BLINDING LASER WEAPONS (original) (raw)

BLINDING LASER WEAPONS: It is Time for the International Community to Take Off Its Blinders.

Lisa A. Small fn(a)

INTRODUCTION.

"One of the most enduring images of the First World War was a photograph of a line of blinded soldiers being led from the battlefield after being exposed to phosgene gas." The inhumanity and cruelty of chemical warfare, as demonstrated in this picture, alarmed the international community, and led to the adoption of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and biological warfare. Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a tremendous effort was made by the international community to regulate various types of weapons and methods of warfare. In 1868, the Declaration of St. Petersburg was the first major international treaty to place humanitarian restrictions on the methods of warfare, by prohibiting the use of explosive and incendiary projectiles. At the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Conventions were adopted making it illegal to employ arms that caused "superfluous injury" or "unnecessary suffering." In addition, the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 codified the fundamental principle of customary international law that the methods or means of warfare are not "unlimited." Finally, the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter "1980 CCW") banned three classes of conventional weapons, including non-detectable fragments, mines and booby traps, and incendiary weapons.

As we enter the twenty-first century, a new weapon has emerged, the modern battlefield laser weapon. Unless the international community begins an aggressive campaign to establish effective methods of control over the use and proliferation of this technology, battlefield lasers may result in soldiers returning home from combat permanently blinded. "Given today’s rapid technological developments, the widespread proliferation of weapons and the continued eruption of numerous armed conflicts, it is clear that weapons developments need to be supervised in order to try to prevent the conflicts of tomorrow wreaking even more suffering than those of [yesterday and] today." In 1995, Protocol IV to the 1980 CCW was drafted, banning the use and transfer of laser weapons whose primary purpose is to permanently blind. Although Protocol IV may be viewed as successful in that it prohibits the use and transfer of a specific category of anti-personnel weapons, it still leaves unrestricted a whole category of battlefield laser devices, whose incidental effect may be permanent blindness.

Before making a legal analysis of battlefield laser weapons, it is important first to understand the fundamentals of such laser weapon systems. Sections II-IV, respectively, define laser weapons, explain their effects on the eye, and provide a brief history of this technology. Section V creates a classification structure for different military battlefield laser systems, and Section VI goes on to discuss current and projected military battlefield laser weapons and policies in the United States, Great Britain and China. In addition, Section VII outlines the possible protective measures that may be taken against laser weapons.

Having provided a comprehensive background on battlefield laser weapons, the legal analysis begins in Section VIII with an outline of existing laws and principles applicable to the use of battlefield laser weapons. This Section also addresses the events leading up to the adoption of specific regulations on the use and transfer of battlefield laser weapon systems. Subsequently, the language and effect of Protocol IV is carefully examined. And finally, Section IX offers a conclusion.

II. WHAT IS A LASER WEAPON?

The term "laser" is an acronym for light amplification by stimulated emission of radiation. A laser is a source of light. The radiation it emits is not different from any other form of electromagnetic radiation. The nature of a laser, however, produces several unique properties that are not available from any other light source. First, laser light is monochromatic. It consists of only one wavelength. Second, laser light is spatially and temporally coherent. The waves of the electromagnetic radiation are in-phase or are in tandem in both space and time. And third, laser light is highly collimated. Unlike ordinary light, the laser beam can travel long distances with minimum radiation dispersion. In fact, the design of the laser device can collimate or make parallel the laser into a parallel beam. In addition to these characteristics, light from a laser source may be continuous or pulsed. Continuous laser light may possess power from one one-thousandth of a watt to many thousands of watts per second. Pulsed lasers may reach energy levels of up to millions of watts per fraction of a second.

Because lasers are coherent, monochromatic and travel in only one direction, they are uniquely adapted for numerous important applications. As a result of the rapid development of laser technology in recent years, the possible applications of lasers have diversified tremendously. The value of lasers in the fields of medicine and industry are widely recognized. Laser technology not only revolutionized medical treatments and surgical procedures, but also introduced new methods and procedures of transmitting communications and conducting civil and mechanical engineering measurements and tests. Future applications of lasers in these fields are continually being sought.

In addition, modern military forces have become dependent upon lasers used as range-finders, target-designators, radar and other highly-technical sensory devices. Also, portable anti-personnel laser weapons are in the advanced stages of development. These portable laser systems represent the future in military weapons technology because they eventually may function only to cause temporary visual impairment as opposed to causing immediate death or permanent blindness. But until these laser weapons have advanced to this endstage of development, their widespread proliferation should be governed carefully.

III. WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF A LASER WEAPON ON THE EYE?

The principal biological tissue target of lasers is the eye. Laser damage to the eye tissue depends upon the inter-relationship between the nature of the laser beam and the atmosphere in which it traverses. With regard to the character of the laser, the most critical factors are the laser wavelength, pulse energy, pulse duration, and image size of the laser beam when it hits the eye. In addition, the atmospheric conditions, including the range, terrain features, water content, turbulence, and pollution, also may alter the laser’s effect on the eye. The actual damage to the eye tissue may vary. Superficial damage to the cornea and lens may be treated by special surgical procedures. But, damage to the retina, as well as hemorrhaging near the retina generally cause a complete loss of vision.

The laser damage to a biological system, like the eye, depends on four factors: (1) transmission (how deep into the tissue the laser beam penetrates), (2) absorption (how much energy the tissue absorbs), (3) degradation (how the absorbed energy degrades), and (4) tissue reaction (acute or latent).

1. Transmission.

Electromagnetic radiation will have an effect on eye tissue only when it can interact with the atoms and molecules that make up those tissues. The process that permits radiation to pass through the eye tissue is called transmission. Transmission is completely dependent upon wavelength, which determines the penetration depth of the radiation into the eye. Each wavelength along the electromagnetic radiation spectrum is composed of a bundle of energy called quanta. A quantum of energy contains the smallest amount of energy that a specific wavelength can have. Thus, the wavelength determines the energy of the quanta within the laser beam, and therefore, determines the extent of its tissue penetration. The transmission of radiation through the eye tissue may not be perfect because losses of radiation energy may occur due to absorption and scattering effects of some tissues.

