John Corvino | Wayne State University (original) (raw)
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Papers by John Corvino
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 12, 2012
Brill | Nijhoff eBooks, 1997
... For example, he noted that several of the gay men studied did not exhibit the unusually small... more ... For example, he noted that several of the gay men studied did not exhibit the unusually smallINAH 3 regions, which suggested that the ... And one can imagine a homosexual couple who (perhaps for religious reasons) express their affection for each other only in non-sexual ways ...
Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding provider... more Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding providers – bakers, florists, photographers and so on – have religious objections to same-sex weddings. These providers have therefore sought religious exemptions to these laws. The question I explore in this essay is that of what difference it should make whether the business owner’s objection is specifically religious. I approach this question from the standpoint of political morality, not constitutional law, although some of what I say may be relevant to the latter. In the opening section, I clarify what it might mean to treat religion as special when contemplating exemptions. In those remaining, I consider four different broad rationales for treating religion as special: (1) that religion deserves special deference because religious obligations are especially binding on religious believers; (2) that it deserves special deference because religion is a distinctive good worth promoting; (3) that it deserves special deference alongside comparably deep secular commitments, because of the state’s interest in such commitments; and (4) that it deserves special deference as a common site of discrimination. I conclude by returning briefly to the wedding controversies.
ABSTPA.CT. This paper revisits the "morality pays" approach to answering the "Why ... more ABSTPA.CT. This paper revisits the "morality pays" approach to answering the "Why be moral?" question in business. First I argue that "moraUty pays" is weakest when it needs to be strongest, and thus inadequate to the task. Then I examine and reject a proposed virtue-ethics alternative, arguing that it either coUapses into "morality pays" or else introduces a new problem. After sketching an account of moral reasons, I go on to argue that "morality pays" can be refrained, not so much as an answer to "Why be moral," but as a prescription for reforming corporate institutions.
Ideals and Ideologies, 2019
Faith and Philosophy, 2018
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2013
The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics, 2022
Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State, 2019
Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding provider... more Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding providers – bakers, florists, photographers and so on – have religious objections to same-sex weddings. These providers have therefore sought religious exemptions to these laws. The question I explore in this essay is that of what difference it should make whether the business owner’s objection is specifically religious. I approach this question from the standpoint of political morality, not constitutional law, although some of what I say may be relevant to the latter. In the opening section, I clarify what it might mean to treat religion as special when contemplating exemptions. In those remaining, I consider four different broad rationales for treating religion as special: (1) that religion deserves special deference because religious obligations are especially binding on religious believers; (2) that it deserves special deference because religion is a distinctive good worth promoting; (3) that it deserves special deference alongside comparably deep secular commitments, because of the state’s interest in such commitments; and (4) that it deserves special deference as a common site of discrimination. I conclude by returning briefly to the wedding controversies.
In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-... more In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, citing religious beliefs. Colorado Public Accommodations law prohibits business owners from denying the “full and equal enjoyment” of their services on the basis of sexual orientation, and Phillips refused to sell the couple the very same items he would sell to a heterosexual couple. But Phillips, who fashions himself as a “cake artist,” argues that applying the law here would interfere with his free-speech rights. Moreover, he argues that he is not actually discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation but on the basis of a particular understanding of marriage; he is happy to sell Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people a wide range of other items. In this chapter, I evaluate both arguments. In the postscript, I briefly explain the US Supreme Court's June 2018 ruling on the case.
