Post Colonial Balochistan (original) (raw)

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 32 (2000), 47–69.

Printed in the United States of America

Paul Titus and Nina Swidler

K N IGH T S , NOT PAW NS : E TH NO - NAT IONA L I S M A N D R E GIONA L DY NA M IC S I N P O S T - C OL ON I A L BA L O C H I S TA N
The creation of Pakistan was a crushing blow to those hoping to establish autonomous, ethnically de˜ned states in the western borderlands of the Indian empire. The best known of these movements, the Red Shirts (Khudai Khidmatgar), was active in the North-West Frontier Province since the 1920s and moved from a¯liation with the Indian National Congress to advocating sovereignty and ultimately an independent Pushtun state when faced with the inevitability of Partition. 1 Similar Pushtun and Balochi movements arose in the last decades of the Raj in the areas that now constitute the Pakistani province of Balochistan. In the pivotal years of 1947 and 1948, the Muslim League was able to outmaneuver and suppress these ambitious young movements, but they did not die. In subsequent decades, Balochi and Pushtun nationalism became key elements in the political discourse and the equation of power in Balochistan, and they remain so today. A number of works on Pakistan’s political history have shown how regional ethnic movements developed in response to the consolidation of a highly centralized state in the post-colonial era.2 While not disagreeing with this premise, the thesis of this study is that the Balochi and Pushtun national movements can be fully understood only if viewed in the context of the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Ethno-nationalist movements emerged in the western borderlands in part because of the ambiguities that the British left in their wake as they steamed away from India. With their departure, diˆerences surfaced over the status of the Durand Line, which had been drawn to demarcate Afghanistan and British India. While Pakistan understood the Durand Line to be an explicit international boundary, the government of Afghanistan and Pushtun nationalists in Pakistan asserted not only that Afghanistan had agreed to it under duress, but also that during the colonial era it had simply demarcated separate spheres of interest and responsibility, not distinct states. 3 The lack of precision in treaties between British India and Afghanistan created the space for Afghan governments in the post-colonial era to challenge the legitimacy of the border and to demand the creation of a homeland for Pushtun (Pushtunistan) in its stead.4
Paul Titus is a Fellow, Sociology Department, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. Nina Swidler is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Fordham University College at Lincoln Center, 113 West 60th Street, New York, N.Y. 10023-7475, U.S.A. ç 2000 Cambridge University Press 0020–7438/00 $9.50

48ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler These ambiguities and consequent tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan shaped developments in Balochistan in the ˜rst decades of the post-colonial period. This was particularly true for Balochistan’s Pushtun ethno-nationalist movement, but it was also true for its Balochi counterpart. Afghanistan’s support was at times signi˜cant to both groups in their opposition to the central government’s eˆorts to exert its control over the border region. This is not to say that Balochistan’s ethnonationalist movements were the creation of external powers. They were not mere pawns in the power politics of two states attempting to assert themselves in a world that was increasingly polarized between capitalist and communist power blocs. Instead, these ethno-nationalist movements must be seen primarily as the eˆorts of regional elites and their followers to achieve greater autonomy and democratic structures in a new, centralizing state. Rather like another piece on the chessboard, the knight, the aspirations and actions of these elites were doubly constrained—on the one hand by the limits of their own tribal societies, and on the other by those imposed on them by the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the colonial period, Balochistan was a complex mix of administrative units: Kalat State, British Balochistan, and areas that the British leased from Kalat. British Balochistan (which was made up of Pushtun areas that Afghanistan ceded to the British in the 1879 Treaty of Gandamak and the Marri-Bugti tribal zone) and the leased areas were directly administered. Ruled by a khan, Kalat was nominally independent, though as in other princely states, the British exerted their dominance by various means, including vetting the khan’s o¯cials and paying subsidies to tribal leaders.5 In June 1947, the tribal leaders and municipal authorities in British Balochistan who were given the authority to decide the future of the area opted to join Pakistan. The khan of Kalat, claiming that Kalat’s treaty relations with British India were of the same status as those between India and Nepal, declared Kalat an independent country.6 The khan was supported in this move by the ethno-nationalist Kalat State National Party (KSNP), which held a majority of seats in the new Kalat House of Commons.7 The new state remained in existence for nine months before succumbing to intense pressure to accede to Pakistan. Events at Partition shaped the subsequent attitudes and politics that emerged in Balochistan. As in the North-West Frontier, most Balochis acquiesced to subsumption into Pakistan, but committed groups of activists objected to the manner in which it was imposed, if not to the act itself. Their responses ranged from peaceful political organizing to sabotage, and some activists received logistical and ˜nancial support from Afghanistan. Faced with the need to settle millions of refugees while consolidating the new state, the government of Pakistan dealt with the activists sharply, jailing some for long periods and organizing its own anti-Afghanistan propaganda and sabotage campaigns. The state structure forged in Pakistan’s ˜rst decades was based on strong, centralized bureaucratic–military institutions. These were manned primarily by Punjabis and refugees from India (Mohajirs) and buttressed by an ontology of Islamic nationhood. The cost of maintaining this structure was high, and ethnic nationalists in both the western border provinces and East Pakistan saw it as one that disadvantaged them and their regions.8 The pattern for the triangular relationship among the ethnic nationalists of the border region and the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan was established in

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just as they had during British domination. Some nationalists. though the antagonism between the sardars and the nationalists remained. Many of the activists had left-wing ideologies and saw the sardars as divisive. Khan Ahmed Yar Khan’s reign (1933–77) bridged the colonial and post-colonial periods. These two factions of the khan’s supporters were themselves political rivals. for example. oppressive agents of outside interests.12 This pattern continued in Pakistan’s ˜rst decade. and Zagar Mengal sardars. During the late colonial and early post-colonial eras.10 The intellectuals and government servants in the nascent Balochi nationalist movement supported his eˆorts. interviews with men involved in those political movements. he sought to recover some of the power for the o¯ce of the khan that the British had encroached upon in the ˜rst decades of the 20th century. The khan attempted to play oˆ nationalist and sardarÿ diˆerences by maintaining his authority as the traditional head of the Balochi tribes while appealing to the nationalists as the leader of the Balochi nation. BALOCHI NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN’S FIRST DECADE In all areas of Balochistan. reaching its peak with the guerrilla war in Balochistan during the early 1970s.11 The ban on the party was lifted after World War II. They claimed that Nasir and other activists had created disturbances in the town of Noshki by making speeches charging that the sardars were appropriating and selling local residents’ wheat rations.Knights. Kalat retained its status as a semi-autonomous princely state with the khan at its head. the Balochi activist poet Gul Khan Nasir was expelled from Kalat State following complaints to the agent to the governor-general in Balochistan from the Badini. Jamaldini. Jirga decisions generally followed tribal custom (rivaj).9 The intensity of the relationship increased with the creation of One Unit in 1955. Initially. Not Pawnsı 49 the aftermath of Partition. and secondary sources. including Kalat. This was not always possible. Personally ambitious. sardars as a group were often the target of ethno-nationalist political attacks. colonial rule was maintained using the jirga–levies system. however. The jirga–levies system suited British desires to maintain a reasonable level of public order at minimum expense. Though some of the nationalists had links to sardarÿ families. Tribal chiefs (sardars or nawabs) were expected to serve on judicial councils ( jirga) as a condition of receiving a subsidy. and by 1939 the activities of the nationalists had so antagonized the sardars and the British that they pressured the khan to declare the KSNP illegal in Kalat State. In March 1946. This article provides a narrative that details the development of Pushtun and Balochi nationalism in Balochistan during this time using material drawn from the archives of Quetta’s district commissioner. as did the sardars to a certain extent. the sardars. and the activists of the nationalist movement. there were three key groups of players in Balochi politics—the khan of Kalat. “Levy” was a general term that included paramilitary corps led by British o¯cers as well as district levies who were under the authority of tribal leaders and whose duties ranged from carrying messages to making arrests. The Pakistani government continued to pay the subsidies to them that the British had institutionalized. It also had the eˆect of enhancing the power of the sardars relative to that of the khan of Kalat. upset at what they saw as the . The sardars continued to enjoy considerable autonomy in their areas.