Figure 1.

2. Absorption.

The absorption and scattering properties of a tissue also change with the wavelength of the electromagnetic radiation. The amount of energy absorbed depends on the amount of pigment present in the tissue, its density, and how concentrated or evenly distributed it is within the tissue. When the laser beam produces enough energy, it can destroy the molecular structure of the eye tissue.

Two basic processes account for absorption: linear processes and non-linear processes. Linear processes involve the inter-dependency between the amount of energy absorbed and the pigment concentration and path length. Non-linear processes occur when high irradiance levels, caused by short pulse durations and small retinal image size, result in the ionization or destruction of the atoms and molecules of a tissue.

3. Degradation.

There are three basic mechanisms of tissue damage: thermal, photochemical and ionization.

Figure 2. Mechanisms of Damage

Pulse Duration (seconds)

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10-12 10-9 10-6 10-3 1 103

I O N I Z A T I O N T H E R M A L P H O T O C H E M I C A L

A. Thermal Processes.

Energy absorbed in the eye tissue is degraded into heat and raises the temperature of that tissue. The temperature increase is dependent on the rate at which energy enters the tissue and the rate at which it flows away from the exposure site (thermal conductivity). The level of energy absorption in the eye tissue is critical because the more absorption that occurs, the more energy is converted into heat. It is this temperature elevation and its duration that determine the extent of the tissue damage.

Because cells have repair processes that are always operational, damaged proteins can be repaired, but only at a certain maximum rate. If the temperature elevation damages proteins at a rate that exceeds the rate of repair, then the cell will die. Where the damage rate is greater than the repair rate, the lower threshold of incident energy for thermal damage is established. An upper threshold forms when the energy input is so rapid that the temperature rises very fast and exceeds the boiling point of water. This vaporization leads to a different type of thermal damage. Thermal tissue damage is caused within a few micro-seconds and is the most common form of optical damage on the battlefield.

B. Photochemical Processes.

Photochemical damage to eye tissue generally occurs with prolonged exposure to relatively weak-intensity light. Because ten seconds or more are needed to cause such damage, battlefield weapons usually do not result in such reactions.

C. Ionization Processes.

Electromagnetic radiation is associated with both an electrical and a magnetic field. If the energy of a laser beam reaches a high level of intensity within a nanosecond (10-9seconds) or less, the atoms that make up the target tissue are completely torn apart. These destroyed atoms are said to be ionized. Forming a highly unstable plasma, this ionized matter may cause cavitation bubbles or hemorrhaging, which in turn may damage a larger area of retinal tissue than that occurring at the original target site.

4. Tissue Reaction.

When a high-energy laser beam causes ionization and thermal damage, the eye tissue reaction is acute or instantaneous. To the contrary, photochemical damage may occur after a latency of four to six hours, at which time pain and blindness may ensue.

In summary, the result of laser action on the eye is dependent upon the relationships between transmission and absorption, which determines the location of the damage, absorption and degradation, which dictates the type of damage, and degradation and reaction, which indicates the type of injury.

IV. HISTORY OF LASER WEAPON TECHNOLOGY.

"Immediately after the laboratory realization of a functional laser in 1960 the military potential was apparent." Therefore, it is not surprising to learn that all early biological data on the interaction between laser radiation and human tissue was compiled by military agencies. This information provides a foundation on which all current practices for the protection of personnel against laser injuries are based.

Interest in tactical laser weapons began in the early 1970s, when it was first realized that technological advancement could eventually lead to the development of portable, inexpensive and powerful lasers with offensive capabilities. Work on specific tactical laser weapon began in 1975-1976, when Martin-Marietta and Lockheed Sanders contracted with the Army to develop laser weapon systems for attack helicopters. In the 1980s, the focus shifted to ground-based weapon systems, such as the American Stingray, Cobra and Laser Countermeasure System (hereinafter "LCMS") (each which will be discussed in detail later in this report).

V. CLASSIFICATION OF MILITARY BATTLEFIELD LASER SYSTEMS.

As a result of the considerable diversity of laser battlefield systems, the First Working Group of Experts (hereinafter "the Group"), convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter "ICRC") from May 31 to June 1, 1990, introduced a useful classification system. This five-category structure was proposed to facilitate the work of the Group, as well as to illuminate the problems associated with such laser battlefield systems. The following framework produced by the Group is neither universal nor exhaustive.

Category A – Systems not designated primarily for anti-personnel use but which under battlefield conditions might present an ocular hazard.

A1. Sub-category 1 -- Range-finders, target designators, laser target markers, optical radar systems (LIDAR) and large, non-portable or vehicle-mounted systems.

The Department of Defense announced in its September 1, 1995 press release that sub-category A1 laser systems "provide a critical technological edge to U.S. forces and allow our forces to fight, win and survive on an increasingly lethal battlefield." Although these systems are "absolutely vital to our modern military," most laser range-finders are not eye-safe and numerous cases of eye damage have been reported. Target designators are even more hazardous than range-finders because they use a more powerful laser output. Because many thousands of these systems have been deployed, in the immediate future, they may be expected to produce the greatest number of eye injuries. Although these devices may not have been designed to specifically target the eye, they are all capable of anti-personnel use.

In addition, the rapid development of diode lasers, which are small, inexpensive and efficient, will lead to widespread proliferation of sub-category A1 systems. As technology advances, the output power of these devices will rise and the ability of these lasers to operate across the visible spectrum will become a reality. "These factors militate to increase the potential risk for eye injury."

A2. Sub-category 2 -- Sighting, training, simulation and other small, portable systems.

