Pieter Gautier | Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (original) (raw)
Uploads
Papers by Pieter Gautier
CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2005
Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet mo... more Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are therefore prepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, the marriage market benefits disappear while the housing premium remains. We extend the model of Burdett and Coles (1997) with a distinction between efficient (cities) and less efficient (non-cities) search markets. One implication of the model is that singles are more likely to move from rural areas to cities while married couples are more likely to make the reverse movement. A second prediction of the model is that attractive singles benefit most from a dense market (i.e. from being choosy). Those predictions are tested with a unique Danish dataset.
Contributions to Economic Analysis, 1999
European Economic Review, 2002
Cepr Discussion Papers, 2006
... This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model with a continuum of worker an... more ... This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model with a continuum of worker and job types. Incorporating two-sided heterogeneity into a search model is useful because one of the most important functions of the labor market is to find the right man for the job. ...
Studies analyzing equilibrium effects of labor market policies typically assume bilateral meeting... more Studies analyzing equilibrium effects of labor market policies typically assume bilateral meetings between workers and firms. This ignores the frictions that arise when workers and firms meet in a multilateral way and cannot coordinate their application and hiring decisions. I analyze the magnitude of these frictions. For this purpose, I present an equilibrium search model of the labor market with an endogenous number of contacts between workers and firms. Firms post a wage and a recruitment technology that determines how many applicants they will interview. After observing these contracts, workers decide to which firms to apply. Send-ing more applications and interviewing more applicants are both costly activities but increase the probability to match. In equilibrium, contract dispersion arises endogenously and work-ers spread their applications over the different types of contracts. The model is estimated on the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects data set. The cost of an appl...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
European Economic Review, 2015
ABSTRACT Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The imp... more ABSTRACT Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Contributions to Economic Analysis, 2006
American Economic Review, 2014
ABSTRACT In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auc... more ABSTRACT In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
CEPR Discussion Paper Series, 2005
Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet mo... more Do people move to cities because of marriage market considerations? In cities singles can meet more potential partners than in rural areas. Singles are therefore prepared to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices. Once married, the marriage market benefits disappear while the housing premium remains. We extend the model of Burdett and Coles (1997) with a distinction between efficient (cities) and less efficient (non-cities) search markets. One implication of the model is that singles are more likely to move from rural areas to cities while married couples are more likely to make the reverse movement. A second prediction of the model is that attractive singles benefit most from a dense market (i.e. from being choosy). Those predictions are tested with a unique Danish dataset.
Contributions to Economic Analysis, 1999
European Economic Review, 2002
Cepr Discussion Papers, 2006
... This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model with a continuum of worker an... more ... This paper incorporates on-the-job search into a matching model with a continuum of worker and job types. Incorporating two-sided heterogeneity into a search model is useful because one of the most important functions of the labor market is to find the right man for the job. ...
Studies analyzing equilibrium effects of labor market policies typically assume bilateral meeting... more Studies analyzing equilibrium effects of labor market policies typically assume bilateral meetings between workers and firms. This ignores the frictions that arise when workers and firms meet in a multilateral way and cannot coordinate their application and hiring decisions. I analyze the magnitude of these frictions. For this purpose, I present an equilibrium search model of the labor market with an endogenous number of contacts between workers and firms. Firms post a wage and a recruitment technology that determines how many applicants they will interview. After observing these contracts, workers decide to which firms to apply. Send-ing more applications and interviewing more applicants are both costly activities but increase the probability to match. In equilibrium, contract dispersion arises endogenously and work-ers spread their applications over the different types of contracts. The model is estimated on the Employment Opportunities Pilot Projects data set. The cost of an appl...
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
European Economic Review, 2015
ABSTRACT Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The imp... more ABSTRACT Many labor market policies affect the marginal benefits and costs of job search. The impact and desirability of such policies depend on the distribution of search costs. In this paper, we provide an equilibrium framework for identifying the distribution of search costs and we apply it to the Dutch labor market. In our model, the wage distribution, job search intensities, and firm entry are simultaneously determined in market equilibrium. Given the distribution of search intensities (which we directly observe), we calibrate the search cost distribution and the flow value of non-market time; these values are then used to derive the socially optimal firm entry rates and distribution of job search intensities. From a social point of view, some unemployed workers search too little due to a hold-up problem, while other unemployed workers search too much due to coordination frictions and rent-seeking behavior. Our results indicate that jointly increasing unemployment benefits and the sanctions for unemployed workers who do not search at all can be welfare-improving.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
Contributions to Economic Analysis, 2006
American Economic Review, 2014
ABSTRACT In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auc... more ABSTRACT In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.