Army of Northern Virginia, 1861-1863 (original) (raw)
A Defense of John Bell Hood
and the 1864 Tennessee Campaign
He was slain by the pen, never by the sword.
--- Ida Richardson Hood 1876-1961 Daughter of Gen. John Bell Hood
Introduction
When did the scholarly study of American Civil War history become a big business? When did the study of brave and principled men and women, and the recording of their deeds for future generations give way to books, videotapes, seminars, conferences, tours, flags, posters, balloons, bumper stickers; all for profit? When did the lust for superlative overshadow objectivity and full disclosure? When did Civil War history become an industry, obsessed with the most, least, biggest, bloodiest, first, last, best and worst, without regard to accuracy and context?
Is General John Bell Hood a casualty of a modern war for attention, fought by rival Civil War "experts," each seeking the admiration of the mass market? How did a Confederate commander of unparalleled courage who gave an arm and a leg to the cause of Southern independence and served his country to the very end earn a modern-day reputation as a drug-addicted, lovelorn, treacherous megalomaniac?
How did Hood fall from being a commander whom Thomas Hay described in 1921 as a man who "commands our admiration and respect" to Wiley Sword's current " fool with a license to kill his own men"?
Perhaps the answer lies in the old Chinese saying, "A writer sells few books if he writes only the truth."
The first of the major books focusing on John Bell Hood and the 1864 Tennessee Campaign was Hay's 1921 classic, Hood's Tennessee Campaign. Hay offered both praise and criticism as each was due, acknowledging Hood's failures, but also his many successes. In the more respectful and gentle tone of the era, Hay found it appropriate to write of Hood, "The strong force of Hood's character yielded an influence that no oratory could command and he passed his days, after the war, refined by sorrow, purified by aspiration, strengthened through self-reliance, and made gentle by an earnest faith in things unseen. He was genial, generous, and indulgent toward others and severe to himself. His aims were prompted by noble desires and in politics his ideals for democratic action were high. With all his limitations, which he recognized, as well as his powers, he commands our admiration and respect."
Twenty years later, Stanley Horn published the first comprehensive modern book on the Army of Tennessee. Necessarily, the 1941 work focused considerable attention on Hood and the 1864 Tennessee Campaign. Perhaps in an effort not to simply repeat Hay's earlier judgments, Horn's portrayal of Hood was noticeably harsher.
Then, in 1971, came another generation, another book on the Army of Tennessee. Not to be outdone by Horn, Thomas Connelly published, in Autumn of Glory, his own "niche" history of the Army of Tennessee in which he employed hyperbole and concealment to present his caustic version of Hood, the soldier and the man.
Then yet another generation passed, and in 1991 Wiley Sword, apparently concluding that Civil War history had been shortchanged by Hay, Horn and Connelly, published his version of Hood's 1864 Tennessee Campaign, Embrace an Angry Wind: The Confederacy's Last Hurrah. In a display of one-upmanship, Sword suppresses historical information, reducing Hood to a drug-affected, conniving, vengeful, vain-glorious imbecile. It is undeniable that Sword is a master wordsmith, but it is equally undeniable that his portrayal of Hood is harsh, caustic, subjective, and in places, factually erroneous.
Such has been the evolution of the historical treatment of Gen. John Bell Hood at the hands of some professional Civil War authors and lecturers whose primary motivations seem to be the elevation of their own celebrity status.
Few figures in American history have been subjected to the level of malevolent mischaracterization that is now directed at John Bell Hood, commander of Confederate forces at the Battles of Franklin and Nashville in 1864. Astonishingly, these false and incomplete portrayals are frequently perpetuated by a small but influential group of academicians whose very professions demand accuracy and full factual disclosure. Many of these guardians of our nation's heritage, in an effort to draw attention to their particular theories, engage in exaggeration and in concealment or selective disclosure of pertinent facts. Like a skillful lawyer who seeks to sway a jury, they disclose information that supports their positions, while concealing information that weakens or impeaches those assertions. Victims of such practices include other historians, who naively accept their colleagues' accounts as factual and incorporate them into their accounts and portrayals. As English historian Philip Guedalla wrote in 1920, "History repeats itself. Historians repeat each other."
Sadly, many professional historians and historical organizations ignore or betray the Standards of Ethical Conduct of the American Historical Association, which state, "As intellectual diversity enhances historical imagination and contributes to the development and vitality of the study of the past, historians should welcome rather than deplore it. When historians make interpretations and judgments, they should be careful not to present them in a way that forecloses discussion of alternative interpretations." Unfortunately, many false and misleading assertions regarding Gen. Hood's role in the 1864 Tennessee Campaign are accepted without honest intellectual debate by many modern historians and have become historical "reality," notwithstanding evidence to the contrary.
Historical institutions themselves have been pulled into the vortex of revisionism. The official websites of multiple Franklin and Nashville area public historical entities describe Hood as "a firm believer in frontal assaults" even when informed that Franklin was the only frontal assault Hood ever ordered as an independent army commander. The City of Franklin's own historical marker at Winstead Hill Park states that "In a fit of rage (Hood) sacrificed his own men" and "gained his revenge" for the lost opportunity at Spring Hill. The unknown author of that marker parrots the myth of an enraged Hood and ignores the historical record, which reveals that Hood, although described as "wrathy as a rattlesnake" in the early morning of Nov. 30, and contentious during his meeting at the Harrison House before the battle - was pensive and composed during the rest of the day. Eyewitness Sumner A. Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee Infantry wrote in the April, 1893 issue of Confederate Veteran magazine, "While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines, having left his escort and staff in the rear. He remained at the front in plain view of the enemy for, perhaps, half an hour making a most careful survey of their lines...but I was absorbed in the one man whose mind was deciding the fate of thousands. With an arm and a leg in the grave, and with the consciousness that he had not until within a couple of days won the confidence which his army had in his predecessor, he had now a very trying ordeal to pass through. It was all-important to act, if at all, at once. He rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge."