Health Care Analysis, 2020
The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. The fourth sentence of th... more The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. The fourth sentence of third paragraph under section Do Harm Reduction Programs Condone Harm? Should be "One of us (Corvino)" instead of "One of us (name removed for blinded manuscript)". The original article has been corrected. Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Health Care Analysis, 2020
At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reductio... more At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reduction.” If harm is bad, as everyone recognizes, then surely reducing it is good. What’s the problem? The problem, we submit, is twofold. First, there’s more to “harm reduction,” as that term is typically used, than simply the reduction of harm. Some of the wariness about harm-reduction programs may result from the nebulous “more.” Thus, part of our task is to provide a clear definition of harm reduction. Next, we turn to a second problem: a worry about complicity. Those who object to harm reduction programs fear that participation in such programs would make them complicit in activities they deem immoral. In this paper we argue that this fear is largely unwarranted. We use supervised injection sites (SISs)—safe spaces for the use of risky drugs—as our paradigmatic case of harm reduction. These SISs are generally offered in the hope of reducing harm to both the drug user and the public. For this reason, our analysis focuses on complicity in harm. We draw upon the work of Gregory Mellema as our framework. Mellema offers three ways one can be complicit in harm caused by another: by enabling, facilitating or condoning it. We argue that one who operates an SIS is not complicit in any of these ways, while also laying out the conditions that must be met if one is to argue that harm reduction entails complicity in non-consequentialist wrongdoing.
Philosophical Topics, 2018
In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in ... more In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which baker Jack Phillips refused to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding. The Court decided the case on fairly narrow grounds; in particular, it set aside the question of whether Phillips illegally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to sell the same cake to a gay couple that he would sell to a heterosexual couple. Concurring opinions by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch do address that question, however, and in this paper I explore the debate between them. By distinguishing between design-based and use-based refusals of service and then arguing that some use-based refusals are tantamount to discrimination on the basis of protected traits, I argue that Jack Phillips did indeed discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. I also argue that another baker, who refused to create a “Leviticus 18:22 ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin’ ” cake, did not discriminate on the...
Journal of Business Ethics, 2006
... Birmingham Character and Culture by Lester H. Hunt, University of Wisconsin at Madison Racist... more ... Birmingham Character and Culture by Lester H. Hunt, University of Wisconsin at Madison Racist Symbols and Reparations: Philosophical Reflections on Vestiges of the American Civil War by George Schedler, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale Same Sex: Debating the ...
Debating Same-Sex Marriage, 2012
Oxford University Press eBooks, Jul 12, 2012
Brill | Nijhoff eBooks, 1997
... For example, he noted that several of the gay men studied did not exhibit the unusually small... more ... For example, he noted that several of the gay men studied did not exhibit the unusually smallINAH 3 regions, which suggested that the ... And one can imagine a homosexual couple who (perhaps for religious reasons) express their affection for each other only in non-sexual ways ...
Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding provider... more Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding providers – bakers, florists, photographers and so on – have religious objections to same-sex weddings. These providers have therefore sought religious exemptions to these laws. The question I explore in this essay is that of what difference it should make whether the business owner’s objection is specifically religious. I approach this question from the standpoint of political morality, not constitutional law, although some of what I say may be relevant to the latter. In the opening section, I clarify what it might mean to treat religion as special when contemplating exemptions. In those remaining, I consider four different broad rationales for treating religion as special: (1) that religion deserves special deference because religious obligations are especially binding on religious believers; (2) that it deserves special deference because religion is a distinctive good worth promoting; (3) that it deserves special deference alongside comparably deep secular commitments, because of the state’s interest in such commitments; and (4) that it deserves special deference as a common site of discrimination. I conclude by returning briefly to the wedding controversies.
ABSTPA.CT. This paper revisits the "morality pays" approach to answering the "Why ... more ABSTPA.CT. This paper revisits the "morality pays" approach to answering the "Why be moral?" question in business. First I argue that "moraUty pays" is weakest when it needs to be strongest, and thus inadequate to the task. Then I examine and reject a proposed virtue-ethics alternative, arguing that it either coUapses into "morality pays" or else introduces a new problem. After sketching an account of moral reasons, I go on to argue that "morality pays" can be refrained, not so much as an answer to "Why be moral," but as a prescription for reforming corporate institutions.