18 The creation of Ustaman Gal occurred when politics in both Pakistan and Balochistan were in a state of ˘ux. Ustaman Gal leaders went to Quetta to organize branches in Balochistan. Eventually. including Gul Khan Nasir.16 No new followers crossed over from Pakistan to join the rebels. who established a camp near the border. KSNP members spoke publicly against the khan. and there. The khan attempted to occupy a middle ground.50ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler coercive measures Pakistan used to achieve Kalat’s accession. Dema Rowak Ulus. the rebels returned to Kalat. Abdul Karim approached prominent sardars. Abdul Karim was commandant of Kalat State’s military. the khan ordered Kalat State troops to join Pakistani troops in sealing the border to prevent supplies from reaching the “absconders. The khan asserted that he knew nothing of his brother’s plans.14 The agent to the governor-general (AGG) reported Abdul Karim’s grievances: the khan had been forced to sign the accession agreement. along with 126 of his men.13 In May 1948. along with several o¯cers and some troops of the Kalat State army. where they had a brief ˜ght with Kalat State and Pakistani troops. who was a key ˜gure in the Balochi nationalist movement early in the post-colonial period. constitutional means for attaining its demands. Only Balochis were actually permitted to join the party. The KSNP. which had the stated goals of making Pakistan a people’s republic. Ustaman Gal. M. and preserving the Balochi language and culture. Abdul Karim was arrested. the report states.15 Abdul Karim sought support from the government of Afghanistan but did not receive it. Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo. merge with Ustaman Gal. According to a ˜le compiled by the Special Branch of the Balochistan Secretariat. a month after the khan signed the Instrument of Accession. and the Pakistani government refused to introduce shariça law.17 Subsequently. a claim that the AGG found hard to believe. condemning his pro-Pakistan speeches and holding him responsible for the detention of Abdul Karim.” In July. The Muslim League was weakened by factionalism. unconstrained by electoral politics. He also proposed that the KSNP and another Balochi nationalist organization. while the central bureaucracy. Makran had acceded to Pakistan as a separate entity. Prior to Partition. Abdul Karim Khan. Abdul Karim again attracted the attention of the authorities by launching a new political party. including the distribution of power between the center and the provinces. Syed. Soon after his release in 1955. Muhammad Husain Unka. establishing a Balochi province. and Ali Ahmad Talpur. who received a seven-year sentence for his role in the brief rebellion. G. the party’s ˜rst meeting was held in Karachi and was attended by leading Balochi and Sindhi nationalists. and during Kalat’s short-lived independence he held the post of governor of Makran. and its members were put under surveillance. Pakistan was without a constitution due to irresolvable disagreements over several key issues. broadened and . but this proved di¯cult and earned him the distrust of both Balochi nationalists and the government of Pakistan. The khan’s ambivalence is well illustrated by his relationship with his younger brother. Abdul Karim led an armed group into Afghanistan in protest against the agreement. was banned. which was accused of having ties to him. which advocated peaceful. With him were several leading ˜gures in the Balochi nationalist movement. shifted their antagonism from the colonial state to its successor. including Gul Khan Nasir and Muhammad Hussain Unka.

continued to hear cases. The creation of a single provincial entity that subsumed all the administrative units of West Pakistan. In 1956. Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. and an end to Pakistani participation in the Western military pacts CENTO and SEATO. Balochistan’s ethno-nationalists objected on the grounds that One Unit curtailed Balochi autonomy. There was considerable tension between Balochi and Pushtun chiefs of the Shahi Jirga on the one hand and the Muslim League on the other. Of special importance to NAP supporters in West Pakistan was the dissolution of One Unit in favor of four ethnically de˜ned provinces. opposition to One Unit intensi˜ed. and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti—were members or a¯liates of the NAP. Sardar Ataullah Mengal. the power of the nationalists was minor compared with that of the sardars. Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo. the PNP joined with the left wing of the East Pakistan–based Awami League to form the National Awami Party (NAP). Las Bela. becoming one of the factors that provoked the military to seize power in 1958.21 While the khan of Kalat initially agreed to the plan. including the princely states. The NAP was to play a pivotal role in Balochi politics for the next twenty years. over how many seats were to be allocated to each in the Advisory Council that was to administer the province in the absence of an elected body. a coalition of ethno-nationalist and left-leaning parties in West Pakistan. Holding a pivotal block of seats. One Unit is generally depicted as an eˆort by Muhajir and Punjabi politicians to avoid once and for all the threat of subordination to the Bengali majority. which threatened to start its own branch of the Muslim League.25 Led by the NAP. The NAP also called for elections. The sardars saw the Muslim League as a threat to their authority and claimed there was no need for it because they were loyal to Pakistan and could guarantee the loyalty of their tribesmen. Kharan. nationalization of industry. was the most signi˜cant political development for Balochistan’s politics since accession to Pakistan.Knights. the Quetta district commissioner wrote that other political parties—notably. The Balochistan Muslim League soon fell victim to divisions over leadership and tensions between Balochi and Pushtun members. as were the leaders of Balochistan’s Pushtun nationalist movement. the NAP’s program was broad and addressed both national and international issues.24 As a national alliance of parties. The Shahi Jirga.20 The sardars set up their own organization. land reform.26 In his fortnightly reports of July 1958.19 In 1952 the central government had taken the unpopular move of joining Kalat. a tribunal of sardars established by the British to resolve tribal disputes. During this time.22 They responded to the new structure by forming a series of political alliances reaching far beyond Balochistan. as did the Quetta municipality and some tribal chiefs. and members of the banned KSNP formed the rival Baloch States Muslim League. and Makran into a single entity—the Balochistan States Union—which remained separate from former British Balochistan. League branches proliferated: the Kalat State Muslim League resisted merger with the provincial league. were warning the government not to “fall victim” to the NAP . the Balochistan Tribal Sardars Federation. the Ustaman Gal joined the Pakistan National Party (PNP). the NAP was able to leverage a vote against One Unit in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly in 1957. The nature of Pakistani politics changed dramatically with the establishment of One Unit in 1955. the Muslim League and the Jamaçat-i-Islami. Not Pawnsı 51 consolidated its power. Key Balochi politicians—notably.23 The following year.

31 Like those of several Balochi nationalist leaders.27 Although he initially consented to One Unit. sealed their o¯ces. as well as with the ˜rst generation of Balochi nationalists. the khan was reputed to have summoned all leading Balochi sardars to Karachi to press the government to restore Kalat State. parallel political developments took place among Pushtuns in Balochistan. led an insurrection of 500 armed men. was Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai. PUSHTUN NATIONALISM IN PAKISTAN’S FIRST DECADE During the later decades of colonial rule and the ˜rst decades of Pakistan’s existence. Underlying tension between Balochis and Pushtuns surfaced from time to time and would later lead to political splits. anti-imperial.52ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler by disintegrating One Unit. and indeed in the 20th century. and arrested a number of NAP leaders. and it was a year before the army could suppress it. however. these issues included demands for the preferential treatment of Balochis and Pushtuns in government service. Nauroz Khan. he and the pro-Congress organization he founded in 1939. the sardar of the Zarakzai tribe. an event that the AGG at the time described as the ˜rst attempt to involve Balochistan in all-India politics. for example. anti-feudal movement that sought the independence of Pushtuns. The military arrested the khan in October and used his alleged eˆorts to resurrect Kalat State as a pretext for imposing martial law on the country. the Quetta district commissioner reported that the khan was encouraging the Afghan government to advocate the restoration of Kalat State. Nauroz Khan died in prison while serving a life sentence. those developments are visible in the Quetta commissioner’s reports. which Balochi nationalists generally opposed. In 1956. Ghaˆar Khan. It was also manifest in the verbal sniping that often accompanied a Balochi or Pushtun gaining a powerful position in the central government. the major issues that were to occupy the political landscape of Balochistan during the 1960s and 1970s were visible. Samad Khan’s political career spanned the colonial and post-colonial eras. in Pushtun demands that parts of Balochistan be joined to the North-West Frontier Province. Their enshrinement in the pantheon of nationalist martyrs is symbolically signi˜cant in the political culture of Balochistan today.32 Samad Khan’s followers describe the Anjuman-i-Watan as a national–democratic. Because Quetta district includes the key transportation route through Chaman to Kandahar. This tension was visible. The insurgency grew. In January 1958. he attended the All India Baloch Conference in Jacobabad. the commissioner took note of incidents in the sensitive border region. The single most prominent Pushtun nationalist in Balochistan during this time. Anjuman-i-Watan. demanding the unconditional release of the khan and annulment of One Unit. and six of his followers were executed for their part in the uprising. His eˆorts came to naught. the khan of Kalat soon began to oppose the policy. Quetta o¯cials were especially concerned with the Afghan government’s involvement in the Pushtun nationalist movement.30 By the time martial law was declared. Samad Khan opposed LONG . In the lead up to Partition. In December 1932. the military banned all of Pakistan’s political parties.33 Samad Khan had close relations with the Red Shirts and their leader. In addition to the dissolution of One Unit.28 After seizing power. Like the Pushtun nationalists of the North-West Frontier Province.29 In Kalat. were frequently cited in intelligence reports. As with the Balochi nationalist movement. charging them with subversion.