Moreover, in an article in the May 3, 1902 edition of the Atlanta Journal newspaper, Army of Tennessee veteran Dr. W. T. Burt, formerly of the 46th Georgia Infantry, quoted these words from his wartime diary concerning Hood's final orders at Franklin: "General Hood's last words to his generals were: 'Now, go down to the work to be done and go at it.'"
These measured actions are hardly those of an enraged man seeking the slaughter his own soldiers. But such are the myths surrounding John Bell Hood, which are stoked by authors and historians eager to sell books at the expense of scholarship.
Hood's Promotion to Command of the Army of Tennessee
It is commonly stated that Gen. Robert E. Lee advised Jefferson Davis not to elevate Gen. Hood to command of the Army of Tennessee. This is patently untrue.
On July 12, 1864, Lee telegrammed his reply to Davis's request for an opinion: "...Hood is a good fighter, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging his action, when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a very high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army. May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter." Lee's cautious advice to Davis about one of his favorite former subordinates can hardly be taken as a rejection of the proposal to install Hood.
It is also commonly said that the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee criticized the appointment of Hood to army command. Although many surely didn't like Hood, it was the removal of Gen. Joseph Johnston that most disappointed the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee. Sumner A. Cunningham wrote in Confederate Veteran magazine in April, 1893, "The removal of General Johnston, and the appointment of Hood to succeed him in command of the Army of Tennessee, was an astounding event. So devoted to Johnston were his men that the presence and immediate command of General Robert E. Lee would not have been accepted without complaint."
The slandering of Hood is furthered by the common accusation that he undermined Johnston through secret correspondence with Richmond. Although Hood did indeed criticize Johnston's retreat during the Dalton-to-Atlanta campaign, he was hardly alone in this. On June 22, 1864, Johnston's trusted subordinate, close confidant and corps commander General William Hardee, wrote to Jefferson Davis, "If the present system continues we may find ourselves at Atlanta before a serious battle is fought." Another of Johnston's corps commanders, General A. P. Stewart, wrote to Davis's military advisor Gen. Braxton Bragg on March 19, 1864, "Are we to hold still, remaining on the defensive in this position until (Sherman) comes down with his combined armies to drive us out?"
Furthermore, Hood was himself the subject of critical letters from his own subordinates, who are never accused of betraying their commander. After the fall of Atlanta, one of Hood's own division commanders, Maj. Gen. Samuel G. French, sent an unsigned letter to Richmond on behalf of several disgruntled generals seeking the removal of Hood as army commander. Also, Gen. S.D. Lee wrote to Hood's immediate superior Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard on Dec. 25, 1864, wishing to discuss "recent events in Tennessee." On Jan. 2, 1865, Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest wrote to Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana commander Lt. General Richard Taylor, complaining of Hood, and seeking intervention by the Confederate high command.
In short, letters of complaint and criticism between subordinate commanders and Richmond authorities were not uncommon during the war. Yet John Bell Hood seems to be the only subordinate ever accused of deceitfully undermining his superior.
The 1864 Tennessee Campaign
Jefferson Davis wrote in his postwar memoirs of the desire of the Confederate government to recover Tennessee in early 1864. In criticizing Joseph Johnston, he wrote "General (Joseph) Johnston entered upon his third command, that of the army designed to recover the State of Tennessee from the enemy. In February, 1864, he was informed of the policy of the Government for his army. It was proposed to reinforce him largely, and that he should advance at once and assume the recovery of at least a part of the State of Tennessee."
After the fall of Atlanta, Davis visited the Army of Tennessee in Palmetto, Georgia on Sept. 26, 1864, and told the troops, "Be of good cheer, for within a short while your faces will be turned homeward and your feet pressing Tennessee soil." Then the following week, while in Augusta, Georgia, Davis was quoted in the October 4 issue of the Augusta Constitutionalist newspaper as alluding to the Army of Tennessee's "treading Tennessee soil" and "pushing on to the Ohio."
In his Official Report on Jan. 30, 1865, Gen. S. D. Lee commented on the disposition of the Army of Tennessee after the Atlanta Campaign: "It was my opinion that the Army should take up the offensive, with the hope that favorable opportunities would be offered for striking the enemy successfully, thus ensuring the efficiency of the Army for future operations." General A. P. Stewart concurred, writing, "I deem it proper to say that after the fall of Atlanta the condition of the army and other considerations rendered it necessary, in my judgment, that an offensive campaign should be made in the enemy's rear and on his line of communications."
After the evacuation of Atlanta in early September, 1864, the Army of Tennessee harassed Sherman's supply and communications lines north of Atlanta. However, Sherman abandoned Atlanta and began his March to the Sea, attacking Savannah, Charleston, Columbia and Wilmington. As Sherman moved southeast, destroying in his wake bridges, crops, livestock and other resources useful to a pursuing army, Hood, to the northwest of Atlanta, realized that he could not possibly overtake Sherman's 275-mile head start. Jefferson Davis, the Confederate War Department, and Hood's immediate superior P. G. T. Beauregard decided that an invasion of Tennessee would be the mission of the Army of Tennessee. Beauregard's Dec. 6, 1864 letter to Davis clearly details the reasons for Hood's Tennessee invasion.
Augusta, Georgia, Dec. 6, 1864
To His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President Confederate States.
...I did not countermand the campaign in Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:
1st. The Roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa River across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and the wagon trains.
2nd. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start about two hundred seventy five miles on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.
3rd. To pursue Sherman, the passage of the Army of Tennessee would, necessarily, have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage; and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.
4th. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman, would have opened to Thomas's force the richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.
...Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas's army and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky and, perhaps, Ohio, and thus prevent him from reinforcing Grant. Meanwhile, supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.
I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant.
P. G. T. Beauregard, General.
In order to conquer the Union troops then occupying Tennessee, Hood planned to first defeat Schofield's 20,000-man force encamped in Pulaski, Tennessee, and then move upon the 20,000-man Union garrison at Nashville. On Nov. 21, 1864, Hood's 33,000 troops departed Florence, Alabama, and eventually intercepted Schofield's retreating force near Columbia, Tennessee. Rather than assault the fortified Federal defenses in Columbia, Hood moved two of his three corps, approximately 20,000 Confederate troops, on a successful flanking movement, cutting off Schofield's retreat route near Spring Hill.