Ideals and Ideologies, 2019
Faith and Philosophy, 2018
The Philosophers' Magazine, 2013
The Palgrave Handbook of Sexual Ethics, 2022
Religious Beliefs and Conscientious Exemptions in a Liberal State, 2019
Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding provider... more Some public accommodations laws prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. Some wedding providers – bakers, florists, photographers and so on – have religious objections to same-sex weddings. These providers have therefore sought religious exemptions to these laws. The question I explore in this essay is that of what difference it should make whether the business owner’s objection is specifically religious. I approach this question from the standpoint of political morality, not constitutional law, although some of what I say may be relevant to the latter. In the opening section, I clarify what it might mean to treat religion as special when contemplating exemptions. In those remaining, I consider four different broad rationales for treating religion as special: (1) that religion deserves special deference because religious obligations are especially binding on religious believers; (2) that it deserves special deference because religion is a distinctive good worth promoting; (3) that it deserves special deference alongside comparably deep secular commitments, because of the state’s interest in such commitments; and (4) that it deserves special deference as a common site of discrimination. I conclude by returning briefly to the wedding controversies.
In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-... more In 2012, baker Jack Phillips of Masterpiece Cakeshop refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, citing religious beliefs. Colorado Public Accommodations law prohibits business owners from denying the “full and equal enjoyment” of their services on the basis of sexual orientation, and Phillips refused to sell the couple the very same items he would sell to a heterosexual couple. But Phillips, who fashions himself as a “cake artist,” argues that applying the law here would interfere with his free-speech rights. Moreover, he argues that he is not actually discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation but on the basis of a particular understanding of marriage; he is happy to sell Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) people a wide range of other items. In this chapter, I evaluate both arguments. In the postscript, I briefly explain the US Supreme Court's June 2018 ruling on the case.
Health Care Analysis, 2020
The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. The fourth sentence of th... more The original version of this article unfortunately contained a mistake. The fourth sentence of third paragraph under section Do Harm Reduction Programs Condone Harm? Should be "One of us (Corvino)" instead of "One of us (name removed for blinded manuscript)". The original article has been corrected. Publisher's Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Health Care Analysis, 2020
At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reductio... more At first glance, it seems difficult to object to any program that merits the label “harm reduction.” If harm is bad, as everyone recognizes, then surely reducing it is good. What’s the problem? The problem, we submit, is twofold. First, there’s more to “harm reduction,” as that term is typically used, than simply the reduction of harm. Some of the wariness about harm-reduction programs may result from the nebulous “more.” Thus, part of our task is to provide a clear definition of harm reduction. Next, we turn to a second problem: a worry about complicity. Those who object to harm reduction programs fear that participation in such programs would make them complicit in activities they deem immoral. In this paper we argue that this fear is largely unwarranted. We use supervised injection sites (SISs)—safe spaces for the use of risky drugs—as our paradigmatic case of harm reduction. These SISs are generally offered in the hope of reducing harm to both the drug user and the public. For this reason, our analysis focuses on complicity in harm. We draw upon the work of Gregory Mellema as our framework. Mellema offers three ways one can be complicit in harm caused by another: by enabling, facilitating or condoning it. We argue that one who operates an SIS is not complicit in any of these ways, while also laying out the conditions that must be met if one is to argue that harm reduction entails complicity in non-consequentialist wrongdoing.
Philosophical Topics, 2018
In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in ... more In June 2018 the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which baker Jack Phillips refused to provide a cake for a same-sex wedding. The Court decided the case on fairly narrow grounds; in particular, it set aside the question of whether Phillips illegally discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to sell the same cake to a gay couple that he would sell to a heterosexual couple. Concurring opinions by Justices Kagan and Gorsuch do address that question, however, and in this paper I explore the debate between them. By distinguishing between design-based and use-based refusals of service and then arguing that some use-based refusals are tantamount to discrimination on the basis of protected traits, I argue that Jack Phillips did indeed discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. I also argue that another baker, who refused to create a “Leviticus 18:22 ‘Homosexuality is a detestable sin’ ” cake, did not discriminate on the...