Despite their important role in military training and precision targeting, sub-category A2 systems may present several problems. Although training and simulation systems are only used with friendly personnel and are designed to be completely eye-safe, under battlefield conditions, these devices could easily become eye-unsafe by simply removing the safety filters or output limiters. Also, smaller, more sophisticated and powerful aiming systems are continually being designed and tested, which inevitably will lead to an increase in the deployment of such laser devices. An example of a sub-category A2 system is the high-fire-rate rifle, which has a day- or night-visible (red) laser clipped to the barrel and the light spot shows the place of bullet impact.

Category B – Anti-Sensor Systems.

Unlike category A systems, anti-sensor systems function primarily to find, block or destroy enemy optical viewing, scanning, ranging, guiding and communications systems. The risk of injury to unprotected eyes from category B systems is extremely high. Military personnel who are using magnifying optics will be at even greater risk of eye injury because the optics may increase the light-gathering power of the eye so that the irradiance of the retinal image is increased. Also, the optics may be detected as an electro-optical sensor to be destroyed because the reflection from the optical lenses appears like that from the optic train of an electro-optical sensor. Examples of category B systems that are developed in the United States are the Stingray, Dazer and Cobra, which will be discussed in detail in the next section.

Category C – Anti-Personnel Systems.

Anti-personnel systems differ from those in categories A and B in that they are specifically designed to harm an individual--in this case, to injure the eyes. Although most information pertaining to such weapons is classified, the British Navy’s Laser Dazzle Sight (LDS) weapon is an exception. This system was employed on British naval vessels and was intended to dazzle pilots of attacking aircraft. The LDS had been commercially available and in use since the Falklands war in 1982. It was not until May 1995, when the Human Rights Watch Arms Project report was issued, identifying ten United States tactical laser weapon programs, that Great Britain stopped its development of such weapons for fear that blinding weapons would go into production in the United States. In addition, it is important to realize that as the energy and wavelength of a laser designed to destroy a sensor nears the level of energy and the wavelength capable of damaging the eyes, anti-sensor systems can also be used for anti-personnel purposes.

Category D – Anti-Material Systems.

This category includes "systems with output beams of such intensity and power that damage is done to material remote from the system." The American Space Defense Initiative weapons are examples of such systems. Because these weapons are beyond the scope of this report, no further discussion will be set forth.

Category E – Non-Laser Intense Light Systems.

Although these systems operate with intense light sources that are not lasers, in military situations, they may cause damage to the eyes and skin similar to that produced by laser light. Non-laser light systems include search lights, aircraft landing lights and strobe and signaling lamps. This category is beyond the scope of this report, therefore no further discussion will be devoted to it.

VI. CURRENT AND PROJECTED MILITARY BATTLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS.

Although widespread use of blinding laser weapons seems remote, technology has progressed to a highly advanced stage of development. Nations have been developing tactical laser weapons for at least twenty years, but it is believed that no country has begun full-scale production or fielded such weapons in significant numbers. U.S. military sources have reported that laser weapon research and development programs exist in the United States, France, Britain, China, Germany, Israel, Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet republics.

1. United States.

In May 1995, the Human Rights Watch Arms Project was the first to identify and detail publicly ten United States tactical laser programs code-named: Saber 203, Stingray, Outrider, Dazer, Cobra, Perseus, Coronet Prince, Compass Hammer, Cameo Bluejay, and Laser Countermeasure System. Although the military claims that these weapons function to counter battlefield surveillance by disrupting optical and electro-optical devices, it appears that all of these weapons also are capable of being used as blinding anti-personnel weapons.

Existing United States Laser Weapon Systems.

1. Saber 203 Grenade Shell Laser Intruder Countermeasure System.

The Fact Sheet from the United States Air Force describes the Saber 203 laser weapon system as "lightweight, compact, and extremely simple to operate." The Saber 203 uses a standard 40 mm M-203 grenade launcher attached to an M-16 rifle. According to the Air Force, the laser light causes glare and flash blinding which "can impair an adversary’s ability to aim or reload a weapon, open a door or gate, plant or arm explosives, drive a vehicle, or leave the area." Though very little information is available, it is known that a Saber 203 prototype was offered to the Marines in Somalia, despite the fact that the Department of Defense states that the system is unfunded.

2. Stingray Combat Protection System (AN/VLQ-7).

The Stingray weapon was developed by Martin-Marietta Electronics and Missiles Group and General Electric to detect, track and counter optical and electro-optical devices on tanks, combat vehicles and other grounds and airborne systems beyond the threat’s effective conventional weapons ranges. The U.S. Army states that the Stingray is:

a tactical laser system integrated on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and designed

to acquire and defeat threat direct fire control systems. Stingray increases the effectiveness and survivability of the Bradley crew and other friendly forces

in the area by employing in-ban laser energy to acquire and disable threat fire

control systems.

The Stingray works by scanning an area with a low-powered, near infrared laser beam. If the beam enters the optical train of an enemy sensor system, a small fraction of light is reflected back to the Stingray, whereby the output of the device becomes locked onto the target and increases in intensity so as to overload and damage the enemy sensor device.

Since 1982, two prototypes were assembled and were eventually deployed in the Gulf War; neither was used during the conflict. In 1995, Martin-Marietta completed a $68.4 million "Advanced Technology Demonstration" contract for the Stingray. Although the program was unfunded in the 1996 Army budget, full scale production could be achieved if funding was made available.

3. Outrider Combat Protection System.

The Outrider is an outgrowth of the Martin-Marietta/General Electric Stingray laser and is under development for the Marine Corps. Outrider is a multi-faceted reconnaissance and surveillance system which is integrated on a high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMVW or "humvee") and intended to be used for low intensity conflicts and special operations. Although a prototype of the Outrider was completed in 1995, its specific use in the Army is unknown.

Dazer.

Dazer is a portable rifle-like, shoulder-fired, non-scanning, manually operated tactical laser weapon whose use is reserved for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) missions. The Dazer uses a short-range, near infrared spectrum alexandrite laser beam, has a battery life of 1000 individual shots, and can make up to 50 shots per minute. The USSOCOM warns in its internal Fact Sheet that the Dazer is hazardous to the eyes and skin and operates at a lethal voltage.