Then a fateful breakdown of Confederate command, an event known as the "Spring Hill Affair," occurred. Hood ordered corps commander Gen. Frank Cheatham to block the Union retreat, but for reasons never determined, Cheatham failed to accomplish the task. A rumor later arose, completely unsupported by any contemporary historical record, to the effect that Hood, suffering from two severe wounds inflicted earlier in the war, was under the influence of pain-killing medication during the night of Nov. 29. In fact, Hood slept that night at the home of Absalom Thompson, and shared a room with other officers and with Tennessee Gov. Isham Harris. For the rest of their lives, none of these men ever wrote or spoke of any drug or alcohol use by Hood. Furthermore, Hood was awakened three times during the night by subordinates to discuss strategy and troop movements. One meeting occurred with Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, who, neither during nor after the war, ever mentioned any impairment of Hood's mental faculties during the night. A harsh critic of Hood's, the outspoken Forrest would not have hesitated to expose such irresponsible conduct.
Schofield's army quickly abandoned its positions in Columbia and retreated overnight to Franklin, marching past the sleeping Confederates, who awakened the next morning to the grim realization that the Federals had escaped.
The Battle of Franklin
In his April, 1893 article in Confederate Veteran magazine, S. A. Cunningham wrote,"...the march to Spring Hill, where the Federal retreat was so nearly cut off, a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame, created an enthusiasm for him equal to that entertained for Stonewall Jackson after his extraordinary achievements. The soldiers were full of ardor, and confident of success. They had unbounded faith in General Hood, whom they believed would achieve a victory that would give us Nashville."
On the morning of Nov. 30, Hood's two corps, encamping at Spring Hill, immediately pursued the retreating Federals. Arriving near Franklin at 2:00 in the afternoon, Hood viewed Schofield's forces frantically constructing defensive fortifications on the southern edge of town. Cunningham stood near Hood on Winstead Hill, two miles south of Franklin, and he later recalled, "The enemy were greatly excited. We could see them running to and fro. Wagon trains were being pressed across the Harpeth River, and on toward Nashville...."
At that time, Hood had very little daylight remaining, and knew that Schofield's forces would most certainly complete their retreat into heavily fortified Nashville overnight. Rather than confront 40,000 Federal defenders inside Nashville, where strong Union defenses had been constructed over three years of occupation, Hood chose to attack Schofield's 20,000 exhausted troops at Franklin, where they had had only 8 hours to fortify.
Hood is frequently criticized for not allowing Gen. Forrest to attempt a flanking maneuver around Franklin, cutting off Schofield's escape route to Nashville. Wiley Sword seems to be the source of the common perception that Forrest's idea of a flanking movement would have been feasible. On page 179 of The Confederacy's Last Hurrah, Sword makes the astonishingly inaccurate assertion that Hollow Tree Gap, the point four and a half miles north of the Union lines where the Federal escape to Nashville could be cut off, was as near to Hood's forces as it was to Schofield's. In fact, Hollow Tree Gap ("Holly Tree Gap" on modern maps) was significantly further from Hood's position as it was from Schofield's. Furthermore, the circuitous route that Forrest would have had to take to Hollow Tree Gap would have made the distance twelve to fifteen miles, not four and a half miles. To accomplish a flanking movement, Forrest's cavalry and 2,000 Confederate infantry would have had to ford the rain-swollen Harpeth River, then march twelve to fifteen miles in open, clear view of the Federals, fighting Union Gen. James Wilson's cavalry, and Federal infantry which surely would have been sent by Schofield to resist the Confederate flank movement, all in three hours time.
With no time for another flanking attempt, and Nashville being only an overnight's march for Schofield's army, Hood decided that an immediate frontal attack was the best of his very limited options. Eyewitness Cunningham agreed, recalling, "It was all important to act, if at all, at once."
Union Gen. John Schofield wrote in his memoir, "Hood's assault at Franklin has been severely criticized. Even so able a general as J.E.Johnston has characterized it as �useless butchery'. These criticisms are based on a misapprehension of the facts, and are essentially erroneous. Hood must have been aware of our relative weakness of numbers at Franklin, and of the probable, if not certain, concentration of large reinforcements at Nashville. He could not hope to have at any future time anything like so great an advantage in that respect. The army at Franklin and the troops at Nashville were within one night's march of each other; Hood must therefore attack on November 30 or lose the advantage of greatly superior numbers. It was impossible, after the pursuit from Spring Hill, in a short day to turn our position or make any other attack but a direct one in front. Besides our position with the river on our rear, gave him the chance of vastly greater results, if his assault were successful, than could be hoped for by any attack he could make after we had crossed the Harpeth. Still more, there was no unusual obstacle to a successful assault at Franklin. The defenses were of the slightest character, and it was not possible to make them formidable during the short time our troops were in position, after the previous exhausting operations of both day and night, which had rendered some rest on the 30th absolutely necessary. The Confederate cause had reached a condition closely verging on desperation, and Hood's commander-in-chief had called upon him to undertake operations which he thought appropriate to such an emergency. Franklin was the last opportunity he could expect to have to reap the results hoped for in his aggressive movement. He must strike there, as best he could, or give up his cause as lost."
Battle of Franklin veteran L.A. Simmons wrote in his 1866 work, The History of the 84th Regiment Illinois Volunteers, "In speaking of this battle, very many are inclined to wonder at the terrible pertinacity of the rebel General Hood, in dashing column after column with such tremendous force and energy upon our center -- involving their decimation, almost their annihilation? Yet this we have considered a most brilliant design, and the brightest record of his generalship, that will be preserved in history. He was playing a stupendous game, for enormous stakes. Could he have succeeded in breaking the center, our whole army was at his mercy. In our rear was a deep and rapid river, swollen by recent rains -- only fordable by infantry at one or two places -- and to retreat across it an utter impossibility. To break the center was to defeat our army; and defeat inevitably involved a surrender. If this army surrendered to him, Nashville, with all its fortifications, all its vast accumulation of army stores, was at his mercy, and could be taken in a day. Hence, with heavy odds -- a vastly superior force -- in his hands, he made the impetuous attack upon our center, and lost in the momentous game. His army well understood that they were fighting for the possession of Nashville. Ours knew they were fighting to preserve that valuable city, and to avoid annihilation." Simmons added that the Federals quickly withdrew to Nashville after the battle as Franklin was "untenable." He also stated that with Schofield's corps absent from Nashville, the city was "scantily protected." Historians have always known that Union Gen. George Thomas's Nashville garrison consisted largely of quartermasters before Schofield's infantry arrived on Dec. 1, 1864, and was later reinforced by additional Union forces from St. Louis and other midwestern areas before the attack on Gen. Hood's army on Dec. 15, 1864.