Wror-i-Pushtun followed a path similar to that of the Ustaman Gal. which would then have the right to join Afghanistan if it chose. It joined forces with likeminded parties in western Pakistan to form the Pakistan National Party. In 1949. an activist who spent thirty years in the Pushtunistan movement (twelve of them in prison). In 1958. after which the “miscreants” crossed to Afghanistan.36 Pakistani Pushtun nationalists also sought the creation of Pushtunistan. a portent of the split that would take place between him and the party’s Balochi leaders in 1970.34 During a brief period of freedom in 1954. Samad Khan was in˘uential in the NAP. Though in detail the concept was somewhat vague and contradictory. and weapons to activists on both sides of the Durand Line.38 Jaçfar Achakzai. its Pushtunistan propaganda increased. He was arrested and released frequently in the early years of independence. Kabul called for the Pushtun areas of Pakistan to be amalgamated into a Pushtunistan. When the army took over the government in 1958. Samad Khan established a new party. books. the Baluchistan Muslim League took legal action against him for what it called disruptive propaganda in his weekly newspaper. An entry in March 1961 is typical: it cites telephone wires cut at several places around Chaman and Pushtunistan ˘ags being displayed and propaganda distributed in the area. This was the ˜rst of Samad Khan’s many stays in Pakistani jails. The Anjuman-i-Watan remained active while he was locked up. Samad Khan spent eighteen of Pakistan’s ˜rst twenty-one years in prison. and he got oˆ to a bad start with Pakistan. Reports of attacks on military personnel. Not Pawnsı 53 the Muslim League. the Quetta commissioner reported that the NAP was working for Samad Khan’s election to the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly.35 Another report described Samad Khan as a controversial ˜gure and said that there was an active anti–Samad Khan faction in the NAP. and raiding animals on both sides of the border were a standard feature of the Quetta commissioners’ fortnightly reports throughout the 1950s and 1960s. .Knights. it charged him with treason and imprisoned him for ten years. whose primary demand was a referendum to determine whether the Pushtun parts of Balochistan should be merged with the North-West Frontier Province. All told. and it was then absorbed into the NAP in 1957. The Balochi and Pushtun nationalist movements diˆered in their intensity in the 1950s. the party was reported to be supporting Afghanistan’s propaganda campaign for Pushtunistan and backing Balochistan’s sardars in their ˜ght with the Muslim League over the composition of the Advisory Council. due largely to the in˘uence that the government of Afghanistan exerted on the latter. sabotage of bridges. said in an interview that both governments sponsored subversive activities in each other’s territory by supplying “money. In February 1948. With the creation of One Unit. Following this. though at least publicly their demands were generally more moderate and focused on merging all Pushtun lands in Pakistan into a single province. telephone wires were cut and school buildings were destroyed in Afghanistan. The following month he was arrested and brie˘y detained. Wror-i-Pushtun. and power poles.” He described most of his own activities as peaceful—public speeches and political rallies— though some activists (as well as people in trouble with the law) left Pakistan to live in Afghanistan and ˜ght in the border area. and bombs. resources. Afghanistan organized and funded a support movement for the Pushtunistan cause that supplied propaganda.37 In any case. buildings.

which was distributed to Afghan nomads ( powindahs). a retired bureaucrat with a long career in the provincial government states that Pakistan did engage in similar activities across the border. He participated in the disturbances in Noshki described earlier.42 Balochi nationalists also received support from the government of Afghanistan for their political endeavors. The conduit for this money was said to be Maulvi Ghulam Haidar Jamaldini. Pakistan closed its consulates in Afghanistan. exhorting them to carry out sabotage in Pakistan.39 The fortnightly reports never mention any Pakistani involvement in organizing sabotage or propaganda-dissemination in Afghanistan. Afghan support for Pushtunistan escalated after 1953. along with some followers. particularly in 1950 and 1951. It also closed the border. .40 Conditions on the border ˘uctuated with the state of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. One report from this period stated that the Afghan government was sending money to border maliks in Shorawak and to Samad Khan and his party to fund opposition to One Unit. Both countries mobilized their armies. and he joined Abdul Karim’s short-lived rebellion.43 An active nationalist before Partition. They also contain reports of Afghan o¯cials holding meetings with land owners (maliks) and mullahs in the border zone. Voice of Democracy (Jumhuriyat Zagh). and publication of a magazine. Information. about 80 kilometers west of Quetta. The following year he was said to have been appointed Islamic judge (qazi) in a Shorawak village. and Broadcasting’s propaganda campaign against Afghanistan in the early 1950s. Prince Abdul Karim and Ustaman Gal reportedly received money from the Afghan government to oppose One Unit. Daud Khan shifted Afghanistan’s foreign policy toward closer relations with the Soviet Union and actively promoted Pushtunistan. when a “palace revolt” brought the forceful Sardar Daud Khan to power. oˆering them land and money if they carried out actions in Pakistan. Men from his border camps were often reported to have cut rail and telegraph lines and carried out other acts of sabotage. but pressure from the international community averted further escalation.54ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler According to the fortnightly reports. with a stipend of 200 Afghanis a month.41 After an Afghan crowd tore down the Pakistani embassy ˘ag in Kabul in March 1955. and he is frequently mentioned as a source of money and other resources for activists. Maulvi Ghulam Haidar spent virtually the rest of his life in Afghanistan. The campaign included broadcasting a radio play depicting Hindus ˜nancing the Pushtunistan movement. Border incidents in Balochistan increased after the governor of Kandahar called upon mullahs to declare a jihad against Pakistan. staying active the whole time in Pushtun and Balochi nationalist causes. the government of Afghanistan encouraged and at times actively recruited exiles. units of Afghan troops were reported to have crossed into Pakistan. In 1953. the Quetta commissioner reported that the maulvi. Most attacks were carried out by such irregulars. One piece of supporting evidence from the archives is a document that describes aspects of the Ministry of the Interior. crossed into Afghanistan and set up a camp near the border at Shorawak. though on occasion. which Afghanistan asserted was an attempt to destroy the basis for Pushtun autonomy. Nevertheless. Relations between the two states took a sharp downward turn with the imposition of One Unit. Maulvi Ghulam Haidar was reported to be a graduate of the “Congress” school in Deoband. for example. disrupting transit trade from Karachi.

Though they were in and out of prison. and modest irrigation systems were constructed with Basic Democracies sponsorship.46 These councils in turn elected members of higher-level municipal–thana. as did Samad Khan Achakzai. personalities.45 Jaçfar Achakzai con˜rmed that activists from Pakistan had diˆerences with Afghan o¯cials.Knights. Even before political parties were o¯cially allowed to re-establish themselves in 1962.47 At its peak. Basic Democracies appear to have brought some development to Balochistan. and later he was reported to be displeased with the amount of money he was receiving from Kabul. the elections are likely to be fought on the basis of tribal a¯nities and ˜nancial inducement. Most of the schemes were relatively small in scale. Balochis and Pushtuns remained united in their opposition to One Unit. in 1964. Not Pawnsı 55 Maulvi Ghulam Haidar’s career illustrates the di¯culties that sometimes surfaced in relations between the Afghan government and the ethno-nationalists active in Balochistan aˆairs. Basic Democracies failed to depoliticize the region. and Bizenjo. roadworks. Marri. but were divided over how it should be dissolved.”48 There is some truth in his statement. schools. Basic Democracies was initially intended to function without political parties. The maulvi seems to have had considerable contact with Afghan o¯cials. At the time of the 1962 elections for national and provincial assemblies. . Those diˆerences would lead to splits in the NAP in 1970. the Quetta district commissioner reported that the maulvi was arrested in Kandahar for allegedly passing information to the government when he visited Pakistan. and divisional councils.” Basic Democracies consisted of a ˜ve-tiered structure at the base of which were union councils. Members of the provincial and national assemblies often served on higher-tier councils. The 1960s were the decade of Ayub Khan and his attempt to restructure Pakistan society through Basic Democracies. and parties that became prominent in Balochistan during the 1950s persisted in the 1960s. grew in stature during the 1960s. Ayesha Jalal characterizes the system as an attempt to extend the scope of bureaucratic patronage while sidelining the urban workers and the politically active intelligentsia. who wanted to limit their movements and activities. after One Unit was abolished. Bugti. there were reports that he was planning to return to Pakistan unless demands he had made to the Afghan government were met. Mengal. He is reported to have met with tribal directorates in Kandahar to plan border strategies. the NAP had resumed activity. However. After his release.44 We can assume that most of his dealings with Afghan o¯cials were positive. Promoted as a way to accelerate development by educating and mobilizing “inarticulate rural and urban masses. the Quetta commissioner noted: “In view of the lack of political consciousness due to the lack of education among the Basic Democrats of this region. however. district. ONE UNIT AND CLOSED BORDERS IN THE 1960S The issues. and it became the main platform from which Balochi and Pushtun nationalists pushed for an end to One Unit. which again had up to half their numbers appointed by the bureaucracy. comprising councilors elected through universal adult franchise as well as government appointees. because he continued to live and work in Afghanistan. the Balochi nationalist sardars and politicians who were associated with the NAP.