5. Cobra.

Like the Dazer, the Cobra is also a portable, rifle-like, non-scanning anti-sensor laser weapon, but uses instead a diode-pumped neodymium laser in the near infrared spectrum.

The Human Rights Watch Arms Project was told by U.S. military sources that McDonnell-Douglas is still actively seeking sponsorship to continue development and production of the Cobra.

6. Perseus Optical Munition.

Similar to the Saber 203, the Perseus "optical flash" 40 mm rifle grenade projectile works when the "[l]ight from an explosion-induced shock-wave is used to pump an inexpensive plastic compact laser ‘bullet’ or ‘optical flash’ device." The grenade’s pulsed chemical laser produces a flash of white light intense enough to temporarily blind people and destroy sensory devices. Although Army officials purport that the program was canceled in 1992, Los Alamos National Laboratory continues to test more compact prototypes and is still actively pursing sponsorship and funding.

7. Coronet Prince (ALQ-179).

The Coronet Prince prototype, developed by Westinghouse Electric Corp. for the Air Force, is described as using a "scanning laser to illuminate the ground and a close-circuit TV camera to detect energy of the ‘glint’ reflected from optics." Details as to how this system actually works are classified and it is unclear if this system is still in operation.

8. Compass Hammer.

All that is known about the Compass Hammer is that it is an optical countermeasure system associated with the Coronet Prince and was developed by the Air Force. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project suspects that this laser system is being developed for use on an F-15E Strike Eagle.

9. Cameo Bluejay.

The Cameo Bluejay is a helicopter-mounted tactical laser weapon developed by Lockheed Sanders. In 1989, the Cameo Bluejay project was canceled due to technical difficulties and it is not known whether it or other derivatives have been revived for helicopter use.

10. Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS) (AN/PLQ-4 and AN/PLQ-5).

LCMS is a one-person portable, manually operated, shoulder-fired, battery-powered, system mounted on an M-16 A3 rifle. According to the Lockheed Sanders Fact Sheet, LCMS has the "primary objective to detect, jam, and suppress threat fire control, optical and electro-optical subsystems." Current plans for the LCMS is to distribute these devices to light infantry, armor, cavalry and special operations troops. Lockheed states that LCMS also can be mounted on a HMMVW, helicopters and small boats. This weapon system has been the source of the most recent discussion in the United States.

B. United States Policy Concerning Battlefield Laser Weapons.

After years of resisting limits on laser weapons, the Pentagon partially reversed its longtime opposition to restrictions and endorsed a U.S. and international ban on futuristic laser weapons that were designed to cause permanent blindness. In a September 1, 1995 press release, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry announced the policy of the Department of Defense on blinding lasers:

The Department of Defense prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause permanent blindness of unenhanced vision and supports negotiations prohibiting the use of such weapons. However, laser systems are absolutely vital to our modern military. Among other things, they are currently used for detection, targeting, range-finding, communications and target destruction. They provided a critical technological edge to US forces and allow our forces to fight, win and survive on an increasingly lethal battlefield. In addition, lasers provide significant humanitarian benefits. They allow weapons systems to be increasingly discriminate, thereby reducing collateral damage to civilian lives and property.

The Department of Defense recognizes that accidental or incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield as the result of the use of legitimate laser systems. Therefore, we continue to strive, through training and doctrine, to minimize these injuries.

The move by Perry was welcomed by members of Congress and human rights activists critical of the Pentagon’s previous stance on laser weapons. But they also stated that the "problem with the Pentagon’s less-than-full about-face is that you can’t distinguish between laser weapons that are designed to blind and those that are designed merely for targeting, range-finding or disruption of optical devices." Lasers designed and marketed as anti-sensor weapons would be permitted, even though they are no less dangerous to the human eye.

As a result of the Clinton Administration’s new policy on blinding laser weapons, which bans use of lasers specifically designed to blind individuals, the Pentagon civilian leaders ordered the Army to cancel production of the LCMS. Army officials had defended the new laser weapon as a high-tech, discreet way of disorienting enemy forces on a battlefield by disrupting night-vision goggles, binoculars and other optical devices. They denied the weapon was intended to cause permanent blindness, although acknowledged that it could do so at ranges up to 3,000 feet. The Army had planned to spend $17 million in 1996-97 buying 75 of the devices for testing and training. An initial contract for 20 weapons was awarded to Lockheed Sanders one day before the Pentagon announced its new policy. After reviewing the LCMS program, the Pentagon decided that the LCMS did not coincide with the spirit of the new policy, though the Army continued to insist the weapon was totally consistent with the Pentagon policy and stressed the importance of lasers in providing our war-fighters with overmatching combat power.

2. Great Britain.

"Prototype systems consciously designed to exploit the ocular effects of laser emissions were . . . first deployed in a combat setting over a decade ago, in the form of the laser dazzle sights mounted on two United Kingdom Royal Navy frigates during the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War." Although the laser dazzle sight (LDS) system had been commercially available since 1982, Great Britain stopped developing laser weapons capable of disabling enemy troops as of May 1995, because it feared that the United States and other countries were on the brink of developing and producing similar systems. According to Roger Freeman, minister for defense procurement, "[t]he UK forces do not possess, and currently have no plans to develop or procure, any laser weapons designed to permanently blind enemy troops or disrupt their eyesight temporarily." Research into a defense against such weapons continues, however.

3. China.

"Although most countries play down the power of their lasers to blind on the battlefield, China, for one, has made no pretense of this potential use of its 73-pound, battery-powered ZM-87 Portable Laser Disturber." In fact, China has begun advertising and marketing the ZM-87 laser on the international market as a weapon against both soldiers and sensors. The target market for the Chinese ZM-87 laser weapon is the Third World, including so-called rogue states (e.g. North Korea and Pakistan). U.S. Army intelligence sources report that China North Industries Corporation, or Norinco, first displayed the ZM-87 in November 1994, and then again in March 1995, at an arms exhibition in the Philippines. At this exhibition, "China succeeded in crossing two thresholds: for the first time it offered a tactical laser weapon for overseas sale on the open market; and for the first time such a system’s primary function was overtly proclaimed as the causing of human eye damage."