Simmons correctly stated that it was impossible for Hood to cross the Harpeth River and attempt a flanking maneuver, and that an immediate attack at Franklin was Hood's only option if the Union forces at Nashville were to be defeated.
Col. Virgil S. Murphey of the 17th Alabama Infantry, who was captured at Franklin, wrote in his diary, "Had Hood succeeded, Nashville would have opened her gates to the head of his victorious legions and the throat of Tennessee released from the grasp of remorseless despotism. It was worth the hazard. Its failure does not diminish the value of the prize." Holding Hood blameless for the Federal escape at Spring Hill, Murphey added, "The same blow delivered with equal power at Spring Hill or Thompson's Station would have yielded us dominion over Tennessee. A failure to obey (Hood's) order lost us a noble commonwealth." Recalling a later conversation with Union Gen. Schofield, who had acknowledged his army's "perilous position" at Spring Hill, Murphey wrote, "I explained that a grave responsibility rested upon the general who failed to make the attack (at Spring Hill) as we knew our advantage and Hood had ordered the attack."
Perhaps the most serious of the many criticisms of Hood are the least substantiated. Hood is accused of ordering the attack in a rage and of punishing Cheatham's Corps, in particular, by intentionally positioning those troops in the center of the formation. As previously stated, a witness described Hood as being "as wrathy as a rattlesnake" early in the morning, and S. A. Cunningham described Hood this way: "While making ready for the charge, General Hood rode up to our lines... for perhaps half an hour, making a most careful survey of their lines...He rode to Stephen D. Lee, the nearest of his subordinate generals, and, shaking hands with him cordially, announced his decision to make an immediate charge." After the early morning of Nov. 30, 1864, Hood certainly interacted personally with dozens of soldiers and commanders during the course of the day, and was observed by hundreds and perhaps thousands more. Yet, in the absence of any eyewitness accounts describing his demeanor as angry or agitated, Hood is nevertheless accused of ordering the Franklin attack in a state of incoherent anger.
A member of A.P. Stewart's staff, B.L. Ridley, wrote in his 1906 publication, Battles and Sketches of the Army of Tennessee, "It has been charged that he (Hood) gave the order to attack at Franklin because of chagrin at his failure at Spring Hill. This supposition does Hood great injustice. A Federal courier had been captured bearing dispatches between Thomas and Schofield of the Federal army. The tenor of the dispatches led Hood to believe that Franklin was not in a defensible position, and that therefore, as he expressed it, he thought his time to fight had come."
Unfortunately, the more common account of Hood's decision to attack at Franklin has contaminated public perception so thoroughly that the City of Franklin's own historical marker at Winstead Hill Park makes the ludicrous assertion that Gen. Hood, angry at his own troops, "gained his revenge" and "in a fit of rage...sacrificed" his own soldiers.
Hood also is often accused of intentionally positioning Cheatham's Corps to incur the heaviest casualties, as punishment for the Confederate failure at Spring Hill. Neither common sense nor personal accounts support this assertion. From the southern edge of town, in diminishing daylight, Hood watched the Union forces retreating from Franklin toward Nashville, a mere overnight's march to the north. With so little time, Hood positioned Confederate corps and divisions for battle in the order in which they had arrived at Franklin from Spring Hill. Stewart's Corps arrived first and was immediately moved to the farthest positions to the east; Cheatham's Corps, arriving last, proceeded to the nearest positions.
Franklin visitors have been told that Hood deviated from standard military practice when forming the army for the assault, thus proving that he had ulterior motives for the positioning of Cheatham's Corps to the left. They are further told that Hood should have had Stewart's Corps align to shield Cheatham's Corps, enabling Cheatham's Corps to file behind Stewart as it positioned. However, visitors are not told that such an alignment would have been necessary only in anticipation of an offensive attack by the Federals. No danger of a Federal offensive existed: as Hood was forming for battle, there was no Federal attack (confirmed by historical records), and no Confederate casualties were sustained near Winstead Hill, where the Confederate forces assembled.
In summary, Hood's critics choose to explain the positioning of Confederate forces as being influenced by his desire to punish certain units, ignoring the obvious (and mundane) explanation that forces were assembled in the order in which they arrived on the field.
Battle of Franklin veteran, Washington Gardner, later a U.S. Congressman from Michigan, wrote of Gen. Hood in Henry Field's book, Bright Skies and Dark Shadows, "By the way, I was somewhat surprised, and may say pained, during my recent trip South, to note the disposition among soldiers of the late Confederate Army to criticize and disparage the merits of Gen. Hood. That he made mistakes no unprejudiced student of the War Between the States will deny, but that he was possessed of some of the best qualities that belong to great military commanders is equally indisputable. As between the General and his critics touching the Battle of Franklin, my sympathies are entirely with the former; while my admiration for the splendid valor exhibited by his heroic legions on that bloody field is not diminished by the fact that they were Americans all, Franklin, from the Confederate standpoint of view, must ever remain one of the saddest tragedies of the Civil War; on the other hand, there were in that battle possibilities to the Confederate cause, and that came near being realized, scarcely second to those of any other in the great conflict. Had Hood won-and he came within an ace of it-and reaped the legitimate fruits of his victory, the verdict of history would have been reversed, and William T. Sherman, who took the flower of his army and with it made an unobstructed march to the sea, leaving but a remnant to contend against a foe that had taxed his every resource from Chattanooga to Atlanta, would have been called at the close as at the beginning of the war, 'Crazy Sherman.' No individual, not even Hood himself, had so much at stake at Franklin as the hero of the 'march to the sea.'"