which included attacks on civilian buses. They called for an end to One Unit.56ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler In a 1964 interview. a ˜eld in which the NAP was the main actor. The Marris suspended their agitation during the 1965 war with India. and full regional autonomy. Trouble in the Mengal area appears to have subsided relatively quickly. The army retaliated aggressively with heavy ground ˜re. and the latter by . It did so under the leadership of an East Pakistani. The Pararis’ main base of activities was in the Marri area. the abolishing of restrictions on the press. Though political parties were permitted to resume activities in 1962. and their “southern command” was led by Ali Muhammad Mengal. attacking government buildings. a prominent sardar recounted how he had toured his territory telling tribesmen how to vote. with a manifesto calling for direct elections to replace the Basic Democracies. They established twenty-two bases and in some areas a virtual parallel government with schools and medical services. the NAP did not formally reconstitute itself until 1964.51 This provoked a hostile reaction from their tribesmen. and currency in central government hands. The activities of Marri. the re-framing of Ayub’s new constitution. a guerrilla force organized by Sher Muhammad Marri. Later.54 These tribal disturbances should be seen in the context of the whole ˜eld of oppositional politics in Balochistan during the 1960s. According to Selig Harrison. Many of the attacks were the work of the Pararis. perhaps because the sardars of six major tribes met with Ali Muhammad Mengal to mediate. whom the government described as an outlaw. and copies were sent to Maulvi Ghulam Haidar for distribution in Afghanistan. asserting that Balochis had been deprived of their rights.49 Among those the Basic Democrats elected to the national assembly were the ethno-nationalist sardars Khair Bakhsh Marri. 53 They engaged in hit-and-run tactics. once elected these men began making critical speeches in the assembly and at public rallies. The government retaliated against their agitation by removing their sardarÿ titles and appointing replacements. Mengal. foreign aˆairs.50 Regardless of whether their electoral success stemmed more from tribal loyalties than nationalist politics. dissolution of One Unit. however. the extent to which the disruptions in the Mengal area. and Akbar Bugti were of particular government concern because these men performed dual roles as tribal heads and nationalist leaders. the former led by the Pukhtun politician Wali Khan of the North-West Frontier Province. and the establishment of quotas for locals in government jobs. and ambushing army convoys and trains. but the Marri and Bugti tribal areas were still unsettled in the late 1960s. with only defense. the Pararis grew from a force of several hundred to nearly a thousand by the end of the 1960s. Sher Muhammad was an avowed Marxist–Leninist who had been a labor activist in the colonial period and in the 1950s founded the Balochi nationalist party Dema Rowak Ulus. the new Mengal and Marri chiefs were assassinated. where they had the support of the sardar. Ataullah Mengal. were a factor of local tribal dynamics. the release of political detainees. and government troops stationed in their territories were attacked. the NAP split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese camps.52 It is unclear. Maulana Bashani. air attacks.55 NAP activists supported Fatima Jinnah in the presidential elections of 1964. in 1967. and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti. Dubbed General Sherov by Zul˜kar Bhutto. blocking roads. Some of their speeches were published. and the destruction of crops. Journalistic accounts claim that they also had bases in Jhalawan and Sarawan.

The group’s early demonstrations led to many arrests and the closing of student hostels. which de-emphasized socialism and stressed regional autonomy and democracy. and professionals. Disputes in northern Pakistan precipitated a number of border incidents. to commit sabotage in Pakistan. when the break in diplomatic ties occurred. In Balochistan. many of whom migrated annually to the Indus plains. a fourth-year student at Quetta Degree College. Several were charged with sedition. On the political front. a NAP leader made a welcoming speech that criticized the government and threatened a jihad against it.Knights. the Afghan capture of explosives on the border suggests Pakistani support for sabotage on the Afghan side. a pro-government notable whom an o¯cial described as “one of the government’s staunchest supporters” and someone “who rendered invaluable service during the operation against Marri rebels in 1966. More serious clashes between Afghan troops and Pakistani scouts occurred in 1961. .”58 The growing movement against Ayub Khan reached a crescendo in 1969. workers. protested One Unit and the jirga system. initially sought improved educational facilities in Balochistan. According to the government report on the incident.”57 Samad Khan was put under surveillance.” The man who shot him was Sher Hasan Kansi. founded in 1967. Maulvi Ghulam Haidar is mentioned frequently in reports during this period as actively organizing anti-Pakistan actions. with violators subject to heavy ˜nes. His policies of political restriction and economic development through functional inequality antagonized a large portion of the population. and called for the release of political prisoners. The Quetta commissioner reported that the Afghan government had organized a Balochi military unit (lashkar) and was urging powindahs. Samad Khan Achakzai was released from prison in 1968. Several student leaders went on to become guerrilla leaders during the 1970s. including Gul Khan Nasir. The Baloch Students Organization (BSO). When he arrived at Quetta airport. Kabul also banned Radio Pakistan. adopting most of the NAP’s demands. tribal jirgas in Balochistan’s major Pushtun towns condemned Afghanistan and pledged support to Pakistan. The demonstrators oˆered prayers for students killed in Rawalpindi and Dacca.60 The two countries suspended diplomatic relations. the assassination “indicate[d] the depth of feeling regarding Pushtunistan among the students. There were several student demonstrations in Quetta during the early months of 1969. Not Pawnsı 57 Bashani. The victim was Ghulam Nabi Marri. as in the rest of Pakistan. The BSO then broadened its program.59 Labor unions organized protests condemning high prices and demanding increased wages and better housing and medical facilities. and Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo—was arrested.56 The Balochi leaders in the NAP and Samad Khan Achakzai aligned with the pro-Soviet faction. and within a month he—along with other activists. and this was accompanied by stepped-up activity in the border region. The motorcade that brought Samad Khan into the city ˘ew banners with “anti-government and anti-Punjabi slogans. Samad Khan’s trial became a spectacle when a Pushtun student entered the proceeding and shot dead a Balochi member of the jirga hearing the case. The commissioner was more reticent regarding the government of Pakistan’s activities in the border region. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan deteriorated in the early 1960s as Pushtuni activities in Balochistan increased. However. his opponents included not only opposition politicians but also students. Nawab Akbar Bugti.

pledged to dissolve One Unit and hold elections. Pakistan continued to close the border to nomads throughout the 1960s.”65 Kabul radio ceased broadcasting Pushtunistan propaganda during the 1965 war between Pakistan and Afghanistan. which both groups claimed as their historical territory.61 Though it imposed the ban in conjunction with the diplomatic break. nearly 8.63 Although diplomatic relations with Afghanistan were restored in 1963. and Sibi. and they were forced to sell the goods (mostly dried fruit) they had purchased for resale in Pakistan in order to buy ˘our. Local Afghan o¯cials advised tribal groups in the border area to avoid “unpleasantries. Toward the end of 1961. and 3) merging the two into a single province. threatened to resign if the party supported Samad Khan’s . the government of Afghanistan concentrated on its eˆorts to establish a constitutional monarchy. 2) reconstituting former British Balochistan and Kalat as separate provinces. Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. Louis Dupree says that Pakistan signaled its intention to close the border in advance. The public debate produced three positions on how the dissolution should take place: l) separating the Pushtun areas of former British Balochistan from Balochistan and merging them with North-West Frontier Province to create a Pushtun province. In 1964.123 animals. large numbers were arrested and sent back to Afghanistan. then president of the Balochistan NAP. an odd coalition led by the nawab of Balochistan’s largest Pushtun tribe. The economic strategy of many powindahs is to combine pastoralism with trade. following the resignation of the pro-Pushtunistan Prime Minister Daud Khan. Each winter.62 Eˆorts to evade the ban during its ˜rst year resulted in the arrest and return of 6.”64 Relations between the two states improved with the eclipse of Daud Khan. and the founder of the Balochistan Muslim League. advocated the second. and burden the economy. Samad Khan Achakzai vigorously promoted the ˜rst option.000 families were blocked at the border. but the nomads believed they would be able to migrate as usual.518 powindahs as well as the seizure and auction of 5. The issue led to another split in the NAP. Though still maintaining support for Pushtunistan. the Bolan Pass. And while the Quetta commissioner reported that jirgas in Balochistan continued to support the ban.58ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler Jirgas were also held when Pakistan took the dramatic step of sealing the border to Afghan powindahs. the government of Pakistan justi˜ed the move on the grounds that the powindahs harm pasture lands. FROM ELECTIONS TO GUERRILLA WAR IN THE 1970S The 1960s closed with a series of victories for Pakistan’s ethno-nationalists: Ayub Khan resigned and his successor. The decision to end One Unit revealed the underlying political divisions in Balochistan. Qazi Isa. Yahya Khan. the Quetta commissioner reported that the government of Afghanistan had changed the tactics in its “Pushtunistan stunt” and was trying to achieve its ends by peaceful means. and Balochi nationalists along with a coalition of Balochi and Pushtun notables led by the sardar of the Raisani tribe wanted the third. and there were reports of some deaths due to starvation. the Jogezais. Dupree argues that it “gave ‘Pushtunistan’ a regional and international respectability it never before had enjoyed. Balochi objections to Pushtun districts joining the North-West Frontier Province revolved around the status of such key areas as Quetta. carry disease.