Norinco’s specification sheet for the ZM-87 states that the effective distance of direct human eye injury is two to three kilometers, and the effective distance of human eye injury by adding a magnifying sighting telescope seven times normal strength is less than five kilometers. Norinco also indicates that the effective distance for flash blinding is ten kilometers, and that the ZM-87 can simultaneously transmit fifteen megawatt laser pulses at two different wavelengths. Although the Chinese system is not as portable as several of the American prototypes, its desired effect is the same: to injure or dizzy the eyes of an enemy combatant, in order to cause the enemy to lose combat ability or to suppress the enemy’s observation and sighting operations.

Presently, China is engaged in a global marketing campaign for its ZM-87 Portable Laser Disturber. Since the 1980s, China has been the leading arms supplier of equipment and materials necessary for nuclear bomb and missile production to the developing world. "China is probably the most aggressive exporter of nuclear technology and materials, with clients in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia." The most egregious expression of China’s uninhibited nuclear proliferation policy was in the early 1980s, when it supplied Pakistan with construction assistance, technical and training support, and complete designs of tested nuclear weapons. In addition, China has also supplied significant nuclear materials and technology to Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, and South Africa. Also, Western observers have been concerned with China’s sales of missiles and missile technology to the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, and any other willing buyer. Despite the economic sanctions which sporadically have been imposed against China as punishment for its role in the proliferation of dangerous weapons, and the constant threats of revocation of China’s "Most-Favored-Nation" trading status, China has continued its arms-supplying activities with very little variation.

China’s historical policy of proliferation of potentially dangerous weapons systems, coupled with the aggressive state of development of tactical laser weapons within the United States military and in other nations, demonstrate the urgency with which the international community must begin to address the ever-present issue of blinding laser technology proliferation. "The secrecy surrounding tactical laser weapons and the apparent lack of oversight raises the question of whether national and international negotiations about these weapons have proceeded only on a partially- and ill-informed basis, particularly with respect to the nature and scale of actual developments." If nothing else, this discussion, concerning the current and prospective battlefield laser systems available around the globe, should make it "abundantly clear that time is running out for the world community to impose effective proliferation or utilization controls on this type of weapon."

VII. PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Presently, there is no viable protection system against anti-personnel laser weapons. Although four categories of protection have evolved, none combats the effects of blinding lasers without severely hindering the ability to see and to carry out activities requiring sight.

1. Eye-Safe Systems.

Although technology is rapidly progressing, scientists have not yet devised a method of ensuring that all laser battlefield systems are eye-safe. When this technology will be available is uncertain.

2. Avoidance.

If soldiers are trained to treat laser radiation in the same way that they regard bullets, then avoidance by measures such as taking cover behind opaque screens could prove effective. Periscope observations of enemy positions may protect against projectile but will not protect against laser radiation. In fact, it may even magnify the amount of energy received by the eye if the optics have a large collecting entrance pupil. Remote sensory systems, like television cameras, would have to be used for surveillance which would reduce accuracy.

3. Patching.

Although wearing an opaque patch on one eye does offer partial protection from blinding lasers, at the same time it deprives the soldier wearing the patch of depth and peripheral vision. Patching only prevents blinding in one eye.

4. Filter.

Although it is possible to provide filters that give high protection without degrading visual acuity, there remains the problem of knowing which lasers are being used and which filter to wear. Protective goggles can filter out lasers of known wavelengths, but technology has advanced to the point where laser systems can be designed to operate at many different wavelengths within a fraction of a second. Therefore, the availability of wavelength agile lasers renders single-filter goggles ineffective. Unfortunately, the screening out of all wavelengths, which is necessary to achieve full protection, would block out all light and leave the protected person unable to see.

Based on the previous discussion, it can be concluded that at the present time there are no foolproof countermeasures to blinding battlefield lasers, and that the ability of these systems to oscillate wavelengths makes protective optical devices useless and impossible to devise.

VIII. CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF EXISTING LAW APPLICABLE TO USE OF BATTLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS.

In analyzing the principles of international law which may be applied to the use of battlefield laser weapons, two questions arise: (1) whether the use of battlefield laser weapons would be contrary to existing principles of international law regarding the use of conventional weapons, and (2) whether there would be a case for devising a mechanism which would specifically regulate the use and proliferation of battlefield laser weapons. The first question deals with the ability of existing international laws and customs to cover a new category of weapons, and will be examined in section 1. The second question, which focuses on whether there was a need to adopt new legal restraints on the use and transfer of battlefield laser weapons, will be addressed in Sections 2A and B.

1. Application of Existing Principles of International Law.

One of the earliest attempts by the international community to impose explicit limitations on how war was to be conducted was the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. The Declaration of St. Petersburg was the first major international agreement to prohibit the use of a specific type of weapon, which caused unnecessary human suffering, and to recognize that the laws of humanity placed restraints on the methods of warfare that armed forces could employ in a conflict. In the Declaration of St. Petersburg, the obligation to restrict the use of certain projectiles was accepted for the rationale [t]hat the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.

The Declaration of St. Petersburg is the progenitor of modern international efforts to regulate the application of industrial and scientific innovations to produce more destructive weapons. Although the International Military Commission could not agree on a general principle regarding scientific applications to weapons development, it did succeed in establishing as contrary to the laws of humanity, the employment of arms which cause the unnecessary or disproportionate suffering of disabled men. Thus, the positive result of this international agreement was the prohibition of the use of exploding bullets as contrary to international humanitarian law. An explosive and incendiary bullet would "uselessly aggravate" a combatant’s suffering by creating a more serious wound than was perceived to be militarily necessary.