Although Hood's Tennessee Campaign ended in decisive defeats at Franklin and Nashville, Tennessee Gov. Isham Harris wrote in a Dec. 25, 1864 letter to Jefferson Davis, "I have been with General Hood from the beginning of this campaign, and beg to say, disastrous as it has ended, I am not able to see anything that General Hood has done that he should not, or neglected anything that he should have done which it was possible to do. Indeed, the more that I have seen and known of him and his policy, the more I have been pleased with him and regret to say that if all had performed their parts as well as he, the results would have been very different.
Davis, commenting on Hood's Franklin attack in his postwar memoirs, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, wrote, "Hood had served with distinction under Lee and (Stonewall) Jackson, and his tactics were of that school. If he had, by an impetuous attack, crushed Schofield's army...we should never have heard complaint because Hood attacked at Franklin, and these were the hopes with which he made his assault."
Hood's Intended Renewal of the Battle of Franklin
Records confirm that Gen. Hood stated his intention to renew the attack on Schofield's forces the next morning, but he never stated with specificity what the tactics or methods of the renewed attack would be. At a meeting late in the night of the battle, Hood told his corps commanders that a major artillery barrage would be delivered on the Union positions at dawn, followed by a "general assault" by the army. The Confederate barrage did in fact happen, but Schofield's army had evacuated Franklin overnight, and no infantry attack occurred. Hood's critics nonetheless contend that his renewed attack would have amounted to nothing more than a duplication of the unsuccessful frontal charge on Union fortifications that had occurred the prior day.
These critics ignore the fact that during the night, after the battle, 8,000 additional Confederate troops of S.D. Lee's Corps and all Confederate artillery had arrived from Columbia. On the morning of Dec. 1, Hood would have had superior troop strength, all of his artillery, and would have had a full ten hours of daylight to implement strategic maneuvers against any Federal forces that might have remained at Franklin.
Furthermore, at the time of his late night meeting with his corps commanders Cheatham, Stewart and S.D. Lee, Hood was told that casualties were "heavy" in Cheatham and Stewart's Corps, but the actual extent of the casualties weren't known until the next morning. Also, although Hood had no way of knowing Federal casualties at the time of the midnight meeting, it would have been understandable for him to think they were severe, having personally witnessed Union Gen. Wagner's advance division being overrun early in the battle and the initial breakthrough of the Union line at the Carter House before darkness set in within an hour of those events.
Hood's Blaming Others for the Defeat at Franklin
Near the end of the Nashville retreat, near Shoal Creek AL, W.G. Davenport of the 6th Texas Cavalry wrote that Gen Hood rode up and "Looking worn and tired but with kindly words for all, said to the soldiers, 'Boys, this is all my fault.'"
General Hood is held to a much harsher standard than other Civil War commanders in virtually every regard, his written and spoken words frequently given the most negative interpretation by his detractors. Commenting on the Confederate failure at Spring Hill, Hood opined that the army had lost its aggressiveness, blaming it on the influence of its previous commander, the cautious and defensive minded Joseph Johnston. Hood wrote, "The discovery that the army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was, still, seemingly unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It seemed to me that I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling block to the Army of Tennessee."
Hood's critics often vilify his usage of the word "evil", accusing him of calling his soldiers evil. These critics are clearly ignorant of nineteenth century idiom, where "evil" was broadly used to describe a negative or harmful trait or characteristic. For example, on May 10, 1863, Robert E. Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis regarding reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia after the death of Stonewall Jackson, "...I have for the past year felt that the corps of this army were too large for one commander. Nothing prevented my proposing to you to reduce their size and increase their number but my inability to recommend commanders. Each corps contains, when in fighting condition, about 30,000 men. These are more than one man can properly handle and keep under his eye in battle in the country that we have to operate in. They are always beyond the range of his vision, and frequently beyond his reach. The loss of Jackson from command of one-half the army seems to me a good opportunity to remedy this evil." Another example is found in an Oct. 8, 1862 letter from the Confederate Secretary of War to the Confederate Congress: "...The subject of the efficiency of the Army is one of paramount importance, and the letter of the Secretary of War herewith submitted has been elicited by correspondence with the generals of our armies in the field, whose practical experience of the evils resulting from the defects in our present system entitles their opinion to great weight..."
In the final sentence of the controversial quote, Hood uses a synonym for "evil", describing the problem with the army as a "stumbling block." The use of this term clearly gives the correct context to Hood's use of the word "evil". The dictionary definition for "stumbling block" is: "An obstacle, hindrance, or difficulty standing in the way of progress or understanding."
Hood echoed the sentiments of other Confederate military and government officials when he lamented an apparent lack of aggressiveness in the Army of Tennessee at the time that he took command. Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee, who joined the Army of Tennessee after Joseph Johnston's removal, described the army's reluctance to attack, "As a corps commander, I regarded the morale of the army greatly impaired after the fall of Atlanta, and in fact before its fall, the troops were not by any means in good spirits...the majority of the officers and men were so impressed with the idea of their inability to carry even temporary breastworks, that when orders were given for attack, and there was a probability of encountering works, they did not generally move to the attack with that spirit which nearly always assures success." However, Hood unambiguously stated that the Army of Tennessee redeemed itself at the Battle of Franklin, and praised them with emotion and eloquence in both his Official Report and his postwar book, Advance and Retreat. Historians deftly conceal Hood's favorable comparison of the Army of Tennessee's efforts at Franklin, (quoted below) to the efforts of his namesake Texas Brigade, Robert E. Lee's most effective and acclaimed soldiers: "The attack (at Franklin), which entailed so great a sacrifice of life, had become a necessity as imperative as that which impelled Gen. Lee to order the assault at Gaines' Mill, when our troops charged across an open space, a distance of one mile, under a most galling fire of musketry and artillery, against an enemy heavily entrenched. The heroes in that action fought not more gallantly than the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee upon the fields of Franklin." Also concealed are Hood's high praise of the soldiers in his Official Report, "Never did troops fight more gallantly." and "When the fortunes of war were against us, the same faithful (Army of Tennessee) soldiers remained true to their flag, and with rare exceptions followed it in retreat as they had borne it in advance."