the party stated. taking two seats. In the Pushtun constituencies. NAP candidates also won three of Balochistan’s four national assembly seats. Abdul Hay Baloch. would be good for Balochistan. as is generally the case in Balochistan. an end to martial law. Samad Khan. the Pushtun people needed a party that would unite Pushtun revolutionary democratic forces so they could concentrate on our own independence and rights. Senator Abdur Rahim Mandokhel. politicians in Balochistan continued to jockey for position. Among the successful NAP candidates in Balochistan’s assembly were the nationalist sardars Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal.Knights. which. as did Wali Khan. the NAP took eight seats. two months before campaigning for Pakistan’s ˜rst open elections began. Not Pawnsı 59 position on the issue. they were the vanguard against the British and the Punjabis. The 1970 elections were a major disappointment to Samad Khan and the Pushtunkwa NAP. In the crisis created by the demands of the Awami League after its sweeping victory in East Pakistan. the NAP passed resolutions calling for the immediate transfer of power to those parties in the majority. creating the boundaries of Balochistan as they now stand. the Pushtunkwa National Awami Party. and several independents tried to set up an anti-NAP coalition. and the long-time nationalists Ghaws Bakhsh Bizenjo and Gul Khan Nasir. Though there were some Pushtun street protests. and the NAP announced that it was willing to work with the Awami League on the basis of its six-point program. and non-locals were generally pleased. Samad Khan formed his own working group of the NAP. The Quetta commissioner reported that Samad Khan and his supporters were angry with the decision. To pursue their independence. and. The chairman of the Baloch Students Organization. who remained the party’s head. The JUI. When its representatives returned to Balochistan. independents had the most seats. Several Pushtun members of the NAP’s Balochistan branch publicly dissociated themselves from Samad Khan. Dr. described the logic behind the step to form a new party this way: The supporters of Pushtunkwa reached the conclusion that other parties always maintained their individual interests. The split was not clearly on ethnic lines. Balochistan’s new boundaries were announced on 28 March 1970. He was the only one of the party’s candidates to win a seat in the twenty-member provincial assembly. this energy was soon channeled into the elections.67 In the province as a whole. which eventually broke away from the main party. In alliances with Congress and NAP. The aim was only to be allies of others. the Pushtun nation was the loser. The government chose the third option. However. was a bigger winner. while Balochi leaders were triumphant. not to merge with them. the Jamiçat Ulama-i-Islam (JUI). and the appointment of a commissioner to examine incidents in East Pakistan along with demands to improve educational facilities in Balochistan and remove the military from the Marri–Bugti areas. Before this happened.68 Though the parties’ activities were o¯cially suspended. with Samad Khan forming his own party.66 An o¯cer in the party. Our own land was left divided. was also elected to the provincial assembly on an NAP ticket. Yahya Khan’s government suspended all political activity. and the party won a plurality of seats in the North-West Frontier Province’s provincial assembly. The BSO held public demonstrations calling for the release of Shaykh Mujib. the restoration of democracy. a religious party. NAP representatives met the Awami League leader Shaykh Mujib in Dacca. and the country slipped into civil war. .

for example. who was elected to the assembly as an independent but later joined the Pakistan People’s Party. to the o¯ce of governor. There was also an anti-NAP police strike in Quetta and serious law-and-order problems in other parts of the province. The white paper also claimed the chief minister had organized and armed tribal forces to attack rival tribes in Jhalawan and Las Bela.72 NAP supporters and a number of scholars have argued that Bhutto destabilized the NAP government because it limited his personal authority and because of international pressure. they had held o¯ce for only ten months. particularly from Iran. After decades in opposition.73 NAP sympathizers claim. Bhutto removed the NAP governments in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province. He appointed the nawab of the Raisani tribe. a NAP-led provincial government came to power. The central government presented its case for dismissal in a 1974 white paper. followed by a sustained campaign of rallies. The NAP and Islamabad agreed on a new constitution which established a degree of provincial autonomy within a federal system. The NAP formed an alliance with the JUI. Sardars and other tribal notables opposed the abolition of the sardarÿ system. and less than a year later. The government eventually banned both the NAP and the Pushtunkwa NAP. and press conferences calling for an end to martial law. Bhutto relented and appointed NAP–JUI coalition governments in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province.71 Underlying these speci˜c charges were the more general allegations that the NAP connived with foreign governments to support Balochi and Pushtun separatist movements and intended to replace Punjabi civil servants with locals. Initially. even though it held the largest bloc in the provincial assembly. though there is little to indicate what precisely this meant in practice. The chief minister therefore mobilized . Even the NAP’s JUI partners complained at times that they were not being consulted on the day-to-day running of the government.70 Amid increasing disorder. They also claim that tribal leaders aligned with the PPP instigated disturbances in Jhalawan and Las Bela. and obstructing the work of the Coast Guard so its supporters could smuggle food and arms. Bhutto attempted to avoid allowing the NAP to form a government. NAP politicians were faced with the challenges of governing. street processions. which held pivotal blocks of seats in both Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province. It charged the NAP–JUI government with organizing its own police force.60ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler and the expansion of education in Balochistan. however. that it was necessary for the government to give its supporters policing powers because most members of the police force of Balochistan came from Punjab and they were recalled by the PPP governor of the province. allowing or encouraging the lawless behavior of the BSO and Marri tribesmen. Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo became Balochistan’s governor and Sardar Ataullah Mengal its chief minister.69 The NAP government had no shortage of opponents. Bhutto’s appointment led to a remarkable period in Balochistan’s history. This move met with violent demonstrations. The Pushtunkwa NAP complained that Pushtuns received “stepmotherly treatment” from the Balochiled government and demanded that Pushtu be the medium of instruction in Pushtun areas. They changed the o¯cial provincial language from English to Urdu and formally abolished the sardarÿ system. and that the army refused to suppress them. its abrupt dismissal precipitated an armed uprising against the government. In April 1972. though the ban was lifted after Zul˜kar Bhutto became president of Pakistan in 1971.

000 Balochi “tribesmen” were in arms and they were opposed by six Pakistani army divisions. a nephew of Gul Khan Nasir. If ˜ve leaders can’t stay together. the period in which the ˜ghting was most intense. The nawab had helped Bhutto make the case against the NAP government by breaking with his former allies in the NAP and saying in a speech that he himself had conspired with them to obtain foreign arms to be used in creating an independent Balochistan. how can a nation? I don’t blame the Pakistan intelligence services for what happened. In the words of Shaista Khan Mengal. In the Marri area the ˜ghters were virtually all Marri. Sasoli.75 For many nationalists. Muhammad Hasni.Knights. forcing them to move with piquets. a leader in the insurgency that followed the NAP’s dismissal.79 These ˜gures are dramatically higher than the NAP’s own claim of 3. 11. with 150 active at any one time. 55. Bugti’s collaboration with the central government and chronic factionalism among NAP leaders exemplify the destructive divisiveness of the tribal system.76 In an interview. The rebellion is best characterized as a war of attrition with sporadic encounters rather than the “heavy ˜ghting” of which Ispahani speaks. The Times report cited earlier said that the city was under virtual martial law.000 Balochis were involved in the ˜ghting. Sasoli. the Quetta commissioner regularly reported bomb blasts in Quetta. another was led by a former chairman of the BSO. there were two groups among the guerrillas: those with tribal ties to the imprisoned leaders (particularly Khair Bakhsh Marri and Ataullah Mengal). Not Pawnsı 61 his Mengal tribesmen to do so. Shaista Khan said those with him included men from the Mengal. One of the guerrilla bands operating in Sarawan was led by Shaista Khan Mengal. These probably account for most of the 178 major engagements registered by the Pakistani army between 1973 and 1975. The fault is with our tribal customs and politics. Awan. Bugti’s claim was denied by Bizenjo and Mengal.81 After a major army operation against them in 1974. Among them were men from the Mengal. Rind. Badini. Zehri. The Times reported that 20. seems largely to concur with this claim. and those with an ideological commitment to the nationalist cause. and in Jhalawan they were mostly Mengal. Throughout these years. Khair Jan said that he had a band of 300 ˜ghters.000 guerrillas and that of Shaista Khan Mengal. Nawab Akbar Bugti replaced Bizenjo as governor. the guerrillas increasingly operated from camps in . As with the Baloch ethno-nationalist movement in general. who puts the ˜gure at around 5.80 The insurgents’ main tactic was ambushing army convoys.”78 In 1976.74 After dismissing the NAP. Bizenjo.77 Assessments of the number of guerrillas and the nature of the ˜ghting vary.000. and Pirkani tribes. the central government found other Balochi tribal leaders to head the provincial government. and another was led by a son of Prince Abdul Karim. a former government o¯cial in Balochistan. and Summalani tribes. They could not make an eˆective organization. Harrison estimates that at the peak of the ˜ghting.500 of them in “organized hard-core units. Khair Jan Baloch. Imagine if the ˜ve Baloch leaders of the NAP had stayed together instead of each having his own political agenda. while in other areas they were mixed. The dismissal of the NAP-led government and arrest of party leaders set oˆ Balochistan’s four-year armed insurgency. where there was also a lot of student political activity in support of the guerrillas.