At the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, the concepts set forth in the Declaration of St. Petersburg were further developed into a general prohibition on the use of weapons, materials or methods of warfare that would cause "superfluous injury" or "unnecessary suffering." The provisions of the 1899 Hague Convention (II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter "Hague II") and the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (hereinafter "Hague IV"), like most of the substantive provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, are considered to embody many of the fundamental principles of customary international law pertaining to a belligerent’s conduct during wartime. Because the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were not exhaustive in their enumeration of prohibited acts, in order to cover all of the cases not sufficiently addressed by or omitted from the Conventions, the drafters included the Martens Clause in the preambles. "Even if one concludes that none of the express treaty provisions in Hague [II or] IV serves as a limiting agent," the Martens Clause refers the decision-maker back to the precepts of customary international law and the laws of humanity to fill in the gaps.

Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience. The Martens Clause was considered "revolutionary in its recognition that the codified laws of war were incomplete and could supplement and interact with customary laws of war."

In addition, "[b]ecause it invokes ‘the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience,’ the Martens clause . . . comes closer than any other clause or canon . . . to providing a moral imperative." The Martens Clause not only requires that military decisions be legal, but that they also be moral. Through their regulations of the conduct of hostilities and their prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, the Hague Conventions protect humanitarian interests by limiting the use of force against belligerents. For example, Article 22 of Hague II and IV provide that "[t]he right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." With references to the "laws of humanity" and "the desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military requirements permit," the underlying influence of the Declaration of St. Petersburg is apparent in the preamble of each of the Hague Conventions. "The principle expressed in this preambular paragraph . . . is in effect identical to the principle at the root of the work of the International Military Commission of 1868, of balancing military necessity against the requirements of humanity." Article 23(e) of the Hague II Regulations indicates that it is prohibited "[t]o employ arms, projectiles or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury," and Article 23(e) in Hague IV Regulations prohibits the employment of "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." Thus, in the spirit of the Declaration of St. Petersburg, the Hague Conventions reaffirm the fundamental elements of humanitarian protection – that means and methods of warfare are limited and may not cause unnecessary or disproportionate suffering.

The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereinafter "Protocol I") is the most current expression of the international community’s desire to provide humanitarian protection during international conflict. "Although some of the articles in Protocol I represent progressive development, the majority of the instrument codifies customary international law." For example, Article 1(2) of Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions restates the Martens Clause as set forth in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. In addition, Article 35, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Additional Protocol I reinforce the basic principles of customary international law articulated in the Declaration of St. Petersburg and the Hague Conventions. Article 35(1) repeats the codification of the premise that "the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose the methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." Article 35(2) reaffirms the prohibition of "weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering" contained in Article 23(e) of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.

By including Article 36 in Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a link was established between the principles laid down in Article 35 and the concrete prohibitions or the effective restraints on new weapons or means of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or may have indiscriminate effects. "[O]n the basis of this article the High Contracting Parties undertake to determine the possibly unlawful nature of a new weapon, both with regard to the provisions of the Protocol, and with regard to any other applicable rule of international law."

In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.

Article 36 establishes the obligation of the domestic government of each Contracting Party to create internal procedures to elucidate "whether the arms that they possess, as well as the arms that they expect to produce or acquire in the future, are the object of a prohibition or not."

In evaluating the legality of the use of any new weapon or method of warfare, a State must refer to any agreement relating to disarmament or to the prohibition, limitation or restriction on the use of a particular type of weapon or means of warfare to which they are a party, as well as the principles of customary international law. Article 36, together with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, remain the only legal instruments on armed conflict that may act as a brake on the abuses resulting from the arms race or on the possibility of future weapons. According to the above-mentioned provisions, "a weapon will be unlawful if its effects are so contrary to considerations of humanity and the public conscience that it arouses widespread revulsion, notwithstanding that it cannot be regarded as causing injuries or suffering which are out of proportion to its military effectiveness and thus does not violate the unnecessary suffering principle."

As discussed above, the principles of customary international law, in conjunction with the treaties and other legal codifications which restrict certain weapons and methods of warfare, play an important role in the development of international laws of armed conflict. Proportionality is a fundamental element of the law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed conflict (jus in bello). "In the law of armed conflict, the notion of proportionality is based on the fundamental principle that the belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict damage on the enemy." The law of armed conflict is a compromise based on a balance between military necessity and the dictates of humanity. Military necessity permits only those measures which are essential to achieving the goals of war, and which are lawful in accordance with international laws and customs. International humanitarian law, as previously discussed in this section, has long held that the infliction of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited. Thus, "it is necessary to weigh up the nature of the injury or the intensity of suffering on the one hand, against the ‘military necessity’, on the other hand, before deciding whether there is a case of superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." The unnecessary suffering principle can be used to ban outright a weapon or means of warfare which is likely to cause unnecessary suffering. In addition, when a weapon has a legitimate use but is also capable of being used in a way which will cause unnecessary suffering, the principle will prohibit that use or method of warfare even though it does not outright ban the weapon itself. This aspect of the unnecessary suffering principle is particularly relevant to battlefield laser weapons because these devices may have a variety of different uses.

Balancing the military necessity of battlefield laser weapon systems against the humanitarian concerns relating to such weapons is a complex task because while these devices possess considerable military effectiveness, they also can inflict extreme suffering or extensive injuries. However, simply because a weapon or method of warfare causes severe or widespread injury or inflicts great pain is not, in itself, sufficient to bring it within the unnecessary suffering principle. "That principle does not prohibit weapons causing extreme suffering or extensive injuries but only those which cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injuries." Thus, by requiring that a balance be achieved, the law attempts to interpose an element of humanity into armed conflict by prohibiting the infliction of suffering which serves no military purpose.

