaction, respectively). Romantic couples (N = 130) participated in an experience sampling study that assessed emotional suppression immediately after making a sacrifice for their partner in their daily lives. Results showed that trust negatively related to emotional suppression when making a sacrifice. Moreover, we found that emotional suppression led to lower satisfaction with the outcome of sacrifice, which in turn resulted in a lower relationship satisfaction (and a negative mood). We discuss the importance of trust in emotion regulation in close relationships and engaging in behaviors that prevent (or confront) relationship conflict.

Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes... more Reputation through gossip is a key mechanism promoting cooperation. The present research proposes that gossip promotes cooperation when one anticipates future interdependence with the gossip recipient (Hypothesis 1), that this effect is more pronounced for proself, compared to prosocial, individuals (Hypothesis 2), and explores the mediating role of reputational concern and expected indirect benefits in the relation between gossip and cooperation. Results from three studies supported these hypotheses, showing that people are more generous in response to gossip to their future interaction partner(s), compared with gossip to other(s) they would never meet or no gossip. Moreover, proselfs, compared with prosocials, showed a larger increase in generosity when they anticipated future interactions with the gossip recipient(s). The observed gossip-based gen- erosity was primarily mediated by reputational concern rather than expected indirect benefits from future partners, and the mediation of reputational concern was more pronounced for proselfs than for prosocials.

Although cooperation between groups is not unusual, most forms of human cooperation are in-group ... more Although cooperation between groups is not unusual, most forms of human cooperation are in-group bounded and, sometimes, motivated by the desire to ward-off and subordinate rivaling out-groups. Building on evolutionary perspectives and models, we propose that humans evolved a capacity for parochial cooperation, which entails (i) in-group love: the tendency to cooperate with and extend trust towards others that are similar, that are familiar rather than unfamiliar, and that belong to one’s own group, and (ii) out-group hate: a willingness to fight against rivaling out-groups. This chapter reviews our own work, and that of others, showing that parochial cooperation (i) emerges especially when it benefits individuals’ within-group reputation, (ii) affects one’s within-group status, (iii) is more prominent among individuals with chronic pro-social rather than pro-self value orientation, and (iv) is sustained and motivated by oxytocin, an evolutionary ancient hypothalamic neuropeptide pivotal in social bonding, pair-bond formation, and empathic responding. Across the board, findings resonate well with relatively recent evolutionary theory on (inter)group relations and add to classic theory in social psychology.

Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-grou... more Although theory suggests individuals are more willing to incur a personal cost to benefit in-group members, compared to out-group members, there is inconsistent evidence in support of this perspective. Applying meta-analytic techniques, we harness a relatively recent explosion of research on intergroup discrimination in cooperative decision making to address several fundamental unresolved issues. First, summarizing evidence across studies, we find a small to medium effect size indicating that people are more cooperative with in-group, compared to out-group, members (d = 0.32). Second, we forward and test predictions about the conditions that moderate in-group favoritism from two influential perspectives – a social identity approach and a bounded generalized reciprocity perspective. Although we find evidence for a slight tendency for in-group favoritism through categorization with no mutual interdependence between group members (e.g., dictator games, d = 0.19), situations that contain interdependence result in stronger in-group favoritism (e.g., social dilemmas, d = 0.42). We also find that in-group favoritism is stronger when there is common (versus unilateral) knowledge of group membership, and stronger during simultaneous (versus sequential) exchanges. Third, we find support for the hypothesis that intergroup discrimination in cooperation is the result of in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation. Finally, we test for additional moderators of in-group favoritism, such as the percentage of men in the sample, experimental versus natural groups, and the country of participants. We discuss the implications of these findings for theoretical perspectives on in-group favoritism, address implications for the methodologies used to study this phenomenon, and suggest directions for future research.

Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiv... more Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior theorizing suggests that cross-societal differences in trust play a key role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily because people in such societies expect their fellow members to contribute only if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by punishing free riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment more effective in promoting cooperation in high- or low-trust societies? In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants across 18 societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust rather than low trust.

Many theories of trust emphasize that trust is most relevant to behavior in situations involving ... more Many theories of trust emphasize that trust is most relevant to behavior in situations involving a conflict of interests. However, it is not clear how trust relates to behavior across situations that differ in the degree of conflicting interest: Does trust matter more when the conflict of interest is small or large? According to an interdependence perspective, trust becomes an especially important determinant of behavior in situations involving larger, compared to smaller, degrees of conflicting interests. To examine this perspective, we conducted a meta-analysis involving 212 effect sizes on the relation between trust (both state and dispositional trust in others) and cooperation in social dilemmas – situations that involve varying degrees of conflict between self-interest and collective interest. Results revealed that the positive relation between trust and cooperation is stronger when there is a larger, compared to smaller, degree of conflict. We also examined several other possible moderators of the relation between trust and cooperation. The relation between trust and cooperation was stronger during individual, compared to intergroup, interactions, but did not vary as a function of the situation being either a one-shot or repeated interaction. We also find differences across countries in the extent that people condition their own cooperation based on their trust in others. We discuss how the results support an emerging consensus about trust being limited to situations of conflict, and address some theoretical and societal implications for our understanding of how and why trust is so important to social interactions and relationships.

Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiv... more Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior theorizing suggests cross-societal differences in trust plays a key role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily because people in such societies only expect their fellow members to contribute if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by punishing free-riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment more effective in promoting cooperation in high or low-trust societies? In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants from studies across 18 societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust, rather than low trust.

Prior research has yielded mixed findings regarding the relation of ostracism to prosocial behavi... more Prior research has yielded mixed findings regarding the relation of ostracism to prosocial behavior, with studies indicating ostracism leads people to become less prosocial, more prosocial, or that prosocial behavior is unaffected by workplace ostracism. By conceptualizing prosocial behavior at work as a social dilemma, we hypothesized that whether or not individuals reduce prosocial behaviors following ostracism can be understood by how individuals manage the conflict between the immediate temptation to treat others poorly and the long-term benefits of not giving in to such temptations. Across three studies – a scenario (Study 1), experimental (Study 2), and field study on employed adults (Study 3) – we find support for the hypothesis that individuals who are less (vs. more) oriented towards future outcomes engage in less prosocial behaviors with others who have ostracized them during prior interactions. We discuss both the practical and theoretical implications of these findings.

Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiv... more Punishment promotes contributions to public goods, but recent evidence suggests that its effectiveness varies across societies. Prior theorizing suggests cross-societal differences in trust plays a key role in determining the effectiveness of punishment, as a form of social norm enforcement, to promote cooperation. One line of reasoning is that punishment promotes cooperation in low-trust societies, primarily because people in such societies only expect their fellow members to contribute if there are strong incentives to do so. Yet another line of reasoning is that high trust makes punishment work, presumably because in high-trust societies people may count on each other to make contributions to public goods and also enforce norm violations by punishing free-riders. This poses a puzzle of punishment: Is punishment more effective in promoting cooperation in high or low-trust societies? In the present article, we examine this puzzle of punishment in a quantitative review of 83 studies involving 7,361 participants from studies across 18 societies that examine the impact of punishment on cooperation in a public goods dilemma. The findings provide a clear answer: Punishment more strongly promotes cooperation in societies with high trust, rather than low trust.