cloth merchants. which included the harassment and resettlement of civilians. book vendors. for example.84 The BSO. president. and Afghanistan as a Greater Balochistan. who in 1975 made an abortive attempt at provoking an armed uprising in Afghanistan. money. palm readers. Most of the rebels had relatively narrow aims—the release of NAP leaders. and weapons. Following a coup in July 1973.90 In retaliation for Kabul’s support for the guerrillas. Harrison describes the BPLF as independent Marxist–Leninists having ties neither with Moscow nor Beijing but with Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri. To combat the rebels. and police in order to carry out acts of sabotage. he was named founder. made possible by a roadbuilding program. those who crossed the border were given refugee status rather than political asylum. and the government of Afghanistan appealed to the United Nations for aid to support them.86 The rebels also received support from the government of Afghanistan. allowed guerrillas to set up base camps. The guerrillas do not appear to have sought a dramatic restructuring of Balochi society. He was reported to be acting as an intermediary when the Afghan government attempted to prod Balochis in the border region to step up their activities in Pakistan.88 Afghan support was forthcoming in part because the resolute supporter of Pushtunistan.87 Reminiscent of Kipling’s version of the Great Game. were su¯cient to limit their activity but could not eliminate them.85 One journalist reported that the guerrillas avoided attacking these militias. including a guerrilla attack that wiped out an entire Pakistani army unit of 300 men in 1976. the government of Pakistan claimed that thousands of Afghan nomads who had resumed migrating to Pakistan in winter were refusing to return to Afghanistan because of the “terror and repression” that awaited them there. in its public-relations war with Daud.83 The army also used standard counterinsurgency techniques. Again.62ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler Afghanistan. and he funneled resources to the rebels. More radical elements in the Balochistan Peoples Liberation Front (BPLF) called for uniting all Balochis in Iran. The North-West Frontier Province politician Ajmal Khattak was designated the NAP “ambassador” to Afghanistan. and greater autonomy for Balochistan Province. Pakistan supported and trained Islamic radicals. which had a presence in all Balochi schools. some sardars opposed political education. Educating the populace was not an important part of their strategy. In another ironic reversal. supplied the guerrillas with money and materiel. however. and. Maulvi Ghulam Haidar ˜gures in events.89 Daud’s support for the Balochi guerrillas was quali˜ed.82 Army drives against the poorly armed rebels. the government took a page from the colonial administration’s handbook by organizing special levies on a tribal basis and holding local leaders responsible for rebel activity in their area. and the insurgency enjoyed at least tacit support from much of the population. had resumed control of the government. according to Shaista Khan. and prime minister of the newly declared Republic of Afghanistan.91 In an ironic reversal of the situation a decade earlier. Sardar Daud Khan. Though they received ˜nancial support. one report in the commissioner’s archives describes twenty-˜ve Balochi “agents” who received training in Afghanistan and were to impersonate bangle sellers. and provided some supplies. which established training camps. restoration of their government. Major incidents continued to occur. Pakistan. but they were a minority. in December 1975 the federal government suspended the pro- SHORT .

and Mengal and Marri going into exile. After their release. The Quetta commissioner reported that he channeled arms and explosives from the Afghan government to saboteurs in Pakistan. where he and some armed supporters kept the separatist movement alive until 1992. the Pushtunkwa NAP. internally diˆerentiated by unstable alliances based on personal rule rather than boundaries set and defended by a state.96 Mengal went to London. with Bizenjo retaining control of the PNP. and he asked for a platoon of government soldiers to protect his camp. Samad Khan Achakzai was killed in 1973 by unknown assassins. when he returned to Pakistan.94 Active in student politics. He complained that Pakistani authorities had arrested many of his men and were making it di¯cult for him to cross the border.92 Though the insurgency was mainly a Balochi undertaking. Pakistani intelligence reported that Bismillah Kakar had been summoned to Kabul because his followers were not active enough in Pakistan. The insurgency ended when General Zia’s martial-law regime freed the leadership of the then-defunct NAP at the end of 1977. CONCLUSION The history of ethno-nationalism in post-colonial Balochistan.95 In 1976. It remained estranged from the NAP and was not involved in the guerrilla movement in the 1970s. the khan of Kalat. skeletal and dominated by military concerns . where he eventually joined with other Pakistani ethno-nationalists to form the Sindhi–Pushtun– Baloch Front. Transportation and communications networks. Although Balochistan’s integration into Pakistan was minimal in the early years of independence. There were. Later he was said to be in charge of a government-sponsored camp where Pushtun and Marri tribesmen received guerrilla training. however. To some extent. and bombings and other forms of sabotage unsettled Balochistan’s Pushtun belt. But they are distinctively in˘ected by Balochistan’s long history as a tribal borderland. Bismillah Kakar went to Afghanistan when the NAP leaders were arrested. Mahmud Khan. active Pushtun nationalists a¯liated with the NAP. took over the leadership of his party. with Wali Khan forming the Awami National Party and the Balochis forming a new version of the Pakistan National Party (PNP).93 His son. is not unlike the politics in other Pakistani provinces during this period. who was described in a 1971 government report on “subversive elements” as a Pushtun with suspected contacts with the Afghan consul. In a now all-too-familiar pattern. the PNP in turn split into factions. these provincial dynamics re˘ect problems and instabilities at the central government level. A key individual in this regard was Bismillah Kakar. the most militant of the Balochi nationalist leaders. with its proliferating factionalism and tensions between ethnic particularism and coalition politics. it accelerated steadily during the decades of this study. The British instituted their own version of tribal governance during the colonial period and supported it against the ˘edgling ethno-nationalist movements of the 1930s. which advocated turning Pakistan into a confederation of states. these leaders split along ethnic lines.Knights. Not Pawnsı 63 vincial assembly and placed Balochistan under the rule of the governor. supporters of Pushtunistan were also active. went to Kabul. Marri.

Substantial investment in state-sponsored education began to redress an extraordinarily high illiteracy rate. long accustomed to playing trans-border politics. The most important “Other” in this regard was always India. Pushtun and Balochi nationalists and gave their movements strategic depth. were upgraded and expanded. These changes aˆected the lives of all Balochis to some degree. . secularism. They increasingly took on a re˘exive. But Balochis and Pushtuns are often in competition with one another in the provincial political economy. The fact that some coercion was required to draw the western areas into Pakistan left an opening for irredentist claims to enter the political discourse. but Pakistan also had to diˆerentiate itself from Afghanistan. This is well illustrated by the fact that the leading spokesmen for the Balochi nationalist movement were sardars.98 Opposition to the policies of Pakistan also entailed rhetorical opposition to sardars. de˜ning themselves in relationship to other peoples as they competed for the opportunities and resources made available by the state. several of them sons of the men discussed in this paper. New bureaucratic and political institutions were established. delineated and de˜ned itself relative to its neighbors as it sought to create a cohesive state structure and national identity. The unstable coalitions detailed earlier should be seen in the context of the declining importance of tribal politics in combination with an ambivalent acceptance of integration into Pakistan. such diˆerentiation did not come easily. too. The elections of the 1980s and 1990s brought a new generation of Balochis and Pushtuns to political o¯ce. Yet very few ethno-nationalist leaders openly advocated the most extreme scenarios—creation of an independent Pushtunistan or Greater Balochistan. its full ˘owering took place as a result of this uneven post-colonial modernization. The economy was monetized. perhaps even emboldened. This ambivalence extended to their own tribal leaders. especially with provincial reorganization after the civil war of 1971. For the people of the western border region. although Balochistan continued to be. How they respond to the forces that marginalize Balochistanis in the Pakistani state and the forces that fuel exclusionary appeals to ethnic identities in provincial politics will shape the future of Balochistan. ethno-nationalist movements in Pakistan’s ˜rst decades should be seen rather as calls for eˆective local government.97 Their vision also entailed ambivalence toward Pakistan because it provided the infrastructural means by which they developed ethno-nationalist consciousness but left them marginalized compared with other ethnic groups. the least-developed province in Pakistan.99 This has been exacerbated by the large number of refugees who settled in Balochistan as a consequence of the civil war in Afghanistan. As young. and a greater share of the resources of the state. and they continue to do so today. objecti˜ed view of their ethnic identity. Afghanistan’s support buttressed. Pakistan. of course. and still is. though often practical cooperation with them. educated Balochis and Pushtuns sought places in the national political economy. their vision transcended the limits of kinship and locality. Though the seeds of ethno-nationalism were sown in Balochistan in the colonial era. and market production increased. who were seen as both collaborators with external authority and embodiments of traditional cultural values. and this creates an undercurrent of ethnic tension.64ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler under the British. Those demands have united Balochi and Pushtun ethno-nationalists in the past. While these may have been the personal ideals or distant goals of some Balochis and Pushtuns.