"In examining whether the use of battlefield laser weapons against personnel would violate the unnecessary suffering principle, it is necessary to ask whether there are other weapons which offer the same, or greater, military advantages as lasers but cause lesser suffering or injury." In the case of battlefield lasers, this analysis is plagued by problems and uncertainty. For example, in a comparison between the likely effects of anti-personnel lasers and those of a rifle, machine-gun fire or artillery shells, lasers are much less likely to cause death but more likely to cause permanent disability. There is no consensus in the international on whether death or permanent blindness is invariably a worse form of injury or suffering than the infliction of permanent blindness. In addition, when making a comparison of the gravity of the non-fatal injuries caused by other weapons with the injuries caused by lasers, it is not certain whether permanent blindness would be regarded by most people as worse than other forms of permanent disablement, such as paralysis. Also, a comparison of the military effectiveness of laser weapons and alternative forms of weaponry is difficult to make, for it is not easy to acquire information about weapons which have not yet been used on the battlefield. In summary, it still remains unclear whether anti-personnel lasers actually violate the laws of war. Due to the disturbing nature of the potential effects of such weapons, regulations on battlefield laser systems recently have been addressed by the international community.

2. Specific Regulations on the Use and Transfer of Battlefield Laser Weapon Systems.

Conferences Held From 1979-1995 Concerning Certain Conventional Weapons.

The question of prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons that may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects has been considered by the international community under the aegis of both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations. Concerned about protecting civilian populations from the indiscriminate effects and unnecessary suffering caused by various conventional weapons, the ICRC called for a meeting of experts to critically examine the legality of such weapons technology. The ICRC convened the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons in two session – the first conference was held in Lucerne from September 24-October 10, 1974, and the second session convened at Lugano from January 28-February 26, 1976. The ICRC Conferences at Lucerne and Lugano concentrated their discussions on weapons, such as small-calibre bullets, blast and fragmentation weapons, incendiary weapons, and future weapons (i.e. lasers, microwave, infra-sound, light-flash devices, and geophysical, environmental and electronic weapons). Future weapons were not discussed beyond the first two conferences because experts stated that too little information was available at that stage to make any assessment.

The debate on conventional weapons continued at the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (1974-1977), where once again radically opposing viewpoints made the adoption of any resolution impossible. In 1977, the Diplomatic Conference transmitted its unresolved business relating to conventional weapons to the United Nations . The United Nations General Assembly agreed to convene a United Nations conference in 1979 for the purpose of reaching agreements on the prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which were thought to cause excessive injury or to have indiscriminate effects. After two preparatory conferences, the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter "1980 UN Conference") met in Geneva in 1979 and again in 1980. The 1980 UN Conference produced a Convention with three annexed protocols.

After the 1980 UN Conference, the ICRC was made aware by a number of technical and military publications that lasers were being developed for use as an anti-personnel weapon and that such weapons could permanently blind the person attacked. Deeply concerned about reports that portable laser weapons had been developed since the 1980 UN Conference, the ICRC began to encourage the international community to gather more detailed information on the accuracy of these reports and on the effects of such weapons. As custodian of international humanitarian law, the ICRC decided to sponsor a meeting of experts to clarify the law relating to new weapons development, specifically on battlefield laser weapons. Thus, the First Round Table of Experts on Battlefield Laser Weapons was convened from June 19-21, 1989. This group of experts set out to examine the development of anti-personnel laser weapons and their medical and legal implications. The meeting confirmed not only that such anti-sensor and anti-personnel weapons were being developed, but also that the risk of permanent blindness resulting from these devices was quite high. In addition, the experts were divided on whether these anti-personnel lasers did in fact cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury, and therefore requested further studies.

As a result of the findings at the initial meeting, the ICRC organized two working groups of scientific experts in 1990. The First Working Group of Experts, which convened in May-June 1990, analyzed the characteristics of existing battlefield lasers and those under development, and indicated that present range-finding equipment could be used as an anti-personnel weapon. Also, a committee of ophthalmologists studied the effect of these laser systems on the eye and warned that surgical treatment and protective measures were at present, and would continue to be for the foreseeable future, virtually non-existent. The Second Working Group of Experts, which met in November 1990 and was principally comprised of psychiatrists, surgeons, psychologists, doctors, and a health economist, studied the short- and long-term effects of blindness on an individual and on society as a whole, as compared to other typical battlefield injuries. The final meeting, the Second Round Table of Experts, convened during April 9-11, 1991, to discuss the legal and policy implications of the use of blinding laser weapons, and to consider possible legal regulation. Although experts disagreed on the appropriate method of regulation, the majority believed that a regulation to prevent blinding as a method of warfare was necessary.

The 1995 Review Conference of the State Parties to the "1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects."

The Review Conference of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter "1980 CCW"), which took place between September 25 and October 13, 1995, was viewed by human rights activists as a victory for international humanitarian law, at least with regard to blinding laser weapons, because it produced Protocol IV to the 1980 CCW. Protocol IV represents a significant breakthrough in international humanitarian law because it is the first time since 1868, when the Declaration of St. Petersburg prohibited the use of exploding bullets, that a weapon of military interest has been banned before its use on the battlefield and before a stream of victims gave visible proof to the world of its tragic effect. In addition, it is also the first time that both the use and transfer of a weapon has been entirely prohibited under international humanitarian law. "The prohibition [in advance] of an abhorrent new weapon whose production and proliferation appeared imminent is an historic step for humanity." Furthermore, Protocol IV led the Twenty-Sixth International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in Geneva to adopt a resolution welcoming this new instrument; urging States to declare themselves bound by its provisions at the earliest possible date; and recognizing that negotiators in Vienna intended Protocol IV to apply not only to international armed conflicts, but also to non-international conflicts.

In analyzing Protocol IV, it is necessary to remember that a complete ban on battlefield laser systems may be objectionable for both military and humanitarian reasons. From a military standpoint, laser technology used for detection, targeting, range-finding, communications, and target destruction is essential to any modern military force. For instance, "[t]arget-marking lasers are necessary to the use of many precision-guided munitions, both air and artillery delivered." Moreover, from a humanitarian perspective, "[b]y ensuring that weapons are accurately delivered on military targets, precision-targeting [and range-finders] radically reduce the danger of collateral injury to civilian populations." Thus, a total ban on battlefield lasers and all research and development programs focusing on this technology, may retard, or even end, technological advancements in this area. The inability to recognize that most of the laser technology used in the fields of medicine and industry originates from military research projects, and the failure to regard this research as an essential part of the technological revolution taking place as we enter the twenty-first century, may be limiting because it forecloses the possibility that in the future, lasers may become effective weapons causing only temporary effects on the eye.