Many Civil War commanders wrote honest assessments of the mood and condition of their troops, yet only Hood's critics characterize those assessments as "blaming" the troops. After the surrender at Appomattox, Robert E. Lee wrote, in an April 10, 1865, letter to Jefferson Davis, "...The operations which occurred while the troops were in the entrenchments in front of Richmond and Petersburg were not marked by the boldness and decision which formerly characterized them. Except in particular instances, they were feeble; and a want of confidence seemed to possess officers and men." No reasonable person would misinterpret Lee's words as blaming the soldiers of the Army of Northern Virginia for the loss of Richmond, Petersburg, and the war, yet such misinterpretation is promulgated with startling regularity by detractors of John Bell Hood.
Furthermore, Chaplain James M'Neilly of Quarles' Brigade recalled Confederate Gen. William Wing Loring's crying out to his troops at Franklin, "Great God! Do I command cowards?" Loring's exhortation to his courageous soldiers is never mischaracterized as insulting them, or blaming them for the Confederate failure at Franklin. Unlike their portrayal of Hood, historians have never sought to vilify Loring by misrepresenting his words.
Hood is also criticized for not accepting responsibility for the failures of the campaign. Hood's detractors fail to reveal that he wrote in his memoirs, "Whilst I failed utterly to bring battle at Spring Hill..." and also wrote of the Tennessee Campaign in his farewell address after resigning command of the Army of Tennessee, "I am alone responsible for its conception..."
Hood's Nashville Investment
At West Point, all cadets, including Hood, were taught Napoleon's Military Maxims. In nineteenth-century warfare, these were considered to be the most fundamental of military tactics. Napoleon's Maxim Number VI states, "At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skillful the maneuvers in a retreat, it will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own--whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only."
Franklin was, by the current technical definition, a Confederate victory, since Schofield yielded the field to Hood and retreated. Although Hood knew that his casualties were high at Franklin, he also knew that he had inflicted substantial casualties on Schofield. Historians frequently list only 189 Union killed at Franklin, versus 1,700 Confederates. However, due to Schofield's frantic overnight retreat to Nashville, most Union dead were left uncounted at Franklin. Official Union reports listed over 1,000 as "missing" at Franklin, presumably killed in action. (Mr. David Fraley, Military Historian at the Carter House in Franklin, is extensively researching the Union "missing" at Franklin, and as of Dec. 2005, through documentation, identified approximately 700 Union soldiers killed at Franklin.) Immediately after the battle of Franklin, Hood proceeded on to Nashville, constructing heavy defensive fortifications, including redoubts, with hopes of enticing Thomas to attack. Hood was concerned that a retrograde movement out of Tennessee would inspire desertions, a problem that had plagued the Army of Tennessee for many months. Hood concluded that an assault by Thomas on heavy defensive fortifications could cripple the Federals, and a successful Confederate counterattack might then be launched.
In their criticisms of Hood's movement on Nashville, authors and scholars seldom reveal that after the Battle of Franklin, Hood immediately requested that P.G.T. Beauregard contact Richmond and seek reinforcements or a strategic intervention by Confederate Gen. Kirby Smith in the Trans-Mississippi. On Dec. 2, Beauregard wired Jefferson Davis, "Cannot I send Gen. E. Kirby Smith to reinforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee?" Beauregard further asked that if logistics prohibited troops from crossing the Union-controlled Mississippi River, could Kirby Smith launch an offensive into Missouri, thus keeping Union Gen. A. J. Smith's Federal forces in St. Louis from reinforcing Thomas at Nashville. Receiving no reply, Beauregard again wrote to Kirby Smith, as did Confederate Secretary of War Seddon, but it was not until January 6, after the decisive Battle of Nashville, that Smith replied, stating that he could provide no assistance. Hood also requested reinforcements from other areas, specifically Breckinridge in western Virginia, and troops from Mobile. Both requests were denied by Richmond.
General U. S. Grant was so concerned with the threat of Hood's army outside of Nashville that he ordered Thomas to attack on Dec. 6. Then on Dec. 11, when Thomas still had not attacked Hood, Grant telegraphed Thomas, "If you delay attacking longer, the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio." In fact, Grant left his army in Virginia and was actually en route to Nashville to personally supervise an attack by Thomas's forces on December 15th when he learned of Thomas's assault and wired Thomas at 11:30 pm, "I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of today, I shall go no further."
The Confederate government and high command were well aware of the importance and urgency of Hood's mission. Jefferson Davis and department commander Beauregard corresponded extensively during the campaign, and on Nov. 30 Davis wired Beauregard, "Until Hood reaches the country proper of the enemy, he can scarcely change Grant�s or Sherman�s campaigns." With a wounded yet still potent army of 31,000 after Franklin, at Nashville Hood made a final attempt to change the fortunes of the war for the Confederacy.
The "Destruction" of the Army of Tennessee at Franklin and Nashville
Perhaps the most fallacious hyperbole that revisionist authors and historians foist upon the Civil War history community is the claim that the Army of Tennessee was "destroyed" at Franklin and Nashville. Clearly the most guilty of these scholars is Wiley Sword, whose 1991 book, The Confederacy's Last Hurrah, has unfortunately been embraced so widely in the Civil War history community that his biased interpretation and presentation currently defines Gen. Hood and the Tennessee Campaign. Sword concludes that Hood lost "two thirds" of his army, and calls the losses incurred in the Tennessee Campaign as unparalleled in American military history. Astonishingly though, among other factual errors, Sword's casualty figures counted 3,000 Confederates wounded and left at Franklin on Nov. 30 when Hood's army marched on to Nashville, and counted those same soldiers again as "captured" when they were captured by Federal forces pursuing Hood's army that retreated through Franklin on Dec. 18.