Wenner-Gren funded Nina Swidler’s research in the archives of the Quetta district commissioner’s o¯ce. M. Jhalawan. These are. Muhammada Hussain Unka was an activist poet. 1– 2 (1966): 99–114. In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.. 1978). See Redaelli. The coastal areas of Las Bela and Makran as well as the western area of Kharan had been largely independent prior to the expansion of Kalat in the mid–18th century and became so again with the weakening of Kalat’s power during the unrest of the mid–19th century: see Baluchistan (Pakistan). Ayesha Jalal. During a 1995 visit to the home of the veteran nationalist Malik Faiz Muhammad Yusafzai in Pringabad. Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press. and S. beyond the scope of this paper. however.J. and Commissioner Quetta Division. Syed Iqbal Ahmad. Gul Khan Nasir. M. “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 211–14. 426–27. N. 117.” Paci˜c Aˆairs 39. 122–32. The Father’s Bow: The Khanate of Kalat and British India (Florence: Manent. Aziz Luni and Habib Ahmed Khan provided invaluable support and guidance in Quetta. “Poetry and Politics: Nationalism and Language Standardization in the Balochi Literary Movement. Seyyed V. Afghanistan (Princeton. 1992). Khalid Bin Sayeed. 172. ˜le 309–5/46. 1980). Baluchistan District Gazetteer. such as those created by Pakistan’s dispute with India over Kashmir. Contemporary History of Balochistan (Quetta: Third World Publications. 1994). . 26 (originally published in 1906). 1994). 1963). 1986). 26. N. 1996). Wayne Wilcox. and Baluchistan (Pakistan). 120. 1990). Not Pawnsı 65 NOTES Authors’ note: An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Institute of Pakistan Studies conference “Pakistan: Fifty Years as a State. and Ahmar Mustikhan provided some key references.C. Kharan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab. Ù7Malik Muhammad Saeed Dehwar. 486. Ù6Inayataullah Baloch. Ethnicity. 105–37. The Kalat State National Party was founded in 1937. Titus saw copies of letters from the khan of Kalat to Malik Faiz Muhammad.” Wake Forest University. Erwin Orywal made useful comments on an earlier draft.Knights. The Father’s Bow. Nationalism and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province (Durham. ˜le 1–S/48. 15Agent to the Governor-General’s Fortnightly Reports. and the Fulbright Foundation funded that of Paul Titus. 310. Nasr. for example. Paul Titus (Karachi: Oxford University Press. Balochistan: Its Strategic Importance (Karachi: Royal Book Company. 10Riccardo Redaelli. 11Ibid. Ù4Louis Dupree. Makran (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab. 3Khurshid Hasan. Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger. 1997. 1988). Ù1Stephen Rittenberg. as well as Cold War politics involving the Soviet Union and the West. Abdul Karim Khwajakhel (usually known as Abdul Karim Shorish). ed. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaçat Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press.” Asian Survey 11. 14Like Gul Khan Nasir. but opposition from tribal leaders led the khan to ban it in 1939. 1998). After the war. idem. The Problem of “Greater Baluchistan”: A Study of Baluch Nationalism (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH. the Political Branch reported that Prince Abdul Karim was instrumental in the khan’s eˆorts to increase Kalat’s store of arms. The Problem of “Greater Baluchistan. 33–35 (originally published in 1906). 1981). Modern South Asia (London: Routledge. 234– 40. no.: Princeton University Press. the party revived and was for a time a¯liated with the Congress-backed All India States Peoples Conference: see Baloch.” in Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Balochistan. For the backgrounds of both men and extracts of their poetry. 143– 46. The Political System of Pakistan (Lahore: Oxford University Press. Ù9Those dynamics are in turn part of broader regional dynamics. 13In 1942. 7 (1962): 15. Ù8Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal. 159. 1967). ˜le 275–S/45. 1986).” 15–57. R. Qureshi. 1987). and others forbidding them to enter Kalat State because of their political activities. Ù2See. 12See Commissioner Quetta Division. and Kachhi. 16Selig Harrison. Baluchistan District Gazetteer.: Carolina Academic Press. 1997). “Pakistan–Afghanistan Relations. Ù5The core of Kalat State consisted of the provinces of Sarawan. see Carina Jahani.

Commissioner Quetta Division. ˜le 1–S/49. We are indebted to Aziz Luni (personal communication. H. was more in˘uential in Afghanistan.: Dawson. V. Several of them were tried by jirga: see Commissioner Quetta Division. 29Ra˜que Afzal. Political Parties in Pakistan 1958–1969 (Islamabad: National Institute of Cultural Research. and that its members were “poorly educated.” The News (2 December 1995). ˜le 10–S/53(3). 24Ra˜que Afzal. LONG . which took an ambiguous position toward One Unit. State of Martial Rule. Gankovsky and L. Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan (Folkestone. and Y.” in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship. a splinter from the Muslim League. ˜le 1–S/58. 292. Rashid (London: Zed Press. Political Parties in Pakistan 1947–1958 (Islamabad: Commission on Historical and Cultural Research. 35Commissioner Quetta Division. 33–36. 1979). 115–17. A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan. and the Khudai Khidmatgar. 101. 34Commissioner Quetta Division. 28There are. senator in the Pakistan assembly and member of the Pushtunkwa Milli Awami Party. With Republican Party support.000 rupees (Wilcox. 30The legend of Nauroz Khan holds that he was arrested when Pakistani military o¯cers broke an oath they swore on the Quråan that he would receive amnesty and safe conduct following cease-˜re negotiations. The biggest carrot was an increase in his annual allowance from 425. 274. ˜le 1–S/58. ed. ˜le 1–S/58. ˜le 351–5/50. and Commissioner Quetta Division. Baluchistan Secretariat (Secret Branch. 1976). the Barkhordar Kahol Hamidzais. Pakistan. 1987). Inside Baluchistan: A Political Biography of His Highness Baiglar Baigi Khan-e-Azam XII (Karachi: Royal Book Company. Politics in Pakistan.” The News (3 December 1995).000 rupees to 650. 1958: see Commissioner Quetta Division. which entailed the virtual elimination of Kalat as a political entity. 182. ˜le 275–S/45. 47.K. The State of Martial Rule. Charles Kennedy. ˜le 1–S/49. 31The Achakzai tribe occupies the strategic lands on both sides of the border around Chaman. successor to the Pushtunkwa National Awami Party founded by Samad Khan. 194. 23The other parties in the PNP were the Wror-i-Pushtun. and Ali Jan. ˜le 267–S/48. 14 June 1999) for details on the life of Abdul Samad Khan. R. 19See Asaf Hussain. 33These are the words of Abdur Rehim Mandokhel. U.d. radically diˆerent versions of the khan’s actions prior to the coup. the Sind Hari Committee. that it had created “bad feelings” among the khan and the sardars. 261. Wilcox (Pakistan. for example. 27Commissioner Quetta Division. con˜dential report 90 ML/29A. and Jalal. 186–87). Gardezi and J. 81. 206–7) appears to agree with the khan. 11. 1987). The government tried the rebels in military court because there was no provision for the death penalty in Kalat law. A History of Pakistan 1947–58 (Lahore: People’s Publishing House. 20Commissioner Quetta Division. 22See Commissioner Quetta Division. the Azad Party. 32See Commissioner Quetta Division. State of Martial Rule. Sayeed. Jalal. A report on the incident cited a number of sardars in Jhalawan and the khan’s wife as accessories to the rebellion for providing weapons or supplies to the rebels. 26Jalal. though his subsection of the tribe. repeats the army’s contention that the khan seceded from Pakistan in response to the army building bases in Balochistan. Akbar Bugti appears to have been initially more closely a¯liated with the Republican Party. Wilcox asserts that the center used a combination of carrots and sticks to induce the khan to agree to the consolidation. ˜le 315–3/46. “Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai: Hero of the Pushtoonkhwa. Gordon-Polonskaya.” of “doubtful character. 200. Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press. “Class and State. ˜le 309–5/46. 18Special Branch of the Baluchistan Secretariat. 25Though he was later to a¯liate with the NAP. and Jalal. Abdul Samad Khan was born in 1907 in the town of Gulistan in British Balochistan. 216–19. while the khan emphatically denies this: see Jalal. n. ˜le 932–S/55. not surprisingly. 1983). Ahmed Yar Khan Baluch. the Sindhi Awami Mahaz. 1975). Yunas Samad.66ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler 17Other charges leveled against the KSNP were that it was an ally of the Indian National Congress.” and thus manipulated by party leaders for their “sel˜sh ends”: Commissioner Quetta Division. “Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai—A Victim of Dissent. he was brie˘y minister of the interior in the central government when Firoz Khan Noon attempted to salvage his government by expanding his cabinet a month prior to the military coup in October. Among those hanged was Nauroz Khan’s son. The State of Martial Rule. 268. 1995). See also Kalimullah Bareach. 1937–1958 (New Delhi: Sage.). 21Hamza Alavi.