Upon examination of the language of Protocol IV, it is evident that the Parties to the CCW attempted to establish a compromise between those who advocated a total ban on battlefield laser technology, and others who believed that no legal regulation was necessary because the standards of customary international law were sufficient in their opinion. At the Review Conference, a consensus was reached, providing that an outright ban on battlefield laser systems was unnecessary, but that any imposed restrictions must preserve the legitimacy of laser systems whose incidental or collateral effect is blinding. Article 1 of Protocol IV effectively prohibits the use of "laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." "To remove any possible doubt as to whether Article 1 might apply to unintentional cases of blindness caused by lasers designed for other purposes, Article 3 excludes [from the prohibition in this Protocol,] ‘[b]linding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical equipment.’" In addition, Article 4 defines "permanent blindness" for purposes of Protocol IV as an "irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect for recovery." This definition implicitly carves out another exception from the Article 1 prohibition, excluding laser weapons intended to dazzle or temporarily blind an enemy combatant. Therefore, it is clear that Protocol IV was intended to prohibit only a small class of laser weapons, whose primary purpose is to cause permanent blindness.

"While Articles 1, 3, and 4 define what is prohibited by Protocol IV, the Protocol does not completely ignore other combat laser injuries to the eye." Article 2 makes a Party accountable for any incidental combat blindings, which may result from the use of target-markers or range-finders, by requiring that it "take all feasible precautions to avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision." Although States would be obligated to produce evidence of a legitimate military purpose and to document their efforts to avoid unnecessary blinding, such a demonstration would require a difficult subjective inquiry into the actual intent of the Party. In summary, the compromise struck in Protocol IV leaves a whole category of battlefield laser systems unregulated and results in a fairly weak writing.

IX. CONCLUSION.

Throughout history, military doctrine, organization, and strategy have continually undergone changes, due in part to technological breakthroughs. In the past, the introduction of a new weapons has led to advantageous shifts in military doctrine and strategy, enabling innovators to avoid exhausting attritional battles and to pursue a form of decisive warfare. Today, battlefield laser weapon systems represent the next major shift in the nature of conflict and warfare. In order to fully comprehend the role that battlefield lasers will play in twenty-first century warfare, it is necessary to analyze the evolution of the concept of warfare since the passing of the Cold War.

The Cold War can be characterized as a culture of intense but controlled tension, which required disciplined constraints on the use of force. "To use force at all during the Cold War came to be seen almost everywhere as a very grave decision indeed, to be made only after the fullest deliberation, usually after all other means had been exhausted." During the Cold War, many hot wars developed in the contested zones between each camp as each superpower provided its allies and clients with military technology, weapons and expertise far beyond their own capacities. However, the fear that escalation would eventually lead to a nuclear attack prevented any direct combat between the superpowers themselves anywhere in the world. The Cold War suppressed many potential shooting wars around the world because neither superpower would tolerate them within its own camp.

Although the concept of war governing the Cold War era is commonly viewed as the only possible method of warfare, military history demonstrates that this is not the case. In reality, "wars fought for great national purposes that can evoke public fervor, by armed forces that represent the aroused nation rather than merely a body of professionals going about their business" are a modern military innovation, associated with a particular period of recent history. In fact, prior to the French Revolution, most wars were not fought for imperative purposes and rarely evoked popular enthusiasm, but instead, were battles characterized by prudent strategies and tactics to conserve professional forces.

Now that the Cold War period has ended, a new culture of wars easily started and fought without constraint has emerged. Military planners indicate that U.S. forces will be increasingly called upon to intervene overseas in civil and ethnic conflicts, peacekeeping operations such as those in Somalia, Haiti, or Bosnia, or limited attacks, such as in Panama and Grenada, what the military calls "Operations Other Than War." Consequently, this demand for U.S. military force has clashed vehemently with the general refusal of the American public to sanction interventions in place after place without end. This political struggle is contingent upon the cost in U.S. casualties of a particular concept of war and particular methods of intervention. If these could be changed drastically to minimize the exposure of U.S. military personnel to the risks of combat, the response of public opinion of proposed military interventions also may change.

Present circumstances mandate a reversion back to the eighteenth century concept of warfare, as well as an adoption of a new mentality that would "require not only a patient disposition, but also a modest one, so as to admit the desirability of partial results when doing more would be too costly in U.S. lives, and doing nothing is too damaging to world order and U.S. self-respect." If military planning is appropriately modified to fully exploit the technical potential of certain modern weapons, "it may be possible to emulate the casualty-avoiding methods of eighteenth-century warfare and thus conduct armed yet virtually bloodless interventions." Battlefield laser weapons will be the tactical tool used to facilitate the transition back to this historical concept of warfare. In the future, laser weapon systems not only will enable military and political objectives to be achieved, but also will be effective in keeping casualty levels at a minimum. Before these laser systems are employed on the battlefield, however, it is vital that control over this technology is attained. At the present time, technology has not yet advanced to a level where scientists are capable of designing a completely eye-safe battlefield laser system. But in an age marked by rapid and significant technological innovation in the area of warfare, it is foreseeable that laser weapon technology could soon be designed to temporarily stun, disorient or immobilize enemy forces, as opposed to killing them outright or permanently blinding them.

It is inevitable that opponents of battlefield laser weapons will be quick to point out that the use of these weapons will result in some casualties. Indeed, the use of battlefield laser systems, like all other weapons, run the risk of causing battlefield injuries, but casualties are always an unfortunate consequence of war. By continuing military laser research and development programs, it may not be long until a battlefield laser system could be made available that is capable of meeting its military objective, while simultaneously yielding few casualties. Because this is not an ideal world, free from conflict and war, such technological innovation may be viewed as a step in the right direction.