Ascertaining accurate Confederate troop statistics late in the war has proved to be extremely difficult, especially in regard to the Army of Tennessee. Upon his dismissal in July, 1864, Joseph Johnston's enraged Chief of Staff, W. W. Mackall, abruptly departed, taking many of the army's administrative records with him. Records after the Tennessee Campaign were more credible than the post-Atlanta records, but still somewhat incomplete and confusing.
The Army of Tennessee commenced the invasion of Tennessee on November 21, 1864 with a troop strength of 33,000 infantry and cavalry. Upon arrival in Tupelo, Mississippi, in late December 1864, after the army's retreat from Nashville, troop strength according to various records ranged from a low of 19,000 (15,500 infantry and 3,500 cavalry) to a high of 22,000 (18,500 infantry and 3,500 cavalry.) Simple subtraction produces a total loss during the campaign of between 14,000 (highest) to 11,000 (lowest.)
In deriving casualties that were a direct result of military combat, the large number of Confederate prisoners held by the Federals at Nashville must be considered. Multiple accounts of large numbers of Confederates who voluntarily surrendered have been recorded. For example, there is Private Sam Watkins' account in Company Aytch: "...more than ten thousand had stopped and allowed themselves to be captured." Other accounts recall entire companies of Confederates surrendering. S. A. Cunningham wrote in Reminiscences of the Forty-First Tennessee that after the retreat from Nashville "Almost all the Tennesseans had either gone home on furlough or took French leave (deserted)." Although Hood, as army commander, is ultimately responsible, any fair assessment would conclude that four years of dysfunctional army leadership and the deprivations of war caused many Confederates to opt for the relative comfort of a Federal prison, or abandon the cause.
Notwithstanding this, approximately 20,000 Confederate troops arrived in Tupelo, Mississippi in late December, 1864. Hood soon resigned, and furloughs were granted to large numbers of soldiers. In early 1865, when the hopes of the Confederacy were fading and the beleaguered Robert E. Lee was soon to surrender at Appomattox, several thousand troops of the Army of Tennessee were transferred to North Carolina, and several thousand were sent to Mobile, Alabama.
Chief Surgeon Dr. Samuel Mims Thompson of the 41st Tennessee wrote after the war, "It is true that we were sadly repulsed at Nashville. But he (Hood) brought off the larger portion of the army with Quartermaster, Commissary, Medical and Ordnance trains."
Although the Army of Tennessee never engaged in another major military campaign after Nashville (the war continued for only five more months, three months of which were during the usual inactive winter-camp period) to say that it was "destroyed" at Franklin or Nashville is nonsense. If the army was destroyed at Franklin, how could it have been defeated two weeks later in Nashville? If the army was destroyed at Nashville, how could it have retreated to Mississippi? Even Hood's most vicious critics acknowledge that an approximate minimum of 20,000 infantry and cavalry of the Army of Tennessee arrived in Tupelo.
Is it ever contended that Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was "destroyed" in its final campaign of the war? In an April 10, 1865 letter to Jefferson Davis, Lee detailed the manpower situation with the Army of Northern Virginia on its final retreat to Appomattox. Lee wrote, "At the commencement of the withdrawal of the army from the lines on the night of the 2d, it began to disintegrate, and straggling from the ranks increased up to the surrender on the 9th. On that day, as previously reported, there were only seven thousand eight hundred and ninety-two (7,892) effective infantry. During the night, when the surrender became known, more than ten thousand men came in, as reported to me by the Chief Commissary of the Army. During the succeeding days stragglers continued to give themselves up, so that on the 12th April, according to the rolls of those paroled, twenty-six thousand and eighteen (26,018) officers and men had surrendered. Men who had left the ranks on the march, and crossed James River, returned and gave themselves up, and many have since come to Richmond and surrendered."
If the same logic and statistical interpretations were applied to Lee that are often applied to Hood's Tennessee Campaign, it should be asserted that since only 8,000 troops were on hand at Appomattox, from an army that began the final campaign with 26,000, the Army of Northern Virginia was destroyed prior to the surrender. Lee lost approximately 70% of his troops on his final campaign including deserters, stragglers, and those who surrendered, but it has never been asserted that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was "destroyed."
Hood's army was defeated in Tennessee, but not destroyed there. Rather, the Army of Tennessee, the Army of Northern Virginia, and all other Southern military units, like the Confederate States of America itself, were destroyed by four years of death, destruction and deprivation at the hands of a larger, stronger, resolute opponent.
Furthermore, an analysis of casualty rates in the major civil war battles indicates that the casualties incurred during the 1864 Tennessee Campaign, although high, do not deviate drastically from other Confederate losses. According to Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage, by Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson, the total number of killed, wounded, and missing in the thirty largest civil war battles from First Manassas through Chickamauga were 225,790 out of 981,225 engaged, or 23%. Some Confederate casualty rates in notable battles include Shiloh (24.1%); Antietam (22.6%); Murfreesboro (26.6%); Chickamauga (25.6%); and Gettysburg (30.2%). Although the number captured at Nashville make an accurate analysis difficult, the numbers killed, wounded, and captured (a reasonably modified figure) for the entire Tennessee Campaign are probably comparable to those of many other Civil War campaigns.
Hood's Alleged Drug Usage
Nowhere in the vast historical records is there mention by any friend or foe of Hood having used pain-killing medication, either during or after the war. Nevertheless, rarely is there a conversation regarding the 1864 Tennessee Campaign, among amateur or professional historians, that does not include the unfounded story of Hood's alleged drug-induced mental impairment.
During the ill-fated Tennessee Campaign, Hood was constantly surrounded by subordinates and associates. Many of these witnesses, both supporters and detractors, kept diaries and wrote postwar memoirs. None ever mentioned any use of medication or alcohol by Hood during the campaign, not even the outspoken and opinionated Nathan Bedford Forrest, one of Hood's harshest critics.
The seeds of the drug myth were planted in the 1940 book Old Bald Head: General R. S. Ewell, by Percy Hamlin. The author theorized that Hood might have used laudanum, but offered no documentation and no footnote. Since then, many authors have routinely asserted that Hood used laudanum, offering Hamlin's speculation as the source.
