HMS Campbeltown and the Raid on St. Nazaire, France. 28th/29th March 1942 (original) (raw)

After France had very quickly decided to give up the fight against Germany in the Second World War and surrender, their Atlantic and Channel ports were handed over to the Germans intact. One of these at St.Nazaire in the Loire estuary contained their largest dry dock which had been built for the purpose of serving the liner Normandie. It was known as the Forme-Ecluse or the Normandie Dock. It was 1,148 ft long and 164ft wide.

The threat from the German battleship Tirpitz, known to be in the North Sea, was a very serious one. If she got into the Atlantic, as had the Bismark, and evaded destruction, she could have been accommodated in this dock when servicing was needed, the only one big enough outside Germany. In England it was decided, inspite of the enormous risks and difficulties, that it had to be destroyed. The code name of the attack was to be 'Operation Chariot'

The raid was one to rival any similar feats before or since. The 1918 raid by Admiral Keyes on Zeebrugge has been hailed as daring and brilliant, and so it was, but it can be argued that the raid on St Nazaire exceeded it. It was carried out by a smaller force with a more difficult prospect and the results were of great long-term strategic significance. It has not received the prominence in recent history it deserves.

The means of taking the dock out of use, once the plan had received approval, was to take a Naval force and Army commandos across the Channel and up the Loire estuary to destroy the caissons giving access to the dry-dock, the gates' winding machinery and the pumproom. This would involve HMS Campeltown as the most visible element of the plan which developed but it was a combined services operation with RAF as well, and it could not have been achieved by the Royal Navy alone.

Joint Commanders were Commander R E D Ryder, RN, and Colonel Newman in charge of the commandos, whose joint leadership and example ensured that the operation was to become a model of inter-service co-operation and a great success.

The plan involved placing a very large quantitiy of explosives against the dock gates (caissons) and some way of doing this had to be found. At the time Campbeltown was in dock for repair and she was chosen to be the means, being considered expendable, carrying 4.25 tons of explosives. She was to be commanded by Lt-Cdr S H Beattie RN, supported by MGB314 as headquarters ship, and 16 motor launches were to carry the commando force and demolition squads, a force total of 621 men. MTB74, commanded by Sub-Lt R C Wynn RNVR was included as a contingency to torpedo the gates if Campbeltown failed.

The force would have to first get across the Channel, then travel up the estuary. If it was recognised early by the defenders success would be impossible so Cambeltown was disguised as a German MOWE class torpedo boat. She also had to modified to carry the explosives and made as light as possible to navigate the shallow waters. German recognition signals were known and used to good effect when the force was challenged. The explosives on Campbeltown were placed forward so when she rammed the gates they would be as close as possible to them. The charges were timed to go off later when the attacking force had finished their job and got clear.

There was only a limited time for preparation since the attack could only take place when the tides were right. The night of March 28th/29th 1942 was chosen for the attack itself. The force set off on the afternoon of 26th March with HMS Tynedale and HMS Atherstone as escort, with all the appearance of a anti-submarine attacking force. These destroyers would then lay off the estuary to cover the withdrawal. HM Submarine Sturgeon was to place herself 40 miles off St Nazaire to act as beacon. Two further destroyers HMS Cleveland and HMS Brocklesby were to act as reinforcements.

Luck was with the ships as they made their way to the objective in a roundabout way. No enemy aircraft were encountered and although HMS Tynedale saw and attacked U-595 unsuccessfully, the U-boat's radio subsequent report did not contain anything significant. Some French fishing boats were also seen but they did not report the presence of the Force and, even as the ships approached the estuary entrance and were seen by a patrol craft, it had no radio and could not report the fact.

It was not all good fortune. The involvement of the RAF was to carry out a bombing raid just prior to the sea attack, the intention of which, in part, was to divert the defenders' attentions to the sky and away from the surface. However, for political reasons, it was RAF policy only to bomb clearly identifiable targets in built up areas, and because the previously clear skies had given way to cloud the planes did not attack, even though they had arrived over the target. Consequently the defenders had been alerted and did not relax their guard after the planes had flown off.

Nevertheless with skill, bravery and use of intelligence about German signals the force got to within a mile of their target before they were seriously challenged, but once they had been identified the full force of the defenders' armament was brought to bear. Many men were killed in their boats before they had a chance to get ashore but the attack was driven home and HMS Campbeltown was rammed into the caissons, at 1.34am, exactly as planned. Commandos managed also to destroy their objectives but inevitably many were killed while doing so. Two MTB's and 14 of the motor launches were lost.

The dock itself was empty when the attack took place and when the battle was over the Germans attempted to pull Campeltown off the gates, without success. The delayed action fuses did not activate as they had been set to and it was not until nearly noon on the 29th that an enormous explosion occurred which completely destroyed the gates. The water in the estuary washed Campbeltown into the dock along with debris of all kinds. For some reason the Germans, although having had plenty of time to search for and find the explosives failed to do so, and there were many of them either on or near the ship at the time. Estimates of German losses vary between 150 and 300 from the fight and the explosion. Some 48 hours later two more explosions from delayed action torpedoes fired from MTB74 at the entrance to the old dock caused considerable confusion if not panic among the remaining garrison. The Germans thought that bombs had been planted and the workers feared reprisals and attempted get out of the docks area and were fired upon.

Further casualties among navy personnel occurred on the way home and the rate of attrition among them was to exceed 50%, being 105 men. Commando losses were 64. A total of 169 lost out of 621. In this operation 5 Victoria Crosses were won, with 80 other medals and 51 Mentions in Despatches. The operation was described by the Germans as 'a model example of a cleverly planned operation, superbly prepared down to the last detail, which was carried out well and boldly with a daredevil spirit.' and they accorded the dead due respect at the burial ceremonies a few days later.

The dock and machinery was so badly damaged that it was not repaired until after the end of the war.

HMS Campbeltown on the caissons after the attack.