Journal of Business Ethics, 2006
... Birmingham Character and Culture by Lester H. Hunt, University of Wisconsin at Madison Racist... more ... Birmingham Character and Culture by Lester H. Hunt, University of Wisconsin at Madison Racist Symbols and Reparations: Philosophical Reflections on Vestiges of the American Civil War by George Schedler, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale Same Sex: Debating the ...
Debating Same-Sex Marriage, 2012
This point-counterpoint book brings together leading voices in the culture wars to debate such qu... more This point-counterpoint book brings together leading voices in the culture wars to debate such questions: John Corvino, a longtime LGBT-rights advocate, opposite Ryan T. Anderson and Sherif Girgis, prominent young social conservatives.
Many such questions have arisen in response to same-sex marriage: How should we treat county clerks who do not wish to authorize such marriages, for example; or bakers, florists, and photographers who do not wish to provide same-sex wedding services? But the conflicts extend well beyond the LGBT rights arena. How should we treat hospitals, schools, and adoption agencies that can't in conscience follow antidiscrimination laws, healthcare mandates, and other regulations? Should corporations ever get exemptions? Should public officials?
Should we keep controversial laws like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or pass new ones like the First Amendment Defense Act? Should the law give religion and conscience special protection at all, and if so, why? What counts as discrimination, and when is it unjust? What kinds of material and dignitary harms should the law try to fight-and what is dignitary harm, anyway?
Beyond the law, how should we treat religious beliefs and practices we find mistaken or even oppressive? Should we tolerate them or actively discourage them?
In point-counterpoint format, Corvino, Anderson and Girgis explore these questions and more. Although their differences run deep, they tackle them with civility, clarity, and flair. Their debate is an essential contribution to contemporary discussions about why religious liberty matters and what respecting it requires.
Polls and election results show Americans sharply divided on same-sex marriage, and the controver... more Polls and election results show Americans sharply divided on same-sex marriage, and the controversy is unlikely to subside anytime soon. Debating Same-Sex Marriage provides an indispensable roadmap to the ongoing debate. Taking a "point/counterpoint" approach, John Corvino (a philosopher and prominent gay advocate) and Maggie Gallagher (a nationally syndicated columnist and co-founder of the National Organization for Marriage) explore fundamental questions: What is marriage for? Is sexual difference essential to it? Why does the government sanction it? What are the implications of same-sex marriage for children's welfare, for religious freedom, and for our understanding of marriage itself? While the authors disagree on many points, they share the following conviction: Because marriage is a vital public institution, this issue deserves a comprehensive, rigorous, thoughtful debate.
For the last twenty years, John Corvino--widely known as the author of the weekly column "The Gay... more For the last twenty years, John Corvino--widely known as the author of the weekly column "The Gay Moralist"--has traversed the country responding to moral and religious arguments against same-sex relationships. In this timely book, he shares that experience--addressing the standard objections to homosexuality and offering insight into the culture wars more generally.
Is homosexuality unnatural? Does the Bible condemn it? Are people born gay (and should it matter either way)? Corvino approaches such questions with precision, sensitivity, and good humor. In the process, he makes a fresh case for moral engagement, forcefully rejecting the idea that morality is a "private matter." This book appears at a time when same-sex marriage is being hotly debated across the U.S. Many people object to such marriage on the grounds that same-sex relationships are immoral, or at least, that they do not deserve the same social recognition as heterosexual relationships. Unfortunately, the traditional rhetoric of gay-rights advocates--which emphasizes privacy and tolerance--fails to meet this objection. Legally speaking, when it comes to marriage, "tolerance" might be enough, Corvino concedes, but socially speaking, marriage requires more. Marriage is more than just a relationship between two individuals, recognized by the state. It is also a relationship between those individuals and a larger community. The fight for same-sex marriage, ultimately, is a fight for full inclusion in the moral fabric. What is needed is a positive case for moral approval--which is what Corvino unabashedly offers here.
Corvino blends a philosopher's precision with a light touch that is full of humanity and wit. This volume captures the voice of one of the most rational participants in a national debate noted for generating more heat than light.