Hood's Reckless Aggressiveness
On the Internet websites of several Nashville-area Civil War organizations, it is declared that Hood was "a firm believer in frontal assaults." The truth is that as an army commander, the attack at Franklin was the first, last and only frontal assault that Hood ever ordered. His attacks during the defense of Atlanta-Peachtree Creek, Decatur, Ezra Church and Jonesborough-were all assaults on Union Gen. William T. Sherman's flanks and rear. Furthermore, Hood's decision not to attack fortified Union positions at Columbia, Tennessee on Nov. 28, 1864 set the stage for the Battle of Franklin. His final battle at Nashville on Dec. 15-16, 1864 also involved no frontal Confederate attack.
Earlier in the war, Hood had urged Gen. James Longstreet to allow the withdrawal of his brigade after the first day at Second Manassas, and he counseled Gen. Robert E. Lee to withdraw Confederate forces after Antietam. Hood also convinced Lee to withdraw Hood's brigade at South Mountain, and at Gettysburg Hood was unsuccessful in urging Longstreet to allow Hood's Division to flank the strong Union position on Little Round Top.
Present-day historians are fully aware that Hood was involved in only six major battles as commander of the Army of Tennessee, and that only Franklin involved a frontal charge. Yet they falsely assert that Hood was a proponent of frontal attacks.
The Hatred of Hood by His Soldiers
The only quote by an Army of Tennessee soldier that most people will ever read is Private Sam Watkins's reaction to Hood's replacement of Joseph Johnston as commander of the army. Watkins, of the First Tennessee Infantry, wrote in his acclaimed memoir Company Aytch: "The most terrible and disastrous blow that the South ever received was when Hon. Jefferson Davis placed General Hood in command of the Army of Tennessee." Was Watkins lamenting the appointment of Hood, or the removal of Joe Johnston? S. A. Cunningham wrote in Confederate Veteran magazine in April, 1893, "The removal of General Johnston, and the appointment of Hood to succeed him in command of the Army of Tennessee, was an astounding event. So devoted to Johnston were his men that the presence and immediate command of General Robert E. Lee would not have been accepted without complaint." Consider the other statements by Watkins in Company Aytch:
He (Hood) was a noble, brave and good man, and we loved him for his virtues and goodness of heart.
We all loved Hood, he was such a clever fellow, and a good man.
Poor fellow, I loved him, not as a general, but as a good man.
Every impulse of his nature was to do good, and to serve his country as best he could.
General John B. Hood did all that he could. The die had been cast. Our cause had been lost before he took command. He fought with the everlasting grip of the bulldog and the fierceness of the wounded tiger. The army had been decimated until it was a mere skeleton...when he commenced his march into Tennessee.
Even Watkins offered a poignant testimony of his love for his former commander when he wrote the following epitaph for Hood in The Southern Bivouac 2 (May 1884):
But the half of brave Hood's body molders here: The rest was lost in honor's bold career. Both limbs and fame he scattered all around, Yet still, though mangled, was with honor crowned; For ever ready with his blood to part, War left him nothing whole; except his heart.
Dr. Samuel Thompson of the 41st Tennessee wrote after the war, "Many, we know, will disagree with us, but we think to calmly and impartially view General Hood's course we will be forced to accord to him abilities of the highest order and a military commander with but few superiors. What became of General Hood for the remainder of the war we do not know, but if he was removed for failure in Tennessee, he was treated very unjustly. That he did so, we believe was no fault of his. He failed simply because he had not men and supplies to contend with the immense force that was against him."
Col. Virgil S. Murphey of the 17th Alabama wrote in his diary, "Our government had placed Hood in command, and as such I yielded to him my confidence and cordial cooperation." Murphey, who had been captured at Franklin and was being held in Nashville, also wrote that when prisoners learned of Hood's army advancing on Nashville, "About 300 Yankee bounty jumpers and prisoners in the yard yelled with delight and declared their readiness to rejoin Hood."
Virtually every Civil War history enthusiast is familiar with the clever lyrics, supposedly written by an unknown disgruntled Army of Tennessee soldier during the retreat from Nashville. Sung to the tune of "The Yellow Rose of Texas," the lyrics are:
So now I'm marching southward; My heart is full of woe. I'm going back to Georgia To see my Uncle Joe. You may talk about your Beauregard And sing of General Lee, But the gallant Hood of Texas Played Hell in Tennessee.
When the soldiers indeed returned and saw their "Uncle Joe" Johnston, what did they experience? Hood resigned his command in January 1865, and the following month Johnston was reappointed commander of the Army of Tennessee. Johnston, historically portrayed as a commander universally loved by his troops, whose paramount tactical consideration was to incur the fewest casualties, wrote in his postwar memoirs that he accepted command "...with a full consciousness on my part, however, that we could have no other object, in continuing the war, other than to obtain fair terms of peace; for the Southern cause must have appeared hopeless then, to all intelligent and dispassionate Southern men. I therefore resumed the duties of my military grade with no hope beyond that of contributing to obtain peace on such conditions as, under the circumstances, ought to satisfy the Southern people and their Government." Johnston, who criticized Hood for the "useless butchery" at Franklin, nevertheless ordered the Army of Tennessee to attack Sherman's Union army at Bentonville, North Carolina, on March 19, 1865, and the ensuing defeat resulted in 3,092 Confederate casualties.
"Uncle Joe" Johnston, in an effort that he admitted was hopeless, ordered over 3,000 soldiers of the Army of Tennessee to death, wounding or capture at Bentonville simply to obtain fairer surrender terms; yet he is historically portrayed as a compassionate commander who loved his troops, while John Bell Hood, who at Franklin and Nashville was attempting to win a war not yet decided, is commonly portrayed as a reckless butcher who ordered men to senseless deaths.
Conclusion
In the words of Civil War author and historian Steve Davis, "Really, y'all, this talk must stop." The commercially motivated destruction of the legacies of Civil War heroes such as John Bell Hood is no less despicable than the commercially motivated destruction of Civil War battlefield lands. In both instances, irreparable harm is done to our history.