while Mengal and Marri were elected to the national assembly. 1970).. 193. 63Dar. 59Ayub’s economic policies alienated another key group. 50Ahmad Nawaz Bugti is the brother of Akbar Khan. 255–83. 57Commissioner Quetta Division. 58Ibid. Afghanistan.: Westview Press. “The Rural Roots of Pakistani Militarism. 31. 49Swidler interviewed Nawab Ghaws Bakhsh Raisani in Mehrgar in January 1965. 302–3. Political Parties in Pakistan 1958–1969. 44Commissioner Quetta Division. D. Some references to the government operations against the guerrillas in the Mengal area are in Commissioner Quetta Division. 38Commissioner Quetta Division. Not Pawnsı 67 36In some Afghan versions. 553. 66Pushtunkwa is Pushtu for Pushtunistan. 539. 51The government replaced the sardar with collateral relatives. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. 41Kaur. 15. ˜le 1–S/1971. Pak–Afghan Relations. 39See.” in The Political Inheritance of Pakistan.” Newsletter of Baluchistan Studies (1990). 86. 40Commissioner Quetta Division. 65Commissioner Quetta Division. it would include only the northerly Pushtun majority districts. ˜le 1–S/65. ˜le 1–S/68. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. ˜le 1–S/64. ˜le 1160–S/68. Marvin Weinbaum. ed. Bugti. Selected Documents. 110. see Paul Titus. 1986). 59–67. Pak–Afghan Relations. This ideological split between the West Pakistan and East Pakistan branches of the NAP had been present since the party’s inception: Samad. villagers in the unirrigated Potawar plateau region who supply the bulk of army recruits: Clive Dewey. Quaid-i-Azam University. “Islam and Identity Politics in Pakistan: The Case of the Jamiçat Ulama-i-Islam. 33. For an analysis of the standing of the sardars of the Marri. 3. ed. 46Lawrence Ziring. 109–11. . Afghanistan.. 54Commissioner Quetta Division. The State of Martial Law.Knights. Afghanistan. 1995). 37Kulwant Kaur. 68Commissioner Quetta Division. 61Dupree. ˜le 1–S/68.: Syracuse University Press. ˜les 1–S/65 and 1–S/68. see Paul Titus. Pushtunistan would include all of Balochistan. 52Harrison. Pak–Afghan Relations (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications. 194. Selected Documents on Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan 1947–1985 (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies. ˜le 1–S/62. 30. The Pushtunkwa NAP was formed in July 1970. Akbar Bugti’s son. 67For a discussion of the JUI. 72–73. 47Jalal. 62Fred Scholz. Dupree. William Sax (forthcoming). 43Special Branch of the Baluchistan Secretariat. for example. Low (London: Macmillian. became the Bugti sardar after his father was imprisoned for murdering the man who was given his sardarÿ. 1971). the statement of Liaqat Ali Khan in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 7 October 1950. in others. 55Afzal. ˜le 1–S/61. 175–76) cites Harrison and the Pakistani journal Outlook for his discussion of the guerrilla movement in the 1960s. N. 60Kaur. 56Tariq Ali. ˜le 819–S/53–66. “Tribal Structures and Religious Tolerance: Hindus in Pakistani Baluchistan. 193–222. 53Harrison. The maulvi is sometimes referred to as Maulvi Ghulam Haidar Tajik. 1991). ˜le 22/51 PhS. A Nation in Turmoil. 42Commissioner Quetta Division. the Bugti nawab who was not permitted to run for o¯ce because he had been convicted of murdering his uncle. Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder. 553. Ahmad (Balochistan. 1985). Ahmad Nawaz was elected to the provincial (West Pakistan) assembly. Colo.Y. “Political Alignment of Baluchi Sardars in Relation to the Government of Pakistan. ˜le 1065/S–64. Afghanistan. printed in Saeeduddin Ahmad Dar.” in Marginality and Modernity. Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power (London: Jonathan Cape. 143– 44. 48Commissioner Quetta Division. 45– 46. ˜le 932–S/55.” in Beyond Con˘ict: Re-Visioning Politics and Religion in South Asia. Dupree. 538. and Mengal tribes in the tribal and national spheres. 64Dupree. Saleem. 45Ibid. A. The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan 1958–1969 (Syracuse.

contending that the NAP. 34–35. White Paper on Baluchistan (Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan. Politics in Pakistan. sought Soviet support to establish a “land corridor of weak states aˆording access to the Arabian Sea”: L. a major battle at Chamalang in which the army attacked a large Marri nomadic encampment. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. 77Titus and Swidler interviewed Khair Jan in Quetta. 1986). December 1995. ˜le 110–S/65. 85Commissioner Quetta Division. 1975). 1985). then fought a three-day battle with guerrilla forces attempting to protect it (Harrison. the ˜rst paragraph of Pakistan (1974:44) with the ˜rst paragraph of Williams (1975:72). 63. 1980). or the ˜rst paragraph of Pakistan (1974:13) with the last paragraph of Williams (1975:85). 213. 38). Rushbrook Williams. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. 70Commissioner . 84Harrison estimates that there were 7. 79Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (22 April 1977). Nightmare in Baluchistan. for example. 27585. 1987). 88Ibid. “After the Afghan Coup. November and December 1995. 78Selig Harrison. speculation thrives. Quetta Division. 28301. three years after the guerrilla war ended: Harrison. Martin’s Press. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 13–14. 37–38. N. source report 18/3/75. 72Ibid. 80Salamat Ali. along with the Afghan government. F..” Far Eastern Economic Review (11 October 1974). This followed intensi˜ed army operations against them beginning in June 1974. often quoting it directly without acknowledgment. 74–75. B. and no ambushes were reported in the Marri area in 1975 or in 1976.Y. 75Janmahmad. 11. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. 90Harrison. 1990). Robert Wirsing. and it should be noted that his critical stance toward the PPP could have been in˘uenced by the fact that his book appeared when Zia’s martial law was still in force and Bhutto was o¯cially held to be the cause of many of Pakistan’s di¯culties. Baluchistan: Historical and Political Process (London: New Century. The Quetta commissioner does not report the incident. Baluchistan. vol. 28301. Essays on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab. 81Mahnaz Ispahani. II. 87Commissioner Quetta Division. Marris were reported to be making an exodus for Afghanistan. 96. Compare. Awan. Sayeed. Rushbrook Williams repeats many of the charges made in the government’s white paper. 213. 91Oliver Roy. and ru71Pakistan. 83Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (22 April 1977). ˜le 110–S/75. 86Salamat Ali. no one claimed responsibility for the grenade blast that killed Samad Khan in his Quetta residence. The Military and Politics. but in June 1975. 115–17. Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of Asia (Ithaca.” Foreign Policy 32 (1978): 136–60. “Baluchistan: Bhutto’s Waiting Game. and Titus interviewed Shaista Khan in Kalat. ˜le 1–S/1972/77. 41– 43. ˜le 1109–S/76. 20–21. a branch of the Mengals who live in Sarawan. Harrison. In Afghanistan’s Shadow. 267. “Bhutto’s deadline for Balochistan.” Far Eastern Economic Review (13 May 1974).68ıPaul Titus and Nina Swidler 69Hasan Askari Rizvi. outside the main Mengal region in Jhalawan. 757. Rizvi. 76Gul Khan Nasir and Shaista Khan are Zagar Mengals. 81. These included.1989). 93As with the assassinations of Liaqat Ali Khan and Zia ul-Haq.. In this vacuum. 73See Shahid Burki. The Baluchis and Pushtun (London: Minority Rights Group. 272–75. 27851. 82The Quetta commissioner reported numerous ambushes in the Marri area in mid–1974. Williams expands upon the theme of separatism. A. 75. It is unclear what Awan’s own role was during this period. Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971–1977 (New York: St. Afghanistan. Pakistan Under Challenge (London: Stacey International. 1974). 89Dupree suggests that one of Daud’s primary incentives for staging his coup was the potential to promote Pushtunistan given Pakistan’s instability after the loss of Bangladesh and Bhutto’s inability to stabilize the situation in the border region: Dupree. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. 61. 268. 274. 23 July 1976. The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers. by Harrison’s account. 92Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (20 February 1976). 1989). 74Awan. 301–2.: Cornell University Press.500 members of the BPLF in 1980.

Muslim Politics (Princeton. 94Commissioner Quetta Division. Social Organization. ˜le 1–S/75. Buses and Diˆerential Ethnic Relations in Pakistani Balochistan. who was governor at the time of the assassination.J. 3 (1998): 3. . 95Ibid. N. Buy the Pushtun: Stereotypes.Knights.: Princeton University Press.. 99Paul Titus. “Honor the Baloch. Essays on Baloch National Struggle.657–88. Islam. who identify an “objecti˜cation” of Muslim consciousness. They argue that as a result of state education and mass communication. 273–97. and idem. 1996).” Modern Asian Studies 32. 293–94. Not Pawnsı 69 mored culprits include Zul˜kar Bhutto and the PPP government.” in Marginality and Modernity. they now see themselves.” in Marginality and Modernity. 37– 45. and History in Western Pakistan. “Beyond Parody: Ethnography Engages Nationalist Discourse. 96Janmahmad. most people in the Middle East no longer practice a local variant of a religion they learn from ulema trained in traditional manners. ˜le 110–S/65. and other religions from a perspective that allows greater re˘exivity and objectivity: Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori. Akbar Bugti. and members of the Marri tribe acting in retaliation for the murder of Ghulam Nabi Marri. 168–90. 98Nina Swidler. Rather. “Routes to Ethnicity: Roads. 97The notion of an objecti˜ed ethnic identity is derived from Eickelman and Piscatori.